Below the Street Q2 but in-line with our estimate. EBITDA got a $31m net boost from an adjustment to the receivable reserve.




  • Las Vegas:  In the short run, their high-end baccarat business is very volatile.  Last's year's results benefited to the tune of $150MM, and this year WYNN only won $38MM.  Hold was 37% last year in 2Q vs only 17% this year.
    • If you normalize for hold, then they would have done more business this year
    • The rest of the business in Las Vegas was flat 
  • Business levels in LV are slightly better than last year
  • In Macau, the market has gotten more competitive.  Generally speaking, the high end of the market was flat.  Wynn suffered a bit on the revenue side but not on the EBITDA. 
  • They have been able to hold the rate that they pay to junkets to 40% + 3% for comps which is about 5% less then the competition. They believe that they give away as much of their money to junkets as they can to maintain a good business.  Wynn is really concentrating on maintaining the bottom line. 
  • Growth in Macau has slowed down as the base has gotten bigger and to a greater extent because Asia is also experiencing similar types of macro pressures as the rest of the world
  • Wynn is improving their high limit slot business in Macau
  • Using credit as a marketing tool is a big mistake in the gaming business.  They will not buy business with credit. They are very conservative with granting credit and as a result, over the last 6 months, their collections have actually improved (which is why their results in Macau look so good - the reversal of the bad debt provision was $17MM in the quarter, 2/3rds of which benefited Macau vs. a charge)
  • Got a $2.3BN R/C and T/L for the construction of Wynn Cotai; interest rate will be under 2%.  The facility is expected to close in about 10 days.  



  • Doesn't think that the slowdown in Macau is driven by political issues.  The junkets are being responsible in extending credit.
  • No real change in the mix of direct vs. VIP
    • According to our calculation, direct dropped to 8.25% from 10% last Q
  • Cash balance: 
    • $500MM is at the parent
    • $600MM is in Macau
    • Balance in Las Vegas
  • Plan to spend about $150MM on foundation over the next 9-12 months.  Spent $140MM on Cotai so far - mostly on the land.
  • Only held 9% in baccarat this Q, adjusted for hold the quarter would have been $116MM in Las Vegas
  • The reserve reversal was 2/3rds in Macau and 1/3 Las Vegas
  • When SCC opened, they did see an impact on their property.  Folks got very aggressive around the opening. Aggressive incentives have extended into the Mass segment and not just the VIP segment and even in slot promotional allowances. 
  • Macau will continue to have cost pressures primarily surrounding payroll
  • Giving some of those under-utilitized tables to sub-junkets and eliminating some of the middle men. That way they end up giving the junket a better rate than they had elsewhere.  
  • Use of cash will be a very interesting topic for their board now that the financing for Cotai is lined up
  • What they are doing to grow revenue in Wynn Macau?
    • Expand retail space to 58,000 (10% increase) and sales there are really rocking.  They get 15% increases in all their new leases.
    • Someone is paying them $500,000/Q fixed for 2,000 SQFT of retail space
    • New junket room open by Christmas
    • Late in the June Q, moved Tiffany and then LVMH expanded into their space
  • While there is no change in credit worthiness in their client base, collections are slower on the direct side
  • What's their normal reserve for doubtful accounts, normally $14MM charge - so its the delta of $31MM peak to trough. They were 100% reserved in Macau at 150 days. So while collections have slowed, they collected better than they thought.  They changed their 100% reserve to 1 year from 150 days in Macau. In Vegas they changed the 100% reserve from 1 year to 18 months. 
  • As the amount of credit being issued in Macau ballooned with all the new properties, WYNN reserved more worrying about the market as a whole vs. just their own books. In hindsight, they were over-reserving for the last year or two.  At the end of 2011, their bad debt expense was 42% of their accounts receiveable.  Their reserve is 44% today.
  • They are going to increase the number of Mass tables they have on the floor in Macau
  • One of the reasons why it takes longer to collect is because players have outstanding debt at multiple casinos
  • They usually settle on the 5th day of each month with their junkets. They don't have a rolling program like their competitors.



