Rise of the Religious "Nones." NewsWire

NEWSWIRE: 4/22/19

• For the first time, “no religion” (23.1%) has edged out Catholic (23.0%) and evangelical (22.5%) as the most common religious identity among Americans. To be sure, those who identify with some religion collectively outnumber the nones, but the speedy growth of the unaffiliated—up over 3X since 1991—suggests that they won’t remain absent from political leadership much longer. (CNN)
• NH: This finding is notable, since it derives from an identically worded GSS (General Social Science) survey stretching back to 1972 (see chart below). The trend is consistent with the in-depth research of other major research institutes, such as the "Rise of the Nones" surveys conducted by Pew Research. (See: "Did You Know? Nones Rising.")
• The total rise in "no religion" since the early 1990s--from about 7% to 23%--seems incredible. But most experts explain that a significant share of this growth can be explained by fewer shy respondents, that is, by fewer people saying that they are, say, "Episcopalian" or "Lutheran" when in fact they never (either back then or today) went to church. In other words, their responses to surveys have changed even though their behavior hasn't. Supporting this thesis is the fact that moderate, mainstream Protestant denominations (which ask the least from believers in terms of behavior) have seen the biggest declines, while stricter and more orthodox faith have seen the smallest declines. By some measures (for example, the share who read scripture and proselytize), those 77% remaining within denominations are becoming a bit more religious over time.
• Still, across all Americans, participation in organized religion has clearly been declining over the last two or three decades. Since 2007, prayer, belief in God, and church attendance have all been trending down. Not only has the "unaffiliated" share grown, but even within the unaffiliated, most religious behaviors are in steep decline.
• Behind the decline are both "period" and "cohort" drivers. Among the period drivers (affecting persons of all ages), one big one is declining public trust in churches and church leaders due to widely publicized scandals and abuses. This decline has been especially steep among liberals disaffected by churches that have allied themselves with social conservatives and the Republican Party. As a result, America's red-versus-blue political divide now encompasses religion (see Robert Putnam et al., American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us)--which tempts some Democratic leaders to abandon their religious voters.
• There are also strong generational drivers. The evidence suggests that Millennials and Xers are each becoming less religious (at the same age) than the two generations before them (Xers and Boomers). Even among Millennials, late-wavers (born in the 1990s) appear to be less religious than early-wavers (born in the 1980s), although some of this may be caused by a progressively later age of marriage and childbearing. (Marriage and children are well-known "life cycle" triggers of greater religiosity.) The unaffiliateds' median age is 36, ten years younger than the national median age. Millennials are left-brained achievers who hold science and technology in high regard. Clearly, many of these thirtyish young adults want to break from what they perceive to be the faith-based, born-again dogmas of their Boomer parents.
• While Democratic leaders seem to be riding a rising wave, they need to be cautious. For starters, the "nones" are a bimodal group. Only a minority (7% of the total) call themselves "atheist" or "agnostic." These voters--who tend to be young, affluent, well-educated, white, male, unmarried, and overtly secular--will vote overwhelmingly for progressive Democratic candidates. But most of the rest (16%), who call themselves "nothing in particular," are very different: They are disproportionately poor and uneducated. While they lean Democratic, they tend not to vote, characterize themselves as "moderates," and (unlike the atheist/agnostic) respect the role of religion in American life. This points to a further problem for Democrats on the cultural left. By very large majorities, most Americans believe that churches "strengthen community bonds" (89%), "play an important role in helping the poor" (87%), and "protect and strengthen morality in society" (75%). Even a majority of the unaffiliated believe all these things. Most Americans still say they would be "less likely" to vote for an atheist presidential candidate.
• And then there's race and ethnicity, which also poses a dilemma for Democrats. While nonwhites tend to lean Democratic, they are also significantly more religious and "affiliated" than whites. Latinos, for example, are 33% less likely than whites to call themselves atheists; African-Americans are 75% less likely. Even Bernie Sanders--about as close to a "none" candidate that the Democrats are likely to field--went out of his way in 2016 to deny allegations that he was, or just might be, an atheist himself. Even so, Hillary Clinton beat out Sanders in the 2016 primaries largely because Hillary knew--and Bernie didn't know--how to connect with the deep religious sensibilities of African-Americans living in the Deep South.

