THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXXVI | TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 2.17.24 | (MPW)

 

The Worst REIT CEO Line Ever?: "As I mentioned, we believe strongly that there have been rumors and falsehoods around MPT and our business in recent months. We appreciate that, like other public companies, MPT is regularly the focus of third-party reports that may express opinions about the company, which may be favorable or not. However, we encourage our investors to recognize that not all market commentators or reporters are equal or write objectively without agendas. We welcome each of you to speak directly with me, Steve, Drew or Tim, as we are eager to address any questions or concerns you may have." - CEO Ed Aldag, 1Q22 earnings call

Relevant Presentations:

REIT Status Deck (MPW) - LINK 

Prospect Rent Deferral Questions (MPW) - PDF LINK *WE TOLD YOU OVER THE TARGET*

Overview of Priory Tenant Relationship (MPW) - Replay LINK

Prospect Restructuring Agreement Deck (MPW) - LINK *BOMBS AWAY!* 

Actual Prospect Restructuring Agreement (MPW) - LINK

RCF Covenant Work (MPW) - LINK

Tenant Timelines (MPW) - LINK

Ticker: MPW

Company Name: Active Short Medical Properties (Dis)Trust 

Subsector: Frauds / Restructurings

Headline: 4Q23 call questions for your friendly neighborhood sell-sider + dividend cut likely coming + revised thoughts on new U.K. entities

• We are going to update/add to/subtract from this piece once per week on a rolling basis. This list may prove useful to new parties to the situation looking to get up to speed, as well as a recap of many things that have happened since Hedgeye began closely following the company. This represents a subset of nearly ~2 years of work. New/updated items are denoted in green. There's something here for everyone! MPW's equity is worthless, it just happens to still have a price. Like any other donut, the path there will not be linear.
• Potential 4Q23 Earnings Call Questions (New/Updated):
• Curveball! Did Priory pay all of its contractually-owed cash rent + interest for 4Q23 and then for January + February 2024? Were there are any deferrals of cash rent + interest? If so, were these amounts included or excluded from reported 4Q23 AFFO?
• Same question for Swiss Medical Network (SMN) / Infracore + Vibra + LifePoint + Pipeline?
• Have any other tenants not paid their contractual cash rent + interest for those above periods? Were there any other deferrals and, if so, were those amounts included or excluded from 4Q23 AFFO?
• Have any tenants been late on cash rent + interest payments for January + February 2024? Just given the 3Q23 10-Q experience...
• Has MPW ever entered into an executed and contractual recapitalization agreement involving largest tenant Steward, since MPW first invested in Steward in 2016? If so, for what amounts per each agreement and in the aggregate since 2016? If so, why were these agreements not disclosed to investors for a material tenant exposure? 
• Was the ~$205 million loan to the "International JV," which found its way to Steward U.S., + the ~$200 million cash paid over-and-above the cancelled mortgage on the Steward Utah hospitals actually two steps of the same recap transaction?  
• Has MPW ever guaranteed or used its balance sheet to pay Steward vendor invoices or payables/working capital needs? If so, in what amounts? Has MPW ever done so for any other tenants? 
• Does Apollo have ANY recourse to MPW's balance sheet regarding the ~$900 million mortgage on the MAM JV?
• Did MPW amend the initial return on the ~$363 million Cerberus buyout loan from "cash" to "PIK-like" with 3Q23 results, so as to keep this loan within the definition of "current" or "performing" under the RCF Total Leverage covenant? If not, why was it changed? 
• Given that buyers appear not willing to assume the Prospect PA mortgage, is an impairment required there?
• Given that both (1) the PHPH minority interest transfer and (2) the creation of PHPH itself have not been approved by the CA DMHC, is an impairment/restatement required for the ~$680 million of OpCo value carried on MPW's balance sheet and the PHP equity recorded on the P&L?
• We will save the balance of our Steward + RCF questions for after earnings, depending on what MPW shows the world on Wednesday. 
• MPW NAV Analysis by Operator/Portfolio (New/Updated):
• Can be found HERE. We estimate ~$6.9 billion of saleable/financeable value for the wholly-owned consolidated real estate assets. We ascribe de-minimis value to the real estate UJVs and think the OpCo stakes should be treated as worthless. We believe this estimate could be generous, especially when viewed against a reasonable timeframe to sell and monetize the assets. Some of the assets undoubtedly are not marketable at all. The in-place tenant leases are massively over-sized relative to affordability.
• To be clear, we do not think a NAV can be calculated with any precision for MPW. We doubt the company can value its own assets accurately. We are certain that management would not tell the Street what they really think the values are. We are, however, highly-confident of two things: (1) MPW very significantly overpaid (likely so as to max out MPW executive comp and GAAP FFO), effectively paying real estate cap rates/multiples for OpCo cash flows, and (2) the assets are worth less than the debt.
• We believe the Circle portfolio is worth ~$1 billion versus a ~$2 billion carrying value, and not 100% sellable/more likely to be financed. We believe the CommonSpirit portfolio is also worth about ~$1 billion versus a ~$791.5 million book value, and the most likely large, full-sale candidate. If these numbers are close to being correct, these two key portfolios could combine to produce just ~$1.5 billion of gross proceeds to MPW (sell 100% of CommonSpirit and finance/JV ~40-50% of Circle). This is nowhere near sufficient to save MPW as there is ~$6.7 billion of debt, including ~$3 billion of bank debt, maturing through 2027. Asset quality falls off quickly for the remaining larger tenant relationships.
• Key Question: Why has the CommonSpirit portfolio not traded yet? Our understanding is that management set the expectation that it would be announced before year-end 2023. What happened? Is there something esoteric about the lease or OpCo structuring? How strong is the parent guarantee? Did MPW agree to any capex obligations and, if so, have they been funded? How are potential buyers underwriting the CommonSpirit repurchase option? Have any buyers walked away after going through DD? Did buyers find any irregularities in the information provided? Big fan of rhetorical questions over here at Hedgeye!
• Reasons this exercise is so difficult: MPW does not provide cash rent by operator, lack of hospital square footage, lack of accurate OpCo financials and profitability, unreliable coverage metrics, no terminal value for the real estate as a higher-and-better use, lack of transaction comps, no publicly-traded peers, non-transparent MPW reporting overall, and opacity on how "capex" is spent and what the returns are, among others.
• We believe the fatal error here is viewing MPW as an asset-based loan vehicle. MPW is actually a highly-levered "securitization" of OpCo cash flows, in our view, with no terminal "bullet" at maturity, owing to the extremely long lease terms (time value of money) + very high capital requirements for hospitals + virtually no higher-and-better use for the physical plant without significant additional investment. OpCo, and by extension MPW's, cash flows are collapsing.
• Another potentially interesting way of thinking about MPW: "MPW turns tenant operating losses into MPW real estate revenues, by capitalizing those losses onto MPW's balance sheet." It does so through OpCo investments and overpaying for the real estate. Just a thought...   
• This will be an ongoing exercise. We welcome any and all feedback.
• Steward Health Care:
• Days Since SEC "Requested" MPW Disclose Steward's 2022 Financials: 194 
• Our understanding of the situation is that, when questioned by multiple investors as to why MPW still has not filed Steward's 2022 financial statements, management's response has been something on the order of: "we have 2022 financial statements, but they are not yet audited because Steward cannot get the auditor to sign off (amazing, btw), so we cannot file them." We assume that means "sign off with a clean opinion / without a going-concern warning."
• In a word, bullshit. Once again, they are playing games to conveniently serve their own ends. The management team is and has been lying to your faces. At this point it should be obvious. 
• Let's take a trip back down memory lane to 2019. MPW was (ironically) working towards acquiring the Prospect Medical portfolio for ~$1.55 billion. MPW intended to sell equity to help fund that transaction. But wait, hold the phones! The SEC sent MPW a comment letter HERE on 6.17.19, querying what consideration MPW gave towards filing financials for Steward as a near ~40% tenant exposure. With an unresolved staff conflict, MPW could not conduct the equity offering. Sound familiar?
• Hamner responded back on 7.1.19 HERE that Steward was late and had "requested multiple extensions" in submitting its financial statements. Sound familiar again?
• Later in a 7.23.19 filing HERE, Hamner noted "...that Steward has requested additional time into July to further finalize its financial statements...,"...beginning the week of July 8, 2019 and thereafter, the Company is contemplating engaging in one or more capital markets transactions...," and that if the audit was not completed then "...for purposes of ensuring that investors receive adequate disclosure, the Company will ensure that any offering documents will include or incorporate, at a minimum, summary financial information for the tenant." 
• On 7.15.19 HERE and HERE MPW filed Steward's unaudited 2017/2018 financial tables without footnotes. So they have provided unaudited financial statements for Steward before, but only when it works for them! There is clear and demonstrable precedent, filed with the SEC, of MPW doing so.
• On the same day 7.15.19, MPW announced the pricing of the equity offering HERE + the closing of the Prospect acquisition HERE. Both with shareholders having only the benefit of unaudited summary Steward financials, for the purposes of ensuring adequate disclosure (sarcasm)!
• So it is acceptable when it fits their aims, but now the financials cannot be provided to investors because they are unaudited.
• They are lying to you, plain and simple.
• Steward's Ongoing Restructuring (New/Updated): Following THIS announcement on 1.4.24, we believe all parties involved are desperately pulling out all the stops to keep Steward out of bankruptcy for as long as possible, but that a filing is likely inevitable. We believe the recently announced Steward bridge financing, which may be in the ~$150 million range + involve the existing ABL lenders (and MPW based on HERE?) + come at a higher cost, was obtained under an immediate need (like making payroll) for precisely that reason. At the same time it is unclear how much if anything was actually funded, as there has yet to be a follow-up closing announcement from either Steward or MPW. It is very possible that this announcement came when it did simply to "calm the market" and prevent vendors + doctors from completely bailing on Steward and putting the final nail in the coffin. We believe a BK may be inevitable, as any sale of Steward's PhysicianCo likely cannot occur except via a 363 sale. In general it is very likely that MPW may have received its final dollar of rent from Steward, and even to a new operator any remaining lease obligations must be massively reduced. Remember, it is critical to understand that this is a systemwide problem at Steward, not just a MA problem. A breakdown of the issues as we see them:
• The latest important update came HERE from a BK/restructuring reporter who formerly worked at Debtwire and Bloomberg, stating that "Steward is preparing to file for bankruptcy." We do not know the source of this claim, but we do view the reporter as credible with a history of reporting on BKs.   
• The WSJ reported HERE that Steward hired restructuring advisors. Bloomberg reported HERE on creditor-side advisors. 
• The latest articles from the Globe can be found HERE, HERE and HERE. The MA Congressional delegation also sent this letter to Cerberus.
• Other key recent articles can be found HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE and very sadly HERE.
• A WBUR Boston interview that Hedgeye participated in can be found HERE.
• A very excellent article, in our view, can be found HERE from Bisnow.
• It should now be abundantly clear that investors have been broadly deceived, if not outright lied to, regarding the status of Steward since at least early-2022. As recently as 3Q23 results on 10.26.23, investors were told "... their hospital operations continue to perform well, as evidenced by strong trailing 12 month EBITDARM coverage of 2.7 times... strong facility-level operations... the facilities continue to generate strong EBITDARM coverage of more than two times fixed rent payments... we expect Steward will continue to make improvements on its operations..." 
• Reality: Steward was never improving, was insolvent and worsening the entire time, and only made it this far via direct support from MPW's balance sheet. MPW itself running out of available liquidity may have been the catalyst for this obvious "shell game" to end. In prior years MPW would have just raised capital and extended additional support to Steward.   
• We believe that the ~$1 billion of OpCo loan + equity investments in Steward sitting on MPW's balance sheet right now are near worthless. This is before any coming impairments on the Steward real estate, write-downs of lease intangibles or impairments on other OpCo investments. This is incredibly important given the ~$1.2 billion of estimated cushion under the RCF Total Leverage covenant and the ~$1.6 billion estimated cushion under the Tangible Net Worth test. Both are maintenance covenants with the RCF being essentially fully-drawn today. See "MPW's RCF Covenants" below. 
• What does this mean for MPW's REIT status? See HERE. MPW was already arguably above the 35% TRS ownership limitation for an OpCo via its investments in Steward. If MPW is the only unsecured creditor of Steward outside of the trade payables, then that likely makes MPW the NewCo Steward equity to the extent there will be any. This was always the primary short thesis on MPW - NOT that Steward would necessarily go BK, rather that MPW would continue pushing and extending itself further and further past being just primary landlord and into a position of unsecured creditor and equity owner. Doing so has a limit. We just reached it.     
• Regarding the managed care business, which is called "Stewardship Health," it is now abundantly clear based on HERE and HERE that MPW/Steward began running the "Prospect Medical Playbook" as early as early-October 2023 and before 3Q23 results. I.e. creating the entities and ring-fencing any health plan + doctor practice collateral as an entity separate from the HospitalCo. See the tweet for the steps in the playbook. These underlying actions were not consistent with the public narrative from MPW.
• We believe that a significant portion of any managed care value is tied up in Steward Medical Group ("SMG"). Recall that CMAX has an option to acquire SMG for a purchase price equal to the trailing twelve-month GAAP revenue of SMG if certain hurdles are met. It is unclear to us how this impacts the financeable value of SMG, but it for sure complicates things.   
• What is the collateral in Steward for any DIP? The real estate is already gone, VBC was sold in 2022 and the A/R are already secured in favor of the ABL lenders. Just logically does that mean that Stewardship is really the only financeable collateral for a DIP? Does that mean there will be no or de minimis value left over to satisfy other unsecured claims including MPW's? What happens next? In prior years MPW would have been the DIP, but now does not have the ability to do so.
• What does this mean for MPW's ability to file its 10-K report on time this year? Will they request an extension? Will the auditors require a "going concern" warning on MPW? We think all reasonable questions...
• See HERE and HERE for a preposterous backdating of Form 4s related to tax sales by management following this announcement. There is no bottom...
• Somehow, miraculously, MPW still has a ~$2 billion equity market cap. There is still time to head for the exists...
• DOJ Lawsuit: The DoJ recently sued Steward HERE, accusing the company of fraudulently over-billing CMS/Medicare. Senior-level Steward executives were implicated. An FBI agent provided a quote. MPW was not a named defendant.  
• HNI Physicians Services ("HNI") v. Steward Health Care et al: Filed HERE on 12.1.23 in the District Court of Jefferson County, Texas.
• Another case of delayed/non-payment of Steward's vendors, this time occurring in Texas which shows (again) that Steward's problems extend outside of MA.
• Similar to ProLink below, promises made by Steward that HNI would be repaid after the closing of the sale of the Utah OpCos to CommonSpirit, and then never paid.
• In this case, Steward is alleged to have issued FAKE CHECKS to HNI as a delay tactic. We'll write that again.... they are alleged to have issued FAKE CHECKS. With Steward not giving the actual tracking numbers, and as the checks did not arrive, we believe it is safe to conclude that they were indeed fake. 
• HNI is suing Steward for breach, unjust enrichment and fraud. 
• ProLink Healthcare ("ProLink") v. Steward Health Care: Filed HERE on 12.13.23 in the Superior Court for the Commonwealth of MA with a very large unpaid amount due from Steward.
• Alleged Damages: A huge ~$45.7 million unpaid amount. A separate ~$25-30 million bond posting in early-2023 required support from MPW.
• MPW gets a mention in the complaint - "...Steward - which is backed by an Alabama-based real estate investment trust, Medical Properties Trust, Inc.,..."
• A services agreement entered into on 4.1.20 contracted ProLink to provide Steward with healthcare staffing services across all of Steward's markets. Steward agreed to make timely payment of invoices within 60 days.  
• The contract was terminated in October 2023. ProLink claims it fully performed under the agreement.
• Beginning in late-2021 and early-2022, ProLink alleges Steward billing personnel became non-responsive and failed to pay certain invoices.   
• ProLink believed that Steward would make payments following the sale of the Utah hospital OpCos to CommonSpirit in May 2023. Steward did not and "became or remained financially unable" to make significant payments to ProLink on its total accounts receivable."
• Steward did not dispute the invoices, and ProLink's counsel demanded payments. 
• ProLink terminated services with Steward at the end of the contract.
• Same patterns...
• MPW Guaranteeing Steward Payables?: See HERE for a UCC filing made by CME Corp. on 4.19.23. CME is a medical equipment and services company, and a vendor to Steward. MPW is listed as a debtor, in addition to Steward. Does this mean MPW had been guaranteeing Steward's payables/the vendor's receivables? It appears that the vendor can enforce claims against MPW for these payments, i.e. Steward's payables are also MPW's payables and MPW has balance sheet risk. How common is this across Steward's other vendor relationships, and also MPW's other tenants? This could be a big deal. What would this mean under a Steward BK?
• Did MPW Make a 4Q23 Loan?: On 11.10.23 MPW, via MPT Sycamore OpCo, filed a UCC "continuation" in Texas. This was done one day after the 3Q23 10-Q was filed with the SEC. The last time MPW did this was on 4.28.22, the day of the 1Q22 earnings call, which was also the date that we believe MPW funded the ~$150 million term loan facility to Steward for working capital support. Recall that MPW management told investors at the November 2023 NAREIT that they could likely have to extend more support to Steward. We believe Steward attempts at raising additional ABL funds, over and above what has been disclosed, may have proved unsuccessful. It turns out that MPW did, in fact, lend to Steward two days into 2024.
  
