Few summits, outside of meetings with Chinese President Xi Jingping, will be more important for the U.S. and for President Donald Trump than his sit-downs with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Despite the despicable nature of the regime in Pyongyang, Trump deserves credit for interrupting a North Korean rush to high-confidence, intercontinental nuclear missile capability. He didn't get what he wanted in Hanoi, and he walked away rather than accept a bad deal; “good for him” for doing so.
- One is never sure where ground truth is nowadays on the background to talks to “denuclearize” North Korea; but from reports last week, what was on offer from Kim (dismantle some but not all of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, maintain the moratorium on testing ) wasn’t enough to convince Trump to eliminate all sanctions on Pyongyang (the Kim demand).
WHO was (initially) relieved?
- Japan: they’ve been left out of almost everything in the spin-up to the Hanoi meetings; their concerns - Japanese abductees held by the North, Kim's arsenal of short-range missiles - were, at best, only marginally addressed; Japan wants, and deserves, billing in the next round.
- The U.S. Forces (Korea) military command: in the wake of Singapore and the surprise announcement on suspension of “war games” (Trump's term - and Kim's), the worry of senior commanders was of a summit announcement curtailing large-scale joint exercises with South Korea on the peninsula; that didn’t happen immediately.
- However, with the president again reiterating his complaint about the excessive cost, the president has now, unfortunately, scrubbed the large-scale, decades-long exercises -- to the chagrin of our theater commanders.
WHO’s (still) Uneasy?
- President Moon Jea-in: the South Korean president had gotten way out front of his highlights (“out-kicked his coverage”) on his personalized outreach to the North; the walk-away by Trump will leave him politically vulnerable.
- Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: the talks with Pyongyang are his baby. He’ll do his best, with his special representative for North Korea, Steve Biegun, to maintain momentum, post-Hanoi. But the necessary spade-work at the worker level, to narrow the issues in advance of the summit, was too little and too late. That’s on Pompeo; but ultimately, it's on the president, who trusted his instincts, not Pompeo's, and proceeded with the meeting anyway.
The BIG QUESTION:
- China: with their economy slowing, one might argue that sanctions relief on the North was a strong motivation for Beijing to encourage Kim to be flexible; but the key for China has always been stability on the peninsula! They have that now; anything further down the diplomatic road that radically transforms the Korean economy and opens up the North would be a geo-strategic set-back. Beijing sees Kim right now in a “Goldilocks” moment: there’s no testing, trade has effectively re-opened, and there’s (still!) a dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea, with China playing a pivotal role; if you were president Xi Jingping, you'd ask, "why change anything??"
Bottom Line: the Hanoi summit deserves an "A" for concept and a "D-" for execution. We're unlikely to return to market-roiling sabre rattling any time soon; but as most Korea hands (and this writer) predicted, "Denuclearizing" North Korea will remain a foreign policy mirage.
JOIN US THIS TUESDAY, MARCH 12 AT 2:00 PM FOR MORE ON NORTH KOREA AND A GEOPOLITICAL ROUNDUP WITH GENERAL CHRISTMAN - AS WELL AS AN UPDATE ON THE BURGEONING CRISIS IN VENEZUELA. WE'LL BE JOINED BY OUR SENIOR ENERGY ANALYST JOE MCMONIGLE. FIND THE CALL DETAILS HERE.
