...between a series of bad options.
Yogi Berra, a Hall of Fame member of the New York Yankees and “philosopher,” once said, “When you come to a fork in the road, take it!” Vladmir Putin has taken Yogi’s advice in the conduct of his war in Ukraine.
Putin has had a few very bad weeks.
The Ukrainian counter-offensive in the northeast of the country has been a staggering success, and it continues. Kyiv liberated more territory in two weeks than Russia seized in the previous five months. Remarks by both Chinese President Xi Jinping as well as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during their meetings with Putin in Uzbekistan were clearly not supportive of Russia’s aggression.
He had an option in the aftermath of these military and diplomatic reversals to crank up his propaganda machine and announce that his “special military technical operation” had been a remarkable success. Putin could have argued Russia had “de-nazified” large portions of Ukraine, reduced the threat Kyiv posed, and sent a clear message to the West. He could have accompanied this by the announcement of a ceasefire and a call for negotiations. This might have brought the war to a pause and offered him a chance to use the upcoming winter to reorganize his forces.
His second option was to escalate. With a speech to the Russian people on 21 September, he made his choice. It is critical to consider what this means and how he might escalate further.
Putin escalated the war in three ways. First, he announced a “partial mobilization.” The Kremlin claimed it would consist of 300,000 reservists or those with previous military experience. It is the first mobilization by Russian armed forces since World War II and underscores the Russian Army’s desperate need for manpower. The Pentagon estimates the Kremlin has suffered around 80,000 casualties since this war began.
This is a desperate gamble and is, in part, a response to right-wing hardliners in the Russian media who have been openly critical after a string of recent defeats. But Putin risks greater social unrest and opposition to the war at home with the decision. This now occurring in many cities across Russia.
Up to this point, most Russians have been apathetic about the war, as Putin has sought to insulate the population from its ill effects. The mobilization will test the loyalty of those born after the demise of the Soviet Union and those less fond of the Russian strongman.
Second, Putin described this conflict as primarily between Russia and the West. He falsely claimed that Western leaders were threatening the very existence of the “Motherland." Consequently, Putin warned that he would “use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people. This is not a bluff.” This is an obvious threat to employ nuclear weapons and comes at an ironic moment. October is the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis which was the last time the U.S. was involved in a crisis that threatened global nuclear catastrophe.
This is a blatant attempt to intimidate Ukraine, Washington, and NATO. But it is also an effort by Putin to reshape the narrative. In this case, he is appealing to Russian nationalism. He is falsely describing Russia’s very existence as imperiled by outside forces and calling upon the nation to respond as their ancestors did against Napoleon’s invasion in 1812 or the Germans’ attack in World War II.
Third, he shared his support for the accession of four occupied Ukrainian provinces via this past weekend’s referendums. These were obviously sham elections and will subsequently lead to a Duma vote to formally annex these territories into the Russian Federation. Once that occurs these areas like Crimea, annexed by Moscow in 2014, will be deemed Russian territory by Moscow. This heightens Putin’s attempt at nuclear extortion. Once Moscow claims these areas are Russian territory, they can use any attacks against them as an excuse to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in their defense.
Since Mr. Putin has chosen a path of escalation, what might he do in the future? He has further escalatory options.
He can threaten nuclear catastrophe with missile and artillery strikes that would disable or damage a Ukrainian nuclear power plant and create a Chernobyl-like disaster. In the last week, a missile struck 1000 feet from South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. External power to the Zaporizhzhia plant, the largest in Europe, has been shut off several times forcing the staff to use emergency power to cool the reactors. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency has described the situation at the plant as “untenable and we are playing with fire."
This is a classic example of so-call “Hybrid Warfare,” which is the fusion of conventional with unconventional instruments of power and tools of subversion. Putin can threaten these facilities at times of his choosing. This has the intimidating effect of nuclear weapons without the potential international blowback. Such threats are actually criminal, as they endanger the staff and innocent civilians in Ukraine and beyond. Finally, they divert media attention away from reports of war crimes, Russian failures on battlefield and other challenges.
Putin could also further employ the “energy weapon” he has created. He has already ended the export of natural gas to Europe and could seek to do more. He clearly hopes skyrocketing energy costs coupled with the arrival of winter will result in social unrest in Europe. This might force European leaders to reduce their support for Ukraine and put pressure on Kyiv to accept negotiations on Putin’s terms.
His expanded attacks on Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure and closure of nuclear power plants are also part of this effort. They reduce energy available to Ukraine and will likely result in more refugees as winter arrives. This places additional pressure on NATO countries discourages them from maintaining their existing nuclear facilities, and forces them to consider sharing limited supplies with Kyiv.
Moscow could use the “food weapon” and once again halt the export of Ukrainian grain from its Black Sea ports. In July an agreement was signed by Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the United Nations that allows the export of millions of tons of Ukrainian and Russian grain and fertilizer. Ukraine and Russia provide roughly 30 percent of the world’s grain, and the failure to deliver these commodities to global markets may well result in famine in many parts of the world.
Finally, Putin could escalate militarily by further force mobilizations, strikes on NATO territory at locations important to the flow of military assistance, or expanded cyberattacks. The use of nuclear weapons as Putin threatened is also an option. This would likely be a tactical nuclear weapon, and Russia is believed to have 2,000 such weapons. They are designed with a nuclear yield below 100 kilotons and delivered by short-range aircraft, artillery, or missiles.
While the West cannot ignore expanded military threats, the probability that Putin would use nuclear weapons would appear low for several reasons. First, Russian military doctrine calls for the use of such weapons primarily to create conditions on the battlefield that can then be rapidly exploited by conventional forces. But Moscow no longer has readily available forces to exploit opportunities any such deployment might offer. Second, Putin would become even more of an international pariah than he already is. The tepid support that he now has from China, India, and other countries in the Global South would likely evaporate. Third, he would have to consider the response by the West. This could include the imposition of a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine, expanded military assistance, and even the direct involvement of Western ground forces. Washington has already sent private warnings about the grave consequences should Moscow cross the nuclear threshold. Fourth, the employment of such weapon(s) in eastern Ukraine would result in a radiation pattern that would threaten areas occupied by his forces or existing Russian territory.
Mr. Putin’s threats of escalation have not had the immediate effect he had hoped, and Western countries have announced their continued support for Ukraine. But there is no ignoring the fact that the world is at an extremely dangerous moment. It is critically important for the West to adopt policies that deter or respond to potential future escalation by Moscow while avoiding inadvertent escalation that could occur due to an isolated incident.
Fred Ikle observed in his book Every War Must End that wars end when one side changes its objectives or is forced to do so. Mr. Putin’s objectives have changed multiple times. He initially sought to capture Kyiv and topple the Zelensky government. He then pursued the capture of Odessa and the occupation of Ukraine’s Black Sea coastline. Putin has settled on an attempt to annex the Donbas in southeastern Ukraine and portions of the coast. All his efforts have failed. But Putin still believes he can “win,” and success will shatter the long-term unity of the West. He is convinced his willpower is superior to Western determination to resist.
Time will tell whether he is correct.
