Below is a complimentary Demography Unplugged research note written on 12/14/20 by Hedgeye Demography analyst Neil Howe. Click here to learn more and subscribe.
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James Davison Hunter coauthors a major report on the social and culture divisions that emerged in the 2020 presidential election. Entitled "Democracy in Dark Times," the report shows that most voters were driven by fears of the candidate they didn't vote for and that religion, education, race, age, and gender (in roughly that order) are the biggest drivers of polarization. (Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture) |
NH: Every several years, the IASC analyzes a large recent survey of voters, conducted by Gallup, on the state of American politics. In 2020, the report's lead author is James Davison Hunter, UVA professor of religion, culture, and social theory.
Hunter is best known for his 1991 book Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, which presciently anticipated America's growing values divide during the Clinton era and whose very title coined the term "culture wars."
Many of the top-line findings of Hunter's report are pretty dark indeed.
The IASC survey shows that voters in 2020 were overwhelming driven by their fear of what would happen if the other side won--namely, that America would be stripped of its liberties. Of all Biden voters, 63% say the word "fascist" could describe most Trump voters, and 82% agree that Trump would "gradually transform our country into a dictatorship." Of all Trump voters, 72% say the word "socialist" could describe most Biden supporters, and 90% agreed that the Democrats would "gradually transform our country into a socialist country."
Sounds here like the loathing is mutual. But in other ways the feelings are asymmetric.
Trump voters were mostly driven by the desire to elect Trump, Biden voters mostly by the desire to defeat Trump. This reflects a difference in perspective. Most Democrats want to return to where America was going before its inevitable progress was interrupted, which means that Biden is only one of many who could have served their purpose.
Most Republicans want to keep America from heading towards further corruption, and Trump is the only candidate they have yet seen who fits that description.
Let me spotlight one ominous trend up front: Despite general agreement that the country's economy will improve next year, a rapidly growing share of Americans see their country as being in decline. From 22% in 1996, this share rose to 31% in 2003 and to 48% in 2016. This year, it hit 66%. (This is in accord with other survey findings: see "America is Registering Record Levels of Unhappiness.")
As for all the trends indicating rising civic distrust in recent decades, well, this year they either continued rising or at least held steady. In 1996, 60% of Americans had little or no confidence that government can actually solve a problem. In 2016, that share rose to 64%. In 2020, it rose to 70%.
Those with little or no confidence that the government will tell the truth to the public rose to an all-time high of 74%. Ditto for the share who agree that "political events these days seem more like theater or entertainment than like something to be taken seriously."
Populist distrust of money and power remains as strong as ever. 71% agree that "our economic system is rigged in favor of the wealthiest Americans." This is about the same as in 2016, though the share who "strongly agree" has risen from 31% to 40%. 72% have little or no confidence in the ability of banks or Wall Street "to resolve our nation's economic problems." Just about everyone, 79%, agrees that "Wall Street and big business in our country often profit at the expense of ordinary Americans."
To be sure, the left sometimes goes further here than the right. Questions get the most agreement from both sides when they ask about the wealth and power of big business. If asked only about "people who are very rich," 57% of Democrats agree they are a very serious or extreme threat--versus only 19% of Republicans.
Similar differences show up on capitalism versus socialism. Three-quarters of Republicans are at least somewhat favorable about capitalism, and the same share are completely negative about socialism. Democrats are pretty mixed on both--not terribly enthusiastic about either, but somewhat more favorable about socialism.
On the other hand, while a good majority of all voters think that "media distortions and fake news" are a serious problem, Republicans are much more likely to blame the media than Democrats. Over half of Republican voters completely agree, and another quarter mostly agree, that "the mainstream media exaggerated coronavirus to order to take down Donald Trump." Only 9% of Democrats agreed.
Age also cuts a bit across partisan lines. Voters under 30 are decidedly more favorable toward socialism. Roughly the same share (one quarter) of young voters across both parties see capitalism to be mostly or completely negative as see socialism to be mostly or completely positive. Also, young voters are much harsher toward the wealthy: 50% of all voters under 30 see the very rich as a very or extremely serious threat to America.
Let's now move on to issues. Hunter usefully divides the issues into three categories of "threats." Some threats are perceived as at least very serious mostly by Trump voters, others are perceived that way mostly by Biden voters, and still other are perceived that way about equally by both voter groups.
In the last category, threats to both sides, the biggest is polarization and divisiveness itself. Everyone agrees this threatens America, though clearly it points to no obvious policy solution that would also gain bipartisan support.
In the first two categories, IMO the relatively high readings on both sides for "racism" and for "crime and lawlessness" are likely due to the timing of this survey (late July and early August). Subsequent surveys show declining responses to these issues
On all the other issues, I would pay closest attention to those marked as serious threats by at least one-third of both sides. One is "inequality and poverty," which includes such actionable items as antitrust policy, minimum wage, and a national healthcare buy-in. The other is "China." Creative leadership could find bipartisan traction on either or both issues because they have substantial energy in both parties. Two other issues that are close to this threshold are "Wall Street and the banking system" and "unrestricted access to assault weapons."
Notice that several other much-hyped issues are not close to this threshold: "Immigrants and immigration," "climate change," "the very rich." See "Both Parties Want America to Take 'Active' Role in World Affairs," "What Issues Divide Voters on the Same Side?" and "Positive Trends in Attitudes Toward Immigration."
Next, Hunter does something pretty creative. He takes all the issues in the first two categories, conservative fears and progressive fears, and he creates two overall conservative and progressive fear indexes. Then he creates what he calls a "cultural cartography of fear" by mapping the electorate on this two-dimensional grid.
