At around 1:45 in the morning on April 14, the sky over Israel erupted. Loud blasts could be heard as its air defenses protected the nation from an aerial bombardment. Iran had chosen to attack Israel with 300 explosive drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles before dawn. In the aftermath, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, a spokesman for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), said 99% of the projectiles were intercepted by Israel, supported by U.S., British, Jordanian, and other allied forces. Israeli air defenses held and limited the fallout. While this attack may have assuaged the demands of Iranian hardliners, it failed to inflict significant damage on the Israeli military or cause large-scale civilian casualties.
No one was strategically surprised when this occurred. Tehran had telegraphed its plans for nearly two weeks after Israel struck an Iranian diplomatic compound in the Syrian capital of Damascus on April 1, which killed a senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) Quds Force general officer and several of his deputies. But while everyone knew the attack was coming – President Joe Biden warned it would “come sooner rather than later” a day before the strike – It was a surprise in terms of the number of weapons employed, how widespread the military targets were across Israeli territory, and the attack emanating directly from Iran as opposed to Tehran employing one of its proxies. The Israeli military even published a map that showed the entire country covered in red dots, which depicted the areas at risk of being hit and where people should seek shelter.
Iran and Israel have fought a “shadow war” for years. Across decades, the conflict appeared limited to Israel delivering strikes against IRGC targets in Lebanon and Syria. Iran would then respond using its proxies to fire rockets at Israel. Israel also conducted special operations attacks, cyberattacks, and assassinations of Iranian military officers and scientists in Iran and elsewhere.
This Iranian air blitz threatens to transform the ongoing Middle East crisis into a major regional war. The world is genuinely waiting anxiously to see how and when Israel might respond – because a response seems inevitable. The layers that existed between direct conflict and war have now disappeared, and it may be impossible to rebuild them.
President Biden reaffirmed America’s “ironclad commitment” to Israel’s security in a phone call to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately following the attack. But the president also warned his Israeli counterpart that he should “think very carefully and strategically” about his response to Iran’s first direct attack against his country. Netanyahu should consider Israel’s successful defense a victory. After all, the attack had a limited effect: the Israeli military said that a base in the country’s south sustained minor damage and a seven-year-old Bedouin girl was severely wounded in a village nearby. But while the president congratulated the prime minister for the successful defense, which the U.S. had aided, he also told him that American military forces would not directly participate in any counterattack against Iran. The Biden administration has made clear it will not be dragged into a war, despite Netanyahu likely eying multiple political benefits of a direct conflict.
Before the attack, it was widely known that Iran had substantial drone, missile, and targeting capabilities but these proved insufficient to penetrate Israel’s defenses, even with the help of the other members of the Axis of Resistance. (Hezbollah expanded its attack on Israel and the Houthis launched missiles as well.) Furthermore, there have been reports that a substantial number of Iranian ballistic missiles failed on launch or crashed on the way to their target.
Israel could not have defended itself alone, however. It received significant help from the US military, which shot down dozens of drones and missiles. US Central Command (CENTCOM) provided Israel with critical intelligence and targeting information as the Iranian attack began. British Armed Forces and Jordan – which was criticized by other Arab countries for helping – also aided the effort. It has also been reported that Saudi Arabia assisted in the identification and shootdown of the missiles and drones passing over its territory. Israel, meanwhile, relied on its three-tier air defenses network: Iron Dome (low level out to 45 miles), David Sling (mid-level out to 180 miles), and Arrow 3 (high level and strategic in range) with astonishing success. Put simply -- during this attack, Israel and its allies demonstrated far superior anti-missile capabilities than Iran has missile capabilities.
The Biden Administration is now focused on avoiding a full-scale war between its close ally and Iran. It would appear some type of response is inevitable, but the timing and character of the response may reflect political divisions within the Israeli government. Netanyahu’s governing coalition is dependent on some conservative and hawkish politicians. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, both considered extremely far-right figures, are urging a massive military response and could threaten to withdraw political support from Netanyahu government if their demands are not met. Ben-Gvir said after a deadlocked weekend war council, which demonstrated the division within the Israeli government, that the only way to deter Iran is for Israel to go “crazy.”
Israeli minister Benny Gantz, a centrist who joined the government after the 7 October Hamas attack, has taken a more cautious position and said in recent days that Israel would "exact the price" from Iran “in a way and at a time that suits us”. US media reported that Israel had planned to launch a counter-strike immediately after the attack, but Netanyahu decided to delay it after speaking to President Biden. All of Israel’s allies seem to be encouraging restraint. Still, an Israeli response is only a matter of time. As General Herzi Halvei said after a war council on 15 April, the Iranian attack “will be met with a response”, but reports attributed to Israeli leaders suggest it could be “limited in scope”.