  • Wynn Resorts reported revenue of $1,253MM and Adjusted EBITDA of $384MM
    • Macau: $908MM of net revenue and $302MM of Adj. EBITDA
    • Las Vegas: $345MM of net revenue and $82MM of Adj. EBITDA
  • Wynn Macau's EBITDA benefitted by a large reversal of doubtful accounts. This quarter Wynn had a $17MM reversal- most of which related to Macau.  
  • Wynn Cotai expected to cost between $3.5-4BN to construct
  • We estimate that direct VIP play at Wynn Macau was 8.25%
  • We estimate that the hold impact to Macau negatively impacted Wynn's net revenue by $21MM and EBITDA by $3MM
    • VIP:  If hold was in line with historical averages of 2.93% then net revenue and EBITDA would have been $30MM and $6MM higher
    • Mass: Wynn's mass hold for the last 5 quarters of 28.8% would have resulted in net revenue and EBITDA being $7MM and $3MM lower, respectively
  • In Las Vegas, table hold was only 15% compared to a 9 quarter average of 23.5%.  Had Wynn held at 23.5%, win would have been $49MM higher


In an effort to evaluate performance and as a follow up to our YouTube, we compare how the quarter measured up to previous management commentary and guidance.




  • Worse:  Below the Street quarter but in-line with our projection.  However, EBITDA got a $17m boost from an allowance for doubtful account reserve adjustment.


  • WORSE:  Growth has slowed; the outlook is more uncertain but China is relatively stable.  More cautious on direct VIP credit collection. 
  • PREVIOUSLY:  "All the way up until today, is volumes are up over last year in Macau on the VIP side. The market's still very robust.I also think that the customers are coming back to momma. They tried all the other properties and they are going to play where they feel the most comfortable. That's... what I'm seeing now."


  • SAME:  Still waiting for construction permit.  Groundbreaking will happen in Fall 2012.  46 month schedule remains unchanged.
  • PREVIOUSLY:  "I think everybody knows that we were finally given the green light in the land concession, which will lead to imminent ground breaking in the next few weeks."


  • BETTER:  WYNN benefited from a large reversal of doubtful accounts ($17MM).  2/3 was related to Macau, with 1/3 hitting the Las Vegas P&L.
  • PREVIOUSLY:  "Bad debt expense was up $8 million and that was all in Macau....We had a few large accounts that went past 150 days. We have a very conservative accounting policy. If it's 150 days we're fully reserved. And so we had a few large accounts go over 150 days. Our bad debt provision went up. We're 55% reserved in Macau right now and our collections in the second quarter have continued to be very stable and normal."


  • SAME:  Plan to close financing for a $2.3 billion revolver with interest rates under 2% in ten days
  • PREVIOUSLY:  "We're always conservative so it'll be between 25% to 40% in equity and the rest will be financing that we'll start working on this year. We're only two times levered right now on a net basis."


  • SAME:  Will expand retail space to 58,000 sq ft by the end of 2012 at Wynn Macau.  
  • PREVIOUSLY:  "We have 52,000 square feet of retail. It's going to 60,000 – it's in the process of going to 60,000, but we had 52,000 at year-end."


Non-performing loans in Wenzhou — a good barometer of Macau VIP


  • As announced today, non-performing loans surged in the city of Wenzhou, Zhejiang province in June 2012 to 2.69% of overall loans, up from 1.33% at the beginning of 2012.  Wenzhou was named a pilot zone in March to test a series of financial reforms aimed at ending reliance on shadow banking.  
  • Wenzhou generates only 4% of visitors to Macau but its non-performing loan ratio has been a great indicator of Macau’s VIP growth particularly since June 2011, as shown in the chart below
  • Macau’s VIP business is heavily reliant on credit and liquidity



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CONCLUSION: Contrary to consensus speculation, we are of the view that Chinese policymakers are likely not readying a stimulus package to be announced and administered over the intermediate term that would be substantial enough to meaningfully inflect the slope of Chinese economic growth. As such, it would be prudent to fade any incremental Chinese stimulus rallies for the time being.


ACTIVE THEME(S): Growth Slowing’s Slope


In a JAN ’11 note titled “PONDERING CHINESE GROWTH”, we wrote, “To date, we haven’t heard anyone mention the possibility that [the not-yet-released 2011-15 5YR Plan] may come with a more explicit slowdown in the Chinese growth model from the current high-single-digit-to-low-double-digit trajectory to a more modest mid-single-digit pace. While we won’t know until we know, we do know that this scenario is outside of consensus expectations.”