• 4Q23 Rent: The 1.4.24 press release indicates ~$50 million of consolidated unpaid rent, meaning there was essentially no rent paid from Steward to MPW in 4Q23.
• FY 2023 Rent: Based on simple math, it appears that Steward paid less than ~20% of cash rent on a net basis for MPW's consolidated assets for all of 2023. We estimate ~$192 million due annually based on HERE, or ~$48 million per quarter and ~$16 million per month due on the 12th of each month. The facts:
• 1Q23: MPW advanced ~$50 million to Steward for "working capital support" and secured by Steward's business interruption insurance receivables, even though those proceeds are very much in doubt. 
• 2Q23: MPW credited back ~$50 million to Steward as a rent deferral and expressed as an A/R build. This was not discussed on the 2Q23 call, vaguely referenced in the 10-Q in relation to Norwood, and later disclosed verbally to sell-side analysts without an 8-K filing. This Steward rent was included in reported "NFFO" and "AFFO" earnings. 
• 3Q23: MPW lent Steward ~$40 million on an unsecured basis for "working capital support." This was part of the now-infamous "ABL refinancing," with the loan suspiciously classified and re-classified multiple times. See HERE, HERE and HERE.
• 4Q23: See above.
• Look at these numbers. See how they are close to the ~$48 million quarterly cash rent owed?
• As we said in early-2022, Steward (1) is effectively insolvent, (2) cannot afford its rent obligations, and (3) cannot exist without the support of MPW's balance sheet leaving (4) MPW as the effective equity owner of Steward. These two entities are effectively (or actually?) just one entity, and we think should be consolidated. MPW owns and controls the operator.
• The Saga of St. Joseph's Medical Center ("SJM"):
• Want to see some potential fraud, but moreover the tactics and extent to which this management team will go to deceive investors (and in this case the SEC) + avoid disclosure around Steward? Well then take a hard look at MPW's involvement with SJM.
• On 9.29.17, as part of its financing of the IASIS transaction, MPW acquired SJM along with 8 other hospitals for ~$700 million + originated the ~$700 million mortgage loan on Utah +  made an additional ~$100 million equity investment in Steward. Same format that we see over and over again across MPW's deals: (1) acquire real estate, (2) originate a mortgage loan with equivalent terms to the leases (setting up payment of additional consideration later), and (3) capitalize the operator with an "acquisition loan" or equity investment. 
• As disclosed in the 2017 10-K HERE filed on 3.1.18, this resulted in ~$1.86 billion of leased assets to Steward, or ~19.6% of 2017 year-end gross assets and ~20.6% of total assets per the reported balance sheet.
• We believe MPW recognized it had tripped over the 20% reporting threshold per SEC Topic 2 Section 2340, and so listed SJM as held for sale at year end.
• MPW disclosed in the 2017 10-K as a subsequent event that it sold SJM to Steward on 3.1.18, the same day that the 10-K was filed. It did so by converting the fee simple interest in SJM into a mortgage note with the same terms as the leases, i.e. for no cash consideration.  
• The SEC took notice. On 7.3.18, the SEC wrote to MPW HERE, requesting to "Please tell us whether properties leased to Steward represent more than 20% of your total assets as of December 31, 2017. To the extent you lease more than 20% of your total assets to Steward, please tell us what consideration you gave to providing audited financial statements of Steward."
• On 7.18.18, MPW responded as follows HERE, noting that leased properties to Steward represented ~21.2% of total assets, but that they did not provide Steward's audited 2017 financials because they "knew that this spike (above 20%) in lease concentration as of December 31, 2017 was short-term." It further highlighted the 3.1.18 "sale" of SJM as the justification for short-term concentration.
• What MPW did NOT note to the SEC, however, was that according to Harris County property records HERE MPW/Steward had entered into a "Mortgage Conversion Purchase Agreement" on 5.18.18, just two months after the "sale" and two months before it responded to the SEC with its "short-term" argument.
• That purchase appears to have been executed by "MPT Buyer" and recorded in Harris County on 8.8.18, just three weeks after the response to the SEC. MPW later noted in the 3Q18 10-Q HERE that it acquired an unnamed Texas hospital from Steward in 3Q18 for cancellation of a mortgage + additional cash. This was SJM. MPW still owns SJM to this day.
• To Recap/Summarize: MPW acquired SJM in September 2017, sold it to Steward in March 2018 for a note and no cash consideration, used that sale as justification with the SEC to not disclose Steward's 2017 financials under SEC Topic 2 Section 2340, had an agreement in place at the time of SEC correspondence to buy SJM back, and then bought SJM back in 3Q18 for cancellation of the mortgage + additional cash to Steward. Why would anyone do this? There is no sound economic argument to execute these transactions within 12 months. We believe that MPW did this so as to (1) avoid required disclosure of Steward's audited 2017 financials (sound familiar?) + (2) inject additional cash into Steward (sound familiar?). We further believe that this may be the first indication during MPW's involvement with Steward that something was seriously wrong with the relationship.
• The "spike" in lease concentration was not "short-term." Indeed, it went back up after MPW re-acquired the fee simple interest in SJM in the same year. MPW would have to disclose Steward's financials in both 2018 and 2020 on higher leased asset exposure, and we await the filing of the audited 2022 financials. 
• If all of this were not bad enough, despite buying back SJM in 2018 MPW still listed the original 9.29.17 as the acquisition date of SJM in Schedule III of the 2018 10-K filing HERE. This is fine, nothing wrong here at all...
• Prospect Medical Holdings 2022 Rent & Deferrals (New/Updated):
• We believe that MPW very actively and deliberately misled investors throughout 2022 on the status of Prospect's contractual rent + interest. Prospect at the time was MPW's 2nd-largest U.S. tenant, accounting for >10% of annual cash rent + interest. We believe that we detected a 2022 10-K disclosure issue that could reasonably be considered fraudulent, barring a sufficient explanation which has yet to be provided by the company. The disclosure for sure did not provide investors or analysts with an accurate or useful portrayal of the facts. This belief is more than reasonable, and is supported by MPW's own reported financials and disclosures + other documents. Our work on the issue can be found HERE, HERE and HERE.
• The company did not react well to us raising this specific issue. At the same time, they also did not (1) issue to us a call for retraction, (2) contact us to correct the record, (3) issue any public response or (4) name us in any new or existing legal complaint. We regard the explanations provided thus far to investors to be nowhere near satisfactory. We remain confident in our work and believe the FACTS and patterns below speak for themselves. We believe the burden falls on management to offer a better explanation. We believe they hope time + short memories will make these issues go away. Not so long as we are around, we can guarantee you that.   
• (1): Throughout 2022 we observed a massive increase in accrued but unpaid cash rent + interest via an A/R build on MPW's balance sheet HERE. MPW continued reporting higher AFFO unburdened by rent deferrals, causing a very large divergence between AFFO and cash from operations (CFO) on the statement of cash flows HERE. These metrics had previously been tightly correlated with each other. Something was clearly wrong. Which tenants were not paying? We suspected Steward and/or Prospect at the time.
• (2): In late-2022, we observed a gradual change in MPW's definition of AFFO HERE with a summary HERE. We believe this change was very important, as MPW booked Prospect rent as financing lease income rather than rental revenue. It also opened the door for certain one-time non-cash items to potentially be included in AFFO. We raised this concern with investors. Our understanding is that MPW management downplayed these concerns at the time, and insisted there was no change to AFFO reporting. We disagreed, as no definitional changes occur without intent or intense review.
• (3): On a date that will likely live in REIT infamy, on 8.3.22 MPW reported 2Q22 results. On the call CFO Steve Hamner three times denied making a "bridge" loan to Prospect. Six days later MPW filed its 10-Q and disclosed it had originated a ~$100 million mortgage loan to Prospect during 2Q22. This loan had not been previously disclosed anywhere. Later, a UCC and property deed search revealed the ~$100 million had actually been advanced on an unsecured basis in May 2022 (!!), and was later "papered" as a mortgage upsize to Foothill Regional nearly ~3 months later on 7.26.22, or 8 days before 2Q22 earnings. Hamner signed the deed amendment on 7.18.22. We consider this fact pattern to evidence a deliberate effort at obfuscation and deception. See HERE. On the exact same day that the unsecured loan advances were "papered" as a mortgage upsize, we now know from HERE that there were restructuring discussions ongoing involving MPW - the Second Amendment to the TRS Loan dated 7.6.22 made reference to a "Master Restructuring Agreement." None of this was properly disclosed to investors on a timely basis. 
• (4): Prospect essentially failed in 4Q22 and underwent an out-of-court restructuring. MPW did not disclose this at any point during 4Q22, including at the November 2022 NAREIT conference. MPW first disclosed HERE with 4Q22 results in February 2022 that its investments in Prospect were being restructured. MPW moved Prospect to cash accounting beginning 1.1.23, meaning rent would only be recorded when actually received. This last part is important. 
• (5): On 3.1.23 MPW filed its 2022 10-K report with the SEC HERE. In it management wrote "Until the 2022 fourth quarter, Prospect was current on its rent and interest obligations under the various agreements." This implied one quarter or less of accrued/recorded but unpaid rent + interest for all of 2022, or ~$33-34 million.
• (6): On 5.23.23, MPW announced its version of the Prospect restructuring. In the release HERE, it explicitly noted "... accrued rent and interest of approximately $56 million... expected to be recovered through equity interests in the managed care business." ~$56 million is more than ~$33-34 million, implying more than one quarter of accrued/recorded but unpaid rent + interest from 2022. Rent + interest could only be accrued and recorded prior to Prospect being moved to cash accounting on 1.1.23, aka in 2022. This was clearly and observably inconsistent with the language in the 10-K, leading us to explore the issue further. 
• (7): Following disastrous 2Q23 results, on 8.9.23 MPW filed its 10-Q report HERE. Management wrote the following: "... but Prospect continued to remain current with respect to contractual rent and interest payments until the fourth quarter of 2022," and "This non-controlling ownership interest was received in exchange for unpaid rent and interest through December 2022, previously unrecorded rent and interest revenue in 2023 totaling approximately $68 million..." Why quantify the 2023 unrecorded amount under cash accounting, but not the recorded but unpaid amount from 2022 literally right next to it? This did not make any sense to us and was a "red flag," and appeared like an effort to obfuscate. We believed at the time (and still do to this day) that Prospect likely stopped paying MPW well-before 4Q22. MPW also included ~$0.11/share of non-cash PHP equity in AFFO in the quarter, despite the transaction not being approved/earned (relevant to AFFO definition changes above).
• (8): On 9.9.23 we wrote about all of this HERE for the first time. We posited that Prospect stopped paying earlier in 3Q22. The following Tuesday, 9.12.23, we also tweeted our thoughts HERE.
