Caribbean discounting continued through FQ1 2014 while European pricing was mixed.



Below are some observations from our proprietary pricing survey for CCL, RCL, and NCLH.  We analyze YoY trends, as well as relative trends, which are determined by pricing compared to the last earnings/guidance date for a cruise operator i.e. CCL: 6/25; RCL: 7/25; NCLH: 7/29.  For a more detailed analysis, please contact us at .

  • CCL:  Heavy discounting in the Caribbean extended to FQ1 2014.  Early signs point to a brand pricing recovery starting in late FQ2.  However, Wave Season will dictate the health of the Caribbean market where higher capacity and a very competitive promotional environment exist.   Europe remains steady.
  • RCL:  Given the strength in European pricing, we believe it’s enough to offset the Caribbean weakness.  RCL should meet or exceed its FY 2013 guidance.  Surprisingly weak 2014 pricing across most brands has us worried, however. FQ2 comps are nowhere near as easy as CCL and pricing in that quarter looks weak in the Caribbean.
  • NCLH:  Close-in Caribbean pricing was lower in September.  Breakaway and Getaway maintained nice price premiums.   


Caribbean – Carnival brand

  • FQ4 close-in pricing remained lower in the double digits YoY, though continued to improve MoM
  • FQ1 2014 is a red flag as pricing dipped even lower in the last month and the trend was negative  
  • However, FQ2 2014 pricing had made a full U-turn in the last two months and was modestly higher
  • Early FQ3 2014 pricing was nicely higher with positive pricing trend


  • Costa’s pricing for the upcoming quarters had been relatively stable.  We estimate overall Costa FQ4 2013 YoY pricing was +20%.  The pricing trend was slightly positive for FY 2014.
  • Overall, Royal Princess pricing improved in September
  • AIDA FQ4 2013 pricing in the Western Europe/Med remained lower.  Pricing trend was flat for 2014.


  • Holland America summer 2014 pricing was modestly higher in Alaska, though pricing trend deteriorated in September.  Princess pricing was nicely higher in the double digits YoY.

Asia, Mexico, South America

  • Asia 
    • Costa and Holland America’s FQ1 2014 pricing trend were flat. Princess’s pricing for its sparse itineraries was higher for FQ2 2014.         
  • Mexico
    • Carnival brand pricing for FQ4 and FQ1 2014 worsened, while FQ2 pricing turned nicely higher
    • Princess discounted prices by a significant amount in September
  • South America
    • Costa’s pricing trend was modestly higher.  Holland America continued its struggles with FQ4 pricing down significantly and FQ2 2014 pricing slightly lower.  Princess’s FQ1 pricing trend turned negative in September.



  • RC brand:  YoY pricing worsened slightly for FQ4, FQ1 and FQ2 periods.  
  • Celebrity:  Pricing slightly improved from lower prices in August for FQ4 but FQ1 prices were unchanged
  • Pullmantur:  Flat pricing trend for FQ1, however significant discounting for FQ2 itineraries


  • RC brand:  FQ4 close-in pricing remain very strong but FQ2 2014 pricing was -17% YoY
  • Celebrity:  Major red flag for FQ2 2014 as pricing remained lower substantially and pricing trend was negative.  
  • Azamara:  2014 pricing was flat
  • Pullmantur:  FQ2 2014 pricing was hit by substantial discounting.  Flat pricing for 2H 2014.


  • RC brand & Celebrity:  Pricing down double digits YoY for Q2 2014 

Asia and South America

  • Asia 
    • RC brand & Celebrity:  Pricing was nicely higher
    • Azamara:  Flat pricing
  • South America
    • Celebrity:  Sparse itineraries flat for Q1 2014 but pricing was slightly higher




  • Close-in FQ4 pricing was modestly weaker in September.  FQ 2014 pricing trend was slightly positive.
  • Breakaway:  steady pricing, maintained 35-40% pricing premium over Gem
  • Getaway: steady pricing with 50%-60% pricing premium over Epic and Sun


  • Steady pricing for 2014


  • Slightly positive close-in FQ4 pricing  Flat pricing for FQ2 2014.

What We Learned from LINN Energy's Latest S-4/A

LINN Energy (LINE, LNCO) filed its 4th amended S-4 (LINN/BRY merger proxy) with the SEC on 9/18/2013.