Those thoughts were the then unknowns; the known-knowns of today are as follows: 

  1. Chinese policymakers did, in fact, guide to lower economic growth target(s) in the so-called 12th Five-Year Plan (+7% per annum, down from a consistently-exceeded +7.5% per annum in the five years through 2010); and
  2. A structurally slower rate of Chinese growth is being increasingly priced into consensus expectations. 

To the latter point, global currency market participants have dramatically revised down their expectations for NTM yuan strength in both the onshore (Shanghai) and off-shore (Hong Kong) markets. The discount relative to the spot price embedded in 1YR USD/CNY non-deliverable forwards is -0.7%, which is down from an all-time high premium of +13% (MAR ’08). The discount relative to the spot price embedded in 1YR USD/CNH non-deliverable forwards is -1.3%, which is down from an all-time high premium of +1.9% (MAR ’11). Perhaps a greater callout is the sheer length of time the secular yuan-appreciation story has been more-or-less priced out of the market; at roughly 8MO, you’d have to pull the chart back to 2002 to see a comparable prolonged period(s) of expected yuan dormancy.




As a result, we interpret the aforementioned FX trends as a sign that international investors hold a generally neutral-to-bearish long-term view on the Chinese economy, particularly from a GROWTH/INFLATION/POLICY perspective (i.e. slow growth = lower interest rates; widespread credit quality headwinds = fiscal expansion). That was certainly not the case in JAN ’11!


As an aside, we place substantially more emphasis on actual flows of capital to gauge investor and corporate sentiment rather than on traditional sell-side polls. Looking to flows of hard capital, Foreign Direct Investment growth in China slowed to -6.9% YoY in JUN, which is the slowest rate since DEC. From a 1H12 perspective, FDI inflows dropped -3% YoY. It’s clear that corporations, too, are revising down their expectations for Chinese economic over the long-term by slowing their rates of capital investment into the Chinese economy. In spite of Chinese policymakers’ recent +167% increase in QFII quotas to $80B (APR ’12), growth in capital inflows, as measured by Chinese bank’s foreign exchange positions, have slowed dramatically since last SEP.






Needless to say, international investors and corporations simply aren’t buying into the sell-side-generated Chinese growth machine like they used to. While we certainly aren’t arguing for the Chinese economy to pack it in and go away, we do stick with the conclusion of our OCT ’11 note titled “PUTTING CHINA INTO PERSPECTIVE” as it relates our expectations for Chinese economic growth over the next three years:


“…a structural downshift in rates of Chinese economic growth is not at all out of the band of probable outcomes over the long term and this has major implications for a great many corporations and investor portfolios worldwide.”


In light of these expectations, it may very well be that consensus expectations for the Chinese economy over the long-term TAIL are as close to our subdued expectations as they’ve ever been. From an intermediate-term TREND perspective, however, they have farther to travel as it relates to narrowing that delta.


It was as clear as day to anyone at their desk last Friday that U.S. equity investors equated the sharp slowdown in China’s 2Q12 Real GDP growth into Pavlovian expectations of further rate cuts and perhaps a meaningful fiscal stimulus package (CNY4 trillion during 2008-10) fully-equipped with another state-directed lending spree (CNY17.5 trillion during 2009-10).


As we penned in a research note last Friday, titled “CHINESE GROWTH: STICKING TO THE [CENTRAL] PLAN”:


“…we maintain conviction in our view that Chinese economic growth is not poised to meaningfully inflect over the intermediate term. Furthermore, we can’t stress how much the late-year transition in leadership or the growing official realization that the 2008-09 stimulus package and central plan (i.e. state-directed lending) contributed heavily to a rapid and potentially unhealthy expansion in credit (+96.6% since the end of 2008) may slow Chinese policymakers’ fiscal/regulatory response [if any] to an incremental deterioration in economic growth.”


In terms of updating our thoughts here, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was back in the media today guiding down expectations for Chinese growth [again], this time stating that China’s labor market will become “more severe” and “more complex”. He’s calling on Party Commissions and municipal governments to fulfill their role in promoting “proactive labor policy” by “maintain[ing] steady and relatively rapid economic growth”.