• (9): On 9.14.23 in our view the company clearly responded to our work. This ridiculous, nonsensical issue is now done and in the past given the timeline in this scheduling order, so we will discuss it as promised. It is part of the story, and we believe strongly that investors should know and understand the character of the management team with whom they consider investing. Rather than attempting to engage with us at some point over the last two years, issuing a call for retraction or officially responding to the work as any normal company would, management resorted instead to intimidation tactics against an analyst doing his job - analyzing what is clearly a problem company! On that day the company served us with a subpoena related to a case in which we are/were not named... not to our place of work, but to our home. Despicable, desperate behavior. That subpoena was dated 9.12.23, the same day that we first tweeted publicly about the Prospect rent issue. In the process they also told us that we were "over the target" and 100% on to some important/sensitive issue. We would keep looking, and we are glad that we did (see below). That subpoena has hung on the wall since 9.14.23. It will remain there. We hang it with pride, and look to it as "the price of seeking truth." And one more point... HERE on 4.13.23 we both invited the company to engage AND made it clear that we would not stand idly by and be harassed or accused of wrongdoing. The company should take that statement seriously. We were not joking around.  
• (10): On 11.1.23, now determined to go deeper down this rabbit hole, we obtained a copy of the fully-executed 5.23.23 Prospect Restructuring Agreement HERE via a records request with the California DMHC. The agreement illuminated several things, most importantly that MPW was attempting to satisfy ~$194 million of outstanding accrued and deferred rent + interest obligations from Prospect. This figure was obviously well-above what we had first estimated, masked by the "marketability discount" used on MPW's balance sheet, and indicated Prospect had stopped paying some time in early-2022. We believe that Prospect very likely paid essentially no rent + interest to MPW during 2022, in addition to receiving ~$100 million of loan support from its landlord.  
• (11): Finally, MPW was forced to admit unconvincingly in private to analysts and investors that its lease agreements allowed for unusually large deferrals to tenants, and that Prospect had stopped paying cash rent + interest well-before 4Q22. So while perhaps compliant with these weak/self-serving agreements, Prospect was for sure not current on its cash rent + interest obligations as stated in the 2022 10-K. "Current" implies paying. Why were these amounts included in AFFO, despite remaining unpaid? Why was none of this disclosed to investors throughout 2022 for a material tenant exposure? How is this not a 10-K disclosure issue? Does this call into question the "strength" of MPW's lease agreements with all of its tenants? What will the auditors think? What will regulators think? In general, how can you trust these guys? 
• To Summarize the Scheme: Prospect failing --> make undisclosed ~$100 million working capital advance to Prospect --> tenant stops paying cash rent + interest early in 2022 --> begin gradually changing AFFO definition to boost AFFO by those unpaid amounts/open door to including other non-cash items --> "paper" that advance as mortgage --> poorly disclose loan timing --> pay off Prospect ABL lenders to keep restructuring out of court --> represent to investors that Prospect was "current" until 4Q22 --> attempt to recoup all unpaid amounts via restructured PHPH equity --> run non-cash PHPH equity through P&L and include in AFFO --> get caught by WSJ on PHPH not being approved --> get caught by Hedgeye on unpaid rent + interest --> attempt to intimidate analyst --> restructuring agreement proves suspicions. All of this done without saying a word to investors about the actual status of second-largest U.S. tenant. The matter remains unresolved... 
• More Prospect 2022 Deferrals: This lends more support to our view that Prospect stopped paying rent + interest much earlier in 2022 than implied by the 10-K language or represented by management. MPW disclosed HERE in the 2022 10-K that "Mortgage loans were not delinquent with respect to principal or interest, other than for two months of interest on the Prospect loan." But wait! The released defaults from the actual Prospect restructuring agreement HERE show ~$9.1 million of unpaid interest on the ~$100 million "Tranche 2" of the Foothill loan (see just below for additional). Two months of accrual in 2022 + 4 months and 23 days in 2023 would imply ~$4.7 million of unpaid interest on that second tranche as per HERE. MPW had accrued double that amount! It is quite possible that Prospect never paid a dime of cash interest on that ~$100 million. Either MPW's 10-K or the restructuring agreement is misrepresenting the situation. We would bet on the 10-K.
• Foothill Regional: See HERE. We have signatures! Hamner knew about the ~$100 million working capital advance to Prospect in May 2022 + the papering to the existing mortgage ~3 weeks before the 2Q22 earnings call. Also see HERE, which shows that MPW "lent" ~$150 million in aggregate against a hospital that Prospect paid ~$15 million for in 2014 (both PropCo and OpCo!). MPW then just forgave the mortgage loan and gave the collateral back to Prospect.  
• Prospect CA Hospitals:
• Re-commenced paying ~90% of contractual cash rent (~$3.3 million) in September as expected. This should not be a surprise at all, and to our minds is also questionable as "earnings." MPW advanced Prospect ~$50 million via a now-forgiven convertible loan in 1Q23, as well as ~$75 million via a delayed draw term loan which we believe is now likely fully-drawn. That combined ~$125 million in liquidity equals nearly ~3 years of contractual cash rent owed back from the CA hospitals. It excludes the ~$100 million advanced to Prospect last year. More of the same...
• Prospect PA Hospitals:
• The Inquirer ran a story on 2.1.24 HERE, with a PDF HERE.
• Under an agreement between the PA AG and Prospect, Prospect now has until 2.21.24 to put Crozer Health up for sale. 
• The key line related to MPW: "Industry experts familiar with Crozer doubt bidders will emerge who are willing to assume Crozer’s ~$155 million mortgage and its pension liability." 
• The mortgage was MPW's consideration as part of the restructuring announced 5.23.23, in which it cancelled the rent and conveyed the PA assets back to Prospect. This "value" is what remains on the books after MPW took a ~$171 million real estate impairment in 4Q22 on these hospitals. 
• If buyers are not willing to acquire the assets + assume the mortgage, i.e. there is no value to the asset in excess of the mortgage balance, does that mean the carrying value on MPW's balance sheet must be further impaired?
• If the pension is not assumed by any buyer, would the pension plan attempt/be able to assert claims against PHPH/Prospect HospitalCo RemainCo? 
• PHP Holdings ("PHPH") (New/Updated):
• There are so many issues here including most recently HERE where the transactions STILL have not been approved as of 1.5.24 by the DMHC. 
• First, it remains an open question as to whether or not this equity transfer transaction has or should have occurred. The WSJ was the first to report it HERE. We received our most recent info request from the DMHC on 12.7.23. As of that date the equity transfer still had not been approved.
• Second, how does MPW not own ~100% of PHPH's equity? It is supposed to be receiving a ~49% minority equity and non-controlling interest in the entity. The restructuring agreement clearly indicates MPW received ~$721 million of total consideration for past obligations. At a ~$1 billion gross enterprise valuation for PHP argued for by MPW (that we DO NOT believe, see HERE) less ~$375 million of third-party debt on the PhysicianCo = ~$625 million of PHP equity vs. the ~$721 million "received" by MPW. Looks like ~100% to us...
• Third, about that ~$375 million of third-party financing. MPW claimed HERE that it would "..be used to provide Prospect’s hospital operations with liquidity and capitalize its managed care business for continued growth and value creation in a vibrant market for such businesses." We believe this was a misrepresentation of the facts and economics of the situation. We strongly believe that (1) in reality, the lenders were entering PHPH at an attractive basis should Prospect file and they be forced to take the keys, (2) the interest rate being charged is in the low-double digit range, and (3) the lenders may have a "blanket lien" on all of PHPH's collateral including the health plan. From their perspective this may have been a potential or quasi "loan to own" scenario where they clip ~12-13% along the way and look like heroes. Moreover and perhaps more importantly, this seriously calls into question MPW's stated/claimed ~$1 billion gross valuation for PHPH. It is more than reasonable to believe, based on the above + Apollo's recent deal, that PHPH is worth far less than ~$1 billion and, perhaps, only slightly above the debt.  
• Prospect CT:
• See HERE for our take on a new CT Mirror article detailing ~$67.4 million of new tax liens placed on the hospitals by the state. 
• See HERE for another extension of the CON deadline out to 3.20.24.
• MPW removed the expectation in the 3Q23 10-Q filing (blackline HERE) that the transaction with Yale would close in 2023. The deal had originally been contemplated to close in 3Q23 as per the restructuring agreement. MPW expected cash proceeds of ~$355 million which now seems very much in doubt. Prospect began paying rent again on these assets in 4Q, clearly indicating that these hospitals were not part of any "future deferrals."
• The latest HERE and HERE is that confidential negotiations are ongoing between Prospect and Yale, and that Yale has requested a purchase price reduction of some undisclosed amount. 
• MPW desperately needs this transaction to close and to bring some proceeds in the door, and effectively has paired off its stranded ~$300 million AUD TL debt maturing May 2024 against these assets. 
• Absent a separate capital raise, if this deal is cancelled/meaningfully delayed/re-traded significantly lower we believe MPW could run out of available liquidity by Spring 2024.  
• We currently model this transaction to close in 1Q24 including cash upfront of ~$150 million which is our estimate, plus an "earnout" payment valued at ~$200 million tied to the performance of the hospital to get to ~$350 million + any residual from PHP equity which is very much up in the air. To be clear, this would be a VERY bad outcome for MPW. 
• The first filing was recently made in the CON docket since April 2023. Aside from being sad, how does this ECHN pension obligation affect any purchase price adjustments to the final transaction? We believe potential working capital adjustments are already more than ~$100 million excluding the liens. 
• Priory: To us Priory now becomes perhaps one of the more interesting question going forward. If you believe as we do and wrote about HERE that, similar to Steward + Prospect + Pipeline + SMN, Priory cannot afford its rent and is being kept alive by MPW's balance sheet. And if you further believe that, given what we just saw with Steward and what the math dictates, MPW can no longer afford to keep struggling tenants alive due to its own financial difficulties. Will that cause a cascade of other tenant failures/rent reductions? We believe this is highly likely and that investors are not thinking through this scenario. The problems are NOT limited to just Steward and Prospect. Priory is an additional ~7-8% of annual cash rent.  
• MPW's RCF Covenants: Given MPW's recent actions and obvious leverage issues, we reviewed the covenants under MPW's RCF agreement. We focus on the Total Leverage Ratio and Tangible Net Worth maintenance covenants. Our findings and conclusions can be found HERE. In summary, MPW has a very narrow path to walk in order to survive long-term.
• Dividends (New/Updated): MPW broke its usual dividend declaration cadence last week. We assume a massive dividend cut from the current ~$0.15/share quarter to ~$0.01-0.02/share per quarter, simply because MPW MUST cut the dividend to preserve capital in the structure and gradually rebuild its equity buffer. We expect the maximum portion of what is left to be paid in shares, and "marketed" to shareholders as somehow a great deal (receiving at big discount to *fake* book, etc.).   
• Cash Flows:
  
