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EAT: Becoming A Victim Of Its Own Success

Key Takeaway

Brinker is a great company, but we fear it is becoming a victim of its own success.  As it stands, the 16% earnings growth on 4.4% sales growth that consensus expects in FY16 looks aggressive to us, particularly with industry sales and traffic rolling over.  We don’t see how they hit these numbers and expect estimates to be revised down as the year progresses.

Earnings Recap

Brinker kicked off restaurant earnings season this morning with a disappointing 3Q15 print, as same-store sales and traffic fell short of consensus estimates.  Despite the soft top line, EAT managed to deliver in-line EPS of $0.94 due in large part to lower than expected other operating and G&A expenses.  During the quarter, management repurchased 1.7 million shares of common stock for $104.2 million and paid a $0.28 dividend.  The stock is trading down on the day, with the majority of the casual dining group following suit.

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Soft Comps Are Concerning

After years of operating margin expansion driven by strategic investments within its restaurants (new kitchens, POS systems, fryers, tabletop tablets, remodels, etc.), the brand is entering a phase that will depend on top line trends for incremental leverage.  Despite the recent menu innovation around the Fresh Mex and Fresh Tex platforms, we haven’t quite seen the bump in sales or traffic that most were expecting.  Traffic declined -0.2% in the period, though it was +0.6% adjusting for the Christmas shift, and has now been negative in eight out of the past ten quarters.  While Chili's same-store sales continue to outpace the industry, according to Knapp, its gap is narrowing.  Management attributed this to the aggressive price increases competitors are taking and noted that consumers historically tend to push back once pricing reaches the 3% range the industry is currently running at.  EAT took +0.8% pricing in the quarter and plans to take an additional +1% price increase in mid-4Q in order to offset some of the commodity pressure (burger meat, fajita beef, salmon) they are seeing.


Food & Loyalty Are The Future

While soft comps are concerning, management is betting that initiatives taken to enhance the menu will ultimately prevail and drive future growth.  They expect the Fresh Tex menu to begin to resonate with consumers as they educate the market place on what exactly it is and plan to continue to leverage the Fresh Mex menu given its high profit margins.  Chili’s also eliminated a number of low selling items from the menu, in an effort to streamline operations (improve speed of service, food delivery temperature, etc.).  Management believes it has made, and will continue to make, the proper investments on the technology front (Ziosk, NoWait) in order to drive traffic in the future.  Loyalty, in particular, will be critical moving forward and EAT now has the technology in place that they can leverage to support this effort.


The Earnings Algorithm Is Changing

It’s clear to us that the fundamental earnings algorithm of the company is changing.  A model that once heavily relied on a seemingly endless stream of strategic operational improvements to increase margins is now transitioning to one dependent on sales and traffic growth.  This concerns us given recent trends and will continue to heading into FY16.  Loyalty could ultimately be the top line driver the company has been missing, but we suspect ramping up the program will take longer than most suspect.  Brinker is a great company, but we fear it is becoming a victim of its own success.  As it stands, the 16% earnings growth on 4.4% sales growth that consensus expects in FY16 looks aggressive to us, particularly with industry sales and traffic rolling over.  We don’t see how they hit these numbers and expect earnings estimates to be revised down as the year progresses.


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McCullough: The Fed Is Going To Be Lower (Easier) For Longer


In this brief excerpt from today’s morning Macro Show, Hedgeye CEO Keith McCullough takes a look at the message of the bond market, Fed fund futures, and the “dots.”


Click here to watch the full edition of The Macro Show from April 21.


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Takeaway: The momo has stalled.


RCL was the darling in 2014, up 74% in share price. 2015 is a different story as the stock has lagged CCL and NCLH, -11% YTD versus +3% and +11%, respectively. While the stock clearly got ahead of itself, we also think RCL is facing some fundamental headwinds, particularly in Europe.  For the last several months, we’ve been highlighting emerging weakness in Europe and it appears that RCL’s Q1 and forward guidance corroborates our monthly pricing surveys. 


Moving forward, 2015 estimates are no slam dunk as European uncertainty remains. Given our current estimates, we think there’s a chance they miss Double Double targets in 2017. RCL’s still elevated valuation leaves little room for error so we’ll stay negative.


Please see our detailed note: 




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UA – Growth vs. ROIC Decision Tree

Takeaway: We think UA is hitting the point where it needs to pick between growth and ROIC. In a tape that rewards growth, returns likely coming down.

Few people would argue that UA is a tremendous story by almost any measure. Overcoming significant odds, it has drawn a line in the sand as the #2 Athletic brand in the US, it broke through the $3bn revenue mark faster than any Athletic brand in history (including Nike), it (Plank & Co) created $13.9bn in value for shareholders in just the past 3-years alone off of just a $5bn base, and now stands as one of the only companies with $3bn revenue base that is covered and owned by large-cap managers. #impressive. But the downside for UA is that when it is hovering at over 70x earnings with just 7% of the float short, it leaves extremely little room for error.


The good news is that UA has gotten extremely good at setting and managing quarterly expectations – even better than Nike, we’d argue (and guide/print numbers would support that), which says a lot. The punchline there is that the risk of UA missing numbers in 2015 is pretty low, at least how we’re doing the math.


