What are the bulls smoking buying the all-time high in stocks?
Editor's Note: Below is a brief excerpt from Hedgeye Potomac Chief Political Strategist JT Taylor's Capital Brief sent to institutional clients each morning. For more information on how you can access our institutional research please email firstname.lastname@example.org.
“Ideas control the world.”
-James A. Garfield
With the fallout from the RNC’s first day still lingering, Donald Trump’s historic day two moved to right the ship, with key members of the Republican leadership, Trump’s family and inner circle moving into the spotlight. Speeches by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Speaker Paul Ryan offered up lukewarm support of the party’s nominee (better than cold, huh?) and largely focused on their agendas for Congress as well as unity without tipping their hats too far in Trump’s direction.
And, in a preview of what to expect this fall, Governor Chris Christie delivered a blistering assault on Hillary Clinton and her record dusting off his prosecutor’s badge. If Trump and Co. execute the next two days flawlessly, a largely unified party could be within reach by the end of the week, but don’t hold your breath. Trump’s formal nomination drew mixed reactions with some delegates chanting enthusiastically, while others shouted in protest - but most left confused due to the lack of focus on the theme of the day - Make America Work Again.
Going into it’s sixteenth month, Trump’s campaign has been unscripted, unpredictable and undermanned from the start - and the bizarre rollout of Governor Mike Pence and the early missteps of the convention - especially Melania’s speech and ill-conceived response - were bound to happen. Stepping all over her big moment without holding anyone accountable illustrates the level of disorder ingrained in Trump’s world.
The campaign’s lack of organization, infrastructure, and skeletal staff are all symptoms of a much larger problem augmented by Trump’s continued focus on himself.
In a surprise move, Republicans threw a wrench in the works of the financial services community by including a call to reinstate the Glass-Steagall Act in their convention platform – a law repealed by President Bill Clinton in 1999. Our view is that the passage is Trump’s attempt to generate populist appeal as well as woo voters who view Clinton is too close to Wall Street and too timid on financial reform.
We would typically discount a platform move of this sort, but with some Republicans hopping on board a Democratic ideal - it’s worth keeping on the radar for 2017.
Editor's Note: Below is a Hedgeye Guest Contributor research note written by Dr. Daniel Thornton. During his 33-year career at the St. Louis Fed, Thornton served as vice president and economic advisor. He currently runs D.L. Thornton Economics, an economic research consultancy. Please note that guest columns do not necessarily reflect Hedgeye's opinion. In this particular instance, we disagree with a number of Thornton's conclusions. That's what makes a market! Nevertheless, we think it makes sense to consider ideas we don't share. It is a thoughtful piece and a worthwhile read.
Some economists believe that the U.S. is stuck in a period of slow growth. Former Secretary of the Treasury, Larry Summers, calls this secular stagnation, a term coined by Alvin Hansen in the late 1930s to describe what he believed might be the fate of the U.S. economy at that time—a prolonged period of slow growth.
In Summers’ version, the prolonged period of slow growth is a consequence of a lack of aggregate demand due to excessive saving, ("Why Larry Summers Is Wrong About Slow Growth"). Recently, James Bullard, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, has suggested that the economy has shifted into a low growth regime, (Bullard).
Consequently, he now recommends the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) keep its target for the federal funds rate no higher than 75 basis points over the next 2.5 years to stimulate growth. This essay shows that the idea that the economy is stuck in a low growth state is misguided. The implication of this analysis is that the FOMC should move quickly to implement the normalization plan that it announced on September 17, 2014.
The view that the economy is stuck in a slow growth period comes in large part from Figure 1, which is commonly presented as evidence of secular stagnation. Figure 1 shows the logarithm of real GDP from 1947Q1 to 2015Q3 along with a trend line that is estimated over the period 1947Q1-2007Q4, i.e., up to the start of the last recession. Real GDP is plotted in logarithms because the slope of a line in logarithms is the growth rate. Figure 1 suggests that real GDP grew at about a constant rate of 3.2% over the 1947-2007 period.
Moreover, the figure suggests that output is not even close to returning to trend. Conclusion: The economy is in a prolonged period of weak growth. Summers calls this secular stagnation; Bullard calls it a regime shift.