While it has been our official view that Chinese policy makers will surprise consensus expectations to the downside with regards to any announcement(s) of a fiscal stimulus package and/or a state-directed lending initiative, this does, on the margin, sound like the Chinese leadership is willing to turn an increasingly blind eye to local governments to do what they feel needs to be done to protect growth. That does not, however, include loosening restrictions on property investment – a clear directive Chinese policymakers have made repeatedly in recent weeks.


While it’s too early to tell if this is a meaningful inflection point in Chinese fiscal policy – which would provide a far-more substantial boost to economic growth than merely lowering the cost of capital – we are concerned by the fact Chinese equities simply aren’t pricing in any meaningful inflection point in China’s GROWTH/INFLATION/POLICY dynamics (the Shanghai Composite is still in a Bearish Formation). This leaves us to believe that it would be prudent to fade any incremental Chinese stimulus rallies for the time being.




In contemplating the other side of this view, the Shanghai Composite bottomed just five days prior to the State Council’s economic stimulus announcement in NOV ’08, which does call into question the discounting mechanism of the Chinese equity market to some degree – though we’d argue NOV ’08 was a more panicked and rushed response to a negative growth shock vs. a deliberate and partially policy-induced growth slowdown. Net-net, either Chinese policymakers are being uncharacteristically tight-lipped about their plans to “stabilize” growth or they simply don’t have any a’brewing at the current juncture.


Needless to say, confirmation of the latter would likely deliver a crushing blow to consensus expectations of broad-based fiscal and monetary expansion in China over the intermediate term.


Darius Dale

Senior Analyst

LINSANITY: The End of an Era

Jeremy Lin's move to the Rockets is expensive not just for Knicks fans but Modell's Sporting Goods. Remember in the 2011-2012 basketball season we had a little thing in New York called Linsanity? The hype surrounding Knicks point guard Jeremy Lin was incredible. Like the flavor of the month (Baloteli, Smarty Jones, etc.), everyone simply had to have Lin gear. And now it appears that manufacturing all that gear will cost Modell's to the tune of $1 million.



LINSANITY: The End of an Era  - MODELLS lin



With Lin poised to move to Houston, guess who’s sitting on 40,000 Lin-related items across its 150 stores? Modell’s Sporting Goods. The company is expected to dump these goods at true fire sale prices. Expect $5 t-shirts and the like. This will prove to be a huge headache and cost for the company. Per Hedgeye Retail:


If we assume a conservative $30 ASP per unit, this would equate to a 80%+ discount (t-shirts: $24.99, Jersey $89.99) to flush inventory resulting in over $1mm in lost sales. With Modell’s revenue nearing an estimated $700mm in 2011, each store (105 of 150 stores in tri-state area) could have nearly $7K of the quarter’s ~$1.03mm/store at risk.”


With that kind of loss, the least Lin could do is swing by the Times Square location and sign a couple of jerseys before he hops on his jet to Houston.


