Wishing you and your families a Happy and Safe Fourth of July.
Vladimir Lenin once said, “years go by, and nothing happens…then a week goes by, and decades happen.” The last four months have underscored the truth of these words.
The world has changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February. Four months since Russia attacked Ukraine, NATO leaders assembled in Madrid to discuss the largest armed conflict on the European continent since World War II and the future of the Alliance.
Russia sent a clear message to NATO leaders with a barrage of missile attacks against Ukrainian cities shortly before the summit began causing the number of dead and injured to grow even higher. After mere months, Ukraine and Russia have suffered tens of thousands of casualties – both military and civilian. Villages, towns, and infrastructure have been destroyed on a massive scale. The war will very likely result in famine in many parts of the globe and contribute to significant energy shortages, inflation, and an economic recession. The hours shared between world leaders in Madrid could be monumental, deciding the path of the conflict and potentially shaping the future of geopolitics.
This is only the second time in its history that NATO leaders assembled for a council of war. In 1999, leaders met in Washington, D.C. to celebrate the alliance’s 50-year anniversary. The war in Kosovo, however, led to the planning of NATO’s air campaigns and force deployments that resulted in a direct confrontation with Serbia and an indirect one with the Russian Federation, rather than the expected black-tie dinners. Choices made then still reverberate — Moscow continues to argue that NATO’s intervention in the Balkans was no different than the invasion of Ukraine. The decisions made during this meeting could be consequential in both predictable and unpredictable ways for decades to come.
With that in mind, what were the major outcomes of this momentous meeting? What are the implications for the future?
NATO – THE PAST AS PROLOGUE
Ten European countries, Canada, and the United States established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the onset of the Cold War in 1949. From its beginning, NATO was a collective defense alliance and its mission was to “guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means.” The Alliance is intended to promote democratic values and enable members to consult and cooperate on defense and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict through effective crisis management.
Article 5 of the NATO treaty is its cornerstone. It states that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. Over the past 70 years, NATO has grown to 30 members, and its unity of purpose successfully deterred an armed attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies throughout the Cold War.
The NATO SUMMIT IN 2022
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg described the Madrid Summit as having transformed and strengthened “our alliance at this pivotal time for our security.” Clearly, NATO leaders in light of the invasion of Ukraine made decisions that, if fulfilled, will have dramatic implications for European and global security.
Support for Ukraine:
NATO leaders reiterated their collective support for Ukraine, as did the leaders during the G7 Summit that ended a few days earlier. This included commitments to provide additional military aid such as secure communications, fuel, medical supplies, body armor, anti-drone systems, etc. Germany and Holland announced they would send additional artillery pieces to Ukraine, including the German Panzerhaubitze 2000s, which the Germans call "one of the most modern artillery pieces in the world." President Joe Biden also announced an additional $800 million in military aid to Kyiv.
While such statements and additional military aid will be welcomed by Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was critical of the level of support NATO has provided during his remarks to NATO leaders. He questioned the failure of the Alliance to establish a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine and expressed his disappointment that Ukraine was not provided with advanced fighter aircraft. He pointedly asked why NATO would not allow his country immediate membership. His remarks occurred as Ukraine suffered recent setbacks on the battlefield to include the loss of the Severodonetsk, the last major city in the Luhansk Province. Russia now occupies roughly 20 percent of Ukraine and appears prepared to continue a slow-moving offensive supported by the massive use of artillery and missiles. Meanwhile, Ukraine has made relatively smaller gains in the south, including the recapture of Snake Island, which could be pivotal for the country’s hopes to export grain.
Despite Western military assistance, Russian forces maintain enormous advantages in manpower and materiel. They outnumber Ukraine 10-to-1 in long-range artillery and are currently using 60,000 artillery rounds daily while Ukraine is only able to fire 6,000. Ukraine has also now admitted to suffering 100-200 casualties daily. If the West truly intends for Ukraine to prevail, then a dramatic increase in military aid is required. Some experts believe Kyiv will require 2,500 armored personnel carriers, five hundred tanks, as well as hundreds of additional artillery pieces if it is going to be able to mount an effective counter-offensive. This will also require a massive increase in training assistance to ensure these new weapons can be effectively employed.
Expansion of NATO reaction forces and force deployments to Eastern Europe:
Stoltenberg announced the Alliance would increase the NATO Response Force to 300,000 troops from its current level of 40,000. This will include pre-positioned equipment and stockpiles of military supplies that will be stored on the territory of the Baltic Republics and other NATO members that share a border with the Russian Federation.
But it is important to acknowledge that this is not an increase in the size of any nation’s armed forces, but the designation of additional existing units to be part of the response force. Furthermore, the Secretary-General acknowledged that implementation of this plan will not be completed until next year. Some experts described Mr. Stoltenberg’s announcement as “more fearsome on paper than in reality.” It caught many senior defense officials off guard as no advance notice had been provided. Several wondered what, if any, of their military forces were included in this announcement.