But Figure 1 is very deceptive because the growth rate of output has been trending down over the last 70 years. Figure 2 shows a 6-year moving average of the growth rate of real GDP. The figure also shows a trend line estimated using data up to 2007Q4 and extrapolated to 2015Q3. The growth rate of output in the U.S. declined at a fairly steady rate over the period. Trend growth declined from about 4% in the mid-1950s to about 2.75% by 2007.
Consequently, contrary to what Figure 1 suggests, the growth rate of output was not constant over the period from 1947 to 2007. Moreover, the figure shows that if growth stayed on trend, growth over the last six years would be about 2.5%. Growth over the six years ending 2015Q3 is lower, about 2%. But this is not surprising because the 2007-2009 recession was accompanied by an excessive supply of real capital in the forms of residential and commercial real estate.
Hence, there was severe structural unemployment of construction workers, Employment Growth, and slow growth due to the lack of real fixed investment ("Why is Output Growth So Slow?"). The declining trend in output growth over the period is reflected in Figure 1 simply by choosing different ending dates for the trend.
For example, Figure 3 shows two trend lines; one based on data ending in 1970Q4 and the other based on data ending 1994Q4. The former trend line makes it look like the economy has stagnated since the mid-1970s. Summers should have been screaming madly for the last 40+ years; Bullard should have noticed the regime shift much sooner. Things do not look quite as dire if the trend line ending in 1994Q4 is used. But even with this trend line output has been below trend since about 1980.
An alternative way of looking at the data suggests that the economy returned to trend when the recession ended in 2009Q2. Figure 4 shows real GDP over the period 1947Q1-2015Q3 and a quadratic trend line estimated over the period 1947Q1-1994Q4. The figure strongly suggests that output returned to trend when the recession ended in June 2009. Of course, Figure 4 suffers from the same problem as Figure 1; the trend will be markedly different depending on the period used to estimate it.
For example, if the trend had been estimated using data up to 1970Q4, it would be above actual output since the mid-1970s. However, there are good reasons to choose the mid-1990s as the end point for the trend. Specifically, there was a technology boom that began around that time and a subsequent marked increase in construction.
The increase in output beginning in the early 1990s was largely driven by technology and construction. The tech boom was accompanied by a massive rise in the NASDAQ from about 750 in December 1994 to about 4,600 in February 2000—a more than 500% increase in just over 5 years! The equity bubble burst in February 2000 causing the 2001 recession, which was short and mild. The housing boom continued until house prices began falling in late-2006. The result was the 2007-2009 recession, which intensified significantly following Lehman Bros. bankruptcy announcement in mid-September 2008.
This trend line is also supported by the fact that it accurately reflects the recessions and expansions though the 1990-91 recession and expansion. Output is typically below trend during recessions, while output is generally above trend during the subsequent expansions. This is exactly what is expected if the trend line accurately represented the data over the period. Moreover, Figure 4 suggests that the period of anomalous output occurred during the period from the mid-1990s to mid-2007, which is consistent with experience; the economy did very well from the mid-1990s to the beginning of the recession.
Not only does the trend line seem to accurately reflect the trend in real output from 1947 through 1994, it suggests that output returned to trend precisely when the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dated the end of the recession. Consequently, the economy does not need additional stimulus from fiscal policy, as Larry Summers and Alan Blinder ("Does the Economy Need More Spending Now," Thornton 2013) contend. Nor should the FOMC maintain the funds rate low until 2018, as Bullard suggests. Indeed, the figure suggests that the FOMC should have begun the process of normalizing its balance sheet and the funds rate in 2009—early 2010 at the latest.
Indeed, the FOMC should have proceeded as I recommended ("The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Financial Crisis: What It Did and What It Should Have Done"). Specifically, rather than engaging in QE, the FOMC should have allowed the massive loans it made in the wake of Lehman’s announcement to run off. The balance sheet would have returned to normal passively as banks and other financial institutions repaid their loans from the Fed.
The compelling question is not why is economic growth slow now, but rather why has growth trended down over the last 70 years. One answer from economic theory is employment growth has trended down. In the neoclassical growth model, output is determined by labor and capital. The economic fundamentals of the model produce an optimal constant ratio of capital to labor. Consequently, the growth rate of output is solely determined by population growth; in this model everyone works, so population growth and employment growth are the same.
