Why Does America Have Old Leaders? NewsWire

newswire: 9/14/2020

• In an op-ed, writer Ian Prasad Philbrick asks: “Why Does America Have Old Leaders?” In other wealthy democratic countries, elected leaders are generally getting younger, but at home the presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court all look like gerontocracies. (The New York Times)
• NH: When Donald Trump was elected in 2016, he was 70 years old. That was the first time in American history that someone in his 70s was elected to the U.S. presidency. (Ronald Reagan, elected at age 69 in 1980, was the closest runner up.)
• Now, in 2020, the next president is guaranteed to be in his 70s: either Trump at age 74 or Joe Biden at age 77. By 2024, assuming the next president survives a full term in office, the president will be either 78 or 81. Neither age, needless to say, has any historical precedent in this country.
• So what's going on? Is this part of a longer-term trend?
• Presidential age of course bumps up and down depending on who gets nominated and who gets elected. But yes, if you look back over the broad sweep of history, it's fair to say that the leadership age is trending upward. From the nation's founding until Teddy Roosevelt and the progressive era, the average age trend was down. But ever since, the average age trend has been up, from the early 50s to the early 60s.

• You can get a sense of this sweeping U-shape by looking at the ten U.S. presidents elected in their 60s. Five of them were elected before the Civil War: John Adams, Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and James Buchanan. The other five were elected after the end of World War II: Truman, Eisenhower, Ford, Reagan, and Bush Sr. During the 88 intervening years of (mainly Republican) presidents, the average age was younger.
• The recent rising trend isn't just an accident of the presidency. If you look at the average age of state governors or members of Congress, you see the same rising trend since World War II. The following charts are created by my "Generations of American Leaders" database.

• One plausible explanation is a modern trend toward better health (physical stamina and mental alertness) among older persons. Such a trend is hard to measure exactly, but let's assume that the overall age-adjusted health of people past age 60 is moving upward roughly in tandem with their longevity. Since 1950, male life expectancy at age 65 (the typical leader is still a man) has increased by 5 years, from about 13 to 18 years. This would explain a 5-year rise in average leadership age. But the actual rise in the average age of presidents or state governors since 1950 is more like 10 years for both. And if we keep electing presidents in their mid-70s, it will be more like a 20-year jump for the White House.
• OK, so much for what has been happening in America. How does this aging trend compare with what has been happening in the rest of the developed world--which is the subject of Ian Philbrick's NYT essay?
• Very differently, as it turns out. Philbrick points out that the average age of presidents and prime ministers across all of the OECD countries has been going in the opposite direction since 1950--down, not up.

• He lays out three explanations for the divergence. Explanation one is simply the larger relative demographic size of the postwar Boom Generation in America. Presumably, at least since Bill Clinton in 1991, this size advantage enabled Boomers to enter leadership positions at an unusually young age and is now enabling them to keep clinging to such positions at an unusually old age.
• IMO, this is a weak theory. The larger relative size of Boomers was shared to some extent by other developed countries (especially the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). And the tiny percentage differential could not possibly explain more than a few months difference in the trend over time.
• Explanation two--which Philbrick attributes to me--points to generational differences between the United States and the other countries. Specifically, I have pointed out that American social generations manifest over time a clear alternation between dominant and recessive types. Dominant generations come of age into adulthood during crises or awakenings and tend to be, well, dominant in political leadership. Recessive generations appear as children during crises or awakenings and tend to be crowded out of leadership spots. (See "Political Cartoonist Feels for Gen X.")
• To illustrate, consider all 17 U.S. presidents born since 1861: They belong to six generations, three dominant (Missionary, G.I., and Boom) and three recessive (Lost, Silent, and Gen X). Thus far, 14 presidents belong to the dominant generations. Only 3 belong to the recessive generations: The Lost Generation got 2 (Truman and Eisenhower). Gen X has 1 (Obama, though that may be generous since many consider him to be a Boomer). And the Silent are still zip, though Joe Biden may at last break this perfect null record. (See "Last Chance for Silent Generation to Lead.")
• America's victory in World War II combined with America's postwar supremacy empowered the G.I. Generation to rise to leadership at a relatively young age and stay in power until a relatively old age, pretty much shutting the Silent Generation out of executive power. The G.I.s were directly followed by a generation of Boomer moralists who thereafter have been squeezing Xers out of top spots.
• Xers, as I have often pointed out, lag behind every earlier U.S. generation at the same age in their share of governors or members of Congress. Amazingly, aside from Obama, no Xer even entered as a presidential primary contender in either party until 2016, 55 years after their first birth year. The first Boomer entered (Al Gore in 1988) at age 40 some 28 years earlier. In time, Gen X is sure to achieve a plurality of governors and of members of Congress. They are likely to get another president or two. But their tenure is also likely to be short, interrupted by the early rise of the next dominant generation, Millennials.
• Yet this American generational dynamic did not appear in most of the other developed countries. The "war generations" in Europe and Asia did not emerge into the postwar era with the same reputation for energy and competence of the G.I.s. This allowed the European and Asian "silent generations," with their reputation for technocracy and compromise, to rise to power at a much earlier age than in America. European Boomers, in turn, came to power later than in America and, when they did come to power, they did not differ as much (especially in the EU) in their process-driven managerial style.
• As for Xers abroad, they are very much taking over. Nearly all of the European populist movements are led by men and women born after 1960--the European equivalent of Generation X. Two European countries (Austria and Finland) are already led by "Millennials" in their mid-30s.
• All this matters because, during the 1950s, the average leadership age in America sank as the dominant G.I. Generation was taking over the reigns of power at an early age from the exhausted Lost Generation. And recently it has been rising as the dominant Boomer Generation grows older without heavy competition from Xers. These dynamics, which did not happen abroad, have given an upward slope to the average leadership age trend in America.
• Oh yes, Philbrick also raises a third explanation, which differentiates between nations with presidents versus prime ministers. He points out, interestingly, that the declining leadership age trend across the OECD has occurred mainly in countries with prime ministers. (See again the above chart.) Prime ministers are more likely to be controlled by the major parties they belong to. And the parties may want to choose younger leaders either to control them better or to burnish the parties' "youthful" image. Presidents, on the other hand, are more likely to rise to power on the strength of their own national popularity or personal wealth. 
• Though Philbrick doesn't exactly spell out how this works, he implies that social change over time is favoring youth in prime ministers rather than presidents. Maybe the major parties in parliamentary systems, as they get desperate to attract younger voters, are deliberately leaning toward younger leaders. And maybe the presidential contenders, dependent as they are on national reputation and wealth, still tend to get stronger as they get older.