• Again, this is a VERY difficult exercise. Our updated cash flow and liquidity forecasts are presented HERE. All of the key assumptions are itemized. We use a cash sweep mechanism and any red highlighting is meant to denote when RCF capacity could run out.
• New Assumptions: (1) massive dividend cut essentially to zero in 1Q24, (2) ~$100 million of MPW loan funding to Steward in 1Q24, (3) ~$500 million of proceeds from an assumed 2Q24 secured financing of Circle (~40-50% LTV, ~13% coupon), (4) CommonSpirit portfolio sold in 3Q24 for ~$900 million, (5) Prospect/Yale transaction closing in 2Q24 for ~$150 million cash to MPW.
• Note: all of the above are very uncertain in terms of likelihood and timing. We are trying to be judicious here and give the company the benefit of the doubt, even though they do not deserve it. It can all fall apart easily if any of these pieces break down (too many plates spinning in the air at once).
• Big Points: (1) Absent a capital raise, we believe MPW will run out of available liquidity by 2Q24., (2) it remains unclear how MPW can address the 1Q25 maturity wall even under the best case, and (3) the company's narrative around ~$2 billion of asset sales/financings is clearly not a long-term solution. 
• MPW must raise external capital NOW, or it is going to fail by the Spring. Period. The only long-term solution here is to somehow raise equity and recapitalize the balance sheet.  
• MPW's Debt & Liquidity:
• We estimate MPW's pro forma net debt-to-cash EBITDA at nearly ~12x, now excluding the rent from Steward. In reality the leverage was that high the entire time, just hidden from investors.
• The next maturity is the said ~$300 million of AUD TL debt maturing in May. 
• Inclusive of the 4Q23 Healthscope sale and dividend declaration, we estimate MPW's year-end available liquidity at ~$400-450 million with ~$1.6-1.7 billion drawn on the RCF. 
• We believe MPW must raise at least ~$2 billion of external capital through mid-2024 so as to be able to address the ~$1.4 billion maturity wall in 1Q25. This is just to survive and kick the can back a year. 
• Proceeds must be realized in 1H24, in our view, as these maturities will be viewed as "current" from the perspective of the ratings agencies around March-April 2024. MPW cannot just announce a deal; we believe they need closed proceeds in the door by then or will face additional potential credit rating downgrades. SPGR downgraded their issuer rating two notches deeper into junk in early-December, and Moody's followed suit with a one notch downgrade the following week.
• Asset Sales:
• We estimate, on a weighted average basis, that MPW's consolidated assets would be priced well-above a >10% cap rate and are "worth" less than ~$7 billion gross, aka significantly below MPW's carrying value on the balance sheet as well as the ~$11.1 billion of pro forma net debt. This estimate may be generous. They are worth even less on an NPV basis given the extremely thin market for this asset class and likely extended time to sell. 
• Within that bucket there are some marketable assets - the ones that get mentioned the most are the (1) CommonSpirit Utah assets (we estimate ~$1 billion), (2) Circle Health (we estimate ~$1-1.1 billion) and (3) the UC Health FSERs (we estimate ~$100 million). After that the "adverse selection" problem sets in hard and the quality, marketability and cash flow profiles of the remaining assets falls off quickly.
• In our view the question isn't whether these assets can sell or not, the questions are (1) at what price, (2) what would any impairment be vis-a-vis MPW's debt covenants, and (3) what is the timing to close?
• The follow-on question would be: "What is left for MPW's remaining debt + equity after any such sale?" This is the adverse selection problem - MPW would be left more exposed to inferior assets, including Steward, and its cash flow profile would be materially impaired going forward. 
• The final question is: "Why would any counterparty play ball now?" Would it not make more sense to wait to pick at the carcass? Any rational buyer would...
• Secured Financing (New/Updated):
• The creation HERE of these new Circle entities in the U.K. in early-January stoked questions recently on whether MPW was working toward a secured or JV transaction. While possible, we find it more likely that these new entities are related to MPW electing U.K. REIT status last year. They are Isle of Jersey entities. 
• We do not believe a secured financing can be achieved prior to MPW's 10-K filing, if at all. We believe the market may have moved meaningfully against them since the Steward announcement in early-January. We believe the coupon on ~$400-500 million has likely moved to the ~12-15% range with lenders potentially requiring a lien on ALL of the assets, rather than a single tenant portfolio. This might not be possible depending on what the banks demand. What we are hearing is that several lenders no longer feel they have the ability to underwrite individual tenants after the Steward blow-up. 
• Logically from the perspective of any secured lenders, the question is "why get in front of anything catastrophic at this point? Why take on the counterparty risk?" Would it not make more sense to look to participate on the other side? There will likely be opportunities to do so. 
• Our understanding is that MPW may have rebuffed several inbound secured term sheets at a ~9-10% coupon between 3Q23 results and year-end. This may ultimately prove to have been a catastrophic/fatal "confidence game" error by this management team.   
• It's still all about buying time and "kicking the can" right now...
• Undisclosed SEC Investigation: Third-party research firm Disclosure Insight has been tracking signals of undisclosed SEC investigative activity since 2.7.22. Enforcement proceedings have been confirmed as "ongoing" three times since then. The latest signal on on 1.26.24, just two weeks ago, confirmed ongoing SEC enforcement proceedings.   
• Senate Investigation:
• See HERE.  
• The letter addressed to MPW is HERE. 
• Key Quote: "Despite MPT’s ongoing assurances that it would cooperate with Senator Grassley and the investigation, MPT has hidden behind Lifepoint to provide relevant documents and information on its behalf and has repeatedly failed to provide its own full and complete answers, including documents, in response to his March 17 letter."
• Global HQ Construction:
• See HERE and HERE.
• Is this a good use of shareholder (or bondholder...) capital? 
• Reminder on Nepotism at MPW:
• "Junior," son of CEO Ed Aldag, HERE showing off a gun on one of the MPW planes. HERE is another shot, clearly showing the insiders misusing corporate assets owned by the shareholders. 
• Anderson Aldag, crack "Acquisitions Manager" HERE.
• Stephanie Hamner, daughter of CFO Steve Hamner, HERE bragging about hitting people with cars. Just sue them!  
• Matthew Hamner HERE doing... anybody's guess.
• There is no bottom...
• As we said, we will add to this list as needed and update weekly. Please let us know if you think we are missing anything, but these seem to us to be the key issues running in parallel right now. 