Solid earnings and guidance boosted by lower CostPAR




  • Strong F&B flowthrough led to above consensus results, driven by better banquet business
  • Strong increase in demand in their group business accelerated in the quarter with occupancy increasing more than 5%.  Rate increase was 1.5%.  7% increase in group RevPAR this quarter which was better than transient growth
  • 6% increase in special corporate rates
  • Government business declined by less than 3%
  • Transient volumes decreased a little and overall transient grew just under 5% due to less availability of rooms
  • Total bookings for the remainder of the year are 7.5% of less year and revenue improvement should be 10%.  2013 should benefit from increased business spending.
  • Acquired Hyatt DC for a better price than the one they had orginally negotiated last year
  • Have one smaller asset under contract, which is expected to close in late summer.  Also actively marketing several additional properties which are expected to close during 4Q.
  • Seeing great results from our three recently redeveloped hotels, the Chicago O'Hare Marriott, the Atlanta Perimeter Marriott and the Sheraton Indianapolis, where RevPAR is running better than 35% ahead of three renovation levels
  • Doing some incremental renovations on the Helmsley, NY (lobby and new restaurant)
  • Expect industry fundamentals to remain solid for the remainder of the year
  • Believe that the growth cycle in lodging will be sustained
  • Individual market performance commentary:
    • Philadelphia:  Top performing market with RevPAR+ 23.7% (Occupancy: +13%, driven by strong group and transient demand, ADR: +4%). Results for the Q benefited from the 2011 rooms and meeting space renovations at the Downtown Marriott.  Excellent F&B growth. Expected to be a top performing market in 3Q due to strong group and transient demand, which should allow us to drive pricing.
    • Chicago:  RevPAR: +11.1% (ADR: +7% and Occupancy:+3%); both citywide and overall group demand were excellent. The increase in group business helped drive a 15% increase in F&B.  Expect hotels to underperform in 3Q due to lower levels of citywide and group demand YoY.
    • Boston:  RevPAR: +10%(ADR +8%; Occupancy +1.5%) despite the ongoing renovation of the Boston Copley Marriott.  Outperformance was driven by strong corporate group and transient business which allowed HST to shift the mix of business and benefit from rate compression.  Expect to have a strong 3Q.
    • Atlanta:  RevPAR up 8.3% (Occupancy: 4% and ADR: +1%).  Strength in citywide association and transient demand, while ADR increased over 1%. Expect to underperform in 3Q due to renovations at the Ritz-Carlton Buckhead and the Four Seasons.
    • San Francisco:  RevPAR +8.2% (ADR +7%). The improvement in ADR was driven by rate increases for both group and transient business and F&B revenues increased over 11%. Expect to continue to perform very well in 3Q.
    • New York:  RevPAR 4.8% due to growth in ADR.  Negatively impacted by the second and final stage of the rooms renovations at the New York Marriott Marquis and the Sheraton New York and a rooms renovation at the W Union Square.  The renovations at the Marquis included the addition of eight new rooms at a cost of under $300,000 per key but HST had to shut down the whole floor in order to finish the construction.  Expect better performance in 3Q.
    • Miami Fort Lauderdale: RevPAR -20bps (ADR +3%; Occupancy -3%). Weakness was due to less transient and group demand. Expect better performance in 3Q due to better group bookings.
    • Year-to-date: Los Angeles +10.6%. 
    • Our worst performing market has been San Antonio with a RevPAR decrease of 4.6%.
    • European JV: Results continue to exceed expectations.  Inbound travel to the Eurozone from the U.S., UK, Asia and the Middle East continues to be strong and as a major source of euro lodging demand. The Hotel Arts Barcelona, the Sheraton Warsaw and the Crowne Plaza Amsterdam, all had strong RevPAR increases for the quarter while Brussels and Madrid hotels struggled.
  • Comparable RevPAR should be driven by both ADR and Occupancy 
  • Continue to see improvements in catering, meeting room rental and audio-visual revenues, and better F&B margins.
  • SG&A and marketing,repairs and maintenance increased 3.5%, primarily driven by expenses that are variable with revenues (credit card commissions, guest reward programs and clustered and shared service allocations). 
  • Utility costs were down 3.5% and property taxes increased 6.6% while property insurance increased roughly 14%.
  • Expect unallocated cost to increase more than inflation particularly for sales and marketing where higher revenues will increase cost
  • Property insurance all renewed by June 1 - rate increases they received were only 7% vs the expected increase of 15%
  • Property taxes are only increasing 6% vs their prior expectation of 8-9%
  • Utilities will be down slighly for the year vs. prior expectations for a 1-2% increase 


