Shortly before Christmas, our State Department signaled that the U.S. would begin been providing "enhanced defensive capabilities" – meaning, especially, U.S.-made Javelin anti-tank weapons – to Ukraine. This was a major move in a three-year conflict, one precipitated in 2014 by Vladimir Putin when he sent Russian forces into the eastern Ukrainian districts of Luhansk and Donetsk to support "separatist forces;" Putin's goal was then, and remains, the destabilization of the new, western-leaning political regime in Kiev.
- The purpose of the U.S. weapons initiative? Bolster Ukraine's military capabilities against Russian armored vehicles in the eastern Ukrainian districts, and by imposing greater costs on Russia's ventures, to move the long-stalled "Minsk II peace process" off dead-center.
- The U.S. announcement elicited the predictable outcry from Moscow's foreign ministry.
Why the decision now, after years of Obama reluctance to take this critical "lethal weapons" step on behalf of Ukraine? In part, the decision was prompted by strong Congressional pressure to move beyond the Obama-imposed weapons delivery constraints; but it was also in response to a bloody escalation in the fighting in the days immediately prior to the announcement. 2017 was the most violent year of any since the Russians moved their forces into eastern Ukraine; and the week of December 18th was the bloodiest week so far in a bloody year!
- Further, Russia appears to have returned to a policy of total denial of any responsibility for the fighting; and Moscow recently pulled its officers out of the "Joint Centre for Control and Coordination," a cease-fire monitoring group meant to help de-escalate the fighting. In the face of all this, Secretary Rex Tillerson and our State Department (obviously with the support of the White House) finally said: "enough!"
What does this mean for the future of this protracted conflict? The U.S. move will almost certainly not result in progress in the "Minsk II" talks. Mr Putin faces re-election in March; and while the Russian presidential election outcome is preordained, there is no incentive for Vladimir to make any moves to de-escalate Ukraine tensions over the next 60 days.
Beyond that? In many ways, Putin has accomplished at least a short-term goal: given his three-year disruption campaign in Ukraine, European leaders are in no mood to consider Kiev for membership in either the EU or NATO. And even though Russian casualties are mounting, Putin will be able to withstand any blowback from aggrieved families.
For the longer term, however, Putin has created deep anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine itself - minus Crimea, of course. Further, as long as Russia baldly flouts the Minsk peace process, EU sanctions on Russia will remain, at least through 2018. And even though President Trump still treats Putin and the Russian political leadership deferentially, the Trump security team (McMaster, Mattis, Nikki Haley) is marching to a different drummer - as the Ukraine weapons decision starkly illustrates.
- But Russian "influence operations" will continue unabated; Putin thrives on creating turmoil, particularly in western democracies, and he has found the returns on these campaigns to be well worth the modest cost.
- In this light, watch Italy's national elections, just announced for March. They will be yet another European test of continental political will to push back against anti-EU, anti-free market populism, a movement far from dead in Europe and one that Putin is only too eager to exploit.
