A ceasefire in Gaza – What now?
The war in Gaza that began on 7 October 2023 has become one of modern history’s most significant Middle East conflicts due to its scale and the humanitarian crisis it sparked. Its legacy will surpass previous regional wars in terms of the human cost, economic devastation, and geopolitical impact on the region. Hamas’ attack resulted in over 1,700 Israeli civilians being murdered and 250 taken as hostages. In response, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) conducted a land and air campaign that killed over 46,000 Palestinians in Gaza alone. Of those killed, at least half were women, children, and the elderly.
The war has caused nearly $18.5 billion in infrastructure damage in Gaza, according to a preliminary assessment by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union. Since its start, the war has also had a dramatic effect on the Israeli economy – the nation suffered a 21% decline in year-on-year economic activity in the fourth quarter. Lebanon also faces a deepening economic crisis after the Israeli invasion in August 2024, and Egypt has lost one of its primary sources of revenue as international shipping routes have been directed away from the Suez Canal to avoid Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea.
After months of negotiations, Hamas and Israel finally agreed to terms that could end the war, though it is possible it may not survive its initial phase. Joe Biden and Donald Trump were both quick to claim credit for the Gaza ceasefire agreement, and both deserve some. Biden worked on the terms of the deal since the conflict began, and the final agreement reflects an outline he presented in May. Trump helped pressure the Israelis to accept it.
The agreement has three phases. First, there is an initial “full and complete” six-week ceasefire that includes the exchange of 33 Israeli hostages held by Hamas for roughly 1,000 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Palestinians are also able to return to northern Gaza, and Israeli forces will withdraw from populated areas. Phase 2 would essentially be “a permanent end to the war,” according to Biden, and include an exchange of the remaining Israeli hostages in return for approximately 2,000 additional Palestinian prisoners and the full withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza. The final phase would consist of negotiations to establish a governing authority in Gaza and reconstruction, which will take years.
The region now has an opportunity to move to greater stability and prosperity, but there is a high probability that there will be continued violence, and several failed states may emerge that could allow extremism and terrorism to flourish. It will demand a massive effort by all participants, the Trump Administration, and others for all three phases to be effected and the war to be brought to a close. But there are also many regional complexities that will need to be addressed soon and key questions that actors across the Middle East must answer.
Israel
Israel’s military success has come at enormous costs and strain on the nation. The heads of the IDF (Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi) and Israel’s Southern Command (Major General Finkleman) have resigned in response to investigations into the security failures of 7 October. It is very likely that future investigations will also cast blame on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and members of his government. The Israeli leader and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant also faces arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court to face charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Israel has largely destroyed the military capabilities of Hamas, but its goal of destroying the organization has not been achieved. The IDF has also defeated Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as inflicting significant damage to Iran’s air defense network and reduced its capacity to produce propellant for its missiles. But these are only temporary successes. The question for Israeli leaders is: can they translate this into long-term strategic change that brings greater stability to the Middle East?
Netanyahu’s thinking remains short-term, as he has repeatedly made it clear that he reserves the right to resume the conflict. The prime minister reportedly told the conservative members of his cabinet who opposed the accord that they needed to back the deal to ensure President Trump’s support in the future. This could include support for a resumption of hostilities, Israel’s formal annexation of the West Bank and possibly Gaza, as well as a potential future confrontation with Iran. He also likely fears the end of the conflict, as it could lead to elections – and his party and coalition have performed poorly in polls since 7 October.
Hamas and Gaza
While Hamas’ military capabilities have largely been destroyed, it did demonstrate some residual capability during the initial exchange of hostages as well as a degree of political control in Gaza. The group’s primary goal was to ignite a regional war that would result in the destruction of Israel. While that effort failed, Hamas achieved one critical objective – it survived.
The group still largely controls Gaza’s administration and security forces, and its entrenched power creates a dilemma for Israel. Gaza’s Hamas-run government has sought to clear rubble, restore basic services, and provide security. Members of its police force have reappeared on the streets to curb looting, protect aid convoys, and prevent crime. It continues to coordinate with international organizations and told Reuters that it had 18,000 employees working to provide essential services to residents.
The question for Hamas is can it rebuild and maintain some degree of governing authority in Gaza if this agreement gets to Phase 3? Will it face a confrontation with the Palestinian Authority over who will provide that governing role, or will this ensure a return to conflict?
