Massive protests over the last month in key cities of the Middle East, including Algiers, Cairo, Beirut, and Baghdad, caused some analysts to speculate that the region is on the verge of another "Arab Spring" - recalling the largely failed but extensive uprisings against Arab authoritarian leaders in 2010 and 2011.

  • With the exception of Tunisia, the sad legacy of the uprisings nearly a decade ago is that, while despotic governments were overthrown, the hopeful "spring" quickly became a bleak "Arab winter;" despotism returned in all but name.
  • The latest uprisings, in Beirut and Baghdad in particular, despite the near-record protest numbers in both cities, are destined to end in the same, tragic way. Protests are in essence over in Egypt, thanks to arrests by the thousands in the typical muscular, brutal style of Egyptian security forces; and a promised December election in Algeria appears to have tempered public anger. 
    • But robust protests continue in both Lebanon and Iraq, with strategic consequences both to the U.S. and to our key ally, Israel.  

What’s driving the protests? Common throughout the movements is anger over corruption, stagnant economies, and the absence of even the most basic public services. But it’s a focus on the governing “elites” that draws the fury.  A cry that resonates in Iraq and Lebanon is, “All of them Out!”

  • The governing model in both countries is “confessional,” meaning that key posts are allocated not by competence or open voting, but by sectarian alignment. In Lebanon, for example, it means that the president must be a Maronite Christian, the PM a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker a Shia.
    • Iraq’s leadership allocation is less formal, but it’s still sectarian. It is this governance scheme that protestors have targeted; PM’s in both countries have announced their resignations.

The push-back to the protestors has been brutal, especially in Iraq. At last count, over 300 have been killed and over a thousand injured. Iran’s proxy network throughout the region - unaffected by Trump sanctions – is working overtime in Iraq and Lebanon to maintain Tehran’s influence.

  • Iranian sniper teams have been responsible for some of the deaths in Iraq. "We know how to handle protestors,” was the quote attributed to one Iranian sniper team leader.
  • And in Lebanon, Iran-supported Hezbollah is effectively a state-within-a-state; they will shape the political outcome, not the protestors.

U.S. diplomatic attention to the unrest has been, at best,  unfocused - surprising, given the strategic stakes; the U.S. still has over 5000 troops deployed in Iraq, a country with the world’s fifth-largest proven oil reserves.  And Lebanon’s deepening unrest plays into Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s hands; he is especially eager to ramp up receipt of even more Iranian rockets.

  • U.S. leverage is not inconsequential, especially in Lebanon where the economy verges on collapse and financial assistance is desperately needed; and in Iraq, U.S. forces are the best insurance against an ISIS revival, an existential threat to the Baghdad government.
  • In short, Washington needs to get off the diplomatic sidelines and deploy U.S. soft-power tools on behalf of the few friends who remain in both countries.

In the end, however, these under-reported and by now months-long protests will fail to produce lasting change in either Iraq or Lebanon. The reasons are sadly familiar: the absence of leadership, and the inability to translate massive protests into political movements. Social media can help rally millions in an instant; it can’t instantly produce enduring governance.

  • And Iran, in over-watch, guarantees political sclerosis. The power broker in both countries, Tehran will continue to exploit sectarian rifts, to keep its favorite “elites” in power long after the protests subside.