Limitations could be in the method of retaliation as well as the targets struck, and Israel has several options. These include a large-scale missile attack combined with airstrikes against Iranian targets, even though this would be a very difficult operation. It would require violating the airspace of several neighboring countries (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq). Air strikes would also be dependent on the ability to refuel aircraft during the mission to ensure they could strike their targets and have any chance of returning to Israel. This is a capability that Israel has in a limited fashion. Israel could also consider a large-scale strike against an Iranian proxy such as Hezbollah or a series of cyberattacks combined with special operation missions inside Iran. The latter is a path they have pursued in the past. In terms of targets, Israel could focus its efforts against the missile and drone bases that were launch sites for Iran’s attack. But they could also widen the target set to include other military facilities, oil infrastructure, or facilities associated with Iran’s nuclear program.
The Biden Administration is pushing for a wide-ranging diplomatic effort to stop this crisis from skidding out of control. The president convened a meeting of the Group of Seven (G7) “to coordinate a united diplomatic response”. The participants unanimously condemned the attack and said they “stand ready to take further measures now and in response to further destabilizing initiatives.” Israel has called for wider global economic sanctions against Iran and its UN ambassador called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. But it is likely Russia and China, who both maintain a close relationship with Tehran, that will stall any UN effort to hold Iran responsible.
Meanwhile, Congressional leaders are also facing renewed pressure to vote on a military aid package for Ukraine and Israel that has been stalled in Congress due to opposition by right-wing Republican members. This could be the last chance for the U.S. to provide this support before the election, and House Speaker Mike Johnson has announced that he will have the chamber vote on the aid packages as individual bills.
President Biden is clearly concerned that the U.S. could be drawn into a wider conflict with Israel against Iran, and he also fears that this might trigger a dramatic rise in oil prices with serious implications for the global economy. This would occur rapidly if the conflict resulted in the closure of the Straits of Hormuz, attacks on American forces in the region, Iran began seizing ships in the Gulf, and further chaos spread throughout the region. Consequently, the Biden Administration continues to urge Israel to declare its thwarting of the Iranian attack as a dramatic strategic success and abandon plans for a counterstrike. But the Administration is pursuing a wider strategy to further isolate Tehran diplomatically and economically. This could even imply Biden will pursue additional consultations with Chinese President Xi Jinping, whose nation is dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf.
Consequently, Israel’s challenge is to “retaliate” but not “escalate.” Still, any response must reflect the grim realities of the war in Gaza. Israel is fighting a multi-front war – an impending offensive on Rafah in the Gaza Strip, attacks by Hezbollah from southern Lebanon, growing violence in the West Bank, and missiles from the Houthi rebels in Yemen targeting Israeli ports and commercial ships in the Red Sea.
It is also worth noting that before the Iranian attack, relations between the US and Israel were severely strained. There had been global outrage after the IDF struck an aid convoy in the Gaza Strip killing seven humanitarian aid workers, which served to further increase Israel’s global isolation. Many European governments announced they would not provide any further military assistance to Netanyahu’s government, and Biden threatened to change decades of US policy towards Israel if it did not alter its approach in the Gaza Strip.
The Israelis have responded by opening new aid routes for the Palestinians. But the IDF has continued to insist the strike on the aid convoy was an accident and even suggested they had relied on artificial intelligence for targeting. Two Israeli officers have been relieved for violating established rules of engagement and three others were reprimanded. But sadly, this was not a unique incident. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres noted, after these World Central Kitchen workers’ deaths, that the total number of aid workers killed in the Gaza Strip has climbed to 196. More than 175 of those were members of UN staff, which Guterres said was “unconscionable” and has made this war one of the deadliest in history for aid workers.
But Iran’s attack did not immediately change the course of the war in Gaza and the region more broadly. Israel’s war with Hamas is now in its sixth month. Netanyahu also reported after Iran’s attack that Hamas had rejected the terms of a potential ceasefire, meaning that there is no immediate end in sight for a conflict that has killed 33,000 Palestinians and left another 75,000 people injured. Israel also still believes 129 of its citizens are still being held hostage including six Americans. The UN World Bank has reported that the total infrastructure damage in the Gaza Strip amounts to approximately $18.5bn, and it is unclear whether the international community is prepared to assist in the reconstruction of Gaza. Consequently, a response now that emphasizes diplomacy over kinetic action might also allow Israel to regain a measure of global support that it has lost during the past several months of fighting.
An all-out war between Israel and Iran will likely end any chance for a temporary ceasefire or the release of hostages in the Gaza Strip. It will dramatically raise the cost of this war in blood and treasure, create greater tensions at a time when the global economy continues to teeter and threaten the “soft landing” for the U.S. economy.
The only promising aspect at this moment is that in the aftermath Iran appears legitimately fearful that this situation could spiral further. Tehran, which faces economic and social challenges at home, may also now fully realize that its military forces remain technologically inferior to Israel and its Western allies. The government has released several statements that appear focused on deescalating the situation.
The “shadow war” that lasted for decades has now ended. Time will tell what comes next, but any steps that do not reinforce diplomacy could push the region – and perhaps the world – towards an even greater conflict.