• A new WSJ article debates the pros and cons of the latest crop of high-tech baby monitors. While these devices may not always function perfectly and are not yet regulated by the FDA, there’s no question that they help improve peace of mind for Millennial parents who would rather be safe than sorry. (The Wall Street Journal)
• NH: Spending on babies is being pulled in two directions--downwards by demography (fewer babies being born per year) and upwards by quality and margins (more and fancier must-have gizmos). As we predicted two years ago (see: "Nothing’s Too Good for My Baby"), the upwards pull is winning out. What's the winning marketing pitch? Just glance at this headline for a story on CES 2019 in Las Vegas: "'Family tech: gadgets appeal to parental anxiety." The first step is to prey on fear (omg, what if I'm not there and something goes wrong?), and then move on to optimization (10,000 scientists have ruled this is the best!), practicality (I will save so much time!), and scarcely credible ancillary benefits (wow, that programmable ducky will help my baby learn to code some day!).
• Our summary bears repeating: "For first-time parents, the price tag is worth knowing that their child is healthy and safe—something the baby tech industry banks on. Industry experts agree that baby tech is sold mostly on fear, not practicality. This fear-mongering works well on Xers, whose earliest memories often don’t include parental supervision. Now as parents, they don’t hesitate to fork over their cash for a device that monitors their child’s every breath. For Millennials, these tactics play on their risk-aversion. It’s hardly a surprise that the generation that turns to Yelp to make decisions would want a data-driven app to guide them through parenthood."
• Sure, the Owlet Smart Sock (a wireless oximeter that measures heart rate and blood oxygenation) sounds cool enough. But this year's CES featured even cooler and pricier devices--such as those using "contactless" radar and cameras to achieve the same purpose. (Gotta have one of those.) So are we nearing peak baby gadget? Not yet. On our calendar, we don't expect this trend to top out until the mid-2020s. But clearly we're past the rate-of-change inflection point. From here on out, this crowded industry is likely to trade rising revenues for declining margins.
• The share of Americans not having sex over the past year has reached a record-high 23% in 2018. Though population aging has played a role, the biggest change has occurred among 18- to 30-year-old men, whose rate of sexlessness has nearly tripled over the past decade to 28%—a much steeper increase than that among young women. (The Washington Post)
• NH: Here's another headline triggered by GSS data. Other GSS data series, summarized in Jean Twenge's recent book, similarly spotlight the steep decline in sexual activity among young adults and especially among young men. Most of the evidence suggests that this Millennial trend has been underway since well before 2008.
• For example, the share of 20- to 24-year-olds who have been sexually inactive since age 18 has roughly doubled since late-wave Xers (born in the 1970s) were that age. Total number of sexual partners after age 18 (adjusted for age), after peaking among Boomers (for men) and among Xers (for women), has since been declining for both genders. Not only is the inactive trend steeper for men than for women, but it also seems to be accelerating. According to CDC data, the share of high-school students who say they've had sex--after declining gradually from 54% in 1991 to 47% in 2013--dropped much more suddenly to 41% in 2016.
• Explanations for this drop run the gamut, from reasons having a positive spin (risk aversion, stronger achievement orientation, a growing desire for permanent relationships) to those having a negative spin (too much social media, too many men in economic trouble, the hassle of courtship in the #MeToo era). For our own outline of these drivers, see "Japan: Land of the Young and the Sexless" and "Millennials and Sex: A Relationship on the Rocks?" Biochemical theories focusing on declining testosterone blood levels and on the rise of environmental xenoestrogens are still considered outside the box. But they do have the advantage of explaining the differential change in males versus females. (See: "You're Not the Man Your Father Was.")

