How do you solve a problem like Korea?
When Kim Jong Un disembarked from his luxury armored train to meet President Vladimir Putin in Russia, he smiled softly and stopped to wave at the Russian state media cameras. It was a momentous occasion for the notorious dictator who would later clink glasses with Putin. The trip was Kim’s first outside North Korea after three years of pandemic isolation, and it allowed him to soak up time on the world stage — something the U.S. and its allies have refused the North Korean leader since his meeting with Donald Trump in 2019.
The visit was troubling for the West, and it came mere days after the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) celebrated the 75th anniversary of its founding with typical martial pomp. Kim enjoyed a “paramilitary parade” and received congratulatory letters from Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. During the celebration, North Korea also launched its first submarine that Pyongyang claims can launch nuclear missiles.
Trump’s visit was the last time the U.S. has sought to deal directly with the “Hermit Kingdom” and its nuclear arsenal. Since then, the West has essentially ignored North Korea despite the dictator’s threats and escalating rhetoric about nuclear war. Washington has appeared almost immune to Kim’s angry diatribes, and President Joe Biden’s policies towards North Korea appear to mimic President Barack Obama’s strategy of “strategic patience” while seeking closer ties with both South Korea (ROK) and Japan.
Consistent with the Washington Declaration forged with ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol in April, an American nuclear submarine recently visited South Korea. Washington and Seoul have formed a nuclear consultative group. President Biden also held a historic meeting with Yoon, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida focused on greater cooperation. These efforts are intended to enhance deterrence in the region, but we will have to wait to determine their effectiveness. Meanwhile, Pyongyang continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities.
Kim’s weapons are not imaginary, nor is his future collaboration with the Kremlin. There is growing concern that North Korea may provide Putin with arms to fuel Russia’s war in Ukraine, and in return, North Korea will receive food, aid, cheap fuel, and possibly assistance in developing its nuclear weapons and missiles. This new development is creating many additional security concerns.
One thing is certain for American national security: hope is not a method in strategic planning, and it is not useful when formulating policies to deal with a regime that is armed with nuclear weapons. Washington needs a coordinated policy, not a blind eye.
Who is Kim Jong Un? And internal stability
Kim Jong Un assumed office in April 2012 after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il. He was about 30, experts believe, and little was known about him beyond his brief education in Switzerland, his love of American basketball, and a particular affinity for fine cigars and Western cognac. Beyond that, there have been continuous rumors about his health, particularly after he temporarily disappeared and returned having lost a fair amount of weight. South Korean intelligence has allegedly sought to measure his ever-expanding girth by using photos and artificial intelligence to gain additional insight into his health.
His legitimacy is derived from the mythical narrative that his family has created. Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s founder, and Kim’s grandfather, created a persona that essentially made him a god — though the Soviet Union’s invasion of Pyongyang to push out the Japanese at the end of World War II and Joseph Stalin’s endorsement of the young Korean militant is the real reason he became the DPRK’s first leader. His successors, however, have worked to continue this cult of personality.
Another change in leadership would be unpredictable. In the past, it has led to purges. For example, five of the seven pallbearers for the funeral of Kim Jong Il either disappeared, were brutally executed, or were banished. Still, there are very few remaining family dictatorships since World War II. Most have experienced a rapid and unexpected collapse. This has not occurred yet in North Korea, though such a sudden downfall would likely result in a true international disaster.
There is no clear evidence of internal opposition to Kim’s rule, but little is known about what occurs in North Korea day-to-day. Intelligence sources suggest that, prior to the pandemic, 40% of the North Korean population was in dire need of food assistance. Chinese and Russian intervention (that ignored UN sanctions) limited famine in 2019. Furthermore, the country’s international commerce was all but shut down during the pandemic, which worsened the food shortage. North Korea only opened its borders with allies such as China earlier this year, though movement continues to be limited.
What is the threat that North Korea poses to the United States and its allies?
North Korea has between 75 and 320 kilograms of active nuclear material in addition to its current nuclear weapon stockpile. It maintains 5,000 tons of chemical weapons and likely has some store of biological toxins for military use. Western intelligence also believes that there are a total of 39 relevant nuclear sites and 49 missile sites that would have to be secured in North Korea, which is about the size of Pennsylvania if there were a crisis.
As of now, it is believed that Pyongyang has between 45 and 60 nuclear weapons, and it is clearly working to expand its arsenal and the range of its weapons. North Korea has numerous medium and short-range missiles, which are designed for conventional and chemical use. All, however, could probably be equipped with a nuclear warhead to strike targets in South Korea, Japan, or American forces in the region. They have also developed cruise missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and underwater drones that can deliver a nuclear payload. (There are some questions regarding their effectiveness, however.)
