TODAY’S S&P 500 SET-UP – March 25, 2014
As we look at today's setup for the S&P 500, the range is 38 points or 0.94% downside to 1840 and 1.11% upside to 1878.
CREDIT/ECONOMIC MARKET LOOK:
MACRO DATA POINTS (Bloomberg Estimates):
WHAT TO WATCH:
COMMODITY/GROWTH EXPECTATION (HEADLINES FROM BLOOMBERG)
The Hedgeye Macro Team
“Blame it on the weather” seems to have quickly become the consensus mantra to explain away the recent lackluster performance of many companies. Just last week, Fed chief Janet Yellen joined the chorus saying that harsh winter weather may have had a negative impact on recent economic data.
We wanted to know how people outside the Fed and Old Wall assessed the situation in our Poll of the Day. So we asked: Is the weather to blame for the lackluster performance of companies or is it an excuse?
At the time of this post, 67.5% of respondents picked EXCUSE with 32.5% chose WEATHER.
One voters who wasn’t buying the weather EXCUSE asked “Come on. Did the dog eat your homework, too?”
Another commenter said, “No one ever cites good weather as the reason for accelerating sales growth and expanding operating margins. CEOs/CFOs take all the credit during good times and are quick to defer to extenuating circumstances during bad times. A shame really...”
Over in the “Blame Mother Nature” camp, Hedgeye Managing Director Moshe Silver said WEATHER was to blame arguing, “People's perceptions about weather patterns have changed. After Katrina and Sandy, people fear that the "storm of the century" will be more like the storm of the week. The internet is full of reports of solar activity unlike anything earth has experienced for 1,000 years and how it creates extreme weather conditions. Real or not, it's got people spooked; changing consumption patterns are to be expected. This is just the beginning.”
One voter who blamed WEATHER wrote, “Because I wasn't even able to get to work; forget about a shopping mall or even Home Depot for a shovel.”
Another blame the WEATHER voter added, “Look, the U.S. economy isn't exactly firing on all cylinders. I get it. But to suggest that the weather hasn't played a significant role in curbing consumer spending strains credulity. Have you been outside lately?”
One thing is for sure, it will take more than a few months of frosty temperatures to truly know if weather was the culprit for this period of slow growth.
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Hedgeye Retail sector head Brian McGough explains why he is turning positive on the margin on Lululemon.
With the 4Q13 results in the books, we’ve updated our Midstream MLP Maintenance CapEx Comp Table.
First, some color on the issue…
The widely-held opinion among MLP investors, analysts, bankers, and management teams is that net income doesn’t matter because depreciation, depletion, and amortization (DD&A) is a non-cash expense (and only cash expenses matter). At the simplest level, “Maintenance Capital Expenditures” (M-CapEx) is substituted for DD&A, and MLPs are evaluated and valued based on “Distributable Cash Flow,” rather than net income or earnings.
With respect to that prevailing opinion, our view echoes Warren Buffet’s:
“Trumpeting EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) is a particularly pernicious practice. Doing so implies that depreciation is not truly an expense, given that it is a “non-cash” charge. That’s nonsense. In truth, depreciation is a particularly unattractive expense because the cash outlay it represents is paid up front, before the asset acquired has delivered any benefits to the business. Imagine, if you will, that at the beginning of this year a company paid all of its employees for the next ten years of their service (in the way they would lay out cash for a fixed asset to be useful for ten years). In the following nine years, compensation would be a “non-cash” expense – a reduction of a prepaid compensation asset established this year. Would anyone care to argue that the recording of the expense in years two through ten would be simply a bookkeeping formality?” (BRK 2002 Annual Report).
