Takeaway: It is imperative that Secretary of State Tillerson have a team in place to deal with the growing existential threat posed by North Korea.

What Kim Jong-un Learned From Qadafi and Saddam Hussein - kim jong

The departure of South Korean President Park Geun-hye from the Blue House executive mansion last week was not unexpected; the long-running corruption scandal and eventual impeachment of Park brought to an end a tumultuous and unsettling period for South Korean democracy.

Encouragingly, it also demonstrated the resilience of democratic institutions for one of America's key allies and our 7th largest trading partner. New elections are now set for May 9th, to choose a successor to Park.  

But while streets in Seoul are now quiet, the future direction of South Korean foreign policy is still very much up-for-grabs. At this point, domestic weariness with Park's hard-nosed approach with the North appears to give South Korean "progressives" the upper hand in the May elections; election day surprises are, however, a staple of South Korean politics.

Should "progressives" -- the South Korean Democratic Party in particular -- gain the Blue House, their tradition of a "Sunshine" policy toward the North is likely to be revived. This means:

  1. Reopening economic engagement with the North;
  2. Attempting a diplomatic outreach with Pyongyang; and
  3. Judged by recent statements, pushing back on the stationing of U.S. anti-missile batteries ("THAAD") that are currently driving dyspepsia both in Pyongyang and Beijing. 

These shifts in South Korean politics are nothing new. North Korean missile testing, however, is. Earlier tests have been described by Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haas as "station identification" - reminding the world not to forget Pyongyang.

But testing earlier this month -- salvo-launched solid fuel missiles from mobile transporters -- signals a very different and far more dangerous path by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un: a war-fighting capability with weapons of mass destruction, including, eventually, nuclear-capable intercontinental missiles, to hold the U.S. hostage in the event of future crises on the Korean peninsula.

Kim has learned the lesson from the collapse of governments in Libya (Qadafi) and Iraq (Saddam Hussein): dictatorial leaders threatened by the west are doomed in the absence of nuclear capability. 

Tillerson's Travels

Thankfully, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was just on the road -- to the two countries in NE Asia that need U.S. reassurance (Japan and South Korea), and to the one country (China) at least partially complicit in Pyongyang's missile and nuclear madness.

  • Rex made headlines by stating that Obama's "strategic patience" policy toward the North was at an end, and that "all options are on the table" -- the latter statement containing an implicit U.S. military threat.
  • Despite the press frenzy, however, these are largely self-evident conclusions. But they did provide some long-overdue markers to Beijing, where Tillerson's visit last weekend was largely rhetoric-free and focused where it should be: on North Korea.

Next steps for Rex? Pave the way for a Mar-a-Lago U.S.-China summit, tentatively scheduled next month between Presidents Trump and Xi. This meeting looms as monumentally significant -- both to chart an agreed course ahead on North Korea, and to smooth Beijing-Washington relations roiled by nationalistic "China Dream" and "America First" rhetoric.

Setting the stage for a successful summit may well be the toughest and most important challenge of Rex Tillerson's entire foreign policy stewardship. 

In this light especially, it is imperative that the White House give Tillerson the ability to form a foreign policy team whose competence is commensurate with the challenges he and his department face. Political constraints on that personnel-selection process are incredibly short-sighted; and with the growing existential threat posed by Kim Jong-un, also highly dangerous.