America's Suicide Rate--Up One-Third Since 1999. NewsWire.

NEWSWIRE: 6/24/19

• U.S. suicide rates have risen 33% over the last twenty years and are now the highest they’ve been since the 1930s. The rise was seen among both genders as well as all racial and ethnic groups except Asians, with the sharpest absolute increases occurring among midlife whites. (National Center for Health Statistics)
• NH: Émile Durkheim, one of the founders of sociology, famously wrote that suicide is a measure of a society's overall cohesion or function. Individually, suicide may be a matter of individual temperament or just bad luck. But collectively, a suicide rate tells us how uprooted and dissociated people feel from their own communities. "Anomie" was what Durkheim called this sense of aimlessness. By this measure, the American High (1946 to 1964) and the 1990s were eras of rising social function. Also by this measure, the 1930s, the 1970s, and the most recent (post-GFC) decade have been eras of rising social dysfunction.
• What are the specific characteristics of rising suicide rates since 2007? First, the rise has occurred in nearly every age bracket--except the elderly (age 75+). So the Silent Generation is not participating in the trend. Second, late-wave Boomer and early-wave Xers are showing the largest percentage point increases in suicide. (They are also showing the largest percentage increases in opioid fatalities.) These were the cohorts most affected early in life by the individualism and risk-taking ethos of the 1970s--see my thumbnail sketch of Generation Jones in "The Boomer Boom in Homelessness." Finally, suicide rates among Millennials and Homelanders have indeed shown large percentage increases, but the rates for youth and young-adults fell in the 1 period and are still well below that of their parents in absolute terms.
• So much for age. The other notable feature of the recent increase is the difference by race/ethnicity. Nearly all of the rise has been among non-Hispanic whites (and American Indians), who now have suicide rates much higher than African-Americans, Asians, or Hispanics in just about every age bracket. If suicide constitutes a Durkheimian stress test, that stress has been felt disproportionately by white Americans in recent years. Noncollege midlife whites also show significant recent rises in mortality due to drug abuse, alcoholism, and chronic illness--so-called "deaths of despair," according to the economist Angus Deaton. (See "Health Crisis Among Middle-Age Whites.")
• While the suicide rate is rising in most age brackets, a new JAMA editorial highlights public interest in the rising rate among youth. Many are looking at "period effects" like rising screen time or the experience of growing up in families challenged by economic adversity. They should also be considering a strong cohort effect. Interestingly, in all youth age brackets, the rising suicide rate is occurring primarily among youths born just after 1991. We know this because the upturn in the suicide rate occurs progressively later in the older age brackets: It occurs in 2007 for age 15-19; in 2013 for age 20-24; and in 2016 for age 2016. (See charts below.)
• Any clues about the importance of the 1991 birthyear? Well, those born earlier had mainly Boomer parents; those born later, mainly Xer parents. Also, those born just after 1991 were subject to the huge "attachment parenting" movement triggered by William and Martha Sears' bestseller in 1993.  They were the children under age 10 at the moment of 9/11. And they were all the K-12 students not yet graduating from high school at the depths of the Great Recession.
• Still, the recent youth suicide trend should be kept in perspective. Yes, it is rising and it may have reached a postwar high, surpassing its earlier apex around 1990. But it is a mild rise compared to the massive acceleration in youth suicide during the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s which occurred on the Boomer and Xer youth watch. Prior to 1965, suicide among 15-24 year-olds was typically much lower than that of older adults. (See the last chart below.) Ever since 1980, it has been comparable. And lately, it is has been rising along with the rate of their parents.