Figure 1: Remember... Wait for the 10-K!

Source: Company Reports, Hedgeye 

Please e-mail with any questions.

Rob Simone, CFA
Managing Director
Twitter: @HedgeyeREITs

Prior Notes:

2.16.24 - FLASH UPDATE: THOUGHTS ON THE MPW 1Q24 DIVIDEND DECLARATION | 2.16.24 | (MPW)

2.16.24 - DLR 4Q23 RESULTS - MIXED BAG | 2.16.24 | (DLR)

2.15.24 - FLASH: THOUGHTS ON THE MPW 1Q24 DIVIDEND DECLARATION (MPW)

2.14.24 - INVH 4Q23 RESULTS | 2.14.24 | (INVH)

2.13.24 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | REXR STILL NOT GROWING NET EFFECTIVE RENTS | 2.13.24 | (REXR)

2.12.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXXVI | PHPH TRANSACTION(S) STILL NOT APPROVED | 2.12.24 | (MPW)

2.12.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXXV | UPDATE: TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 2.12.24 | (MPW)

2.11.24 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | REMAINS HARD TO FIND ANY POSITIVES IN PSEC | 2.11.24 | (PSEC)

2.9.24 - THE "OTHER PROSPECT" SERIES | VOL. V | TAKING OUR TIME WITH 2Q24 RESULTS | 2.9.24 | (PSEC)

2.8.24 - UHAL 3Q24 RESULTS | 2.8.24 | (UHAL)

2.7.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXXIII | DID MPW MAKE ANOTHER LOAN TO STEWARD? | 2.7.24 | (MPW)

2.7.24 - REXR 4Q23 RESULTS | 2.7.24 | (REXR)

2.6.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXXII | UPDATE: TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 2.6.24 | (MPW)

2.2.24 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 2.2.24

2.1.24 - AVB 4Q23 RESULTS | 2.1.24 | (AVB, MPW)

1.31.24 - SAVE THE DATE | BLACK BOOK - AMERICAN HEALTHCARE REIT (AHR) - THURSDAY, 2.22.24

1.31.24 - CORRECTION: EQR 4Q23 RESULTS | 1.31.24 | (EQR)

1.30.24 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | JAN. APARTMENT RENTAL RATE TRACKER/HEAT MAP | 1.30.24 | (VARIOUS MF, ABR, PSEC)

1.29.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXXI | UPDATE: TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 1.29.24 | (MPW)

1.25.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXX | STEWARD HIRES RESTRUCTURING ADVISORS | 1.25.24 | (MPW)

1.25.24 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ANOTHER LARGE DEFAULT/FORECLOSURE IN HOUSTON | 1.25.24 | (ABR)

1.23.24 - THE "OTHER PROSPECT" SERIES | VOL. IV | MORE TL DRAWS AT NPRC | 1.23.24 | (PSEC)

1.22.24 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | GAUGING IRM'S FY24 FUNDING NEED | 1.22.24 | (IRM)

1.21.24 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | WE SEE REXR AS A POTENTIAL "MISS" CANDIDATE | 1.21.24 | (REXR, PSEC)

1.19.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXVIX | TAKEAWAYS FROM FROM BOSTON GLOBE ARTICLE | 1.19.24 | (MPW)

1.19.24 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 1.19.24

1.18.24 - PLD 4Q23 RESULTS | AGAIN, BUY PROLOGIS | 1.18.24 | (PLD)

1.17.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | FLASH: OHS EXTENDS PROSPECT/YALE CON DEADLINE AGAIN | 1.17.24 | (MPW)

1.15.24 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | POSITION MONITOR CHANGES | 1.15.24 | (EGP)

1.15.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXVIII | UPDATE: TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 1.15.24 | (MPW)

1.14.24 - "THE OTHER PROSPECT" SERIES | VOL. III | 2023 PROXY REVIEW | 1.14.24 | (PSEC)

1.12.24 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 1.12.24

1.11.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXVIII | ARE THERE GROUNDS HERE FOR A LAWSUIT? | 1.11.24 | (MPW)

1.11.24 - REITS DAILY BRIEF PART | UPDATING OUR CUBE MODEL | 1.11.24 | (CUBE)

1.10.24 - RESENDING: REITS DAILY BRIEF | FLASH: LIENS FILED AGAINST PROSPECT CT HOSPITALS | 1.10.24 | (MPW)

1.9.24 - REITS DAILY BRIEF PART II | HIGHLIGHTS FROM 1Q24 MACRO THEMES | 1.9.24

1.9.24 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | REALLY? REALLY?!? + REXR'S DVLP'T PIPELINE | 1.9.24 | (REXR, MPW)

1.7.24 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | PIECE BY PIECE... | 1.7.24 | (MPW, ABR)

1.5.24 - VIDEO | MPW FLASH UPDATE | 1.5.24 (MPW)

1.5.24 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 1.5.24

1.3.24 - RECIRCULATING: REITS DAILY BRIEF PART II | ADDING FR TO ACTIVE LONG LIST | 1.3.23 | (FR)

1.3.24 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | SBAC FINANCING ASSUMPTIONS | 1.3.23 | (SBAC)

1.1.24 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXVII | UPDATE: TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 1.1.24 | (MPW)

12.31.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | WISHING EVERYONE A HAPPY NEW YEAR | 12.31.23 | (PSEC, HPP)

12.29.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 12.29.23

12.26.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATING OUR SBAC MODEL ASSUMPTIONS | 12.26.23 | (SBAC)

12.24.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXVI | UPDATE: TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 12.24.23 | (MPW)

12.22.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 12.22.23

12.20.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXV | UPDATE: TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 12.20.23 | (MPW)

12.19.23 - "THE OTHER PROSPECT" SERIES | VOL. II | "NT 10-Ks" PILING UP | 12.19.23 | (PSEC)

12.18.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXIV | THE FBI & DOJ HAVE ENTERED THE CHAT... | 12.18.23 | (MPW)

12.18.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ (A DAY LATE) | COLD IN MUCH BETTER SHAPE... | 12.18.23 | (COLD, MPW)

12.15.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 12.15.23

12.15.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXVIII | UPDATE: TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 12.15.23 | (MPW)

12.15.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | BUY PROLOGIS | 12.15.23 | (PLD, MPW)

12.13.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXVII | UPDATE: TRACKING THE KEY ISSUES | 12.13.23 | (MPW)

12.11.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXVI | CAN'T MAKE IT UP... | 12.11.23 | (MPW)

12.10.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | UPDATING OUR DLR MODEL FOR JVS | 12.10.23 | (DLR)

12.8.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | THE DLR DEVLP'T JV IS A TRADE-OFF | 12.8.23 | (DLR)

12.8.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXV | TRACKING WHERE THE KEY ISSUES STAND | 12.8.23 | (MPW)

12.7.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXIV | ARTICLES + LETTERS ON SENATE INVESTIGATION | 12.7.23 | (MPW)

12.7.23 - "THE OTHER PROSPECT" SERIES | VOL. I | PSEC'S PGX MARKS APPEAR "AGGRESSIVE" | 12.7.23 | (PSEC)

12.6.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXIII | CIRCULATING NBC ARTICLE | 12.6.23 | (MPW)

12.5.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATING OUR MAA MODEL | 12.5.23 | (MAA)

12.4.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | APT. RENT 2ND DERIVATIVE APPEARS TURNING... | 12.4.23 | (APARTMENTS)

12.1.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATING OUR CPT MODEL | 12.1.23 | (CPT)

12.1.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 12.1.23

11.30.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXII | PUBLIC FILING ON STEWARD ABL PARTICIPATION | 11.30.23 | (MPW)

11.30.23 - REMINDER: THE REITS SHOW - TODAY, 11.30.23 @ 11AM ET

11.29.23 - REPLAY | BLACK BOOK - NEW ACTIVE SHORT PROSPECT CAPITAL CORP. (PSEC)

11.29.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CXI | FLASH: IMPORTANT CONFERENCE FEEDBACK | 11.29.23 | (MPW)

11.29.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | LARGE MECHANICS LIEN SHOWS UP IN MA | 11.29.23 | (MPW)

11.26.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | A FEW INITIAL THOUGHTS ON "THE OTHER PROSPECT" | 11.26.23 | (PSEC, MPW)

11.17.23 - INVITE | BLACK BOOK - NEW ACTIVE SHORT PROSPECT CAPITAL CORP. (PSEC)

11.17.23 - CIRCULATING YESTERDAY'S CT MIRROR ARTICLE ON PROSPECT CT/YALE SITUATION | 11.17.23 | (MPW)

11.17.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 11.17.23

11.16.23 - REPLAY: THE REITS SHOW - THURSDAY, 11.16.23 @ 11AM ET

11.16.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CX | UPDATING LIQUIDITY FORECASTS | 11.16.23 | (MPW)

11.14.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CIX | SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE ANSWERED CLEARLY... | 11.14.23 | (MPW)

11.14.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UHAL 2Q24 REVIEW + MPW NAREIT QUESTIONS LIST | 11.14.23 | (UHAL, MPW)

11.13.23 - EVENT | BB - NEW ACTIVE SHORT PROSPECT CAPITAL CORP. (PSEC) | WEDNESDAY, 11.29.23 @ 10AM ET

11.13.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | DLR 3Q23 10-Q REVIEW + IMPORTANT TENET LETTER | 11.13.23 | (DLR, MPW)

11.12.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CVIII | PROSPECT NOT "CURRENT" THROUGHOUT 2022 | 11.12.23 | (MPW)

11.11.23 - REPLAY: THE REITS SHOW - TODAY, 11.9.23 @ 11AM ET

11.10.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CVII | FULL 3Q23 10-Q REVIEW | 11.10.23

11.8.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CV | WHAT'S BASIS FOR ~$1 BILLION GROSS FOR PHPH? | 11.8.23 | (MPW)

11.8.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | EXR 3Q23 RESULTS | 11.8.23 | (EXR)

11.7.23 - REMINDER: THE REITS SHOW - THURSDAY, 11.9 @ 11AM ET

11.7.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | APARTMENT RENT TRACKER + MPW 10-Q QUESTIONS | 11.7.23 | (APARTMENTS, MPW)

11.6.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ABR 3Q23 10-Q & OTHER NOTES | 11.6.23 | (ABR)

11.5.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | WE SEE AVB AS THE "FASTEST HORSE" IN MF | 11.5.23 | (AVB, IRM, DLR, MPW)

11.3.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | MORE 3Q23 RESULTS | 11.3.23 | (AMH, SBAC)

11.2.23 - REPLAY: THE REITS SHOW - THURSDAY, 11/2 @ 11AM ET

11.2.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | NSA 3Q23 REVIEW + NEW REALPAGE LAWSUIT | 11.2.23 | (NSA, MULTIFAMILY)

11.1.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CIV | DID PROSPECT PAY ANY RENT IN 2022? | 11.1.23 | (MPW)

11.1.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | PSA 3Q23 REVIEW + DOC TO "DMZ" | 11.1.23 | (PSA, DOC)

10.31.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CIII | DID PROSPECT PAY ANY RENT IN 2022? | 10.31.23 | (MPW)

10.30.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | MERGER MONDAY | 10.30.23 (DOC, HR)

10.29.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | 3Q23 WAS THE WORST JOE QTR SINCE THE SHORT REC | 10.29.23 | (JOE, MPW)

10.29.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CII | BACK DOWN THE PROSPECT RABBIT HOLE | 10.29.23 | (MPW)

10.28.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | DLR 3Q23 RESULTS | 10.28.23 (DLR)

10.27.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | FLASH UPDATE | KEY QUESTION (FOR NOW) COMING OUT OF 3Q23 | 10.27.23 | (MPW)

10.26.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | FLASH | KEY QUESTION (FOR NOW) COMING OUT OF 3Q23 | 10.26.23 | (MPW)

10.26.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME CI | 3Q23 RESULTS FIRST IMPRESSIONS | 10.26.23 | (MPW)

10.25.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF PART II | INVH 3Q23 TAX MESS + ANOTHER YALE ARTICLE | 10.25.23 (INVH, MPW)

10.25.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | DLR 3Q23 EARNINGS PREVIEW | 10.25.23 (DLR, MPW)

10.24.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | REXR 10-Q REVIEW/UPDATE + MPW 3Q23 PREVIEW | 10.24.23 (REXR, MPW)

10.23.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | FLASH CALL REPLAY | WTF IS GOING ON W/ PRIORY? | 10.23.23 | (MPW)

10.20.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 10.20.23

10.19.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXX | NO "OLD WALL" GASLIGHTING ALLOWED HERE | 10.19.23 (MPW)

10.18.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | REXR 3Q23 RESULTS | 10.18.23 (REXR)

10.18.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH SETTLEMENT COMING? + YALE/PROSPECT UPDATE | 10.18.23 (INVH, MPW)

10.17.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXIX | YALE REQUESTING CT PRICE REDUCTION? | 10.17.23 (MPW)

10.16.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | JOE IS TRADING >2x OUR NAV HEADING INTO QUAD 3 | 10.16.23 (JOE)

10.15.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | IRM CASH CONVERSION + COLD TO DMZ | 10.15.23 | (COLD, IRM, MPW)

10.13.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 10.13.23

10.12.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | PLD PRE-3Q23 EXPECTATIONS; QUARTER SHOULD BE "QUIET" | 10.12.23 (PLD)

