India and its Prime Minister Narendra Modi have kept their options open as the global order has been
upended in recent years by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s aggressive expansionist policies.
That sense of impartiality is something President Joe Biden is hoping to change, however, when Modi
arrives in Washington, D.C. for an official state visit, only a few months before India is set to host the
G20 Meeting. This is only the third state visit by an Indian leader to the U.S. in 75 years.
The Biden Administration is seeking to expand economic, diplomatic, and potentially security ties with
India as a future bulwark against the growing threat posed by the People’s Republic of China. The aim is
also to undermine the economic support India provides to Russia by purchasing weapons and oil from
Moscow. But India has successfully remained above the “fray” and avoided aligning its policies closely
with any other nation, despite maintaining its ties with the U.S., China, and Russia.
Under Modi’s religious and conservative leadership, India is undergoing a nationalistic transformation
with a young population and a booming economy. Its median age is one of the youngest at around 28
and, after three decades of steady growth, India’s economy ranks as the fastest-growing among the G20
nations. It is emerging as a significant world power that has immense influence, particularly over the
global south and developing countries. In this strong position, India has been able to pursue its own
priorities that frequently differ from the West’s, China’s, or Russia’s.
The Biden Administration, like its predecessors, recognizes India’s voice is only growing stronger and
seeks its support and cooperation. Prime Minister Modi knows this. With that in mind, what might we
expect from the Indian leader’s visit to the White House? Could Washington secure closer relations with
New Delhi on issues of economics, diplomacy as well as national security, or at least convince Modi that
his nation should more forcefully respond to the aggressive policies of both Beijing and Moscow?
India’s historical and present conflicts
Since India achieved independence in 1947, the country has followed a policy of nonalignment
throughout the Cold War, and this has continued in response to recent East-West tension. Worldwide it
is considered a leader of the so-called “non-alignment movement,” as many smaller or poorer countries
have long sought to avoid being involved in superpower rivalries that they do not believe address the
needs of their populations. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru famously said more than a half-century ago, “We are not pro-Russian, nor for that matter are we pro-American. We are pro-Indian.”
This was the founding foreign policy principle that has guided India and now many other nations.
India may have been non-aligned during the Cold War, but it maintained cordial relations with the Soviet
Union. New Delhi purchased massive amounts of Soviet military hardware and continued this military
dependency once the Soviet Union collapsed. Today, approximately 60-70% of the equipment in the
Indian Army and Air Force was purchased from Moscow.
New Delhi still has its own national security concerns, some of which have persisted since the former British
colony first became a nation. Tensions between India and Pakistan have existed since the two nations
were partitioned along religious and political lines in 1947. This has resulted in one of the most
militarized borders in the world, three wars, and many skirmishes between these two countries. Even
today New Delhi keeps roughly 100,000 troops deployed in the vicinity of Kashmir. American efforts to
also have good relations with Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as well as
America’s own war there complicated efforts to improve cooperation with New Delhi. This only got worse after the attack by ten Pakistani terrorists in November 2012. This attack resulted in the death of 164 civilians and is viewed by the Indian population as their “9-11.”
India has also fought a war with China, as the 1962 Sino-Indian War occurred along their shared border
in the Himalayas. There was a brief subsequent border clash in 1967, and Indian leaders have continued
to argue that the Chinese occupy territory that belongs to India. Tensions rose once again between
Beijing and Delhi in recent years and brief skirmishes have occurred between Indian and Chinese forces.
The most recent occurred in December 2022. As a result, India has also deployed roughly 100,000
troops in this region and made a significant effort to improve the road network and airfields to support
military operations in the Himalayas. Chinese naval expansion in the Indian Ocean has also become a
major concern for the Modi government.
India now has the second-largest military on the planet and is also a significant nuclear power. New
Delhi conducted a nuclear test in 1974 and subsequently built a nuclear arsenal that today is believed to
consist of roughly 160 nuclear warheads. Indian leaders had strongly objected to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (signed in 1968) as a discriminatory measure against non-nuclear states.