Figure 5 shows the 6-year moving average of the growth rate of total non-farm payroll employment from 1949Q1 to 2015Q3. The growth rate does not trend down over the entire period; however, it has trended down since the mid-1960s. It declined precipitously at the beginning of the 2001 recession. This is largely due to a corresponding decline in the labor force participation rate over the period. But there is no reason to believe that the capital/labor ratio should be constant.
There is some degree of substitutability between capital and labor in virtually every production process. Hence, there should be a negative relationship between the growth rates of labor and the growth of physical capital. Unfortunately, the stock of physical capital is notoriously difficult to measure. However, the secular decline in the growth rate of employment is likely linked to technological innovations that have economized the use of labor.
So what should we conclude from all of this? I believe that there are two important conclusions. First, there is no compelling evidence from the behavior of real GDP of secular stagnation or a regime shift to a low growth state. The current slow growth reflects both this fact and the fact that the last recession was accompanied by a large overhang of physical capital. Combine these facts with:
Furthermore, Figure 4 strongly supports the conclusion that output largely returned to trend when the recession ended in 2009. Figure 2 provides less support for this conclusion, but suggests that the 6-year moving average growth is moving close to trend. These figures, combined with the fact that the recession ended in June 2009, suggest that the FOMC’s monetary policy since 2009 has been misguided. Further monetary policy stimulus is not needed. Indeed, it hasn’t been needed for some time.
Consequently, the FOMC should begin the process of implementing the normalization policy it outlined on September 16, 2014 ("Policy Normalization Principles and Plans," Fed). Specifically, it should begin the process of shrinking its balance sheet back to “normal” and raising the funds rate target to between 3 to 4 percent. The FOMC’s goal should be to achieve these objectives by its June 2017 FOMC meeting.
Hedgeye CEO Keith McCullough handpicks the “best of the best” long and short ideas delivered to him by our team of over 30 research analysts across myriad sectors.
Takeaway: Even with all the focus on the Brexit damage to come, investors are still more pessimistic on domestic equities than international.
Editor's Note: Below is a complimentary research note originally published July 14, 2016 by our Financials team. If you would like more info on how you can access our institutional research please email email@example.com.
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Investment Company Institute Mutual Fund Data and ETF Money Flow:
Post-Brexit vote, investors were more optimistic about international equity in the 5-day period ending July 6th, contributing +$1.4 billion to the category. However, domestic equity continues to be a source of funds, losing -$4.5 billion. As defensiveness prevailed, all fixed income categories but global bonds experienced inflows last week, bringing total bond fund flows to +$1.3 billion. In ETFs, both equity and bonds took in a healthy amount of capital. Equity ETFs gained +$4.1 billion with bond ETFs gaining +$6.5 billion. On a year-to-date score, equity ETFS are languishing however averaging just over a -$1.0 billion redemption per week versus passive bond ETFs which are just starting a new growth curve taking in +$1.7 billion.
In the most recent 5-day period ending July 6th, total equity mutual funds put up net outflows of -$3.1 billion, trailing the year-to-date weekly average outflow of -$2.8 billion and the 2015 average outflow of -$1.6 billion.
Fixed income mutual funds put up net inflows of +$1.3 billion, trailing the year-to-date weekly average inflow of +$2.2 billion but outpacing the 2015 average outflow of -$475 million.
Equity ETFs had net subscriptions of +$4.1 billion, outpacing the year-to-date weekly average outflow of -$1.0 billion and the 2015 average inflow of +$2.8 billion. Fixed income ETFs had net inflows of +$6.5 billion, outpacing the year-to-date weekly average inflow of +$1.8 billion and the 2015 average inflow of +$1.0 billion.
Mutual fund flow data is collected weekly from the Investment Company Institute (ICI) and represents a survey of 95% of the investment management industry's mutual fund assets. Mutual fund data largely reflects the actions of retail investors. Exchange traded fund (ETF) information is extracted from Bloomberg and is matched to the same weekly reporting schedule as the ICI mutual fund data. According to industry leader Blackrock (BLK), U.S. ETF participation is 60% institutional investors and 40% retail investors.