10.11.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXVIII | MPW IS BURNING CASH AT AN ALARMING RATE | 10.11.23 (MPW)

10.10.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXVII | WHAT DOES A CAP RATE EVEN MEAN FOR MPW? | 10.10.23 (MPW)

10.10.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | 3Q23 MANHATTAN OFFICE STATS | 10.10.23 (ABR, PLD, TRNO, NYC OFFICE)

10.8.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | FEEDBACK POINTS ON IRM SHORT | 10.8.23 | (IRM, SFR, BIG "G")

10.6.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 10.6.23

10.4.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXVI | TENET REQUESTING FINAL JUDGMENT/SECURITY | 10.4.23

10.3.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | IRM BLACK BOOK REPLAY + DID YOU KNOW? | 10.3.23 (IRM)

9.30.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | APARTMENT RENTS + STORAGE + MPW CF FORECASTS | 9.30.23 | (MF, STORAGE, MPW)

9.29.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXV | ANOTHER ARTICLE ON PROSPECT CT/YALE TRANSACTION | 9.29.23

9.29.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 9.29.23

9.28.23 - [BONUS] REITS DAILY BRIEF | 4Q MACRO THEMES | 9.28.23

9.28.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | THURSDAY MUSINGS ON IRM & MPW | 9.28.23 (IRM, MPW)

9.27.23 - UPDATED EVENT INVITE | NEW ACTIVE SHORT IRON MOUNTAIN BLACK BOOK | (IRM)

9.25.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXIV | MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT PROSPECT RESTRUCTURING | 9.25.23 (MPW)

9.24.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | ADD'L MACRO SLIDES - CREDIT | 9.24.23

9.23.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXIII | AGAIN, THE WHOLE THING JUST STINKS... | 9.23.23 (MPW)

9.22.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 9.22.23

9.21.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXII | ARTICLE ON PROSPECT CT/YALE | 9.21.23 (MPW)

9.20.23 - EVENT INVITE | NEW ACTIVE SHORT IRON MOUNTAIN BLACK BOOK | (IRM)

9.20.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXXI | PROSPECT CT/YALE A 4Q23 EVENT AT BEST | 9.20.23 (MPW)

9.19.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH PUBLISHES 3QTD OPERATIONAL UPDATE | 9.19.23 (AMH, INVH)

9.17.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | APARTMENT RENTS + IRM TO SHORT BENCH | 9.17.23 (APARTMENTS, IRM)

9.15.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 9.15.23

9.14.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXX | DUSTING OFF OUR MPW VALUATION | 9.14.23 (MPW)

9.13.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | GATEWAY OFFICE "STUB" EQUITIES | 9.13.23 (HPP, JBGS, DEI)

9.13.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATING: VALUATION IS NOT A CATALYST! | 9.12.23 (UHAL)

9.11.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXIX | TENET FILES MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT UNDER SEAL | (MPW)

9.11.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXVIII | DID PROSPECT PAY ALL OF ITS 3Q22 RENT + INTEREST? | 9.11.23

9.9.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 9.8.23

9.8.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | 3Q MACRO THEMES SELECT SLIDES | 9.8.23

9.7.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXVII | LIFTING THE CURTAIN ON PRIORY/MEDIAN QUESTIONS | 9.7.23

9.7.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | CONFERENCE UPDATES ROLLING IN | 9.7.23 | (AMH, INVH)

9.6.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXVI | PROSPECT CT WATCH | 9.6.23 (MPW)

9.3.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | ADDING EXR TO ACTIVE LONG, ABR BACK TO SHORT | 9.3.23 (EXR, ABR)

9.2.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXV | INCREDIBLY PROFOUND ON A FRIDAY BEFORE LABOR DAY | 9.2.23 (MPW)

9.1.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 9.1.23

8.31.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ADDING PLD TO ACTIVE LONG LIST | 8.31.23 (PLD)

8.30.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ADDING ESRT TO ACTIVE SHORT LIST | 8.30.23 (ESRT)

8.29.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXIV | THE EQUITY IS THE SACRIFICIAL LAMB | 8.29.23 (MPW)

8.29.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXIII | "OPPORTUNISTIC" | 8.29.23 (MPW)

8.29.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | A FEW POINTS ON DLR COMING AWAY FROM 2Q23 | 8.29.23 (DLR)

8.27.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | NARROWING OUR FOCUS IN TRIPLE-NETS | 8.27.23 | (O, EXR, STAG)

8.25.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 8.25.23

8.24.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXII | ANOTHER UNFAVORABLE STEWARD JUDGMENT? | 8.24.23 (MPW)

8.23.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | JULY APARTMENT RENT TRACKER | 8.23.23

8.23.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXXI | THINKING THROUGH THE DIVIDEND REDUCTION | 8.21.23

8.20.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | ADDING PSA TO ACTIVE LONG LIST | 8.20.23 (PSA, MPW, JOE, DLR)

8.19.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXX | MPW CHOSE TO PUT ITSELF OUT OF ITS OWN MISERY | 8.19.23 | (MPW)

8.18.23 - UPDATE: FLASH | MPW SELLS ~$105 MILLION OF STEWARD ABL PARTICIPATION | 8.18.23 | (MPW)

8.18.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 8.18.23

8.17.23 - FLASH | MPW SELLS ~$105 MILLION OF STEWARD ABL PARTICIPATION | 8.17.23 | (MPW)

8.17.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | POSITION MONITOR | 8.17.23 | (AMH, INVH)

8.14.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ADDING AMH TO ACTIVE LONG LIST | 8.14.23 | (AMH)

8.13.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | LOOKING FORWARD TO NEW IDEAS | 8.13.23 (STORAGE, MF, TOWERS, MPW)

8.10.23 - UPDATE: THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXIX | JUST SHOCKINGLY BAD; 10-Q REVIEW | 8.10.23 | (MPW)

8.8.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXVIII | PUBLISHING OUR VARIANCE TABLE PRE-CALL | 8.8.23 | (MPW)

8.7.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | NSA 2Q23 RESULTS REALLY BAD | 8.7.23 | (NSA)

8.6.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | PROSPECT CYBER ATTACK + DLR 10-Q REVIEW & MODEL UPDATE | 8.6.23 (MPW, DLR)

8.6.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXVII | WHAT IS THIS NEWLY-CREATED TRS ENTITY? | 8.6.23 | (MPW)

8.4.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | CPT 2Q23 RESULTS RIGHT DOWN THE MIDDLE | 8.4.23 | (CPT)

8.3.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | COLD 2Q23 RESULTS | 8.3.23 | (COLD)

8.3.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | PSA + KW 2Q23 RESULTS | 8.3.23 | (PSA, KW)

8.1.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXVI | 2Q23 EARNINGS PREVIEW | 8.1.23 | (MPW)

7.31.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | SBAC + AVB 2Q23 RESULTS | 7.31.23 | (SBAC, AVB)

7.31.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ADDING KW AS ACTIVE SHORT | 7.31.23 | (KW)

7.30.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | POSITION MONITOR UPDATES + SBAC + AMH | 7.30.23 | (AMH, SBAC, DLR, MPW)

7.28.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | TICKING THROUGH JOE'S 2Q23 RESULTS | 7.28.23 | (JOE)

7.27.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH + STAG 2Q23 RESULTS | 7.27.23 | (INVH, STAG)

7.26.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXV | THINKING THROUGH "INT'L JV" & REIT STATUS | 7.26.23 | (MPW)

7.25.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | NXRT 2Q23 POINTS TO RISING BAD DEBT ISSUES | 7.25.23 | (NXRT)

7.22.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | POSITION MONITOR CHANGES | 7.22.23 | (HR, CTRE, AMH, DLR, MPW)

7.21.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 7.21.23

7.20.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | REXR 2Q23 EARNINGS: WE SEE AN INTERESTING TREND | 7.20.23 (REXR)

7.18.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | DLR CHICAGO JV FINALLY COMPLETED | 7.18.23 (DLR)

7.17.23 - POSITION MONITOR UPDATE | 7.17.23 | (KW)

7.16.23 - SPECIAL SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | IS MPW A REIT? | 7.16.23 | (MPW)

7.14.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | SENATE LEGISLATION INTRODUCED TARGETING SFR | 7.14.23 (AMH, INVH, TCN)

7.14.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 7.14.23

7.12.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | REMOVING IRM FROM ACTIVE LONG LIST | 7.12.23 (IRM)

7.9.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | A TOUR OF SHORT IDEAS | 7.9.23 | (COLD, DLR, MPW)

7.7.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 7.7.23

7.7.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | AGGREGATE RENT ROC DECELERATING, 1ST DERIV. (-) IN JUNE | 7.7.23 (APARTMENTS)

7.4.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ADDING AVB TO ACTIVE LONG LIST | 7.4.23 (AVB)

7.2.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | LONG HUNTING IN MF, BUT NOT THERE YET ON EQR | 7.2.23 | (EQR)

6.30.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 6.30.23

6.29.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH ACQUIRING SREIT PORTFOLIO? | 6.29.23 (EPR, INVH)

6.27.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INITIAL FEEDBACK FROM DLR BLACK BOOK | 6.27.23 (DLR, MPW)

6.26.23 - REMINDER | BLACK BOOK - ACTIVE SHORT DIGITAL REALTY @ 10AM ET ON 6.26.23 | (DLR)

6.23.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 6.23.23

6.19.23 - MONDAY NIGHT REIT READ | ADDING REXR TO ACTIVE SHORT LIST | 6.19.23 | (REXR, ABR)

6.16.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 6.16.23

6.13.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXIII | "A MASTERCLASS IN GASLIGHTING"| 6.13.23 | (MPW)

6.13.23 - UPDATE | EVENT INVITE | ACTIVE SHORT DLR BLACK BOOK PRESENTATION | (DLR)

6.12.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | STOPPED OUT ON ABR | 6.12.23 (ABR)

6.11.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | UPDATING UHAL NUMBERS FOLLOWING 10-K FILING | 6.11.23 | (UHAL)

6.9.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 6.9.23

6.8.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | DLR BOARD LETTER MAKES WAVES AT NAREIT | 6.8.23 (DLR, INVH, TCN, REXR)

6.6.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH NAREIT UPDATE NOT GREAT | 6.6.23 (INVH, AMH, AVB, IRT)

6.5.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | APARTMENT UPDATES, BOTH EQUITY & DEBT | 6.5.23 (ABR, AVB, EQR, ESS, UDR)

6.4.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | NAREIT DECKS ROLLING OUT | 6.4.23 | (MPW, REXR, ESS, AMH, INVH, CPT)

6.2.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 6.2.23

6.1.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXXI | ANOTHER TENANT FILES BK WITHIN A YEAR OF SLB | 6.1.23 | (MPW)

5.31.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UHAL DELAYS 2023 10-K FILING | 5.31.23 (UHAL, MPW)

5.29.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | QUI TAM JOINT DISCOVERY PLAN FILED | 5.29.23 | (INVH)

5.26.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 5.26.23

5.26.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | SBAC OUR FAVORITE TAIL LONG IDEA | 5.26.23 (SBAC, BXP)

5.24.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXX | MORE PROSPECT RESTRUCTURING DETAILS EMERGE | 5.24.23 (MPW)

5.23.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXIX | ARTICLE FROM TAP ON MPW & STEWARD | 5.23.23 (MPW)

5.23.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UHAL MOVES EARNINGS + DEBT REFERENCE POINT | 5.23.23 (UHAL, AMT, DLR, MPW)

5.22.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | ADDING DLR TO ACTIVE SHORT LIST | 5.22.23 | (DLR, OFC, MPW)

5.19.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 5.19.23

5.18.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXVII| | SEC WHISTLEBLOWER CASE FILED IN MALTA ORDEAL | 5.18.23 (MPW)

