Today's show featured Financials and Housing Sector Head Josh Steiner. Below is his 18-minute segment.
Today's show featured Financials and Housing Sector Head Josh Steiner. Below is his 18-minute segment.
MGM - MGM's Clark Dumont confirmed that preliminary votes showed all of the casino-hotel company's 11 incumbent directors were re-elected.
Takeaway: No surprise here
Package tours - visitors on package tours totaled 806,000 in April 2015, down by 6.8% YoY. Package tour visitors from Mainland China (648,000) and Taiwan (45,000) dropped by 6.6% and 19.6% YoY, respectively.
There were 99 hotels and guesthouses operating at the end of April 2015, providing 28,000 guest rooms, up by 1.7% year-on-year; 5-star hotels accounted for 64.8% of the total supply, with 18,000 rooms.
A total of 827,000 guests checked into hotels and guesthouses in April 2015, down by 7.1% YoY. Guests from Mainland China (521,000) decreased by 12.0%, while those from Hong Kong (125,000) and Taiwan (29,000) increased by 10.9% and 8.6% respectively.
The average length of stay of guests held stable as April 2014, at 1.4 nights. The average occupancy rate of hotels and guesthouses was 79.4%, a rebound from March (77.2%) yet still down by 5.9% YoY; the rate of 4-star hotels and 5-star hotels was 82.2% and 79.5% respectively.
Takeaway: More bad news for Macau. Package tour visitors fell for the 1st time since Feb 2014. Hotel occupancy declined again in April (-6% YoY).
Hedgeye Macro Team remains negative on Europe, their bottom-up, qualitative analysis (Growth/Inflation/Policy framework) indicates that the Eurozone is setting up to enter the ugly Quad4 in Q4 (equating to growth decelerates and inflation decelerates) = Europe Slowing.
Takeaway: European pricing has been a tailwind for CCL and RCL but a negative pivot here looks increasingly likely in 2015.
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Takeaway: KATE is being thrown out with bathwater it wasn’t even bathed in. We’re fighting an uphill sentiment battle, but it’s one worth fighting.
Conclusion. We’re all-in on KATE at current levels. All along, we’ve pointed to a $70-$80 value. The stock is off 26% over the past month, due to sentiment concerns around 'the space' (KORS is off 27%), but our fundamental outlook has not changed one bit. The business remains very strong, we think that comps are accelerating into the double digits in 2Q, and we think that KATE’s margin guidance for this year will prove conservative. Ultimately we think that numbers this year are 15% too low – a delta that widens to 35% next year, and to 50%+ by 2018 when we think KATE has $3.00 in earnings power. Using decelerating multiples as growth accelerates and the P&L matures gets us 55% upside in a year and a 2-3-bagger by 2018. If we see the typical 'peak multiple on peak earnings' that retail knows so well, then a $100+ stock by year 3 is not out of the question.
To put this stock move in context, KORS – due to its recent implosion – is down 27% for the past month. While we think KORS is beyond cheap and has meaningful downside support here, the fact of the matter is that whether you’re bullish or bearish on KORS – the stock move can at least be explained away by the headlines. But with KATE – that’s simply not the case. As a sidenote, we turned positive on KORS on this week's implosion, but that was not a typical call for us. We think that KATE offers far better upside, has greater margin of error, and is a much more defendable growth story, by far.
Quick Sentiment Check
Our strong sense on the sentiment is that if you were concerned about ‘the handbag space’ (a definition that we still think is ridiculous) and wanted to short it, you had the following options…
a) 2012-14: There was pretty much one name you had for the past 3-years – Coach. The brand was beyond full market saturation, and had 30% margins that had nowhere to go but down without significant risk to the top line. But that name largely became tough to short by the fall of 2014, after it dropped by 55% at the same time the market went up by 45% (yes, 100% relative underperformance).
b) 2014-2015: About the same time Coach stopped going down, KORS became the go-to name to short. It has a fully penetrated business in the US, and Coach-like margins of 29%. Since that time (roughly a year ago) the stock traded off by 50% and underperformed the market by 60%. Then – even before this week’s blow up – the general sense we got from the investment community was that it was getting tougher to short.
c) 2015: With Coach and Kors serving as the poster twins for saturation and underperformance, people naturally look add a triplet to the group. The only other public company in this ‘space’ is KATE, which admittedly looks wildly expensive on current year earnings. As such – for better or worse -- it has turned into the go-to ‘high multiple in a troubled space’ short and source of funds in retail. The unfavorable tape might help the short case for the time being, but the supporting fundamental premises simply make no sense. Here are some considerations…
Why KATE ≠ KORS ≠ COH
Let’s get COH out of the way. This company is good at one thing. Creating handbags for one consumer – a 30-60 (really 40-60) year-old US consumer that shops in department stores and outlet malls. That’s all, nothing else. It has 13% share of the US handbag market. No apparel, no meaningful accessories, little presence with men (manpurses are rarely a good investment hook anyway) and consistent failure in bridging to an International audience. This coach is being drawn by a one-trick pony.