The bad news is that the primary growth elements at UA are becoming more complex, more expensive, and more capital intensive – with what we think is a lengthier duration on payback. Again, when we consider UA’s multiple and lack of room for error in the model, we’d consider these factors ‘errors’, for lack of a better term.  We’d love to own this name given the growth algorithm, but we simply don’t think that the risk-adjusted long-term upside offsets the severe pain of growth slowing, margins falling, returns declining (which is a near certainty), or market style-factors falling out of favor – even for a quarter.


Here are some things we’re referring to:

1) First off, let’s call a spade a spade…capex is going up this year – a lot. It should clock in at $330-$340mm, up from $141mm in 2014. That’s a 140% increase in capital spending – one of the biggest increases we’ve ever seen in this space. We’re not saying UA should not spend it. The fact of the matter is that the company probably should. We fundamentally believe that you need to spend money to make money (assuming it is well spent). But UA has proven to be a good steward of capital over time, and we don’t expect that to change. But with this level of spending, we need to see the company put up 27% growth in earnings this year, versus the Street’s expectation for 15% growth, in order to prevent dilution in ROIC.


2) Connected Fitness As a Business Driver. We struggle with this one. We understand the importance of assets like MapMyRun, Endomondo, and MyFitnessPal. But we don’t see how they are monetized. It doesn’t sound like the company does either, without significant capital spend. Is it possible that UA has a vision for how the different apps will be merged and integrated in a complimentary way years down the road? For sure. But ultimately it needs to drive consumers to the UA brand in a commercial way.  Nike has been struggling with this for years in its digital businesses – most notably Nike+. And let’s not forget that Nike already has a seamless benefit of a digital platform that synchs perfectly with its product. We’re not saying that Nike will beat UA in this arena – this game is wide open. But if UA wants to play it’s going to have to spend.


3) SAP: A big part of the increase in capital spending is SAP-related. If there’s one thing we know about SAP, it is NEVER a 1-year spend, nor is it 2, 3 or even 4. The only companies who successfully implement SAP spend not only for the software (capex), but also for the service component (SG&A) as SAP staff immerse themselves in the company.  UA said repeatedly that it has a ‘partnership with SAP.’  We need to get more color from the company on that one. That sounds to us like someone saying ‘I have a partnership with iOS8’. Unless there’s a profit sharing component (which is possible, by the way), this sounds more like a complex customer agreement.


4) Athlete Endorsements are Headed Higher.  There was an unusual amount of real estate on the call dedicated to Jordan Spieth, Stephan Curry, Lindsay Vonn and Tom Brady. We understand that these athletes are winning, and it’s the job of the CEOs to be promotional regarding their assets. Heck, if I were in Plank’s position and had just notched some high-profile victories with athletes I pushed for from a business/endorsement perspective, I’d be just as loud. But what if these athletes lose? 

What if Jordan Spieth is not ‘the new face of US Golf’?  We’ve already seen the cost of endorsements head higher, and that before Nike lost some high profile events (starting with World Cup). UA and Nike duked it out over Kevin Durant, and Nike won by retaining him. Then Durant lost half his season to injury. The Masters was a shot in the jaw to Nike, who had a major Rory/Tiger campaign leading up to the event. Heck, Nike was sweating it out at the potential for Duke (Nike) to lose to Wisconsin (Adidas) in the NCAA finals. The sports marketing folks at Nike are nervous…and they should be. We think it’s going to go on a buying spree, which puts pressure on everyone. UA will play the game, and they’ll drive up prices for Nike. Nike will do the same for UA. Don’t forget about AdiBok, who is bowing out of its NBA deal to focus more in specific athletes. 

Let’s put real numbers behind it. Last year Nike had $4.7bn in athletic sponsorship obligations sitting on (actually, off) its books. UA was at $393mm. Nike’s total obligations changed last year by $1.1bn. In other words, Nike’s endorsement purse changed last year by more than UA has in total. Again, this is not a nit-pick on UA, but stating the simple facts that the cost of growth is critical to consider with a stock trading at 70x earnings – no matter how good the story might be.

What Is The "Pain Trade"?

Takeaway: Pain Trade in US Stocks = #on

Pain Trade  is the one that the largest % of market participants are not positioned for.

What Is The "Pain Trade"? - z 99


One very important way to listen to where the crowd is positioned is in futures and options contract terms. Before yesterday’s (and this morning’s pre-market futures) ramp, here’s where non-Commercial CFTC futures/options NET positioning stood:


  1. SP500 (Index + Emini) net SHORT position of -40,978
  2. The 3 month avg net position = +13,092 (net LONG)
  3. The 6 month avg net position = +31,930 (net LONG)

Click to enlarge.

What Is The "Pain Trade"? - 04.21.15 chart

Keith's Macro Notebook 4/21: Yen | Europe | S&P 500

Hedgeye CEO Keith McCullough shares the top three things in his macro notebook this morning.

Hedgeye Statistics

The total percentage of successful long and short trading signals since the inception of Real-Time Alerts in August of 2008.

  • LONG SIGNALS 80.51%
  • SHORT SIGNALS 78.32%