Before NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met with the NATO members in Vilnius, Lithuania, earlier this month, he outlined in an article for Foreign Affairs magazine his objectives. The meeting was slated to be particularly vital. Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the allies had telegraphed its importance for months. This was especially true as the Ukrainians were demanding a pathway to join the collective defense organization.
To Stoltenberg, the objectives were clear. He aimed to bring together a multiyear package of support for Ukraine, tie Kyiv closer to NATO, ensure the defense organization acted as a buttress against authoritarianism, adapt command structures to reflect the new geography of the alliance after Finland and Sweden joined NATO, increase cooperation with defense industries across Europe and the US to increase production, and do as much as possible to achieve greater strategic alignment, enhance deterrence, and improve overall defense capabilities.
“We need to invest more and invest it now, because security is the foundation for our economies and societies to thrive,” Stoltenberg wrote. “Preventing aggression today is less costly than fighting a war tomorrow.”
At his closing press conference, Stoltenberg celebrated the achievement of those objectives, which would help NATO “adapt our Alliance for the future.” The Vilnius Summit appears to have done just that. NATO adopted the most detailed and robust defense plans since the Cold War, made new commitments to defense investment, provided additional support for Ukraine, and created a new effort to transition Ukrainian military equipment from the Soviet era to NATO standards – which includes Kyiv acquiring F-16 fighter jets as well as the associated training and logistical support. The allies also negotiated an end to Turkey’s blockade of Sweden’s membership application, ensuring the Nordic state would soon join the defense organization. Member states also made a clear commitment that Ukraine would join NATO once the ongoing conflict had ended.
For the Western allies to commit and agree to so much made it one of the most consequential and effective summits in the alliance’s history and a strong rebuttal to Russia’s efforts. Still, it must be acknowledged that Ukrainian leaders expressed clear disappointment over a disconnect among allies that left Kyiv viewing their path forward as vague.
With that in mind, what are the particulars of a summit that proved to be so vital and why did Ukraine leave appearing upset? How does this prepare the Alliance for the future during the largest conflict in Europe since World War II?
Turkey ends block of Sweden application
That the meeting kicked off with the news that Turkey, which has the second-largest military in the alliance, would end its yearlong blockade of Sweden’s membership application is very significant. Sweden had originally applied with Finland in April 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The two countries had maintained their neutrality between the Kremlin and the West since the onset of the Cold War, but Moscow’s war of aggression served to alter their historic strategic posture. Finland was accepted into the alliance earlier this year, but Turkey objected to Sweden’s bid as the prevailing view in Ankara was that Sweden supported Kurdish groups that Turkey considered terrorists. The Kurds, a Muslim minority group, make up about a fifth of Turkey’s population and have a sordid and, at times, violent history with the Turkish government.
In response, Sweden amended its constitution, changed laws with respect to terrorism, and expanded its counterterror cooperation against the Kurdish militant group, the Kurdistan Workers Party. That still was not enough for Turkish President Erdogan. Stockholm also resumed arms exports to Turkey and made a new bilateral security compact with Ankara. NATO further committed to increasing its overall counterterror efforts and created the post of special coordinator for counterterrorism. But none of that appeared to be truly persuasive to Erdogan who had used this issue during his successful reelection campaign in May. He had portrayed himself as a populist who was the defender of Turkish nationalism.
It is widely believed that the U.S. decision to sell Turkey F-16 fighter jets convinced Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that he had extracted the most concessions he was likely to receive and resulted in his decision to clear the way for Sweden’s membership. Senator Bob Menendez, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, remains opposed to the F-16 fighter jet deal publicly, and had long held up any agreement with Turkey. But behind the scenes it appears his longstanding blockade of a fighter jet sale to Ankara was resolved. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Jeff Flake, former Republican senator of Arizona, is said to have flown regularly between Washington and Turkey to help smooth his former colleague’s concerns, which included recent Turkish incursions into Greek airspace. Menendez told CNN that for a deal to work, he would need to see “less hostility to a fellow NATO ally” – meaning Greece – “commitment that the tranquility that has existed over the last several months continues,” and “no use of US weapons against another NATO ally.”
During the summit, many were watching any announcements that might follow a meeting between Erdogan and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Vilnius. The visit between the country’s leaders appears to have been aimed at resolving disagreements between the two NATO members, which includes a historic territorial dispute in North Cyprus.
While it now appears Sweden has met all necessary requirements, the deliverables of the apparent deal will proceed slowly. Menendez reiterated his opposition to the deal last week, and Erdogan said the Turkish parliament would not consider Stockholm’s accession until it returns from recess in October.