• Pro-EU, centrist liberals carried the day in the European Parliament elections, with Euroskeptics not far behind. When it comes to policy, however, the Euroskeptics have less to unite behind; it’s more likely that the pro-EU parties will be able to consolidate power. (The Economist)
• NH: In a recent podcast on the 2019 EU Parliamentary election results, I pointed out that the center-right alliance (the European People's Party or EPP) now faces an existential identity crisis. Domestically, to be sure, both of the centrist parties (basically, Socialists on the left and Christian Democrats on the right) have been suffering plenty of voter attrition in recent years. But at the EU level, the losses by the center-left coalition (the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats or PASD) have been replaced, in terms of their pro-EU tilt, by a growing liberal alliance and by a growing green movement. On the other side, however, there are few voters left who favor a cautious or conservative pro-EU position. Most of those leaving the EPP are moving to various populist Euro-skeptic parties. Some are joining the liberal centrists. The number remaining is dwindling fast.
• Increasingly, the pro-EU alliance will be defined by the PASD making common cause with the liberals (ALDE), who are younger, more technocratic, and more cosmopolitan than the EPP--and, while not socialists, may go along with measures that enhance the EU's centralizing power. (Think of Macron's "En Marche" or the Spanish "Ciudadanos.") Ditto for the green alliance, whose growing strength in the recent election came just about entirely from the declining clout of the old leftist parties. But the greens are significantly more pro-EU than the old leftists. So pro-EU leaders in the PASD can also get more assistance on their left.
• Arguably, the EU needs stronger and more progressive leadership if it stands any chance of surviving long term--and, perhaps, just surviving the next serious recession. Maybe the recent election will allow such leadership to emerge. Yet if it does, it will hasten the disintegration of the EPP as national members (like Orban's Fidesz and Kurz's Austrian People's Party) draw their lines in the sand.
• Thanks to dedicated researchers at UNC, we are able to track the pro-EU or anti-EU positions of every national party in the EU Parliament. The Economist recast their data, just after the 2019 election, in a wonderful infographic that shows left-right ideology on the x-axis and pro-EU sentiment on the y-axis. Note the anomalous position of Italy's Five-Star movement, which oddly combines a centrist (or left-right mixed) political agenda with a very "Euro-skeptic" EU stance. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Five-Star is being rapidly eclipsed by Matteo Salvini's Lega, which is unambiguously aligned with the right.

• According to California’s Department of Finance, the state’s population increased by 0.47% in 2018—the slowest growth rate in recorded history. The state, which added Congressional seats in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses thanks to a population boom, could lose one in 2020 for the first time ever. (MercatorNet)
• NH: Once upon a time, California was a demographic juggernaut, with ample net immigration from other states and from abroad plus a hefty birthrate. As recently as the 1990 Census, thanks to strong growth in the 1980s, California was able to add five congressional districts to its delegation in DC. That was like adding the state of Connecticut.
• Since then, however, the golden state has been downshifting. In 2000, it added just one more district. In 2010, it added none. And in 2020? New downbeat data on taxpayers from Cali's Department of Finance suggest there is a distinct possibility that the state could actually lose a district.
• So what's the problem? Well, net immigration from abroad is decelerating. Sure, it's still positive--and California remains one of the most "immigrant" states as a percent of population--but the inflow is shrinking. And, what's worse, a rising share of these immigrants is moving to other states. And that brings us to the second problem, which is that net migration to other states is now deeply in the red.
• Who's leaving? Mostly, younger and lower-income families (including lots of Hispanics). Where are they going? To lower-cost states like Texas, Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon. Meanwhile, who's still coming? Mainly higher-income singles from higher-cost states like New York, Illinois, and New Jersey. The fact that families are leaving and singles are arriving points to another problem: a falling indigenous birth rate. Not many can afford to start a family or buy a home in LA or the Bay Area. The changing mix of immigrants from abroad (Asian arrivals now outnumber Hispanic arrivals by nearly three-to-one) is also pulling fertility rates down. And yes, like everywhere else, the native-born aging-in-place Boomers are starting to disappear.
• Keep this in mind. While California may be losing a district after 2020, Texas will probably gain three and Florida another two.