He applies this method first to all voters by party membership and education.
As you can see, Republican and Democratic party members tend to be the most lopsidedly polarized in their fears--Republicans are in the NW quadrant and Democrats are in the SE quadrant. Independents are nearer to the SW-NE diagonal, that is, they are most "evenly balanced" in their fears.
Another big lesson here: Extreme polarization is positively correlated with education. Contrary to the common assumption that more knowledge and education are cures for polarization, this IASC finding has been reconfirmed countless times: The highly educated on both sides are the most polarized.
On the other hand, less-educated voters tend to be more fearful overall than more-educated voters in the same party grouping. High-school Democrats, in other words, may not be quite as fearful of progressive threats--but they are a lot more fearful of conservative threats. This clearly represents an opportunity for a "Trumpified" Republican Party.
Now let's do the same mapping, but this time let's segment voters by their news source. And by what they think about Covid-19. The results, I think, really speak for themselves.
Keep in mind BTW that the large majority of voters do indeed say that a mask requirement makes them feel better about entering a store. You need to be pretty far into the NW quadrant before hitting the center of gravity of voters who say that a mask requirement would make no difference.
And only a few, the Trump die-hards, say it would make them "feel much worse."
Let's do another fear map in order to look at religion and gender--among whites only. Here IASC splits up the electorate into three big grouping: the "Social Elite" (nonevangelicals with an advanced degree), the "Disinherited" (evangelicals with no college degree), and the "Disadvantaged" (nonevangelicals with no college degree). No, these groups don't include all whites. But they represent a good spread.
As we can see, the Disinherited are deep into NW quadrant. 87% said they would vote for Trump. The Disadvantaged are a bit into the SE quadrant. Most of them dislike Trump, and only 28% said they would vote for him. The Social Elite, further into the SE quadrant, have the fewest fears overall. Only 11% said they would vote for Trump.
This map speaks eloquently about the role religion now plays in sorting Americans into ideological mega-identities. Evangelicals are in one corner, "Nones" are in the other. And Catholics and mainline Protestants cluster around the neutral line. Politically, they seem "up for grabs." We can also see how women, in every religious group, consistently express more the progressive fears without however expressing any fewer conservative fears. They are, in other words, closer to the NE corner than men--which means they are more fearful overall.
To complete the picture, let's do one more fear map. This time we'll map both whites and blacks along with religion.
The results are interesting. Catholics (of all races) are close to the neutral line, both in terms of polarization and fear. Whites (of all educational levels) are spread out from NW to SE as expected--but a bit to the conservative west. Blacks (of all educational levels) are spread out similarly--but much more toward the progressive east.
Black "nones" are very small in number, which means that while most blacks have much greater progressive fears than most whites, blacks also share the same conservative fears. African Americans have higher overall fear levels than whites. This is especially true for black evangelical Protestants. Some Trump strategists saw the possibility of outreach to the younger members of this born-again "Kanye" constituency. It didn't work all that well. But it did work for the rapidly growing number of evangelical Hispanics, who on this map are somewhere in between blacks and whites. (See "Trump's Favorability Rises Among Hispanics.")
Let's return to report's title, "Democracy in Dark Times." Just how dark are these times?
Hunter gives reasons for optimism. He emphasizes that the IASC 2016 survey confirmed "a longstanding and deep affection for America held by the vast majority of its citizens." Eight in ten voters agreed that America was "an exceptional nation" with special responsibilities to lead the world.
Nine in ten said that America was either "the greatest country in the world" or "a great country along with others." And more than nine in ten said they were "moderately" or "very" patriotic.
Yet with high expectations come deep frustrations and disappointments. Americans say their votes are increasingly driven by fear, their view of civic institutions by distrust and cynicism, and their opinion of the "other party" by contempt. These forces are gradually making them increasingly pessimistic about their country's long-term future.
"This is what the data from the 2020 IASC Survey of American Political Culture has revealed," concludes Hunter. "And, empirically, this is where legitimation crises invariably lead: dysfunctional institutions, feckless leadership, and a permanently restive population."
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ABOUT NEIL HOWE
Neil Howe is a renowned authority on generations and social change in America. An acclaimed bestselling author and speaker, he is the nation's leading thinker on today's generations—who they are, what motivates them, and how they will shape America's future.
A historian, economist, and demographer, Howe is also a recognized authority on global aging, long-term fiscal policy, and migration. He is a senior associate to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., where he helps direct the CSIS Global Aging Initiative.
Howe has written over a dozen books on generations, demographic change, and fiscal policy, many of them with William Strauss. Howe and Strauss' first book, Generations is a history of America told as a sequence of generational biographies. Vice President Al Gore called it "the most stimulating book on American history that I have ever read" and sent a copy to every member of Congress. Newt Gingrich called it "an intellectual tour de force." Of their book, The Fourth Turning, The Boston Globe wrote, "If Howe and Strauss are right, they will take their place among the great American prophets."
Howe and Strauss originally coined the term "Millennial Generation" in 1991, and wrote the pioneering book on this generation, Millennials Rising. His work has been featured frequently in the media, including USA Today, CNN, the New York Times, and CBS' 60 Minutes.
Previously, with Peter G. Peterson, Howe co-authored On Borrowed Time, a pioneering call for budgetary reform and The Graying of the Great Powers with Richard Jackson.
Howe received his B.A. at U.C. Berkeley and later earned graduate degrees in economics and history from Yale University.