5.17.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATING AMH ESTIMATES + PRIME DOWNGRADED | 5.17.23 (AMH, MPW)

5.16.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATING INVH ESTIMATES | 5.16.23 (CPT, INVH)

5.14.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | FLORIDA IMMIGRATION BILL's IMPACT ON CONSTRUCTION | 5.14.23 | (JOE)

5.12.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 5.12.23

5.11.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | QUI TAM SETTLEMENT INCOMING? | 5.11.23 (INVH)

5.11.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXVII | 1Q23 10-Q REVIEW + FULL CASH FLOW MODEL | 5.11.23 (MPW)

5.9.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | REMOVING EPR FROM ACTIVE SHORT LIST | 5.9.23 (EPR)

5.7.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | NOTES FROM THE ABR CALL + ADDING A PILE OF CASH | 5.7.23 | (ABR, EQC, SLG)

5.6.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXVI | COMING IN OVER THE TOP... | 5.6.23 (MPW)

5.5.23 - AMH 1Q23 RESULTS | 5.5.23 (AMH)

5.4.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH FILES TO DISMISS IMPLEADER CLAIMS | 5.4.23 (INVH)

5.4.23 - PSA 1Q23 RESULTS | 5.4.23 (PSA)

5.23.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH 1Q23 RESULTS + COMMONSPIRIT DEAL CLOSED | 5.2.23 (INVH, MPW, NSA, JOE)

4.28.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXV | 1Q23 REVIEW + 2023 PROXY REVIEW | 4.28.23 (MPW)

4.27.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | VNO DIVIDEND SUSPENSION + JOE ROC DECELERATION AS EXPECTED | 4.27.23 (VNO, JOE)

4.26.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXIV | GET SOME USEFUL INFO, ALONG WITH 1Q23 EARNINGS | 4.26.23 (MPW)

4.24.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | CBRE OFFICE SUBLEASE STATS | 4.24.23 (OFFICE)

4.20.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXII | NO, WE HAVEN'T FORGOTTEN YOU - 1Q23 PREVIEW | 4.20.23 (MPW)

4.20.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 4.20.23

4.18.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ABR LAWSUIT REVEALS POTENTIAL GOVERNANCE ISSUES | 4.18.23 (ABR, PLD)

4.17.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | APARTMENT RENT TRACKER + ANOTHER ABR SPONSOR ISSUE? | 4.17.23 (MF, ABR, MPW)

4.16.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | UPDATING SFR MODELS | 4.16.23 | (AMH, INVH, WY)

4.14.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 4.14.23

4.13.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATED BLACK BOOK CALENDAR INVITES | 4.13.23 (JOE, SBAC)

4.9.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | ADDING NSA TO ACTIVE LONG LIST | 4.9.23 | (NSA, MPW)

4.7.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LXI | NO DAYS OFF... THE ONLY EASY DAY WAS YESTERDAY | 4.7.23 (MPW)

4.6.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 4.6.23

4.5.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ABR SPONSOR COVERAGE + INVH IMPLEADER RESPONSE | 4.5.23 (ABR, INVH)

4.5.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LX | SENATOR SENDS LETTER TO MPW & OTHERS | 4.5.23 (MPW)

4.4.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | SELF-STORAGE ESTIMATES | 4.4.23 (PSA, CUBE)

4.3.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LVIV | LAWSUIT CHECK POINTS TO MORE STEWARD UNPAID BILLS | 4.3.23 (MPW)

4.3.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | SIMILAR ROC STORY, BUT MOVING CUBE TO DMZ | 4.3.23 (CUBE, EXR, LSI, PSA, UHAL)

4.2.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | UPDATING STORAGE NUMBERS | 4.2.23 | (CUBE, EXR, PSA)

3.31.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | A FEW NEWS ITEMS BEFORE THE WEEKEND | 3.31.23 (WY, PGRE)

3.31.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 3.31.23

3.30.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | STANDARD "SIDE SHOW" IN QUI TAM CASE | 3.30.23 (INVH)

3.29.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | HEALTHSCOPE SALE DETAILS EMERGING | 3.29.23 (MPW, ABR)

3.26.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | GOOD TIMES ALL AROUND | 3.26.23 | (ABR, MPW, NTST)

3.24.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 3.24.23

3.23.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | POSITION MONITOR UPDATE - MOVING NTST TO DMZ | 3.23.23 (NTST)

3.23.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | POSITION MONITOR UPDATE - MOVING NTST TO DMZ | 3.23.23 (NTST)

3.21.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATE ON ABR - WORSE THAN WE FIRST PUBLISHED | 3.22.23 (ABR, SLG)

3.21.23 - SAVE THE DATE | BLACK BOOK PRESENTATION - ACTIVE SHORT ST. JOE CO. | 4.6.23 | (JOE)

3.19.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | SHORT ARBOR - BV DEGRADATION COMING | 3.19.23 | (ABR, SLG, VNO)

3.18.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 3.18.23

3.16.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | GOING BACK TO THE SECURITIZATIONS... | 3.16.23 (INVH)

3.15.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LVII | WHY A COMP CONSULTANT AS SENIOR ADVISOR TO CEO? | 3.15.23 (MPW)

3.15.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | TREMORS IN MREIT LAND | 3.15.23 (ABR, BRT, AMT, SBAC)

3.11.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | COMPLETING THE SBAC PIVOT | 3.11.23 (SBAC, MPW)

3.10.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 3.10.23

3.9.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LVI | "PROSPECT NEUTRAL" = "PROSPECT ZERO?" | 3.9.23 (MPW)

3.7.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LV | ANOTHER EXEC DEPARTURE AT STEWARD? | 3.7.23 (MPW)

3.6.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | MORE RESI CONFERENCE THOUGHTS... | 3.6.23 (AVB, ESS, INVH)

3.5.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | A FEW PRESENTATION CALL-OUTS | 3.5.23 | (MAA, CPT, EXR/LSI/PSA)

3.3.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 3.3.23

3.2.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | REMOVING RADI FROM ACTIVE LONG LIST | 3.2.23 (RADI, INVH)

3.2.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LIV | 2022 10-K FILING REVIEW | 3.2.23 (MPW)

3.1.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | THOUGHTS FOLLOWING AMC'S 4Q22 RESULTS | 3.1.23 (EPR)

2.28.23 - CORRECTION: REITS DAILY BRIEF | RADI SALE SAGA FINALLY CONCLUDING? | 2.28.23 (RADI)

2.27.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LIII | STOP WASTING OUR TIME | 2.27.23 (MPW)

2.26.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | EPR 4Q22 CALL NOTES | 2.26.23 | (EPR)

2.26.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LII | "FRAUD" IN MALTA | 2.26.23 (MPW)

2.24.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 2.24.23

2.24.23 - AMH 4Q22 RESULTS | DISAPPOINTING FY23 GUIDE SHOULDN'T BE A SURPRISE... | 2.24.23 (AMH)

2.24.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. LI | MPW'S EQUITY REMAINS WORTHLESS | 2.24.23 (MPW)

2.23.23 - EPR 4Q22 RESULTS | BETTER 4Q, BUT NO FY23 OUTLOOK THE FOCUS | 2.23.23 (EPR)

2.22.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. L | NEW FILINGS IN TENET/STEWARD LITIGATION | 2.22.23 (MPW)

2.21.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | PSA 4Q22 + INVH CASE + OFFICE LOANS | 2.22.23 (PSA, INVH, OFFICE)

2.21.23 - NXRT 4Q22 RESULTS | MOVING TO SHORT BENCH | 2.21.23 (NXRT)

2.20.23 - MONDAY NIGHT REIT READ | NXRT 4Q + STAG MODEL + MIKE PAPA WHISKEY | 2.20.23 | (NXRT, STAG, MPW)

2.17.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 2.17.23

2.16.23 - COLD 4Q22 RESULTS | 2.16.23 (COLD)

2.16.23 - STAG 4Q22 RESULTS | THINK THE FY23 GUIDE IS CONSERVATIVE | 2.16.23 (STAG)

2.16.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XLIX | PUTTING ALL THE MOVING PARTS TOGETHER, AGAIN | 2.16.23 (MPW)

2.15.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XLVIII | COMMONSPIRIT DISCLOSED THE PURCHASE PRICE | 2.15.23 (MPW)

2.15.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH EARNINGS + MPW FOLLOW-UP | 2.15.23 (INVH, MPW)

2.15.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XLVI | NO-NONSENSE TAKE ON STEWARD UTAH | 2.15.23 (MPW)

2.13.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XLV | TOO MUCH V'CNCY IN BIRMINGHAM... SO BUILD A HQ | 2.13.23 (MPW)

2.12.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | NEW ACTIVE SHORT ST. JOE COMPANY | 2.12.23 | (JOE, IRT, DOC)

2.10.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATED CPT NUMBERS + REGAL LEASE NEGOTIATIONS | 2.10.23 (CPT, EPR, O)

2.9.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XLIV | ALL OF YOUR MODELS ARE BROKEN... | 2.9.23 (MPW)

2.9.23 - UHAL 3Q23 RESULTS | U-MISS'ED THE QUARTER | 2.9.23 (UHAL)

2.8.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ESS 4Q RESULTS + UHAL + POSITION MONITOR UPDATES | 2.8.23 (ESS, IRT, UHAL)

2.7.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | STORAGE DEAL + UDR RESULTS + INVH CLASS ACTION | 2.7.23 (LSI, PSA, INVH, UDR)

2.5.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | WHO BLINKS FIRST? WE THINK SELLERS AS WELL | 2.5.23 | (CPT, EPR, MPW)

2.3.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 2.3.23

2.3.23 - CPT 4Q22 RESULTS | OUTRIGHT MISS ON THE QUARTER AND FY23 GUIDE | 2.3.23 (CPT)

2.3.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XLIII | CHERNOBYL IS REBUILDING | 2.3.23 (MPW)

2.2.23 - MAA 4Q22 RESULTS | MIXED BAG, BUT WE LEAN SLIGHT "MISS" ON FY23 GUIDE VS. EXPECTATIONS | (MAA)

2.1.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XLII FLASH | STEWARD'S PRESIDENT DEPARTING | 2.1.23 (MPW)

2.1.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | SFR "PRICING POWER" NARRATIVE TO BE TESTED | 2.1.23 (AMH, INVH, TCN)

1.31.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH CFO DEPARTURE + ADDING AMH TO ACTIVE SHORT LIST | 1.31.23 (AMH, INVH)

1.29.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | "RENTER BILL OF RIGHTS" + STEWARD WTF | 1.29.23 | (APARTMENTS, SFR, MPW)

1.27.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 1.27.23

1.27.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XLI | REBUTTING THE SHASTA REBUTTAL | 1.27.23 (MPW)

1.26.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | RADI SALE PROCESS CONCLUDING NEXT MONTH? | 1.26.23 (EPR/AMC, RADI, SLG)

1.22.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | POTENTIAL FY23 BEATS & MISSES | 1.22.23 (AMH, CUBE, INVH, IRM, MPW, STAG)

1.20.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 1.20.23

1.20.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | OUR NOTES FROM THE PLD CALL | 1.20.23 (PLD)

1.20.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XXXX | PROSPECT CROZER MIGHT BE A TOTAL LOSS | 1.20.23 (MPW)

1.16.23 - MONDAY NIGHT REIT READ | MULTIFAMILY UNDERWRITING + EPR + PIPELINE | 1.16.23 (EPR, APARTMENTS, MPW)

1.13.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XXXIX | PIPELINE HEALTH IS SIMPLY INCREDIBLE | 1.13.23 (MPW)

1.13.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 1.13.23

1.13.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | UPDATING SFR #s FOR HIGHER NC PROPERTY TAXES | 1.13.23 (AMH, INVH)