Lebanon and Hezbollah
Hezbollah in Lebanon has always been Iran’s primary client in the Middle East and served as Tehran’s major deterrent. Israel always had to consider that Hezbollah would attempt to overwhelm Israeli missile defenses with thousands of missiles if they ever attacked Iran directly. In August 2024, the IDF launched an air and ground campaign to destroy Hezbollah after it launched missile and drone attacks on Israel in the aftermath of the initial Hamas attack. In the aftermath, Hezbollah has been soundly defeated, and it is questionable whether Iran can rebuild the Shia paramilitary group.
But Hezbollah remains a major political force in Lebanon, and, like Hamas, it is unlikely to disappear. The Israelis know this, and it may explain why Netanyahu has reportedly asked Trump to support a delay to Israel’s negotiated withdrawal from Lebanon.
Lebanon, meanwhile, is attempting to find a way past the country’s sectarian political system, with two new leaders disliked by Hezbollah. General Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, was elected president by the country’s parliament on 9 January. Nawaf Salam, a Saudi-backed Sunni who led the International Court of Justice, was appointed prime minister. Their election illustrates that many Lebanese are opposed to Hezbollah and believe its attack on Israel was catastrophic. But can the new government achieve full control of the state and pull the country back from the brink of economic ruin? Will it confront Hezbollah and, if so, could that trigger another civil war?
Syria
The collapse of the Assad regime after 53 years was in many ways a byproduct of the Israel-Hamas conflict. Syria was critical to Iran as it allowed the transit of military aid from Iran to Hezbollah, Hamas (in some cases), and other resistance groups in the West Bank. It is important to remember that Tehran’s initial attack against Israel came after an Israeli airstrike in Damascus killed an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps general.
In the subsequent political vacuum, there are now at least three major armed groups controlling different portions of Syrian territory. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham advanced from Idlib province to capture Damascus, the Syrian National Army (SNA) largely controls the border between Syria/Turkey, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control eastern Syria where the Kurdish population lives. Significant fighting has occurred between the Turkish-backed SNA and American-supported SDF since the fall of Assad.
The United States continues to maintain about 2,000 soldiers in SDF-controlled Syrian territory. Their mission is focused on counter-ISIS operations, and the SDF holds over 40,000 ISIS fighters and family members in detention camps. Will the Trump Administration maintain troops in Syria? Can the new Syrian government convince these rival groups to unite under a single flag? If not, the situation will devolve into another civil war.
Iran
Iran is in a more weakened position than at any time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Tehran achieved little by attacking Israel twice with missiles and drones. In response, the Israelis destroyed a significant portion of Iran’s air defenses and its capacity to produce missiles. As mentioned, its proxies – Hezbollah and Hamas – are largely defeated.
The country now faces severe economic challenges, with its currency falling to an all-time low against the dollar (750,000 Rials to $1). That is driven, in part, due to uncertainties surrounding Trump’s return to the White House and the future of economic sanctions. The country is also facing a severe energy crisis despite its vast oil and natural gas reserves. As a result of industries closing, there has been an increase in popular unrest. These challenges will make it difficult for Iran to rebuild its proxies and regional deterrence.
Tehran has two choices. First, it can seek to negotiate an agreement with the US and its Western allies that limits Iran’s nuclear efforts in exchange for a reduction in economic sanctions. Second, it can accelerate its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon to establish a level of minimal deterrent against a possible Israeli/U.S. attack. But that leaves Iran’s leaders with an existential question, and Assad’s fall could indicate that Iran’s religious leaders are losing control.
Saudi Arabia
The Biden Administration had long sought to expand the Abraham Accords which resulted in four Muslim countries (the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan) normalizing relations with Israel. It hoped to have Saudi Arabia join this group, which would have been a regional game changer and increased Iran’s isolation. But this effort was halted by Hamas’s attack against Israel.
It is widely believed that Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman remains extremely interested in achieving an agreement but is fearful of how his population may react after 14 months of hostilities. It is expected to be a priority again under the new Trump Administration, which negotiated the initial Abraham Accords. The Crown Prince was the first foreign leader President Trump phoned after his inauguration, and there are reports that Saudia Arabia could be Trump’s first overseas trip. Still, many believe that for normalization to occur, Israel would need to accept some movement towards a two-state solution with the Palestinians – a difficult pill to swallow for the Israeli far-right.
The Middle East is undergoing dramatic geopolitical change. What has occurred in this conflict and with this ceasefire is the regional equivalent to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. A strategic opportunity exists, but it will be difficult for the current leaders to seize this moment and bring lasting peace to the region.