GEOPOLITICS | Col. Jeffrey McCausland: Washington’s Role in the Middle East One Year Later… - MadMadWorld 2022 NEW 2.0

Fewer than two weeks before the U.S. election, Israel conducted a series of airstrikes on Iranian military targets. The strikes were in response to a large-scale ballistic missile attack that Tehran launched against Israel on October 1, and it is the latest iteration of the tit-for-tat that has occurred between the two countries – which has threatened to escalate the ongoing conflict in the Middle East into a major regional war. All eyes are now on Iran and how it will choose to respond.

Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, has said that the Israeli air strikes which hit Tehran and other areas must "neither be downplayed nor exaggerated". He added, however, that Iran must correct what he described as Israel’s "miscalculation", and that any response must be determined by what is in Iran's best interests. Consequently, the war that has now gone on for over a year following the attack by Hamas against Israel is at an inflection point. Tehran might decide to escalate directly or through its proxies in the region against both Israel and the United States. Alternatively, there may be a chance to restart negotiations on a ceasefire and the release of hostages in Gaza, as the heads of Mossad and the CIA meet in Doha with the prime minister of Qatar – who has been a key mediator throughout this conflict.

Whatever Iran’s decision, the next president of the United States will face continued challenges in the Middle East. After a year of conflict, this begs two critical questions: What is Washington’s position in the war now, and what will America’s role be in the future?

How did we get here?

More than 1,200 Israelis were brutally murdered and another 250 were taken hostage during a brutal Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. The majority of those killed or captured were women, children, the elderly, and young people attending a music concert. 

That attack has led to one of the longest and most destructive wars in the history of the Jewish state. Over 42,000 Palestinians have been killed and 96,000 wounded. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have been tightlipped about casualties, but it is believed roughly 1,000 soldiers have been killed and 7,000 wounded in the ongoing conflict. There are 1.9 million displaced Palestinians in Gaza, and 60,000 Israelis have been forced from their homes. In Lebanon 2500 have died and over 12,000 have been injured. One million Lebanese are now refugees.

Multiple countries have attempted to encourage a ceasefire and avoid further escalation, but those efforts have had limited success. The war is no longer confined to Gaza. It is now a regional conflict that involves the countries or regional actors in Lebanon, Yemen, the West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Four events have recently occurred that may have changed the course of this war and Washington’s role:

1.    The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which has added a new “front” and expanded the overall conflict.

2.    The death of Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

3.    The death of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

4.    Israel and Iran’s direct attacks on one another.

Netanyahu’s success is Biden’s headache.

Israel’s invasion of Lebanon has put the United States in a difficult diplomatic position. The White House has sought to secure a ceasefire for many months. Furthermore, President Joe Biden has clearly grown frustrated with the aggressiveness of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Jerusalem’s willingness to expand this conflict, failure to expand humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians, and unwillingness to discuss a parallel political effort for the war’s aftermath.

Washington also believes the death of Sinwar in mid-October and Nasrallah at the end of September offer an opportunity for Israel to reduce its military efforts. The White House has argued that the Netanyahu government has achieved its objectives of destroying Hamas militarily and politically while dramatically reducing Hezbollah’s military capabilities. But this lame-duck administration has appeared powerless in influencing Netanyahu and moving Israel toward ceasefire negotiations prior to the November election.

Netanyahu appears determined to continue the conflict. He seems to believe that he has an opportunity to destroy Israel’s enemies – or at the very least remove them as a threat for years to come. He also knows that the extreme right-wing members of his coalition remain opposed to any ceasefire and might withdraw their support if he pursues it. This would bring down his government, force national elections, and potentially open him up to a long-delayed trial for corruption.

Furthermore, Netanyahu believes he has weakened Israel’s biggest enemy – Iran – which has now directly attacked Israel twice and inflicted very little damage. Iran’s most powerful proxies – Hezbollah and Hamas – are fighting for survival, so Tehran has lost the central pillars of its deterrent strategy

It does appear that Biden was successful in convincing Netanyahu not to strike Iranian nuclear facilities or energy infrastructure, which would have likely sparked a large-scale Iranian retaliation. Instead, the IDF targeted around twenty conventional military targets around Tehran and western Iran, including vital air defense assets and facilities tied to the country’s drone and missile programs. Consequently, it will be difficult for Tehran to meet its own weapons needs as well as resupplying its proxies, and the Iranians know they are now more vulnerable to a future Israeli attack should they choose to respond to the recent Israeli airstrikes. 