KORS is a different animal. KORS has an $8bn retail footprint versus COH at $5.2bn despite having 300bp lower share of the handbag market than COH (10% share vs COH at 13%). That’s due to its presence in accessories, men, and overseas (it has nearly a $1bn business alone in Europe, and that should at least double from here). Given its diversity, we’d argue that KORS has more in common with a brand like Ralph Lauren than COH. The only thing the two have in common is an EBIT margin that recently peaked at 30%, and is now trending in the high 20s.
KATE is also a different animal (but much smaller, and not on the endangered species list). Did anyone ever consider that one of the reasons why the incumbents are stalling out is because KATE spade is eating their lunch? Think about it this way… COH is at 13% share, KORS is 10%, and KATE is less than 3%. KATE’s (annual) brand footprint is sitting just under $1.5bn – that’s 25% less than KORS ($8bn) generates in a single quarter. Kate is even 20% smaller than Tory Burch, which isn’t (yet) public. Like KORS, KATE sells in multiple categories, with handbags accounting for about 60% of sales, apparel at 15%, footwear at 10%, accessories/other at 15%. The company also has several licenses kicking in this year, including watches (Fossil) that should boost its high-margin accessories business. KATE, unlike COH, has been accepted by consumers in Europe and across Asia – which remains a key part of the growth story.
Aside from licenses, which will help KATE meaningfully effective 2H, don’t underestimate the importance of the maturation curve for its stores. So many people think that KATE’s store base is as old as the brand is. Not so. The brand hit the mainstream over a decade ago, but it really did not start to grow at retail in earnest until about 3-years ago. That’s pretty critical from where we sit because from a profitability standpoint, these stores tend to hit their stride in years 3-4. Looked at a different way, 80% of KATE’s stores are 4-years old or younger, and a whopping 44% are less than 2 years old. This is seriously bullish for the company’s margin equation.
The point here is that KATE is absolutely NOT either of its perceived competitors. Financially, the closest comp is probably Tory Burch. The same reason why Tory will likely go public is that same reason why KATE should be bought today – it is just hitting its stride on the top line, which will accrue disproportionately to margins.
Let’s be clear about something, our estimate of $3.00 in EPS in 2018 is NOT assuming KORS or COH-like margins. It’s fair to say that both of those companies have shown us the perils of over-earning in this (or any) segment of retail. We’re simply assuming that margins at KATE get to 19% -- a good healthy level that should allow the company to continually invest to drive top line growth.
So What’s It Worth?
Today, 41x earnings and 15x EBITDA might seem very aggressive. But consider the earnings ramp. We’re looking at a CAGR over the next three years of about 70% for both earnings and cash flow. If we hold the cash flow multiple at 15x for the next year, which we think is fair as margins head higher and KATE catches estimate revisions and upgrades, then we’re looking at a $38 stock, or a 55% return in 12 months. Then we’ll reduce the multiple by 2 points per year, as the brand gets more mature, which gets us to $50 and then $65 in year 2 and 3 (vs $25 today). All that said, we’ve almost never seen a smooth multiple transition like that in retail. A typical pattern would be a higher/peak multiple on accelerating cash flow. That’s when we start pushing a $100 stock. That’s not our call today, but it’s not out of the realm of possibility.
Takeaway: The Gong Show in Tokyo rages on as Currency Wars continue.
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Ahh… the smell of Japan’s currency on fire - $123.89 vs USD.
You guessed it. Another down day for the Yen to fresh, year-to-date lows. The Nikkei’s ramp on that move remains epic. Get this: Japanese stocks are up for the 10th day in a row. (For all you home-gamers out there, that hasn’t happened in 27 years.)
The Nikkei is up over +18% year-to-date versus around 3% for the S&P 500.
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