1.12.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | POSITION MONITOR UPDATES | 1.12.23 (AMT, HIW, MAA, NSA, SBAC, VTR)

1.10.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ADDING/REMOVING CUBE/SBAC TO ACTIVE SHORT LIST | 1.10.23 (CUBE, EXR, SBAC, WPC)

1.8.23 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | SD WHISTLEBLOWER CASE ACTIVITY + EPR FEEDBACK | 1.8.23 (INVH, EPR, MPW)

1.7.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOL. XXXVIII | ADD'L STEWARD VENDOR COMPLAINTS | 1.7.23 (MPW)

1.6.23 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 1.6.23

1.6.23 - EVENT REPLAY | NEW ACTIVE SHORT EPR PROPERTIES BLACK BOOK | 1.6.23 (EPR)

1.4.23 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXXVII | ARTICLE ON "PONZI HOSPITALS" | 1.4.23 (MPW)

1.4.23 - FLASH | JUDGE DENIES INVH'S MTD | 1.4.23 (INVH)

1.3.23 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INITIAL THOUGHTS ON EPR | 1.3.23 (EPR)

1.1.23 - EVENT INVITE UPDATE | EPR PROPERTIES (EPR) BLACK BOOK | THURSDAY, 1/5 @ 12:30 PM ET

12.30.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 12.30.22

12.26.22 - MONDAY NIGHT REIT READ | MPW "CHEAT SHEET" | 12.26.22 (EPR, MPW)

12.23.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 12.23.22

12.22.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXXVI | STEWARD ABL EXTENSION + OUR QUESTIONS | 12.22.22 (MPW)

12.22.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | POSITION MONITOR UPDATE | 12.22.22 (EPR)

12.20.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | 12.20.22 (CUBE, EXR, LSI, NSA, PSA, MPW)

12.18.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | TAKING AN "L" ON HR | 12.18.22 (HR, DOC)

12.16.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXXV | GOAL POSTS TORN DOWN? | 12.16.22 (MPW)

12.16.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 12.16.22

12.15.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | FLORIDA REINSURANCE BILL + MPW/STEWARD WTF? | 12.15.22 (AMH, INVH, TCN, MPW)

12.14.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | RENT CONTROL MEASURES + CEO CHANGE AT DLR | 12.14.22 (APARTMENTS, DLR)

12.14.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXXIV | GOALPOSTS CONSTANTLY MOVING... | 12.14.22 (MPW)

12.12.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXXIII | PIPELINE AUCTION CALLED OFF | 12.12.22 (MPW)

12.11.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | APARTMENT ITEMS + BREIT/SREIT + MPW MUSINGS | 12.11.22 (APARTMENTS, MPW)

12.9.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 12.9.22

12.9.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | INVH TAKES OUT 2018-1 SECURITIZATION | 12.9.22 (INVH)

12.6.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXXII | CIRCULATING THE CBS REPORT ON PROSPECT | 12.6.22 (MPW)

12.2.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 12.2.22

12.1.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | EQT "IN DISCUSSIONS" TO ACQUIRE RADI? | 12.1.22 (RADI)

11.29.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | HEALTHSCOPE PUSHED BACK + INDT BID | 11.29.22 (MPW, INDT)

11.28.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXX | PIPELINE BK UPDATE + STOCK IS NOT "CHEAP" | 11.28.22 (MPW)

11.27.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | POSITION MONITOR + VAL HANDBOOK | 11.27.22 (DLR, EQIX, HR, DOC, SBAC, MPW)

11.22.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | RESI NEWS ITEMS | 11.22.22

11.20.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | UHAL NUMBERS + POSITION MONITOR UPDATE | 11.20.22 (UHAL)

11.19.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXIX | UPON FURTHER REVIEW... | 11.19.22 (MPW)

11.18.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 11.18.22

11.16.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | NOTES FROM NAREIT DAY #1 | 11.16.22

11.15.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXVIII | IMPORTANT UPDATES FROM CMAX | 11.15.22 (MPW)

11.14.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXVII | HEALTHSCOPE PORTFOLIO SALE UPDATE | 11.14.22 (MPW)

11.13.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | POSITION MONITOR UPDATE | 11.13.22 (IRM, PGRE)

11.11.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 11.11.22

11.9.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | 3Q22 10-Q REVIEW | 11.9.22 (MPW)

11.9.22 - RADI 3Q22 RESULTS | 11.9.22

11.7.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | HEADING BACK TO CHERNOBYL... | 11.7.22 (MPW)

11.6.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | POSITION MONITOR UPDATE + SBAC REVIEW | 11.6.22 (ADC, O, NTST, SBAC)

11.5.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXIV | OPERATIONS SUSPENDED AT DCMH | 11.5.22 (MPW)

11.4.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | SOME FOLLOW UP ITEMS, INCLUDING ON INVH | 11.4.22

11.4.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 11.4.22

11.3.22 - AMH 3Q22 RESULTS | MORE PROPERTY TAX MEDICINE | 11.3.22

11.3.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | POSITION MONITOR UPDATE | 11.3.22

11.2.22 - LSI 3Q22 RESULTS | LSI TO THE RESCUE? | 11.2.22 (LSI)

11.2.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | OCTOBER APARTMENT RENT TRACKER | 11.2.22

11.2.22 - EXR 3Q22 RESULTS | OOF | 11.2.22 (EXR)

11.2.22 - PSA 3Q22 RESULTS | 11.2.22 (PSA)

11.1.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXIII | REAL-TIME LOOK AT TEXARKANA | 11.1.22 (MPW)

11.1.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXII | PIPELINE UNSECURED CREDITOR OBJECTION | 11.1.22 (MPW)

10.31.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | WE MADE A MISTAKE - ADJUSTING INVH NUMBERS | 10.31.22 (INVH)

10.31.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XXI | PIPELINE BK UPDATE | 10.31.22 (MPW)

10.30.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | UPDATED INVH MODEL ASSUMPTIONS | 10.30.22 (INVH, MPW)

10.28.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XX | BACK TO THAT DRY HOLE IN TX... | 10.28.22 (MPW)

10.28.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 10.28.22

10.28.22 - STAG 3Q22 RESULTS | 10.28.22 (STAG)

10.27.22 - INVH POST-3Q22 CALL THOUGHTS | 10.27.22 (INVH)

10.26.22 - MAA 3Q22 RESULTS | 10.27.22 (MAA)

10.26.22 - INVH 3Q22 RESULTS | PERHAPS THE WORST QTR IN RECENT MEMORY FOR A "BLUE CHIP" | 10.26.22 (INVH)

10.26.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XIX | 3Q22 PREVIEW | 10.26.22 (MPW)

10.26.22 - EQR 3Q22 RESULTS | ANOTHER DECEL IN LEASING SPREADS | 10.26.22 (EQR)

10.25.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | THOUGHTS ON NXRT'S 3Q22 | 10.25.22 (NXRT)

10.25.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XVIII | I'M THE CAPTAIN NOW... | (MPW)

10.25.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XVII | THAT'S SOME EXPENSIVE GRASS! | (MPW)

10.23.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | LOT'S TO READ ON SFR | 10.23.22 (VRE, AMH, INVH, TCN, MPW, SBAC)

10.21.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 10.21.22

10.21.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | THC NEGATIVE READ ACROSS FOR STEWARD ET AL | 10.21.22 (MPW)

10.20.22 - REITS CLIENT ALERT | 10.20.22 (MPW)

10.20.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | 3Q22 EARNINGS NOTES | 10.20.22 (REXR, CCI)

10.19.22 - CLARIFICATION ON MAA PORTION OF PRIOR NOTE | 10.19.22 (MAA)

10.19.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | NOTES FROM PLD'S 3Q + SUDDEN MAA CHANGE | 10.19.22 (PLD, MAA, MPW)

10.17.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | ELS MISS + SFR CONSIDERATIONS AROUND QUARTERRA | 10.18.22 (ELS, AMH, INVH, TCN)

10.16.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | ADDING STAG TO ACTIVE LONG LIST | 10.16.22 (STAG, MPW)

10.15.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XV | RESPONDING TO CEO INTERVIEW | (MPW)

10.14.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 10.14.22

10.11.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | 10.11.22 (CPT, INVH, MPW)

10.10.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XIV | WE CALL YOUR BLUFF | (MPW)

10.10.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XIII | HEALTHSCOPE SALE WOULD LIKELY BE DILUTIVE | (MPW)

10.9.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | 10.9.22 (RE FUND FLOWS, MPW, VNO)

10.7.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 10.7.22

10.7.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XII | WHAT EXACTLY IS "CREF?" | (MPW)

10.6.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME XI | PROSPECT BUYING BACK CT HOSPITALS FROM MPW | (MPW)

10.5.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | FACEBOOK TERMINATING 225 PARK AVE LEASE | 10.5.22 (GATEWAY OFFICE, MAA)

10.4.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | WHERE ARE INVH'S + SUI'S IAN UPDATES? | 10.4.22 (INVH, SUI, MPW)

10.3.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME X | TAKEAWAYS FROM INITIAL PIPELINE FILINGS | (MPW)

10.3.22 - FLASH | THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME IX | MPW's ~#12 TENANT FILES IN BK COURT | (MPW)

10.3.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ (ON MONDAY MORNING) | 10.3.22 (SBAC, WY)

10.1.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 10.1.22

9.30.22 - FLASH | (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME VIII - DID STEWARD JUST BLOW UP? | (MPW)

9.30.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME VII - NOTHING TO SAY? | (MPW)

9.29.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | DIVVY HOMES LAYOFFS / GENERAL EXTERNAL GROWTH SLOWDOW | 9.29.22 (AMH, INVH, TCN)

9.28.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | WEN STEWARD CREDIT FACILITY? | 9.28.22 (MPW, APARTMENTS)

9.28.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME VI - A FAMILY AFFAIR (MPW)

9.26.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | IAN MUCH MORE THREATENING | 9.26.22 (ELS, SUI, AMH, INVH)

9.25.22 - SUNDAY NIGHT REIT READ | TS IAN SWINGING WEST | 9.25.22 (RESIDENTIAL)

9.23.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME V - THE CURIOUS CASE OF DISAPPEARING WORK EXPERIENCE | 9.23.22

9.23.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 9.23.22

9.20.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME IV - SO... ABOUT THAT ~$335 MILLION LOAN | 9.20.22 (MPW)

9.18.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME III - I'M ON A BOAT! | 9.18.22 (MPW)

9.16.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK & POSITION MONITOR UPDATE | 9.16.22 (STOR)

9.15.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME 2 - WHATS A WHISTLEBLOWER TO DO? | 9.15.22 (MPW)

9.15.22 - THE (DIS)TRUST SERIES | VOLUME 1 - SEMC NLRB COMPLAINT | 9.15.22 (MPW)

9.14.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | 9.14.22 (CPT, MAA, NXRT)

9.13.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | RESIDENTIAL UPDATES FLOODING IN | 9.13.22 (AMH, INVH)

9.9.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 9.9.22

9.7.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF PART II | WHAT REALLY HAPPENED W/ WATSONVILLE? | 9.7.22 (MPW)

9.7.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | LOOK AT RENT CONTROL MEASURES ON THE NOV BALLOT | 9.7.22 (RESIDENTIAL)

9.5.22 - MONDAY NIGHT REIT READ | INVH ADDED TO S&P 500 + MORE MPW THOUGHTS | 9.5.22 (INVH, MPW)

9.2.22 - REITS WEEKLY VALUATION HANDBOOK | 9.2.22

9.1.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF PART II | PROBABILITY UP THAT COMPLAINT GOES MULTI-STATE | 9.1.22 (INVH)

9.1.22 - REITS DAILY BRIEF | POSITION MONITOR UPDATES | 9.1.22 (EQR, PGRE)