Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid a visit to Cuba two weeks ago; he was feted by Cuban president Diaz-Canel, by Lavrov's foreign-minister counterpart, Eduardo Rodriguez, and of course, by Raul Castro, still the behind-the-scenes Cuban "decider."
- The Lavrov visit was hardly a surprise. Vladimir Putin's habit of moving into strategic areas where U.S. policy affords strategic opportunity has driven the renewed Russian interest in our Caribbean neighbor.
- And on the Cuban side, hard-liners are now firmly in charge; tightened U.S. sanctions on both Cuba and their weakened hemispheric patron, Venezuela, have driven Havana's outreach - to both Moscow and Beijing.
Of course, renewed media interest in the Cuba-Russia engagement led to press speculation on behind-the-scenes agreements. A visit at the Lavrov-level, with the entire Cuban leadership, including Raul, would naturally have led to deals and understandings.
- What the visit was NOT, by the way, was a return to the Cold War "13 Days" of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis - despite recent speculation towards this end in Newsweek magazine.
But what DID the Lavrov visit actually accomplish?
- First, of course, Cuba needs Russian help - of any kind, but most importantly, with resources (agriculture equipment, trucks, and light vehicles). As the Russian economy stabilizes, Moscow is in a better position to help clients; and Russia evidently came through, judging by reports in both Moscow and Havana dailies.
- Further, as Lavrov himself loosely described it, Russia agreed to provide "military-technical assistance." This likely refers, in part, to Russian assistance with internal security - a growing worry of Cuban leaders over population control, now that Cubans have (limited) internet access, and while their economy tanks ever more deeply.
- In exchange, Havana has apparently offered to help re-open the Lourdes intelligence site, 90 miles from Key West. Lourdes is now a school campus, but in the early 60's it was one of the largest intelligence collection sites outside the Soviet Union.
- But what both Lavrov and his boss in Moscow also intended by the visit was to demonstrate, at minimum cost, Russia's renewed global relevance. That they can do this in our backyard, a clear source of irritation to our own defense and foreign policy establishments, is an added bonus.
There's one more aspect to the visit that's worth highlighting: the increasing Russia-PRC cooperative embrace on a growing list of irritants to Washington - like patrols in the East China Sea and near South Korea. Joint involvement in Cuba and Venezuela are just additional manifestations.
Bottom Line: the Russian visits represent a tactical opening for Russia, not a shift in the strategic tectonic plates.
- The Cuban and Venezuelan economies are disasters, and no amount of Russian or Chinese aid will resurrect them. At the same time, neither will collapse. Cuba will remain a Soviet-era museum piece of economic failure for generations.
- Venezuela, however, is at its own turning point; both Moscow and Beijing have strategic incentives to deepen their engagement and marginalize U.S. influence.
- However, if the White House doesn't lose interest and continues to work with regional and global allies to push Maduro out, there is still hope - for a country with the world's largest proven petroleum reserves, with the potential again to be a hemispheric leader, and for U.S. interests in a vital part of the globe that we have for too long ignored.