European nations (most notably Britain, France, and Germany) had already expanded the number of forces forward deployed to NATO’s frontline states in the aftermath of the Russian invasion. As a result, allied battle groups of a few thousand soldiers are now deployed on the territory of the Baltic Republics and other frontline nations. This includes both U.S. and European troops as both a deterrent to further Russian aggression as well as enhancing the region’s defense capabilities.
Despite these efforts, the Baltic states remain threatened by Russia due to their history, geographic location, lack of strategic depth, and recent statements by Putin comparing himself to Peter the Great. This has only increased in the last week due to the Russian complaints that Lithuania is blocking rail movement across its territory to Kaliningrad (a Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea). Moscow has since escalated its threats.
Consequently, Baltic leaders expressed their collective disquiet during the summit that there would not be a significant increase in allied forces deployed on their territory. Most of the forces earmarked for a reinforcing mission will remain in their respective homelands. They would only be moved during a crisis.
While this is both economical and may facilitate training, it means that significant investments must be made in air and sea lift to assure their rapid deployment during a crisis. Any decision to move the reaction force to the Baltic Republics or other NATO frontline states would also occur during a crisis. Consequently, political leaders would be faced with complex decisions with obvious escalatory consequences.
President Biden also announced a significant increase in American military presence in Europe in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. This included a permanent headquarters for the American Fifth Army in Poland, two additional F-35 fighter jet squadrons to be stationed in Britain, additional rotational combat brigades in Romania, and two additional destroyers to be based in Spain, among other moves. This will raise the overall American troop presence in Europe to over 100,000 from its current number of roughly 60,000.
Admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO:
The sudden announcement at the onset of the NATO Summit that Turkey’s President Erdogan had dropped his objections to the admission of Sweden and Finland as new members of the Alliance was a surprise to most foreign policy experts. Many had feared Erdogan might block accession for a year or longer, and the Biden administration had gone as far as to privately urge Ankara to drop its opposition.
Erdogan had objected to both countries due to their perceived willingness to allow members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Ankara views as a terrorist organization, to enter their countries. He was further angered by arms sales restrictions Sweden and Finland had imposed on Turkey following its military incursion into northeast Syria. It was also believed that the Turkish leader was enraged by U.S. support for Kurdish fighters in Syria who were combatting ISIS. He may have also hoped Washington would reconsider the decision not to sell American F-35 fighters to Turkey if he agreed to the entry of the Nordic countries.
The Turkish leader was successful in lifting the arms embargo by Sweden and Finland. They will also back Ankara’s participation in the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) which seeks greater structural cooperation among participating members. Both countries further agreed to support Turkish efforts against the PKK, amend their terrorism laws, and extradite terror suspects. Erdogan also likely believed that his very public objections to the admission of the Nordic states over issues of Turkish security might buttress domestic support as he faces re-elections next June.
The admission of Sweden and Finland will have several long-term security implications for NATO. First, the alliance border with the Russian Federation has now been extended by over eight hundred miles. This will result in additional requirements for forward-deployed NATO troops or reinforcements to both countries in a crisis. Second, NATO now clearly has an Arctic mission that will require additional ground and naval forces that can operate in this complex region. Third, the Baltic Sea has suddenly become a NATO “lake” with serious implications for Russian naval forces. Russian naval planners will find that deploying their fleet from Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg has been severely complicated by the fact that the Baltic Sea is encircled by NATO members.
Still, this dispute underscores a basic NATO fact and potential weakness. The Alliance operates under the consensus of all members. While a NATO of 32 members will be more powerful, it will also make consensus on difficult policy decisions more challenging.
A new strategic concept:
This is the first NATO Strategic Concept since 2010, and it is critical to understand that it is a “concept” and not a “plan.” It reflects the consensus of all current NATO member states. Thus, it is long on aspirations and short on details, and many parts of the document are a case study in “studied ambiguity.” Still, it is a dramatic shift in focus from the preceding concept and establishes a wholly new direction for the Alliance.
The new Strategic Concept clearly underscores the Alliance’s traditional purpose while acknowledging that the region “is not at peace.” Russia is described as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” This is a major departure from the previous concept that portrayed Moscow as a “potential partner” further demonstrating the dramatic change in the security environment.
China was included for the first time in a NATO concept. Beijing was described as a “challenge” to allied “interests, security, and values” as well as seeking to “undermine the rules-based international order.” This may have been a diplomatic compromise, as it is believed that the United States wanted stronger language that described China as a “threat.” But this also implies that NATO is no longer solely focused on the Euro-Atlantic region and has assumed an increased global focus.
