Former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was once asked what was the greatest challenge for any statesman? Macmillan quickly replied, “Events, dear boy, events.” Such is the case for President Joe Biden. Upon his arrival in the White House, it was clear Biden wanted to focus his Administration on ending the pandemic, building the nation “back better” in its aftermath, and the growing challenge of China. But events in Ukraine and Afghanistan as well as domestic challenges have overtaken these initial priorities. With diminishing returns for his original domestic and foreign policy ambitions, Biden’s trip to the Middle East raises two questions: Why did the President make this journey? And what was the outcome?
Biden traveled to the region July 13-16 with stops in Israel, the West Bank and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. During his last stop, he met with the Saudi leadership and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). The president had described Saudi Arabia as a “pariah” during the 2020 presidential campaign and clearly holds the prince responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi. This had strained American-Saudi relations. Consequently, their meeting and fist bump secured global coverage. He also met with the national leaders of the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) plus the leaders of Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan.
Biden waited roughly 18 months following his inauguration to visit the Middle East. His predecessor, Donald Trump, made Saudi Arabia his first foreign destination. Trump underscored his desire for close ties with the Arab kingdom by participating in the ceremonial sword dance with tribal leaders as well as placing his hands on a mysterious glowing orb with King Salman, President Sisi of Egypt, and his wife Melania.
Several common issues came up in both Israel and Saudi Arabia. First, the president wanted greater support from countries in the Middle East to isolate Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Upon his arrival in Israel, Biden described the Russian invasion as “a challenge to the peace and stability everywhere in the world,” and insisted “Putin’s war must be a strategic failure.” Both Israel and the Arab states have sought to remain “neutral” in response to Moscow’s aggression, and the president is aware that of the 10 countries with the largest populations on the planet only the U.S. has condemned Russia for its invasion.
Second, he sought regional agreement on how to respond to the threat posed by Iran. Biden has pursued efforts to negotiate a return to the Iran nuclear agreement or JCPOA from which his predecessor had withdrawn. U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley recently described ongoing negotiations as a “very dangerous situation,” and U.S. analysts believe Iran now has enough enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb. Ongoing negotiations between Tehran and the West appear stalemated. The Iranians have introduced new demands unrelated to the ongoing discussions during the latest talks in Doha. Malley argued that there's still time to resolve the current impasse, but Tehran must soon decide whether it was “prepared to come back into compliance.”
Third, Biden sought to improve relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Administration’s ultimate goal is for the two Middle East powers to establish diplomatic ties and enter the so-called Abraham Accords. Obviously, this would further reduce tensions between the Arab world and Israel as well as serving as a more effective deterrent to Iran.
Israel.
Biden received a warm welcome from Israel’s latest Prime Minister, Yair Lapid who described him as “our brother Joseph.” Lapid had only assumed power on June 30 following the collapse of a coalition led by his predecessor, Naftali Bennett, which had included Arab parties for the first time. This sets the stage for Israeli parliamentary elections in November — the nation’s fifth in four years. It also demonstrates the fragile nature of Israeli politics and the looming presence of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
As a caretaker, Lapid is hardly able to make major decisions, but he emphasized the threat of Iran during the concluding press conference. Biden underscored U.S. “unshakeable commitment” to Israeli security which he described as “bone deep.”
While the two leaders pledged to work together to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, they are divided on how to achieve that goal. Biden committed the United States to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, which could include a revival of the JCPOA. Lapid argued the West should prevent Tehran from having any type of nuclear program. “Diplomacy will not stop Iran,” he argued, without a “credible military threat.”
Beyond discussions of security, the major accomplishments of Biden’s visit may be the name given the final statement – the Jerusalem Communique and his flight upon departure. The former demonstrated the president’s acceptance that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, not Tel Aviv, which his predecessor had established. The latter represented a decision by the Saudi leadership to open their airspace to all civilian flights including Israel. The Administration quickly described this as a historic improvement in relations and a preliminary step towards Saudi Arabia entering the Abraham Accords.
Saudi Arabia and GCC.
The most controversial part of Biden’s trip was clearly his stop in Jeddah to meet the Saudi leadership and subsequent meetings with GCC and other regional leaders. The president, meanwhile, sought to downplay his meeting with MBS and insisted he was “meeting with nine other heads of state. It just happens to be in Saudi Arabia.”
Biden raised the Khashoggi murder at the onset of the meeting with MBS, but the president’s fist bump with the young Saudi leader will remain the most enduring image. It signaled the reset in U.S.-Saudi relations that Biden had wanted and provided MBS the international recognition he desired.
Biden argued that the trip was intended to reset relations for a “new engagement“ with a country that boasts an 80-year alliance with the U.S., but the centerpiece of conversation remained oil. As Americans suffer from rising inflation driven in part by energy costs, administration officials are keenly aware that the only countries with significant excess production capacity are Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Iran. The Saudis provided vague assurances to “support global oil market balancing for sustained economic growth,” but how much additional oil Riyadh and its Arab neighbors will provide won’t be announced until OPEC meets in August.
The final Jeddah Communique also underscored the importance of the strategic partnership between the two countries. It included future efforts to cooperate in energy security, climate change, the regional challenge of Iran, and cybersecurity. The communique also announced an extension of the current cease-fire in the war in Yemen, a Saudi-led conflict and one of the largest humanitarian crises on the planet.
In his final meeting with GCC and other regional leaders, Biden continued his efforts to reassert American leadership. American Middle East policy has moved away from 20 years of war that sought to ensure stability and the flow of oil to now dealing with the growing influence of Russia and China. In many ways, this compliments the recent NATO Summit where Russia was vilified and China was declared a challenge for the first time. The president described this shift in geopolitical terms, “we will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran.”
Conclusions.
The actual consequences of a “reset” often take time and unexpected events will ultimately have an impact. What occurs in the coming months will help answer how successful Biden's journey was. First, do the Saudis convince oil producers to expand production during August meetings? There is some hope that Saudi Arabia and the UAE could increase daily production by 1.25 million barrels.
Second, can the upcoming Israeli elections produce a government that is willing to make concessions with respect to the Palestinian? This might allow relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia to improve and set the stage for an expansion of the Abraham Accords.
Third, is the effort to renegotiate the JCPOA with Iran successful? The final collapse of the JCPOA and increased Iranian belligerence in the region could produce a crisis. With problems at home, a war in Ukraine, and the growing challenge of China Biden clearly wishes to avoid this possibility as he deals with an already overburdened foreign policy agenda.
Fourth, do countries in the region support American efforts that respond to growing Chinese and Russian influence? The White House has announced that all participants supported holding a “U.S.-GCC Summit annually.” Over time Russian isolation and poor military performance in Ukraine may encourage Saudi Arabia and states in the region to realize Moscow is not a reliable partner and further the Abraham Accords with Israel. Confronting Chinese influence in the region will be a longer process and demand both resources as well as time, but hopefully, Biden’s trip to the region is the first step on that journey.
Fundamentally, Biden’s trip to the Middle East was a triumph of interests over values. Supporters, as well as critics, will describe it in those terms. His efforts to isolate Mohammed bin Salman in the aftermath of the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi failed. The president has now acknowledged that future American policy towards the desert kingdom and the region more broadly will only occur by dealing with the young prince.
Finally, Biden’s argument that “democracies versus autocracies” was the organizing principle of his foreign policy has been compromised at least to a degree in response to the demands of the moment. There were few supporters of democracy at the meetings held in Jeddah. Consequently, the Administration in the tradition of Harold Macmillan has realized that it must accept the Middle East as it is rather than how they want it to be.
