Trendspotting: The Baby Bust of 2020

newswire: 8/10/2020

• A new study predicts that the United States will see 300,000 to 500,000 fewer births next year due to the pandemic, which would be about a 10% decline from  2019. In the past, public health crises and severe recessions have each led to declines in births; a combination of the two is likely to result in an even bigger “baby bust.” (Brookings Institution)
• NH: At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, some pundits predicted that all those couples cooped up with nothing to do would lead to a baby boom. Historical evidence (see “Covid-19’s Effect on Fertility Rates”) suggested this was wishful thinking. But before the duration and severity of the pandemic were known, a rebound wasn’t out of the question.
• Nearly six months in, it’s becoming clear just how unlikely this scenario is. All signs indicate we’re heading for a baby bust.
• This Brookings study estimates that we’ll see up to half a million fewer births next year. Why? We’re facing a combination of two scenarios that have historically driven down births: a major economic crisis and a major public health crisis. Study after study has shown that, all things being equal, the prospect of higher incomes is associated with having more children. So is confidence that an abrupt loss of income (like losing a job) is unlikely. When times are good and unemployment is low, people feel more secure about having kids. During the Great Recession, births fell sharply, about 9% overall, with the hardest-hit states seeing bigger declines. As unemployment rose, birthrates fell in tandem.

• A similar dynamic applies during public health crises. Not surprisingly, the uncertainty and stress of a pandemic aren’t conducive to having kids. The authors of the study found that during the 1918 Spanish Flu, large spikes in mortality corresponded with significant declines in births nine months later. The estimated monthly birthrate during this period was 24 births per 1,000 people; when death rates surged, it fell to roughly 21 births per 1,000 people. When death rates fell again, birth rates returned to normal--but they never made up for the declines, leading to fewer kids overall.

• Around the time the Brookings study came out, the Guttmacher Institute released the results of a survey of American women conducted in late April and early May. One-third of women (34%) said that because of the pandemic they wanted to get pregnant later or have fewer children. A much smaller share--only 17%--said they wanted children sooner or more of them. Women also reported that they’re more careful now about using contraceptives. Anecdotally, demand has risen for long-lasting forms of birth control like IUDs and implants.
• Groups that have borne the greatest health and economic effects of the pandemic were the most likely to say that they wanted to delay having kids or have fewer of them. Black (44%) and Hispanic (48%) women were much more likely than white women (25%) to report such a change, and lower-income women (37%) slightly more likely than higher-income women (32%).

• With COVID-19 still raging, these figures could easily go even higher. Death rates from the virus have surged again over the last month, and the unemployment rate is still in the double digits. Let’s not forget that the factors were already depressing fertility prior to the pandemic--stagnant wages, high child care costs, a lack of family-friendly public policies—still persist.
• Indeed, what is grimly anomalous about the record-long economic recovery of the 2010s is how little effect it had on pushing up the total fertility rate (TFR). From 2007 through 2019, the US TFR declined every year except for one very minor uptick in 2014. Overall, US TFR dropped from 2.12 to 1.71. If it were to drop another 10% in 2020, it would end up at 1.53--which is almost exactly the EU's average TFR in 2018. In barely more than a decade, America's reputation for exceptional fertility would disappear. US policymakers may find themselves, much sooner than anticipated, trying to design "pronatal" policies in the manner of Poland, Hungary, or Russia (whose TFRs in 2018 were 1.5, 1.6, and 1.6, respectively).
• Sure, some may hope that American women will "make up the difference" later. Hope springs eternal in this so-call "tempo effect." But we haven't seen it yet. And as the saying goes among demographers, fertility delayed is fertility denied. Right now we’re looking at some very serious delays.