newswire: 9/21/2020
- According to the latest official figures, the fertility rate in England and Wales continued its long decline in 2019 and has now fallen to 1.65. At the same time, the age of first-time mothers continues to rise; the mean age of childbirth now stands at nearly 31. (Office for National Statistics)
- NH: The downward total fertility rate (TFR) trend continues for England and Wales. Last year, the TFR was 1.70. Now it's 1.65, five ticks further down.
- That's only one or two ticks above the lowest-ever annual TFRs for England and Wales--2001 (1.63) and 2002 (1.64). When the number for 2020 rolls in, around August of next year, we will almost certainly see the TFR plunge to its lowest level ever. The U.S. broke its earlier all-time low in 2018 (at 1.74), and no doubt it too will fall further in 2020. (See "U.S. Birthrate Drops Fourth Year in a Row." and "The Baby Bust of 2020.")
- Oh yes, in case you were wondering, the TFR for England and Wales essentially tracks the TFR for all of the United Kingdom. Scotland's TFR is even lower (1.37) and dropping even faster than England and Wales'. Northern Ireland's TFR is slightly higher (1.85 in 2018) but of course Northern Island is a negligible share of the UK's total population.
- The following chart by the World Bank, which only goes until 2018, tracks the UK's TFR over time. Note that this year it will be closer to Germany's than to France's. America's TFR is heading in the same direction.
- For decades, the TFR of the UK, the US, and several other Anglophone countries was significantly higher than fertility rates in most other developed nations--especially those in western Europe. This became known as something of a puzzle for demographers--and many ingenious and plausible theories were invented to explain it. (See "Like the U.S., England-Wales Experiencing a Birth Rate Decline.")
- One frequently cited explanation was the relatively high net immigration rates of Anglophone countries. Since immigrants typically have higher fertility rates than natives in high-income countries, this might help explain Anglophone exceptionalism. Over the last decade, however, net immigration rates in these countries have been trending down slightly--and, more importantly, the TFR of immigrants has been falling much more rapidly than the TFR of natives. This is partly due to the changing origin of immigrants. (In the US, for instance, low-fertility immigrants from Asia now exceed higher-fertility immigrants from Latin America.) And it is partly due to the exceptional hardship experienced by immigrants in earnings and unemployment in the decade following the GFC. (See "Hispanic-American Birthrate Plummets.")
- Like the US, the UK has also experienced this steep decline in immigrant TFR. One example, referenced by The Economist, is the East End of London, a traditional first destination for immigrants from abroad. Twenty years ago, the East End's TFR was well above that of the rest of the UK. Today, it is below.
- In any case, it looks as though this "Anglophone fertility puzzle" is disappearing. So pretty soon there will be nothing left to explain.
- In one respect, at least, England and America continue to differ. Unlike the US, the UK is rapidly losing its positive fertility differential between rural and urban regions. If you scroll around the Office for National Statistics' interactive map of England and Wales, you will notice relatively little TFR difference from one local district to another. In the US, the rural-urban TFR is not only wider, it is in fact widening over time. (See "Regional Fertility Gap Widens.") In the UK, there does exist something of "red-blue" political divide between rural and urban regions, but unlike the US it is not as correlated with sharp differences in religiosity and family size.
- One final point. It is sometimes argued that declining TFRs in the US or UK may not indicate any fall in completed female fertility but rather a temporary "tempo" effect. The argument is that women are not having fewer children, but are simply having them later. In the case of the US, I have responded that such a tempo effect--though no doubt part of the story--cannot possibly be driving most of the TFR decline. Why? Because if it did, we would noticing at least some climb in fertility rates at older ages at the same time that we see a fertility decline at younger ages.
- But we aren't seeing much rise at older ages in the US. At age 25-29, fertility has been declining since 2014; and at age 30-34, it has been declining since 2016. At age 35-39, it has plateaued. Over age 40, sure, it's rising. But 40+ births--accounting for only 3% of the total--can't possibly compensate for the declines at younger ages.
- The same could be said about fertility by age in the UK. (See chart below.) UK fertility rates are now declining for all age groups under 40.