• The headline of a recent David Brooks op-ed says it all: “It’s the Age of Aquarius, All Over Again.” Brooks credits rising interest in astrology and the occult to the desire for spiritual connection as well as widespread disaffection—but unlike he states, it isn’t just Millennials breaking out the sage and tarot cards. (The New York Times)
• NH: In this fascinating essay, Brooks points out how, in the age of Trump, progressive ideology is increasingly allying itself with new-age spiritual practices that were once the province of occultists deemed beyond the pale of science or rationality. These include astrology, tarot-reading, magic, witchcraft, and even Satanism. Learn why AOC's natal chart was a social-media sensation. Or why thousands of witches (belonging to the "anti-Trump resistance") cast a hex on Brett Kavanaugh. Or why dark arts are being deliberately invoked on behalf of those who feel marginalized or oppressed by the patriarchy's evangelical Christianity.
• Tara Isabella Burton concludes an American Interest essay exploring this movement with an arresting sentence: "Back in 1992, Christian broadcaster Pat Robertson warned of the dangers of feminism, predicting that it would induce 'women to leave their husbands. . . .practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism and become lesbians.' Many of today’s witches would happily agree." Wow.
• What to make of all this? Clearly, it owes something to "the rise of the nones" and declining adherence of Christian orthodoxy. (See "Rise of the Religious 'Nones'.") It may also owe something to growing ideological polarization (many progressives may want to directly confront red-zone values) as well as the inevitable human desire to connect with a transcendent power--if not with God, then possibly with something else.
• Brooks is off base, however, to connect this new-age spiritualism to Millennials. When you look at surveys of belief in astrology, for example, young Millennials today are less likely (relative to older Americans) to believe it such things than young Boomers were back in the 1970s. To the contrary, many of these practices show every sign that the sort of spiritualism once pioneered by Boomers in their own youth has become mainstream as Boomers have aged. (See "The Aging of Aquarius.") A recent Pew survey shows some evidence that Democrats lean more to spiritualism than Republicans, but there's little evidence that younger Americans lean more to the irrational than older Americans.
• Spiritualism and magic, in fact, are typically negatively correlated with education, income, and political engagement. To go back to Pew again, those who are working actively in political reform movements tend to be either overtly religious (in some orthodox sense) or overtly atheistic and generally hostile to spiritual or magical practices, "dark" or otherwise. Brooks seems to agree that occultism is more a sign of alienation than genuine activism: "I doubt that much of this will be sustainable. I doubt it’s possible to have tight community and also total autonomy, that it’s possible to detach spiritual practices from the larger narratives and cultures and still have something life-shaping." I would go along with that assessment.
• As prices rise faster than incomes, Millennials are under pressure to buy homes before they’re priced out of the market. But they’re having a hard time escaping the problem, because the influx of people from exorbitantly priced cities is driving up prices in cheaper areas like Salt Lake City and Raleigh. (Associated Press)
• NH: The interviews in this story, conducted mainly in the Salt Lake City area, show how the high real-estate prices of coastal urban centers are starting to push up prices in secondary cities. Yes, many Millennials are in a race to buy before prices rise. (Gee, when did we see that before: Gen-Xers back in 2005 and 2006?) More than that, many are in a geographic race to migrate faster than higher prices are spreading. After you leave Cupertino or Brooklyn for Boulder or Austin, where do you go next once you confront rent or mortgage payments that are still unaffordable? Does Des Moines or Buffalo or Little Rock come up next on your radar screen?
• A new piece explores the future of retirement communities, which are starting to look a lot more like WeWork than Leisure World. At one such community in North Hollywood, Boomer residents engage in “salon-style discussions of history and politics with ethnic food to share.” (MarketWatch)
• NH: This story gets it wrong. In fact, the Boomer retirement experience is coming to resemble neither Leisure World (what their parents had) not WeWork (what their kids are gravitating towards). To begin with, it's seldom a community at all. The vast majority of Boomers are aging in place (see "Boomers Say 'No Thanks" to Downsizing"). And those who do seek out "intentional communities"--most often, single Boomers without kids--will indeed be looking for a talky salon-style environment, not the busy and minimalist WeWork aesthetic.
• Readers can explore where world populations are growing and shrinking in a new interactive infographic created from World Bank data. It underscores that while most countries are still growing, there’s an increasingly stark gap between rich western nations with mostly low birth rates and developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia where birth rates remain high. (Axios)
• NH: This infographic teaches the obvious link between birth rate and long-term population growth. There is a similar (though less direct) negative correlation between GDP per capita and long-term population growth. (See chart 42 in my video, "Demography, Economic Growth, and Long-Term Real Interest Rates.")

