With the results of the presidential election, American voters made clear that domestic issues should be prioritized over foreign affairs – particularly regarding the war in Ukraine. President-elect Donald Trump promised voters that he would end the war with Russia within 24 hours of being elected. While he never presented a plan that would convincingly conclude the conflict – and it is likely impossible to end a clash of this magnitude very quickly – it will be a primary concern for him when he returns to the White House next month. Ending this war will be challenging especially since it has escalated significantly since August, and there is little doubt that we face the possibility of global conflict with the possible use of nuclear weapons.
In August, Ukraine seized the Kursk region of Russia, and Putin pledged to force them out quickly. But Moscow’s efforts have failed, though it has retaken roughly half of the territory it lost through some very bloody battles. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified ground operations in the Donbas region and seized 1,100 square kilometers of Ukrainian land since 1 September – a notable gain considering Kremlin forces only captured 387 square kilometers in all of 2023. The Russian offensive is now capturing territory at a pace not seen in this conflict since 2022. But this is occurring at a horrific price – roughly 1,500 Russian casualties daily.
There are other important variables that have accelerated the conflict in the last few months:
● Ukraine is dramatically short of manpower, and Washington has publicly urged Kyiv to lower the age for conscription from 25 to 18.
● Thousands of North Korean troops are being trained by Russia to fight on the frontlines which may be a significant part of the Kursk pending counteroffensive.
● The U.S. has allowed Ukraine to use long-range missiles at their maximum range.
● Moscow has intensified ballistic missile and drone attacks on Ukraine, which has included the first-time use of an intermediate-range ballistic missile. These attacks have focused on destroying Ukraine’s electric power grid as winter approaches.
● Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a modification of the Kremlin’s nuclear doctrine in a clear effort to intimidate Ukraine and the West prior to Trump’s return to the Oval Office.
Further complicating matters for the incoming Trump Administration – Russia and Ukraine appear far from a peace deal and have very different views on arriving at one.
Though we do not know how the incoming Trump Administration plans to end the conflict, we can likely guess their planned approach given that the president-elect has tapped retired General Keith Kellogg – A Vietnam veteran who served as National Security Council chief-of-staff during the first Trump Administration – to serve as special envoy for the war in Ukraine. Kellogg, a rare mainstream figure in Trump’s orbit who has remained loyal to him, presented a peace plan to the president-elect in April. It is unknown whether Trump intends to accept his plan but it is plausible considering that others, such as former acting Director of National Intelligence Ric Grenell, reportedly shared their own proposals with him and also lobbied for the job.
Kellogg’s plan
Kellogg presented a plan titled “America First, Russia & Ukraine: Research Report” to Trump in April. Co-written with Frederick Fleitz, a former CIA analyst who is now the vice chairman of the American First Policy Institute Center for American Security. The proposal attracted little notice when it first became public but was largely disregarded as a capitulation to Russia by many within the foreign policy community.
While the authors write that it was essential that “Russia lose this war,” they allege that the Biden Administration moved too slowly to provide “Ukraine with the weapons it needed to expel Russian forces early in the war” and should have “used all forms of statecraft to end the war, including sanctions, diplomatic isolation of Russia, and, ultimately, negotiations” to achieve those ends.
They argue that because “there was no U.S. strategy to achieve a ceasefire as an end state of the conflict, nor to deal with the reality that Ukraine would likely lose a long-term war of attrition” circumstances now require a new philosophical premise for recommendations that boils down to “we are where we are.”
“It is too late to avoid the possible consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” they argue. Consequently, the plan recommends forcing Ukraine to the negotiating table with Russia, and that Washington adopt this as its official policy. There is no mention of coordinating with allies, but it appears to encourage Trump to make this decision unilaterally. The authors argue that Washington can force Kyiv’s hand by making Ukrainian military aid dependent on its participation in negotiations with Moscow. They do not explain how these negotiations would be organized. It is unclear whether these would be bilateral discussions between Ukraine and Russia, if the U.S. would participate, or if other allies would have a voice in the matter.
To encourage Putin to agree to a ceasefire and subsequent negotiations, the plan suggests offering to “put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period, in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal, with security guarantees” for both Ukraine and Russia – which would in essence involve Moscow in a NATO decision. Kellogg and Fleitz argue that any long-term commitment between the alliance and Ukraine provokes Russia, and the war could have been avoided by the Biden White House agreeing to delay Kyiv’s accession into NATO by a decade.