The new S-4 has plenty of new terminology, methodology, and disclosure, though the distribution remains intact.  But LINN’s credibility, particularly with respect to maintenance CapEx, likely does not.  The outcome of ongoing SEC inquiry remains uncertain, as does the LINN/BRY merger.  Below we highlight the key takeaways from the new filing.


On the Ongoing SEC Inquiry...

  • “The SEC staff is investigating whether any violations of federal securities laws have occurred” (pg. 208).  That is new language.
  • New disclosure regarding the ongoing SEC inquiry states that a restatement of financials is possible (our emphasis): “LINN and LinnCo are unable to predict the timing or outcome of the SEC inquiry or estimate the nature or amount of any possible sanction or enforcement action the SEC could seek to impose, which could include fines, penalties, damages, sanctions, administrative remedies and modifications to LinnCo and LINN’s disclosure, accounting and business practices, including a prohibition on specific conduct or a potential restatement of LINN’s or LinnCo’s financial statements, any of which could be material” (pg. 46).  That is also new language.
  • LINN’s high legal expenses are not going away soon: “LinnCo and LINN’s legal expenses incurred in defending the lawsuits and responding to the SEC inquiry have been significant and LinnCo and LINN expect them to continue to be significant in the future” (pg. 47).

Changing Everything and Nothing...

  • In a move that could eventually reverberate across the MLP space, LINN will no longer use the non-GAAP terminology “maintenance capital expenditures” and “distributable cash flow.”  Perhaps a small step in the right direction for this sector.
  • LINN has changed how it calculates adjusted EBITDA, and has restated the prior period numbers.  LINN no longer includes adjustments for cash flows from A&D between the effective and closing dates, and will also deduct the premiums paid for put options that settled during the period.  As a result, 2Q13 adjusted EBITDA falls 10% from $362MM to $326MM, and 2012 adjusted EBITDA falls 16% from $1,402MM to $1,172MM.  This will allow investors to more appropriately value LINN Energy on an EBITDA basis, and compare that valuation to other E&Ps that do not account for derivatives in this way.
  • Given that the reductions in adjusted EBITDA would flow directly to the distribution, LINN has changed its methodology for determining distributions.  It will now start with GAAP cash flow from operations, make discretionary adjustments to that figure including premiums paid, changes in working capital, and, “Discretionary reductions for a portion of oil and natural gas development costs,” which takes the place of “maintenance CapEx.”  
  • LINN has changed non-GAAP terminology, methodology, and disclosure – but the end result is the same.  LINN still arrives at the exact same number that it previously called “distributable cash flow;” will continue to benefit from past premiums paid; has the methodology in place benefit from future premiums paid; and has only changed what it calls “maintenance CapEx,” not how it’s calculated.  The changes and new disclosures are a blow to the Company’s credibility, and investors are, on the margin, better equipped to decide for themselves whether or not LINN’s distribution is an accurate representation of its economic reality, however, if this is enough to satisfy the SEC, it is doing investors a disservice, in our view.

Good Riddance Maintenance CapEx, Hello “Discretionary Reductions…”

  • We presume that the SEC was not on board with LINN using the term “maintenance capital expenditures” without it actually maintaining anything.  LINN also noted that, “Unlike many publicly traded partnerships, LINN’s limited liability company agreement does not include the concept of “maintenance capital expenditures,” but LINN has historically used this term because of its broad market acceptance among publicly traded partnerships, analysts and investors as a way of distinguishing between different types of capital expenditures for purposes of distribution payment” (pg. 235).
  • Because we know that our readers enjoy a good laugh, we quote LINN’s new disclosure around, “Discretionary reductions for a portion of oil and natural gas development costs” with our emphasis:

