Beginning in late June and lasting through the middle of July, Europe will confront a series of foreign policy and national security decisions that are Shakespearean in their significance. Whether the outcome is a farce, a tragedy or a romance will be determined by the leadership exercised from both Washington and Brussels -- and critically, whether the two capitals can restore transatlantic policy unity that has been fraying badly for over a decade.  What are the key events? There are at least four:

  • The June 23rd referendum in the UK on whether that country should remain in the EU or depart (“Brexit”).
  • The EU vote in July on whether to continue the EU-wide economic sanctions against Russia.
  • NATO’s summit in Warsaw Poland on July 8-9.
  • Finally, a decision in the same time frame on whether to keep Montenegro on track to become the 29th member of the NATO alliance.

What makes these 2016 “Ides of July” decisions so potentially momentous is that, in each area, Vladimir Putin is in close over-watch; as former chess champion Gary Kasparov recently wrote, "Putin always supports the most divisive events in European politics; divide and conquer isn't new, but that doesn't mean it isn't effective." The front lines for Putin's long-term strategy are being fought on these four axes.

  • Consider first the “Brexit” referendum: UK PM David Cameron has staked his political future, and in many ways the future of the UK itself, on a too-close-to call Brexit vote next month. The Russian information campaign, always in over-time on the Russian Today (RT) and Sputnik "news" outlets, is replete with pro-Brexit articles on the June 23rd vote. Again, the Kasparov article explains why. In Kasparov's words, "An EU without Britain, weakened and less able to confront Russian mischief on Europe's borders, is exactly what Putin wants!"
  • Similarly, on the EU Russian sanctions vote, the EU fracturing is already evident: France's lower house recently voted against renewal, Hungary and Greece are openly critical of the sanctions logic, and Italy is widely expected to be the next country to openly challenge renewal. Moscow's pretense as a "peace-maker" in Syria is part of a broader Putin soft-sell to the continent, all to wean more European countries, many of whom feel overwhelmed by refugee flows, away from an Obama/Merkel-inspired policy that's viewed as growing increasingly stale. Memories of why the sanctions policy was initiated (i.e., Crimea) are fading quickly.
  • NATO's Poland Summit poses a delicate test of a Russian red line: whether NATO should permanently station ground forces in any of the central and eastern European member states, especially the Baltics. Defense Secretary Ash Carter has already previewed the answer: to avoid violating the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, Carter has suggested that NATO rotate continuously a heavy force contingent into "front line" eastern NATO states without actually stationing them there. Predictably, Russia has already howled, claiming such an action would upset the military balance in the region -- conveniently omitting from their rhetoric the fact that NATO's responses are being driven entirely by Russia's Ukraine adventures and their air and submarine mischief in the Baltics and North Atlantic.
  • Closely related is NATO's decision on Montenegro.  A move to potential Montenegran accession in 2017 may be the most grating to Putin.  For well over a century, Russia has viewed itself as the protector of European Slavs - for deep ethnic, religious and historical reasons. Whenever NATO involves itself in the Balkans in any way, Russian anxieties and passions are awakened over fears about harm to their Slavic "compatriots." This pan-Slavic Russian passion nearly led to a direct US-Russian clash during the Kosovo War in 1999; if NATO keeps on its expected path to Montenegro's accession, expect a full-throated Russian objection.

Shakespearean tradition says that Julius Caesar was warned by a soothsayer to "Beware the Ides;" he ignored that warning, and other portentous signs of doom, including his wife's dreams. For Europe and the US in 2016, Ides warnings abound. 

  • By the "Ides" of this July, it will be clear whether the EU, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship will have successfully confronted their most important set of strategic decisions in over a decade. If they do, it will be because leaders acted with political courage despite Putin's threats and blandishments. 
  • Putin of course will not be pleased; that displeasure in turn will likely lead to yet another round of soft and hard provocations from Moscow. As long as Putin is in the leadership chair, this geo-political long game will persist; his patience and vision run deep. One hopes Europe and America have the patience and endurance to match. The Ides of this July will signal the answer.