More concerning, Pyongyang successfully tested its first ICBM in 2017, and it has continued to test this capability. It appears this missile could strike the United States and could be equipped with multiple nuclear payloads. It is unclear, however, whether Kim has perfected the ability to build a warhead that can survive reentry. That is what makes his collaboration with the Russians even more concerning.
Pyongyang’s recent success at building a solid-fueled missile is also significant. It allows them to be launched more quickly than older liquid-fueled missiles, and they are harder to detect. A large number of ICBMs might saturate existing U.S. missile defenses, though it is unclear whether the missiles that appeared during a military parade were real or mock efforts. Kim has often paraded fake weapons at similar events.
What are American policy options?
When reporters asked President Biden whether he had any message for Kim when he visited Seoul in May last year, he said, “Hello. Period.”
At this point, America does not have much left in its toolkit to address or punish North Korea. It would be difficult to find anything to further sanction and diplomacy is at a standstill, as Pyongyang continues to develop weapons and appears uninterested in dialogue.
U.S. policy is also not completely its own in Northeast Asia. It has many close allies that are deeply involved and more directly threatened by Pyongyang, so any policy must reflect the concerns of countries like South Korea and Japan.
The Washington Declaration is essential in this regard. It created a nuclear consultative group on joint response tactics, increased intel sharing between the two countries, and ensured the U.S. would strengthen South Korea’s deterrent capabilities. It further established joint military training programs and an annual intergovernmental simulation.
But, the possibility of limiting North Korea’s threat is restricted by China, as it is impossible to imagine any meaningful change without direct Chinese involvement. Beijing remains Pyongyang’s greatest benefactor and the only nation that has leverage over the small Asian country. The Chinese have been historically resistant to a resolution regarding security issues on the Korean peninsula, as they believe that a unified Korea would be an American ally. They have no interest in allowing Washington to expand its military presence in the region, particularly as the nature of the strategic environment changes.
Through the years, different administrations have pursued different approaches. All understood that if a crisis occurred and the U.S. did not support South Korea or Japan fully, it would damage America’s security strategy throughout Asia. In such an instance, other Asian allies might pursue alternative security arrangements or greater accommodation to China, further weakening American influence in the region.
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush attempted to negotiate with North Korea to avoid the expansion of its nuclear program. This ended when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 and withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under President Barack Obama, the White House pursued “strategic patience” and allowed Seoul to seek improvements in relations that might reduce tensions. Trump discarded most of that. He initially threatened “fire and fury” but “then we (Kim and Trump) fell in love.”
While North Korean experts considered Trump’s attempt to negotiate with Kim as particularly naïve and oddly self-aggrandizing, there was some acknowledgment that there must be a new strategy toward North Korea. South Korea’s own policy has vacillated over the years between those seeking accommodation with North Korea and more conservative governments that have emphasized a harder-line approach to defense and deterrence. Yoon, the current president, is clearly a conservative who has entertained creating a ROK nuclear arsenal and characterized his predecessor’s diplomatic policies as “fake peace.”
By all accounts, Trump’s was a new but highly flawed approach. It sidelined Seoul, damaged U.S. relations with South Korea, and it relied on the hope that Kim would ultimately give up his biggest life insurance policy against U.S. intervention — his nuclear weapons in exchange for economic assistance. It also likely cemented Kim’s view that talking to the U.S. is a wasted effort, as the entire spectacle gained him very little.
Biden’s policy has, in some ways, reverted to Obama’s, though with some significant differences, which is complemented by the current South Korean government’s harsher view of its northern neighbor. Consequently, the administration has invested more heavily in enhanced deterrence and defense, sought increased defense spending by allies, and closer coordination with them as well. This was demonstrated in the recent Camp David meetings with the leaders of South Korea and Japan.
Still, while this may temporarily deter Kim, it does not directly address the danger of his growing nuclear arsenal or the question mark that is North Korean policy in the future. Presidents have sought an effective strategy with North Korea since its inception 75 years ago. All those efforts have failed, and Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear weapons worsened the country’s threat exponentially. Kim’s visit to Russia with the war in Ukraine in the backdrop underscores how that conflict has changed geopolitics. For the past two decades, the Russian Federation supported efforts that aimed to limit North Korea’s nuclear weapons and advanced missile programs. It appears Putin is now willing to slash that policy effort to secure his objectives in Ukraine. The West must now acknowledge that a new “axis of authoritarian” states is emerging, and the security concerns that this portends is only now beginning.