• New data show that 12% of voters who cast a ballot for Bernie Sanders in the 2016 primaries went on to vote for Donald Trump. These voters, who were less likely to identify as Democrats in the first place, drive home the point that populism often takes priority over partisanship in the voting booth. (NPR)
• NH: With Bernie's renewed push for 2020, this bit of remarkable information is rising again on political news sites. The massive size and validated accuracy of this survey (every voter is vetted) ensures that this number is fairly accurate. And yes this margin was more than large enough to carry Trump over the top.
• To be sure, the spread of "open primaries" means that some of these voters were not Democrats. Still, according to the survey, 45% of these Sanders-Trump voters considered themselves Democrats and another 25% considered themselves "independent." Only 5% said they were "strong Republicans."
• It's also not uncommon for primary voters to cross party lines in the general election. In 2016, 10% of Marco Rubio voters went on to support Clinton--as did 32% of John Kasich voters. But here the motivation was obvious: These voters, turned off by Trump's emotional extremism, pulled the lever for someone closer to their own more moderate GOP outlook--that is, someone more toward the "middle." But how can you apply that explanation to someone who supported a candidate at the left edge of the Democratic Party and then voted for a "MAGA" tribalist on the right?
• IMO, we have entered an era in which the usefulness of the traditional left-right ideological spectrum is being challenged by a very different spectrum--call it populist-versus-elitist or authoritarian-versus-libertarian. On that new spectrum, the populists and authoritarians on the left and right can often find a common cause. Bernie Sanders understands this perfectly well, which is why he recently appeared on a ratings-busting one-hour Fox News special, in Bethlehem, PA, with rusted-out factories in the background. As the ramp-up to 2020 continues, this new reality will gradually dawn on more Democratic candidates. Just yesterday, Pete Buttigieg drew parallels between Bernie's and Donald's supporters and said both want to "turn against the system" and "blow up the system."
• I've spelled this thesis out in the European context as well (see: "Most French Citizens Disapprove of Macron"), pointing out that it's not the rising strength of either the populist right or the populist left in France or Italy that is portentous--it is the rise of both at the expense of the moderate middle.
• With Boomers flocking to the gym, demand is rising for personal trainers in their 50s and older. It’s a win-win situation: Older gymgoers are happy to find someone their age, trainers are staying busy in an encore career, and gyms are finding that older trainers reliably attract older clients and tend to stay longer than younger trainers. (The Wall Street Journal)
• Consultant Jason Dorsey argues that the GFC effectively split the Millennial Generation into two halves, each with its own unique set of financial habits. While it’s true that late-wave Millennials did not experience the crash firsthand like their early-wave peers, both groups share the same ethos of risk aversion and financial responsibility. (Business Insider)
• NH: While I'm not a huge Jason Dorsey fan, I do agree with him that the Millennial Generation is a generation of trends. First-wave Millennials, born from 1982 to 1992 and mostly the children of Boomers, were the "special" schoolkids of the 1990s who grew up in a relatively buoyant economy. They left home or college just before or during or after the Great Recession. Last-wavers, born from 1993 to 2004 and mostly the children of Xers, were the "sheltered" post-9/11 kids who grew up in the midst of geopolitical and economic anxiety. They have been coming of age and getting their first jobs just as the economy has been gradually accelerating.
• If we think of Millennials as a transition from the resilience, individualism, and derring-do of Gen X to the fragility, group-orientation, and risk-aversion of Homelanders, we can understand how the location in history of each Millennial half--first-wave and last-wave--has reinforced this transition. (For reflections on cohorts born at the very front end of the Millennial Generation, see: "Are You an 'Xennial?'")
• Rural and small towns have seen more growth in the West than in any other region of the U.S. since 2010. Western states have weathered the urbanization of the nation far better than those in the East, in large part because they were less dependent on manufacturing and have also been able to lure new residents with the great outdoors. (The Washington Post)
• NH: Rural America has been shrinking as a share of America's population for nearly 40 years--ever since the 1970s. That's back when cities were crime-ridden and "de-industrializing" and young Boomers were heading into the wilderness to discover nature (and themselves). Then came the 1980s, when Boomers transformed into gentrified yuppies--followed by two generations of coming-of-age adults, Xers and Millennials, which both in their own way fell in love with cities. Downtown crime declined, city politics became halfway functional again, and hi-tech began to adopt a modernist urban sheen. In 2012, for the first time ever, rural America actually shrank in absolute numbers. That absolute yearly shrinkage continued through 2016. Birthrates are higher in rural America, but so are death rates given the rising median age due to the steady outmigration of young people.
• In 2017, rural America barely eked out positive growth again (see first chart below). Driven to desperation by high urban real-estate prices, some youth are at last returning. Another big driver of rural growth is a strong in-migration of Hispanics; whites are still net emigrants. And maybe the biggest emerging driver of all? Retiring Boomers. That's right, the same Boomers who boosted rural growth as kids in jeans during the '70s are coming back to resettle there--and bringing all their pension, Social Security, and Medicare dollars with them. That's a trend that may extend through the next decade. Take one look at the counties where in-migration is picking up fastest and it's pretty obvious: gorgeous recreation and retirement destinations top the list.
• That may be one explanation for the west-versus-rest dichotomy shown here (see second chart below). The dry air, moderate climate, and spectacular vistas of many western counties need no elaboration. Also, unlike so many rural counties in the Northeast and Midwest, most of these western locales never industrialized. Which means that fewer of them have been contracting due to foreign competition and automation--and that fewer are burdened by the unsightly costs and environmental hazards of abandoned communities and industrial infrastructure.