• With candidates ranging from ages 37 to 77, the 2020 Democratic field has the public asking: How old should a president be? In most recent elections, Democrats have favored the youngest candidate, but currently the two leading candidates—Sanders and Biden—are the oldest. (The New York Times)
• NH: Yes, for what it's worth, I'm quoted in this story. But IMO if you want a better take on generational differences among the Democratic line-up, you should be sure to watch our forthcoming Demography Unplugged video on the 2020 race. Let me reproduce (below) the nice NYT graphic showing the unusually large spread in ages among the Democratic contenders this time around--ranging from Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders (born in 1942) to Pete Buttigieg (born in 1982).
• That's a forty-year spread, much wider than in any election year since at least 1960. But even this may be a gross underestimate. Why not count the candidacy of Mike Gravel (age 89), the former Alaska senator and one-time Watergate firebrand? If you include Gravel, the spread widens to an incredible 52 years. Gravel was the third speaker of the House of Representatives of the newly gestating state of Alaska in 1965. That was 17 years before Pete Buttigieg was even born!
• The NYT piece repeats the often-heard claim that Republican presidents in recent decades have been older because Democratic leaders are somehow predisposed to go with youth. I disagree. The Republican presidents have been older because they have mostly been the incumbents--and the Democrats (after licking their wounds) generally need to come up with a new challenger. If you look at congressional leadership, the opposite is true. The Democrats have mostly been the incumbents and they have typically had the older leaders. Today, the Democratic leaders in the House are some 14 years older, on average, than Republican leaders in the House.

• Brands that went all in on targeting Millennials are finally waking up to a harsh reality: Many of them are broke. Apparently, marketers were so excited by this generation’s size and the prospect of their spending habits that they overlooked how much money they actually have—but we could have told you that. (Adweek)
• Half of Americans think made-up news is a major problem in our country, but there’s a huge partisan gulf over who’s responsible and an age gap over who cares. Republicans are three times as likely as Democrats to blame journalists for creating made-up news, while young adults are much less likely than Americans age 50+ to believe that it’s hurting democracy and will get worse in the future. (Pew Research Center)
• NH: Fifty percent of Americans say "made-up news" is "a big problem" in America today. That ranks below affordable health care (61%), but above climate change (46%), racism (40%), and illegal immigration (38%).
• Republican-leaning voters are more likely to regard this as a big problem than Democratic-leaning voters, by roughly 60% to 40%. They are also much more likely to hold media to blame. Since most Republican voters are well aware that most journalists hold left-of-center views, the obvious corollary is that they find it easier to identify the media as the source of "fake news."
• Both Democrats and Republicans agree that the media ranks among the least trustworthy of American institutions in part due to the propagation of misleading news. Both agree that political polarization is a fundamental cause of perceptions of media bias. And neither side is optimistic that this impasse will improve anytime soon, though Millennials (as they are on most issues) are more optimistic in their outlook.

DID YOU KNOW?

Sobriety is the New Black. Waving off booze at a party used to be seen as a signal that you were in recovery, pregnant, or had a religious objection. But increasingly, it’s happening for another reason: You might just be one of the thousands of young people joining the ranks of the “sober curious.” Many of the “sober curious” don’t wish to give up alcohol altogether, but simply to drink less while putting more thought into how much they consume. Rather than join a 12-step program, they’re gravitating towards “sober influencers” and trendy lifestyle communities like Hip Sobriety. As such, sobriety is becoming another branch of the wellness movement, complete with yoga retreats, alcohol-free bars, and plenty of new, nonalcoholic options from big-name brands and high-end restaurants. For Millennials who were never all that wild in the first place, cutting back doesn’t automatically equal social ostracism. Instead, it’s an invitation to save money and remember those Netflix binges the next morning.