- 1) First off, as it relates to P&L/Balance Sheet triangulation, LIZ is starting off in a similar place as JNY (see chart below – and see JNY post for info on how to interpret the chart). I think inventories are in check – in part supported by the year/year change in average selling price heading higher. At the same time, LIZ cycles against massive margin headwinds, which should solidify LIZ in the ‘sweet spot’ of its margin/inventory cycle.
- 2) Wholesale business is still extremely poor, but sales decline in the core Liz Claiborne brand have stabilized since the last conference call. See Exhibit 2.
- 3) Check out my 5/13 post as to why I like this name over the next 1-2 years. It has arguably more fat than any other company in the space. With a new CEO who is bordering on not being ‘new’ anymore, he has to either a) show that his recent investments are working, b) cut costs if his bet was wrong, or c) lose his job. I think any of them is a positive stock event. The Board has changes incentives to facilitate 2009 as the break-out margin year – and I think this is attainable even with supply chain pressures.
- Full disclosure is that my Partner Keith McCullough (he’s the expert on the stock – and me on the fundamentals) is not a fan of this name now from a quant standpoint. I’ll bow out of the debate as to whether it is going up or down by a couple bucks near-term, but the 1-2 year margin call is going to be tough to justify only a $13 stock if I am right.
What should we expect from earnings tonight after the close? Las Vegas won’t be pretty and is probably getting worse. Room rates are not done falling. I’m pretty sure the new Palazzo hotel/casino is struggling. The other potential negative for the quarter will be Macau margins due to escalating Junket commissions. However, Macau is where LVS may actually “roll the point” should they choose to discuss the July performance of Venetian Macau. Despite a so-so month for the market overall, I believe Venetian may have stolen some markets share. July foot traffic picked up dramatically in July as I wrote in my 7/24/08 post “MACAU UPDATE FROM THE GROUND”. If Vegas is salvageable and my intelligence on Venetian is correct, a short squeeze could push the volatility into the 1 or more standard deviation range, on the upside.
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- Although all casual dining operators will benefit from this reduced capacity, Brinker’s Chili’s restaurants should be the biggest beneficiary as Bennigan’s was a direct competitor within the bar and grill segment. From a geographic exposure standpoint, both Bennigan’s and Steak & Ale’s most penetrated markets overlap with Chili’s locations. Specifically, 23% of Bennigan’s domestic restaurants (includes franchised locations) and 27% of Steak & Ale’s restaurants are in Texas. Chili’s has the most geographic exposure relative to its total number of stores to Texas (accounts for 17% of its restaurant base). Chili’s second biggest state is Florida where 11% of its restaurant base is located relative to Bennigan’s 18% and Steak & Ale’s 21% exposure.
- Chili’s returns have been hurt recently by its own overly aggressive unit growth and by over capacity in the casual dining segment. EAT management had already taken steps to reverse its declining returns by slowing unit growth plans for FY08, FY09 and FY10. Now, excess capacity within the industry, particularly within the bar and grill segment, is starting to come down.
Why the 2Q flag? Check out the chart below. Though KSWS has been losing share – it has been at a less severe rate for much of the past 12 months. What I find ironic, however, is that the share position peaked almost to the day of KSWS’ last quarterly conference call – when management presumably saw a light at the end of the tunnel for its business (even though this team never articulates it as such).
Since then, KSWS market share has regressed slightly. My sense is that this is, in part, as the company clears inventory of its more basic product (recall that low performance trend is rolling over) and prepping to get in the performance footwear game with its running shoe in the spring. Am I thrilled that KSWS will go head to head with Nike, Under Armour, New Balance and Asics? Hardly. But the numbers KSWS needs to crank its P&L are a rounding error to the market.
In the meantime, it is beginning to see its easiest revenue, margin, working capital and capex compares in years – at the same time it should start to harvest recent investments.
I like how this is shaping up.
Why is JNY up 15% today? For starters, JNY beat (lowered expectations) and it is the first time in more quarters than I can count where results did not result in a downward revision. That’s enough for a pop in this tape. But any other positive nuggets I can throw out regarding the quarter can best be summed up in the chart below. For everyone that has seen me put up these convoluted charts with squiggly lines, here a textbook example as to why they matter.
The Y axis represents sales growth less inventory growth. The X axis is the yy change in margin. Upper right (sales outstripping inventories and margins headed up) = good. Lower left (inventories too high, sales slow, and margins down) = bad.
Best in class retailers and brands can stay in that upper right quadrant for years. JNY, on the other hand, has not been there for 2 consecutive quarters since the Clinton administration. No joke. I like the fact that Wes Card (CEO) has taken up spending levels to make up for the sins of his predecessor. Perhaps that buoys brand momentum to a slight degree. But I still think that we need at least $100mm in added brand investment to help JNY regain relevance, and give the company any sense of stability. Unfortunately that $100mm equals about 300bp in margin, and JNY is running at about 5% today. That’s bad where I come from. Stuck between a boulder and a hard place.
Does this matter near-term? Probably not. One of JNY’s problems has been its retail business, where margins have gone from 10% to -5% over 7 years. This quarter went from -2 to +3% margin on a yy basis. This was simply due to controlling inventory and being less promotional. Is this sustainable? I’m not convinced it is. But with inventories being cleaner (which they are), JNY probably has a couple quarters to keep the retail margin expansion going.
If such is the case, and JNY flows this success through to the margin level instead of reinvesting in the emaciated brands, then this name could take a big turn for the worse as we head into ’09.