American Involvement widens over time.

As the conflict has continued over the past year, the American's role in both supporting Israel and responding to a widening conflict has increased. This goes beyond the $18 billion in military aid that Washington has provided Israel since the conflict began. It has sparked military responses from groups, areas, and countries throughout the Middle East. As a result, the US Navy is involved in its most intense sustained combat since World War II.

Houthi fighters in Yemen – acting in solidarity with the Palestinians – have conducted one hundred attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea. They have sunk two vessels, seized another, and killed at least four seafarers. It has also been reported recently that Russia has been providing targeting data to the Houthis through Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers embedded with the Yemeni group. This has been invaluable in their efforts to disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea, further demonstrating how far Vladimir Putin is willing to go to disrupt the West and raising the stakes for Washington even further.

In response, American forces have conducted hundreds of airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. The US Navy has engaged Houthi drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and more on almost a daily basis. On October 15, the U.S. Air Force conducted an airstrike against underground Houthi weapons storage sites using B2 bombers launched from bases in the United States. It is widely believed this was a message to the Houthis and Iran. 

This is only one example of how the United States has become increasingly involved in the conflict. Let us not forget that the U.S. has maintained two carrier battle groups in the region for nearly a year – one in the Mediterranean and one in the Arabian Sea – and increased the 40,000 troops that were in the region at the onset of the conflict. Consequently, senior military officials have remained worried that groups supported by Iran may conduct retaliatory strikes against American forces in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere in the region

American forces are also preparing for a potential massive evacuation from Lebanon, where there are over 80,000 Americans. U.S. Marines had to evacuate nearly 15,000 Americans during a previous war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006. Consequently, some Pentagon officials are becoming increasingly concerned about whether the expanded American involvement in the war is
constraining this conflict or inflaming it.

That is why it may come as no surprise that the Biden Administration has sought greater leverage. In October, the White House sent the Israeli government a memorandum that threatened to reduce military aid if the Netanyahu government did not expedite humanitarian aid to Gaza which is key to achieving a ceasefire and avoiding a humanitarian disaster. Gaza aid convoys, which feed 1.9 million displaced people, had plummeted to an all-time low. Washington gave the Israelis 30 days to respond and effect a change, which means the deadline falls after the American presidential election. 

Where does this lead?

There appears little reason to be overly optimistic that Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza and Lebanon will conclude any time soon – though there are indications that Iran is increasingly interested in a ceasefire and may choose to defer any response to the recent Israeli airstrikes. CIA Director Burns and his Israeli counterpart have returned to Qatar for possible renewed negotiations, and Egypt and other Arab states are urging renewed efforts to obtain a ceasefire and release of the hostages.

But the path to a ceasefire remains difficult. Prime Minister Netanyahu does not appear inclined to aggressively pursue negotiations at this moment. He believes that Israel is “winning.” Furthermore, he may think in the aftermath of the Israeli strike on Iran that Tehran will realize that its proxies are largely defeated, and it is increasingly vulnerable.

Hamas and Hezbollah have suffered significant losses to their respective military capabilities. The IDF leadership now says that only four of the twenty-four battalions of Hamas fighters that existed at the onset of the war remain. Both groups have also suffered losses of leadership. It will clearly take time for new leadership to be identified and consolidate control over their remaining forces. Whether they will be able to muster the willpower to move toward a negotiation in the aftermath of what their organizations have suffered is difficult to predict.

Finally, the Biden Administration has little diplomatic leverage, and that will remain true until the presidential election is over. Once a new president is elected, Washington may be able to pursue a more aggressive effort to end the conflict in the waning days of the Biden Administration. But that could also depend on who is elected, their priorities, and how they are perceived globally. It is a certainty, however, that soon this conflict in the Middle East will no longer be Joe Biden’s problem – it will belong to Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.