In determining the amount of cash that it distributes to its unitholders, LINN makes an estimate at the end of each year of the amounts (which LINN refers to as discretionary reductions for a portion of oil and natural gas development costs) that LINN believes will be necessary during the following year to offset natural declines in its existing cash producing assets through drilling and development activities. In determining this portion of oil and natural gas development costs, management evaluates historical results of LINN’s drilling and development activities based on periodically revised and updated information from past years to assess the costs, adequacy and effectiveness of such activities and future assumptions regarding cost trends, production and decline rates and reserve recoveries. However, LINN’s management does not conduct an analysis to evaluate historical amounts of capital actually spent on such drilling and development activities. LINN’s ability to pursue projects with a view toward offsetting natural declines in its existing cash producing assets through drilling and development activities is limited to its inventory of development opportunities on its existing acreage position. Management’s estimate of this discretionary portion of its oil and natural gas development costs does not include the historical acquisition cost of projects pursued during the year or the acquisition of new oil and natural gas reserves. Moreover, LINN’s assumptions regarding costs, production and decline rates and reserve recoveries may prove incorrect. If LINN is unable to offset natural declines in its existing cash producing assets from this discretionary portion of its oil and natural gas development costs, LINN’s net cash provided by operating activities could be reduced, which could adversely affect its ability to pay a distribution at the current level or at all. Furthermore, LINN’s existing reserves, inventory of drilling locations and production levels will decline over time as a result of development and production activities. Consequently, if LINN were to limit its total capital expenditures to this discretionary portion of its oil and natural gas development costs and not complete acquisitions of new reserves, total reserves would ultimately decrease over time, resulting in an inability to sustain production at current levels, which could adversely affect LINN’s ability to pay a distribution at the current level or at all” (pg. 51).

“[They] represent discretionary reductions for a portion of oil and natural gas development costs, an estimated component of total development costs, which are amounts established by the board of directors at the end of each year for the following year, allocated across four quarters, that are intended to offset natural declines in LINN’s existing cash producing assets during the year as compared to the prior year. The portion of oil and natural gas development costs includes estimated drilling and development costs associated with projects to convert a portion of non-producing reserves to producing status. However, the amounts do not include the historical cost of acquired properties as those amounts have already been spent in prior periods, were financed primarily with external sources of funding and do not affect LINN’s ability to pay distributions in the current period” (pg. 237).

  • Most investors and analysts believe that maintenance CapEx represents the capital required to maintain production and reserve volumes over time, but LINN is telling us, flat out, that this measure does NOT represent that, as we demonstrated in our prior research.  As a reminder, we believe that that number would be over $1B per year; and if LINN deducted that amount from operating cash flow, the entire distribution would be wiped out. Further, LINN is telling us that the number is, essentially, made up.  It is an estimate that LINN does not reconcile to actual results.  Given its importance in calculating distributions, and valuing the equity (for many), this is concerning.
  • What investors should take away from this new disclosure is that LINN needs to raise additional capital (or cut the distribution) just to keep production and reserves from declining.  We always believed this to be the case, but now LINN has disclosed it. 
  • We also now know for sure that LINN’s maintenance CapEx:
    • Does not include the cost of acquiring undeveloped reserves and acreage;
    • Only takes into account offsetting some production decline, not maintaining other PP&E (as of the 6/30/2013 balance sheet, LINN had $534MM gross and $443MM net other PP&E).
  • What remains unclear is what production decline LINN is attempting to offset when estimating maintenance CapEx at the end of each year for the following year.  It appears that it is not pro forma production at YE, but actual production in the prior year (pg. 237).  Given that 2013 actual production will be ~804 MMcfe/d (ex. Berry), up 20% over the 2012 production rate of 671 MMcfe/d, should we expect LINN’s maintenance CapEx to step change higher in 1Q14?  This has not been the case in prior years, but the additional disclosure around the methodology suggests that this could be the case.  Further, it remains unclear how LINN’s disappointing Hogshooter wells in early 2013 will impact 2014 maintenance CapEx relative to 2013.  This could be another problem, as LINN has diverted capital away from those high IP rate locations.  Perhaps these are moot points because LINN will just say the number is whatever it wants?

It’s Strange to Us That…

  • The SEC is not OK with LINN deducting premiums paid and adding back cash flows from A&D activity in adjusted EBITDA, but is OK with LINN doing this when determining distributions (pgs. 329, 237/8).
  • LINN no longer uses “distributable cash flow” or “maintenance capital expenditures,” but management’s 2012 quantitative performance measures stated in the S-4 still rely upon of these metrics (pg. 298).
  • LINN has changed how it calculates adjusted EBITDA and the prior period numbers, but the fairness opinions of the bankers, which relied upon, in part, the old adjusted EBITDA numbers, have not changed.
  • LINN’s board of directors “has considered current shortfalls” in available cash versus distributions, but “has decided to maintain the distribution at its current level” (pg. 236).