M-CapEx is now a hotly-debated topic in the MLP sector, as it should be. Because there’s no simple, “right” answer, most default to simply plugging the management’s number into their models, and then projecting future M-CapEx consistent with it (usually as a % of adjusted EBITDA (another dubious management metric)). And as we have little insight as to how management calculates (or even defines) M-CapEx (no reconciliation back to GAAP Capital Expenditures), it’s difficult to evaluate the appropriateness of what management is giving us. In short, MLPs can essentially give us any M-CapEx number they want, it’s difficult for investors and analysts to scrutinize the metric given the lack of transparency, clarity, and disclosure (which is why most don’t even bother to), and MLP managements (especially those with Incentive Distribution Rights) are incentivized to give a M-CapEx as low as is palatable to the sell-side (and this seems to be very low), at least in the short-term.
Buffet gives the best definition of M-CapEx that we’ve heard:
“…the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc. that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume.”
He goes on:
“Most managers probably will acknowledge that they need to spend something more than [DD&A] on their businesses over the longer term just to hold their ground in terms of both unit volume and competitive position. When this imperative exists - that is, when [Maintenance CapEx] exceeds [DD&A] - GAAP earnings overstate owner earnings. Frequently this overstatement is substantial” (BRK 1986 Annual Report).
Clearly Buffet doesn’t talk to many MLP management teams, because Midstream MLP M-CapEx equaled only 28% of DD&A in 2013!
Bruce Greenwald (Professor of Finance and Asset Management at Columbia Business School) defines M-CapEx as the capital cost of keeping revenues flat, relying upon the ratio of gross-PP&E-to-revenues over the prior seven year period (see these notes for more on his method). One could perform a similar calculation using a below-the-line figure like EBIT.
Note how neither of these definitions have anything to do with keeping assets "safe" or "compliant"...
In our view, the vast majority of MLPs screen as highly aggressive with their M-CapEx figures. In 2013 there was not one large midstream MLP with M-CapEx higher than DD&A, and the average was only 28% (down from 34% in 2012).
We believe that M-CapEx vs. DD&A and PP&E are the best metrics when screening for potential aggressive accounting, because the comparison is going to be apples-to-apples across companies, as well as internally consistent. M-CapEx as a % of EBITDA is less useful for two reasons: 1) the definitions of EBITDA and/or adjusted EBITDA vary from one MLP to another, and 2) this measure does not control for differences in returns on capital or EBITDA margins among companies; all else being equal, a higher EBITDA margin MLP will screen as more aggressive than a lower EBITDA margin MLP in an M-CapEx vs. EBITDA ranking.
To the argument that DD&A is irrelevant because, “The book useful life is understated,” we say: “Show me.” We have not seen an instance of a natural gas processing plant or long-haul pipeline installed 25 to 35 years ago that has not received significant capital expenditure (in excess of its depreciation) since, and is still in proper working order. We fully appreciate that book useful lives can be, and often are, extended, but not without major capital expenditure over time. While the timing of the capital expenditure will be lumpy and difficult to predict, it will come (or the assets will be abandoned/scrapped). For instance, Enbridge (ENB, EEP) recently announced that it will replace its Line 3 crude oil pipeline after 46 years in service; the line replacement will cost $7 billion, and Enbridge IR noted to us that, “…the replacement cost of the infrastructure is significantly greater than the sum of its original cost and collective subsequent investments made to the pipeline.” Given the impact of inflation on the replacement cost of long-lived, fixed assets, this really is not surprising.
Why this matters…
The short-term consequence is that MLP investors, today, are discounting decades of future “distributable” cash flows that are likely to be significantly in excess of future “free” cash flows, lending to widespread and substantial equity overvaluation.
The longer-term consequence is that, at some point, CFFO growth will slow (and possibly cease and/or go negative), while the MLP has a large, externally-financed “growth” CapEx budget. By this stage, returns on incremental “growth” CapEx are below the cost of capital (and perhaps negative), and the coming dilution is obvious to all. The more aggressive the MLP is with M-CapEx today, the more acute this risk is.
Here is our updated 2013 Comp Table, followed by some takeaways below:
Comp Table Takeaways
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