Is Ukraine’s glass half full?
Many believe Ukraine should have much to be happy about with new military commitments to its defense, additional military aid, and a clear statement from all 31 NATO nations that its “future is in NATO.” And yet the Ukrainians could not hide that they were disgruntled that the summit did not offer Kyiv any specifics or a timetable to membership.
Hours before he arrived at the summit, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy telegraphed that he knew what was coming and blasted NATO’s leadership in a tweet. “It’s unprecedented and absurd when a time frame is not set, neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership,” he wrote before arriving in Vilnius. By the end of the meeting, Zelenskyy’s tune had changed after closed-door discussions with key alliance members, including President Joe Biden. Reportedly, the outburst nearly backfired on the Ukrainian leader.
While the pathway is admittedly vague, NATO has removed a step from the process (eliminating the so-called Membership Action Plan), promised to continue its support of Ukraine in its war with Russia, and said alliance member’s foreign ministers would regularly check on Ukraine’s progress toward NATO standards regarding democratization, addressing corruption and military integration. Furthermore, the Alliance announced a NATO-Ukraine Defense Council that would allow Kyiv to consult directly with NATO members on policy and strategic issues. Nevertheless, it was clear Kyiv wanted more.
Clearly, Ukraine cannot be granted entry into NATO immediately. If it were, it would immediately trigger Article V of the NATO Treaty and force all members to join the war against Russia. There is also the need for each NATO member state’s parliament or congress to vote in favor of a new member which is what occurred with the admission of Finland and is pending for Sweden. But Kyiv’s current status remains problematic, and even a “frozen conflict” would keep Ukraine’s borders undefined — which would complicate its membership further. Still, Poland and the Baltic States were seeking a clear statement that Ukraine would be given membership as soon as the war ended, as they continued to push for NATO to adopt a stronger response to Russian aggression.
Ukraine’s concerns are twofold. First, there is a growing belief that Kyiv is fighting a war for all of Europe, but it is left without assurances or equal status. Second, Ukrainian leaders worry their membership application could be negotiated away in a diplomatic settlement with Moscow, and Ukraine become a “buffer state.” There is also a fear that Russia could prolong the conflict to prevent Kyiv’s entry if NATO does not provide Kyiv a clear path to membership and the collective security guarantee. After all, Ukraine likely understands better than most that, as Winston Churchill once said, “The only thing worse than fighting a war with allies is fighting a war without allies.”
While their concerns are reasonable — after all Ukrainian national security interests were ignored in past agreements that provided vague security guarantees — it remains remarkable that thirty-one member states were able to agree on a statement that committed as much as it did to Kyiv. The Ukrainians could have come away from Vilnius in a much more tenuous position.
A new Cold War
At the conclusion of the summit, President Biden invoked Europe’s momentous history and compared Ukraine’s war with Russia to the Cold War, which tormented the continent for decades. Despite the comparison and yearlong commitment that it illustrated, he maintained that the U.S. and NATO support “will not waiver.” The speech seemed aimed at preparing allies, partners, and the public for a long war. This may have also been intended to dampen expectations for the much-discussed Ukrainian counteroffensive.
“Putin still wrongly believes that he can outlast Ukraine,” Biden said during a speech in Vilnius. “After all this time Putin still doubts our staying power. He is making a bad bet.”
To that end, NATO allies have made dramatic increases in current defense spending as well as future pledges that the U.S. has long complained were inadequate. Germany’s commitments alone after years of spurning the 2 percent GDP spending requirement of member states shows that Berlin’s reluctance to make the necessary financial commitments has changed tremendously. Allies also agreed to station more troops in frontline states, create a massive reserve force for rapid deployment, and reaffirmed NATO’s nuclear posture. All these efforts further illustrate the remarkable unity of the moment.
But Russia was not the only focus. NATO allies called on Iran to halt its nuclear efforts and acted to rebut the growing threat of China as a united front. While NATO members did not describe Beijing as an adversary, they invited Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea to attend as observers. Japan also became an “official partner” by signing a new agreement that addressed the “coercive” efforts of China on the international stage while also noting its human rights abuses at home.
In all, the meeting continued to underscore the unity of the alliance, which was sorely tested by the Trump administration and the withdrawal from Afghanistan. But it also highlighted that the world should be prepared for a long-term international security situation that could challenge our current thinking about the global order. The decades of relative peace in Europe that followed the end of World War II and the Cold War are being re-evaluated. There appears to be some hope, however, that the investments the alliance makes today may prevent “fighting a war tomorrow.”