Pakistan followed suit with nuclear tests in May of 1998 which occurred only a few weeks after India’s
second round of nuclear tests. Islamabad’s arsenal is now slightly larger than India’s, and Pakistani
leaders have also begun the development of so-called “tactical nuclear weapons.” The expanding
nuclear arsenals of these two nations coupled with their historical animosity as well as growing
terrorism in the region have continued to endanger international peace and security.
Obstacles and opportunities
In October 2008, the U.S. lifted a three-decade U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India — a major
breakthrough in relations between the two countries. Critics argued that it reversed 50 years of U.S.
nonproliferation efforts and undermined attempts to prevent states like Iran or North Korea from
acquiring nuclear weapons. But by further providing U.S. assistance to India’s civilian nuclear energy
program and expanding U.S.-India cooperation in energy and satellite technology, it also cemented a
new and more cordial relationship between New Delhi and Washington.
Another significant development in the relationship came through the formation of the Quad,
orchestrated by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 as a strategic security dialogue
between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. It included diplomatic dialogue and joint military
exercises which were viewed as a response to increased Chinese economic and military power. Though
the Quad briefly ceased, it was resurrected at the 2017 ASEAN Summit to counter China militarily and
diplomatically in the Indo-Pacific region. It is also important to note that India remains the only Quad
member with a border with China.
Rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region have created conditions where relations between Washington
and New Delhi could improve both rapidly and significantly. This is particularly true given the recent
Chinese “balloon” controversy as well as recent aggressive military actions by the PRC and India’s
position as a burgeoning economic and military superpower.
But obstacles, as well as opportunities, persist. The wave of Hindu nationalism that Modi and his party
rode to power cannot be ignored. His government has clearly sought to restrict the rights of Muslims,
and supporters fomented recent widespread ethnic violence in Manipur. His primary political opponent,
Rahul Gandhi was also convicted of defamation for a remark he made about Modi during the 2019 election. He now faces a two-year prison term and loss of his seat in parliament, and this comes just as the nation prepares for national elections in 2024. Many fear that Indian “democracy” is now at risk.
Still, Modi currently enjoys 70% popularity with the population based on recent polls and may be the
world’s most popular democratically elected leader. He is clearly a populist, and his policies are not
dissimilar from those pursued by Prime Minister Victor Orbán in Hungary or President Erdogan of
Turkey. As chair for the G20, India was critical of the war in Ukraine at a recent meeting it hosted of the
world’s largest economies. Prime Minister Modi argued the war placed global sustainable development
at risk. Consequently, his government has continued its traditional foreign policy goal of remaining
“nonaligned” while benefiting from the purchase of Russian energy at discounted prices. Russian oil now
accounts for nearly 20% of India's annual crude imports, up from just 2% in 2021.
Outcomes?
It does not seem, however, that the Biden Administration should have lofty expectations about the
outcome of Modi’s impending trip. State visits are largely staged events with significant pageantry and
pre-planned “deliverables” It was not a coincidence that Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin visited India
earlier this month as did National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.
U.S.-India economic relations have improved significantly in recent years. Bilateral trade increased to
$191 billion in 2022, and the United States is now India’s top trading partner. Observers should expect
announcements concerning expanded trade, improved supply chains, semiconductor chips, and perhaps
an agreement for the joint production of GE F-414 jet engines to power indigenous Indian fighter aircraft
or the co-production of long-range artillery. There also appears to be planning to announce an initiative on
critical and emerging technology that could portend dramatic cooperation between Indian and
American defense industries in the future.
But Washington should not expect a dramatic shift in Indian national security policy.
Modi’s policies are popular at home and his third-way strategy has the support of many underdeveloped
countries globally. He is unlikely to change his public stance on the Ukraine War and will likely reiterate
his support for peace (though it is doubtful he has a plan for it). At most, the U.S. and India will have
discussions about tensions in the Taiwan Straits, but policy will not change. At this point, Biden would be
delighted with a bland joint statement that “peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and South China
Sea is in the national interests of both countries.”
There is an old saying “culture eats strategy for lunch daily,” and this might clarify Indian policy
perspectives. Modi remains a Hindu nationalist who desires that his country have “partners” around the
world. He has yet to see a reason for close allies.
