WE HAVE REDISCOVERED INDUSTRIAL WAR….
A crisis of artillery shells on the front lines led to a British political crisis in 1916, as Prime Minister H.H. Asquith’s government collapsed. British military planners had long relied on shrapnel to defeat infantry in the open. But war is a harsh teacher, and this tactic was failing due in large measure to the arrival of trench warfare for which high explosive shells were better suited.
The rate of artillery fire had increased to control an increasingly static battlefield, and the stocks of shells were depleted quickly. The disastrous Battle of Aubers was the final straw, as British efforts had been stymied by a lack of artillery rounds.
Now 107 years after those battles, the United States, its NATO allies, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation have rediscovered “industrial warfare” and the consequences of false assumptions. The attached appendix summarizes the major weapons provided Ukraine by the United States since the onset of the war. Clearly, the ability of the U.S. to continue providing this level of support for these weapons is putting a significant strain on American war stocks and whether the U.S. can `expand production quickly to meet this growing problem.
The West Rediscovers Industrial Warfare.
In World War II there were 84 ammunition plants that produced artillery, tank, and small arms ammunition. During the Cold War, that number shrank to 16, and today only five remain.
The U.S. and its NATO allies maintained massive stockpiles of ammunition forward deployed in Europe, but most American ammunition stocks were either moved to the Middle East during Operation Desert Shield/Storm or returned to the United States following the end of the Soviet Union. NATO stocks also dwindled and massive amounts of artillery ammunition were declared obsolete and destroyed. Ironically, the expected lifetime reliability of a 155mm projectile is 20 years, which means that any artillery round produced during the Cold War is now expired.
As the military refocused its attention to “Operations Other Than War” in the 1990s and counter-terrorism/insurgency operations after 9/11, the possibility of large-scale mechanized warfare seemed remote. Investments in appropriate weaponry and associated ammunition were reduced by the United States as well as its NATO allies.
To better understand the looming challenge, let us focus on the 155mm howitzer since it has been the centerpiece of both the artillery platforms and associated ammunition provided to Ukraine by the U.S. and its European allies.
Since 2018, the U.S. has averaged production of 175,000 155mm shells annually. It is widely believed that roughly 76,000 were high explosive shells. So, depending on what you count within the 806,000 rounds provided to Ukraine, the U.S. has provided between roughly four and 10 years of our annual production.
Furthermore, it has been reported that Ukraine has expended roughly 6,000 rounds of artillery per day. During the ongoing counteroffensive, that number has increased. This means the 806k rounds provided by the U.S. is a little over four months of ammunition at that rate of fire.
This need will grow.
Ukraine depended on 152mm and 122mm howitzers that had been provided by the Soviet Union or locally produced. After six months these ammunitions stocks have been depleted. It is reported the British have sought to purchase shells from Pakistan for Ukraine, but percentage of artillery support provided Ukrainian forces will be increasingly provided by American systems.
Congress has appropriated $600 million to accelerate the production of munitions for Ukraine, and the most recent announcement of American military assistance to Ukraine further indicates a growing problem. The White House asked Congress to approve $13.7 billion to address Ukraine’s need as part of a short-term funding bill, but a significant percentage of the funding was earmarked to replenish American stocks. Most of the funding also went to contracts to industry for weapons and munitions that have not yet been produced. That means it may not arrive in Ukraine for many months.
Russia also affected.
For hundreds of years, the Russian military has revered artillery as “The God of War.” Not surprising that Russian tactics have attempted to use massive artillery fire to destroy Ukrainian towns, particularly in the Donbas Region. This was followed by a slow, deliberate ground offensive. Open-source information reveals that the Russian rate of fire has periodically reached 60,000 rounds per day.
Consequently, Russian artillery expenditures are reportedly to be over 4.25 million artillery rounds during the first six months of the war. These shells, however, had degraded reliability due to age, storage problems and poor maintenance. Prior to the war, Russian artillery stocks were estimated to be between five and 15 million rounds. Even if the higher number is assumed correct, it would mean Moscow has expended 30% of its available artillery stocks. At current production rates, this will take between five and 10 years to replace.
As these rates of fire grow, the artillery gun itself becomes more susceptible to catastrophic failure. Consequently, both Ukraine and Russian forces will also face a growing need to replace artillery tubes. Obviously, this is more acute for Moscow since their expenditure rates are higher and the average age of their artillery force is older.
Russia has sought to confront this growing challenge of weapons resupply in several ways. Moscow recently purchased drones from Iran that will be employed for both reconnaissance as well as strike missions. U.S. officials have also declassified intelligence that Russia will purchase thousands of artillery rounds, rockets, and small arms from North Korea. Pyongyang maintains millions of artillery rounds in its war stocks, but they are likely of poor quality, accuracy, and reliability. Furthermore, the movement of these munitions from North Korea to the battle will be a monumental logistical effort. This would also be a violation of United Nations resolutions aimed at curbing weapons purchases from Pyongyang.
Moscow has denounced this report as false. The Kremlin had hoped China would be willing to violate the American sanctions on supplying the Russian military. While China has been willing to buy Russian oil at a discount, Beijing, at least so far, has respected the export controls aimed at Moscow’s military and not tried to sell either military equipment or components.
Where does this go?
This is a problem that does not lend itself to a quick solution for the U.S., Ukraine, or Russia, but it will be critical to how this war turns out. While the challenge of artillery shells is acute, many of the weapons provided to Ukraine (i.e., Javelin, Stinger, HIMARS rockets, HARM, “smart” artillery rounds, etc.) are produced in smaller numbers than artillery rounds. Still, they are dependent on microchips. This will inhibit the ability to expand their manufacturing quickly and makes U.S. relations with Taiwan more important than ever.
In this regard, the U.S. has repeatedly warned China that if China’s computer chip companies violate sanctions against Russia, the U.S. will effectively shut down those businesses, cutting off their access to the American technology they need to make semiconductors vital to the Chinese economy.
Washington will also need to make difficult choices. First, Washington must continue to provide assistance to Ukraine as well as maintain its own wartime stocks. Second, there are expanded demands from our European allies to replace equipment and ammunition they have transferred to Ukraine as well as to pursue the modernization and expansion of their forces. Third, the Pentagon is seeking to accelerate arms sales to Asian allies in order to better deter China. Finally, Washington has also announced a $1 billion arms sale to Taiwan.
Bill La Plante, Defense Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, is urging a shift to long-term deals with manufacturers for the production of missiles, bombs, and ammunition needed by American forces and our allies. The Pentagon hopes this will push the defense industry to improve and expand its factories.
While this is a step in the right direction, it is insufficient. Historians describe the American role in World War II as the “arsenal of democracy.” America’s ability to produce massive amounts of weapons, ammunition, ships, planes, etc. for its own forces as well as its allies was key to victory. If Ukraine’s war demonstrates President Biden’s argument that the onset of the 21st century will witness a competition between democracies and autocracies, then a similar manufacturing effort by the United States and its allies is required.