Most Recent 12 Week Flow in Millions by Mutual Fund Product: Chart data is the most recent 12 weeks from the ICI mutual fund survey and includes the weekly average for 2015 and the weekly year-to-date average for 2016:
Cumulative Annual Flow in Millions by Mutual Fund Product: Chart data is the cumulative fund flow from the ICI mutual fund survey for each year starting with 2008.
Most Recent 12 Week Flow within Equity and Fixed Income Exchange Traded Funds: Chart data is the most recent 12 weeks from Bloomberg's ETF database (matched to the Wednesday to Wednesday reporting format of the ICI), the weekly average for 2015, and the weekly year-to-date average for 2016. In the third table are the results of the weekly flows into and out of the major market and sector SPDRs:
Sector and Asset Class Weekly ETF and Year-to-Date Results: In sector SPDR callouts, the financials XLF ETF lost -6% or -$952 million in redemptions.
Cumulative Annual Flow in Millions within Equity and Fixed Income Exchange Traded Funds: Chart data is the cumulative fund flow from Bloomberg's ETF database for each year starting with 2013.
The net of total equity mutual fund and ETF flows against total bond mutual fund and ETF flows totaled a negative -$6.8 billion spread for the week (+$992 million of total equity inflow net of the +$7.8 billion inflow to fixed income; positive numbers imply greater money flow to stocks; negative numbers imply greater money flow to bonds). The 52-week moving average is -$3.4 billion (negative numbers imply more positive money flow to bonds for the week) with a 52-week high of +$20.2 billion (more positive money flow to equities) and a 52-week low of -$19.0 billion (negative numbers imply more positive money flow to bonds for the week.)
Exposures: The weekly data herein is important for the public asset managers with trends in mutual funds and ETFs impacting the companies with the following estimated revenue impact:
Takeaway: We think Q2 economic growth will accelerate and the Fed will turn hawkish.
Q2 GDP ↑ (vs. Q1) = U.S. Dollar ↑ = Rates ↑ = Reflation (i.e. commodities) ↓ = Fed hawkish
That's our latest thinking on the current macro setup. Here's analysis from Hedgeye CEO Keith McCullough in a note sent to subscribers earlier this morning:
"The #StrongDollar move continues as consensus remains A) bearish on USD (see net positioning in CFTC futures & options data) and B) finally too dovish on what the Fed might do in SEP – what slows this down if we’re right on the Q2 sequential GDP acceleration as European and Japanese economic data continues to slow? Still bearish on Euros."
"Oil continues to break-down as the USD continues to threaten a breakout – WTI down -1.4% yesterday takes it -7.1% in the last month as the inverse USD correlation there remains as real as it is for the CRB Index (down -1.1% yesterday to 186 and signaling bearish TREND @Hedgeye); WTI immediate-term risk range now = $43.91-46.65."
That's just in the past week.
In the past few days, Hedgye CEO Keith McCullough has been trimming exposure to our favorite Macro idea, Long Bonds (TLT). We'll be happy to buy them back on selloffs (especially given our bearish outlook for Q3 GDP).
Takeaway: Reality check. Over the past year, Wall Street earnings estimates for big banks typically fell over -20%.
That's the long and short of it. The news this morning is Morgan Stanley (MS) beat consensus earnings estimates, sending its shares higher. Setting aside for a second that MS revenue and earnings were down -9% and -12% respectively year-over-year, let's look at the parlor game being played by Old Wall analysts belying those "beats."
The first thing to note? In order to manufacture these earnings beats, Wall Street's downward revisions are sometimes massive. Over the past year, big bank consensus earnings estimates dropped anywhere between -9% and -29%. Check out the charts below showing consensus earnings estimates (the red line depicting the steady decline in those estimates.)
None of this suggests big bank impropriety. However, these five stocks are up between +2% and +9% in the past month on significantly downgraded earnings beats.
Don't expect it to stop. Another way to beat on earnings is to reduce the share count via stock buybacks. (Note: Executive bonuses are often tied to EPS growth, so therein lies another motivation to reduce the share count and goose earnings.)
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