The authors acknowledge that a formal territorial settlement “would require a future diplomatic breakthrough which probably will not occur before Putin leaves office.” In the meantime, they endorse a political-territorial framework recommended by the Council on Foreign Relations that includes a negotiated ceasefire along the existing frontlines, which would allow Kyiv to preserve its remaining territory. It would also require limited sanctions relief on Russia, an understanding that Ukraine had not formally ceded any lost territory to Russia, and peace talks.
It is possible and likely that this plan has changed since it first became public, given the shifts in the conflict over the past few months. As of now, however, this is the clearest picture that we have of Trump’s intended approach to the war.
The Putin and Zelenskyy reality check
In response to the Kellogg plan, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that “if the idea is to give up territory, it is not new… it is a bad idea that will not lead to peace.” On the other side of the conflict, Dmitry Peskov, the chief Kremlin spokesperson, said that Putin’s peace initiative – which the Atlantic Council deemed “a blueprint for the destruction of Ukraine” – is the only basis for negotiations that Russia is willing to accept. This includes formally ceding Crimea and the Donbas, disarming Ukraine and forcing it to adopt Russian as the country’s official language, limits on the size of Ukraine’s military, and the russification of Ukrainian culture, religion, history, and national identity.
Neither country is likely to accept the other’s terms. But Putin and Zelenskyy must both face harsh domestic realities at this point, which could encourage them to take seats at a negotiating table.
For Zelenskyy, he must contend with falling popularity. A new Gallup study suggests most Ukrainians support an end to the war. More than 52% indicated their preference for a negotiated peace rather than continued fighting, which is a 25% drop in domestic support for the war since 2022. Ukraine also faces major manpower issues as previously mentioned and expanding conscription will not be politically popular. But Zelensky will seek bilateral or multilateral security guarantees as part of any ceasefire or subsequent agreement. This could be the most difficult part of any negotiation.
Putin, meanwhile, is beginning to feel a growing amount of domestic pressure as well. He believed this conflict would end in a matter of days, but it has now lasted for more than 1,000. British intelligence believe Moscow has suffered 700,000 casualties (100,000 dead) as well as the loss of over 3,500 tanks and 7,500 armored vehicles. Moscow is no longer able to replace its losses through recruitment and, consequently, has turned to North Korea and other countries for replacements.
The war and Western sanctions have also placed increasing stress on Russia’s economy. Moscow announced that it is increasing its defense spending in 2025 to $145 billion from $86 billion in 2022. This spending represents 6.2% of Russia’s GDP (as compared to 3.5% for the US) and 40% of the country’s total budget in 2025.
Consequently, Russia has been forced to decrease payments to wounded soldiers and the families of those killed – which will be unpopular. There is also a growing labor shortage due to high casualties and many workers moving to jobs in defense industries because of higher wages. This has contributed to inflation, and Moscow already admits to 9% inflation though many experts believe it could be twice that level. The Central Bank recently increased interest rates to 21% interest rates, and the Russian currency has also dropped to levels last seen shortly after the invasion in 2022.
The road ahead for Trump
The president-elect will want to fulfill his campaign promises and find a quick solution. Still, he could be fearful that if he imposes a solution on the Ukrainians his opponents could describe it as not dissimilar to the Biden Administration’s catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan. That may encourage him to push for a ceasefire that turns this war into a “frozen conflict” with months, if not years, of negotiations.
He may also realize that backing a Moscow-favorable proposal might encourage China to conduct similar aggression against Taiwan. Some of his advisers may also urge him to consider the impact such actions may have on the unity of NATO, but that is unlikely to be persuasive to Mr. Trump.
The truth of the matter is that all wars must end. Inevitably the Ukraine conflict will conclude as well, but the Trump Administration will need to ask what any potential solution portends for future stability and American national security. Because of how the conflict has evolved and grown to include more stakeholders, it is impossible to consider it within a vacuum.
Ending the Ukraine war is not an isolated event. It will have serious implications for America’s role around the globe. Forcing Kyiv’s hand could weaken U.S. alliances and embolden Washington’s adversaries. The question for the Trump Administration is one of cost-benefit and the future direction of American foreign policy. Does it seek to maintain the global norms and alliances created at the end of World War II, which have greatly benefited the United States, or does it seek greater isolation and policies that might accommodate aggression?
