North Korea will acquire intercontinental ballistic missile nuclear weapons capability – arguably, already has. The recent missile test that transited northern Japan only reinforced the inescapable conclusion that Kim Jong Un is bent on accelerating his nuclear weapons plans; he knows that, in reality, there is very little the U.S., our regional allies, or even China, can do to make him back away from a course he views as existential for his regime. 

The real issue now is how the U.S. and our treaty allies will be safeguarded.  Bottom Line:  we're safeguarded against the NK threat through the credibility of our deterrent, nuclear or conventional – i.e., the certainty of overwhelming destruction of North Korea should they attack us or our allies.

  • This has to be believed by an adversary.  But consider: of the thousands of tweets and public statements issued by President Trump since inauguration, his by-now iconic "fire and fury" declaration has to be the most damaging. Besides diminishing U.S. credibility (i.e., an empty U.S. response to a post-"fire and fury" North Korean threat), it also undermined what was probably the most significant diplomatic advance in Trump's presidency: securing the 15-0 vote in the Security Council against North Korea.

The concept of credible deterrence is applicable in many more circumstances than against North Korea. Our Cold War experience with the Soviet Union was illustrative.  Deterrence then not only reduced the risks of nuclear Armageddon, but it also allowed us to protect our interests short of war in less apocalyptic but still vital scenarios –like Berlin.

  • It was impossible fifty years ago, absent the credible U.S. commitment made by Truman, Ike, and JFK, to defend West Berlin militarily (“a small western island surrounded by East Germany,” in the words of Johns Hopkins professor Michael Mandelbaum), U.S. deterrence fortunately sufficed. It is equally impossible today to protect the Baltic states – unless Moscow believes the words of U.S. presidents and a Russian attack is prevented.
  • Beyond Europe and Northeast Asia, other global flash points demand a credible U.S. commitment or diplomatic involvement to contain the dangers:
  • In the Middle East, where Iran‘s mischief-making with America’s Sunni Arab friends continues to unsettle the region.
  • And in South Asia, where Indian-Pakistan nuclear brinkmanship led the region perilously close to war in the early days of Bush43’s presidency.

In the end, in the world of deterrence – theory and practice – words matter. Unguided, impulsive blurts by the Commander-in-Chief may play to a domestic political base; but to a global audience, especially our adversaries, the dangers accumulate as our most precious asset, our credibility, withers.