• Fully 35% of Millennials would be comfortable talking about money-related topics on the first date, compared to 23% of Xers and 14% of Boomers. While this could just be a result of more conversational openness in general, it also reflects a more pragmatic approach to romance and greater concerns with personal finance among young people. (Bankrate)
• NH: Economic duress and later marriage ages have made young-adult Millennials far more pragmatic and candid than their parents or grandparents ever were about looking carefully at the financial circumstances of their romantic partners. We have discussed this topic often: See “Did You Know? Until Debt Do Us Part”; “Did You Know? Show Me Your Money”; and “Did You Know? Popping the (Credit Score) Question.” Among young women, who (as expected) worry more about this than young men, this focus on dollars and cents can even be regarded as a measure of their achievement orientation. There's a great quote here from Maria Liz Meinhofer, a certified money coach: "Women are constantly trying to improve themselves. So things like being very mindful of their credit score, this is something that is very, very common in women.”
• A growing number of demographers worry that the impending global population-growth slowdown could be worse than anticipated. Why? Progress in education and other social indicators, unaccounted for in most of the official fertility models, could pose a huge drag on birthrates for decades to come. (The Economist)
• NH: Wolfgang Lutz, head of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna, is probably the world's leading expert on the empirical relationship between education and fertility. He finds that more education has a direct and linear link to less fertility. According to his research, even a modest acceleration in educational attainment in Africa and South Asia could result in global population peaking at just under 9 billion--which is far below the peak estimated by the official U.N. projection (11 billion).

• A new poll underscores Americans’ paradoxical relationship with social media: We hate it, but continue to use it daily. Negative opinions about social media’s effects span virtually every demographic and political group, with most Americans saying they’re not satisfied with the level of regulation of companies like Facebook and Twitter—but stopping short of wishing to break them up. (The Wall Street Journal)
• NH: Tech-lash keeps rolling. (See "Tech-Lash Batters Silicon Valley" and "America and Facebook: A Love-Hate Relationship.") While Americans keep using Facebook and Twitter, it is remarkable how negative most Americans are about these brands--and how many Americans have decided that they have failed in their original mission to improve our lives, keep us informed, and "bring us together."

DID YOU KNOW?

Let's Get Personal. The age of one-size-fits-all shopping is over. That’s according to The Wall Street Journal, which documents the rise of highly personalized products catered to individual shoppers. Prose, a customized hair care brand, asks customers to create an online profile and answer 30 questions about their lifestyle habits that the company uses to craft a unique product. L’Oréal goes even further: For $195, the company offers an in-person skin consultation with a physician, who enters patient notes into an algorithm that creates a made-to-order serum. Even beverage makers are getting personal: Gatorade is readying Gx, a “customizable hydration system” that uses an athlete’s biometric data to create a drink formula tailored to their individual needs. These types of products would not be possible without advanced Big Data algorithms that can quickly and easily turn customer inputs into product recommendations. Consumers like 27-year-old Ashleigh Knopp don’t mind the extra time and effort it takes to find the perfect product: “I’d spend that much time in a store figuring out what to pay.”