  • Group business in 2012:  roughly 25% of that business was booked when rates were softer. Very little of that "soft" business left on the books for 2013.
  • Special corporate rates tend to be below rack rates, and given the amount of special corporate they had probably held back pricing a bit in the quarter
  • Expanded the scope of their Orlando renovation and the net effect of that including adding a bar/restaurant at the Helmslely should result in better EBITDA from these hotels going forward
  • Mid 13 range on their acquisition price
  • Attrition/ cancellation clauses: they are seeing the ability to negotiate better terms on these clauses where occupancy is stronger
  • More than 90% of their group business is already on the books for 2012 so they may not book as many rooms YoY as last year given the reduced capacity
  • RevPAR growth rate in the 4Q vs. 3Q? Don't necessarily see a big difference in trends between the 2 quarters
  • Do expect that a number of the hotels that they are marketing will close by the end of the year, however, only one of the hotels met the standard of being excluded from ongoing operations. 
  • Expectations for a pick of M&A activity in 2H12 have moderated, however, there are more opportunities in the market today. For the full year, they still expect to be a net acquirer of assets.
  • Washington market is closer to their prior peak than other markets, but the Hyatt DC is about 8-10% below prior peak. The upside from owning this hotel is the good location and their long term view on DC.  They believe that this will continue to be a very strong convention market.  Seeing increase in 2015-2016 booking volumes.  Expect to see an accelerated level of activity in that market in 2013.  The location is also in the heart of convention activity in town. 
  • Depending on where pricing goes will influence whether they will be a net buyer or seller of assets
  • Wages and benefit increased a little more than 3% this past quarter, but on a per occupied room basis it was only about 1%. Expect that increases for the rest of the year will be a little north of 3% but on a per occupied room basis only about 1%. 
  • Is food inflation an issue?  HST actually had a margin improvement due to better menu management and procurement synergies.  They are not seeing food inflation as an issue.
  • Still expect the bulk of their investment to be in the US.  In Europe, they would be interested in London, Paris and Germany which they feel are more defensive and would perform better.  In Brazil, they would like to buy more full service hotels there.  They believe that there is also an opportunity in Select Service to capture the rising middle class.  In Asia, their efforts are mostly focused on Australia, Singapore and HK. 
  • Want to be a lower leveraged company then where they were at the last peak cycle - so at or below 3x leverage level 
  • Expect European RevPAR to be similar for the remainder of the year.  Expect similar 3-4% RevPAR growth for the full year.  Seeing relatively good group activity throughout Europe.  Seeing some benefit from weak Euro on US travel to the region. 
  • Major 2013 renovations planned? 
    • Nothing as major as the ones they had this year, although they would be surprised if one or 2 hotels don't creep into their capital plan where they see opportunity.  Think that that they are fairly caught up on capital projects.  Don't expect as much disruption next year. However, they are not done with their capital allocation plans so it's a bit early to say.
  • Some of their planned capital spend does consider improving assets that they want to sell so that they don't get dinged on the sale price.  Room renovations may not make sense since there are a lot of rebranding opportunities upon a sale but some things like roofs and maintenance do make sense. 
  • Last cycle they sold 35-36 hotels. Not sure that they will be as active of a seller but they do want to reduce non-core exposure.





  • "The increase in total revenues for the second quarter and year-to-date 2012 reflect the improved performance of the Company's owned hotels due to improvements in comparable hotel RevPAR of 6.1%... and year-to-date and improvements in comparable food and beverage revenues of 5.7%, respectively. In addition, the improvement in operating results for year-to-date 2012 includes operations for the ten hotels (nearly 4,000 rooms) acquired in the first half of 2011, which increased revenues by an incremental $56 million. If the Company reported its results on a calendar quarter basis, then comparable hotel RevPAR would have increased 6.8% for the second quarter 2012"
  • "On July 16, 2012, the Company acquired the 888-room Grand Hyatt Washington, D.C. for approximately $400 million....The acquisition has been funded with available cash and a draw under the revolver portion of the Company's credit facility. The Company intends to repay a portion of the revolver draw, as well as other debt, with proceeds from a five-year term loan currently under negotiation. The Company has received commitments from a number of banks"
    • Preliminary terms: 
      • $400MM
      • L+180bps (2.1%)
      • Closing by end of July  
  • "The Company continued to actively pursue its strategy of extending its debt maturities and lowering its overall cost of debt."
    • On June 7, 2012 the Company entered into a $100 million mortgage loan secured by the Hyatt Regency Reston and due in 2016, with an additional one-year extension at the Company's option
      • Terms: 1 month LIBOR+310bps (3.34%)
    • HST issued $650MM of debt in 1Q12 at an average interest rate on 5.3% and used the proceeds to reduce approximately $1BN of debt during the quarter, with an average GAAP interest rate of 6.8%. 
    • Proforma for the Hyatt DC acquisition and new term loan, HST will have $760MM of availability under its R/C, cash of $150MM and total debt of $5.3BN
  • In 2Q HST issued 3.1MM shares of stock at $15.75 with net proceeds of $48MM. $350MM of issuance capacity remains under the April 2012 Sales Agency Financing Agreements
  • Capex spend in 2Q12:
    • ROI: $50MM
    • Acquisition: $50MM
    • Renewal and replacement: $79M

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