For the first time ever, the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea participated in a NATO Summit. Their presence not only underscored the global impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine but also resulted in agreements to expand cooperation in such areas as cyber and hybrid threats, maritime security, counterterrorism, and the impact of climate change on security. Consequently, the emerging global security environment and potential close cooperation between Beijing and Moscow further suggest that the so-called American “pivot to the Pacific” or France’s desire for “strategic autonomy” are false choices.
The 2010 Strategic Concept also addressed alliance nuclear policy as a matter of direct deterrence capabilities. It also underscored the allies’ collective ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a decisive military response. The concept further emphasized that "an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities” remained a core element of NATO's overall strategy. The 2022 version goes further which reflects serious disquiet since Mr. Putin has “rattled his nuclear saber” during the ongoing crisis. The new concept emphasizes the continued importance of U.S. nuclear forces as well as the forces of Britain and France.
It also stresses the sustained need for “forward-deployed American nuclear weapons.” This refers to the roughly 150 nuclear warheads that the U.S. maintains on the European continent (stored in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) which are designed for delivery by dual-capable aircraft provided by alliance air forces. Maintaining this capability in the future will require Germany and Turkey to acquire the American F35A fighter. Germany announced the purchase of this aircraft in the last few months, but so far the United States has refused to sell them to Ankara.
Defense spending and burden-sharing:
A Westernized version of a Japanese proverb says that “vision without resources is a fairy tale,” which is a concept that NATO will again be forced to confront.
The military forces required by the Summit will clearly be very expensive. The question of “burden-sharing” or the willingness of each NATO member to provide their fair share in terms of manpower, weapons, materiel, and money has been an issue for the Alliance since its conception. In 2014 NATO codified this with a pledge that each member state would spend at least 2 percent of its respective GDP on defense. Nine allies have met this threshold (including prospective members Sweden and Finland), and 19 have prepared plans to do so by 2024. 5 have outlined plans to do so in the future.
Consequently, the question of defense spending and associated burden-sharing by NATO allies will continue to loom large with members of Congress. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted $857.46 billion for American national security in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. This is $45 billion more than requested by the Biden administration. This will be roughly 3.5% of American GDP.
Germany will be pivotal to this issue. In the days following the invasion of Ukraine German Chancellor Olav Scholz announced a “revolution” or “Zeitwende” in German security thinking. Berlin, which had not spent 2 percent of its GDP on defense since 1990, committed to achieving this goal immediately. For the past 20 years, Germany has spent around 1.3 percent on defense. In addition, Scholtz pledged to establish a special fund of approximately $130 billion for immediate investments in military capacity. Whether or not the Chancellor can deliver on this promise and convince the German population to make the necessary sacrifices is fundamental.
CONCLUSIONS:
The European security architecture created at the end of the Cold War was destroyed by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Consequently, the Alliance is confronted by the end of one era and the start of a new one. In many ways, the Madrid Summit returned NATO to a Cold War military footing conceptually, but it remains to be seen whether this will translate into agreed investments, strategy, forces, and policies in the future. Still, it is critical to realize that the future of NATO will be defined by how it meets this challenge.
Moscow was likely surprised and angered by the results of the Madrid summit. Mr. Putin’s immediate reaction was a combination of defiance, bluster, and a threat to respond militarily if he perceives expanded threats to Russia. He had probably hoped for an extended and acrimonious admissions process for Sweden and Finland that would demonstrate disunity among NATO members. The results were hardly encouraging for the Russian leader. Putin had argued prior to the invasion that NATO posed a growing threat to Russian national security. His war in Ukraine has resulted in a NATO that is larger, more united, supportive of Ukraine and deploying more forces to Eastern Europe. As many observers have noted, he managed in the early weeks of the war to undermine two hundred years of Swedish neutrality and decades of German pacifism.
Putin still likely believes his willpower and patience are greater than his Western adversaries. He will be watching carefully for any sign of lagging Western resolve and was heartened by several recent political developments in the West. Ten American Senators (several who may run for President in 2024) voted against recent funding to support Ukraine. President Emmanuel Macron’s party recently lost its majority in the French Parliament. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson appears to be on the “political ropes” following an attempted vote of no confidence. President Biden’s popularity has fallen below 40% in some polls, and American voters are beset by growing inflation, the abortion debate, mass shootings, and a looming economic recession. As the leader of the Alliance, Mr. Biden must in the words of one expert, “transform short-term unity borne of reactive shock into enduring cohesion, borne of affirmative purpose.”
At difficult moments thoughts from the past can be instructive. On 20 January 1961, John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as President of the United States. In his remarks that day President Kennedy observed, “Now the trumpet summons us again – not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need – not as a call to battle, though embattled we are – but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation.” These words should resonate not only with Americans but with our allies in Europe and Asia. Ultimately, the crisis we now face is not about Russia, Ukraine, or even China in the longer term. It is about us.