Kevin Kaiser

Senior Analyst


Takeaway: Yesterday's price action should confirm to investors what the primary driver of EM asset prices is (i.e. US monetary policy).



  • We think yesterday’s price action confirms our once-controversial view that EM asset prices are not much more than a function of a global carry trade born out of USD debasement.
  • To the extent the duration of said debasement is being extended on the margin, we DO NOT think it is appropriate to aggressively wager on continued #EmergingOutflows over our immediate-term TRADE duration.
  • Specifically, we need time to access whether or not our quantitative risk management levels confirm the continuation or conclusion of our #StrongDollar and #RatesRising themes.
  • If a continuation is confirmed, our patience will eventually be rewarded with better entry prices on the SHORT side of EM assets. If a conclusion is confirmed, we see #EmergingOutflows as a phenomenon that will eventually play out over the long-term TAIL, rather than a TREND & TAIL duration event; in fact, a number of EM assets would actually appear attractive to us on the LONG side with respect to our intermediate-term TREND duration.
  • Lastly, we update our views on how to play our #EmergingOutflows theme at the asset class and country level at the conclusion of this note. Email us if you’d like to dig deeper into a specific country or region.


Looking to our custom Emerging Markets Divergence Monitor, EM assets were up +3% yesterday, on average, at the asset class level. At the regional level, they were up +3.9% on average yesterday and, at the country level, the were up +4.1% on average. As of yesterday’s close:




If you didn’t know what the real bull case for emerging markets was, now you know: debasement of the world’s reserve currency – largely born out of domestic financial repression.


In simpler terms, EM assets are a carry trade that is financed by the cheapness and abundance of USD-denominated global capital flows. Moreover, the institutionalized reach for yield has been a boon to EM asset prices over the past ~decade.




After a day like yesterday, any investor would be hard-pressed to push back on our interpretation of the bull case for emerging markets with the same tired reasons that are marketed in mutual and exchange-traded fund prospectuses.


Such pushback is often riddled with consensus buzzwords and catchphrases like “RAPID GROWTH” and “DIVERSIFICATION” and “A LEVERED PLAY ON GLOBAL GROWTH” and [my personal favorite] “INVESTORS ARE UNDER-ALLOCATED TO COUNTRY XYZ BASED ON ITS SHARE OF GLOBAL GDP”.


In our view, none of those storytelling factors improved on the margin yesterday – at least not enough to justify yesterday’s broad-based, hog-wild appreciation across the spectrum of EM assets.


Rather, the two primary factors responsible for determining the direction and magnitude of global capital flows into emerging market economies both were indeed supportive on the margin: the US Dollar Index (a proxy for the USD) plummeted to a ~7M low of 80.24 and the UST 10Y Yield (a proxy for US interest rates) dropped -16bps DoD to 2.69%.


Perhaps more importantly, the US Dollar Index snapped our 81.34 TREND line of support:




Interestingly, the UST 10Y Yield did not. The bond market is currently experiencing what we’d argue are growth-induced outflows (roughly -3% of beginning AUM) – as opposed to being perpetuated by rising inflation expectations or accelerating credit risk.




It’s worth noting that the 5Y Breakeven Rate has fallen -10bps since the UST 10Y Yield put in its YTD trough on MAY 2 and 5Y CDS for the United States has also dropped -10bps since then. The price of gold – which gold bugs would happily consider a rough proxy for both inflation expectations and sovereign default risk – has declined -6.7% over that same time frame.


In the context of declining inflation expectations and perceived credit risk, there can be only one reason for #RatesRising: #GrowthAccelerating.


Well, as Keith highlighted in today’s Early Look, our Street-leading positive outlook for US economic growth has gotten decidedly less positive with yesterday’s central planning episode.


In light of this, we can’t sit here with a straight face and tell you to keep shorting emerging markets on the bounce(s). Indeed, as we all have witnessed during 2010-12, #WeakDollar has tended to perpetuate a reflexive cycle of #GrowthSlowing followed by more #WeakDollar.


If Bernanke wants investors to roll the bones in Indian rupee or Indonesian rupiah-denominated assets from here, then so be it. We’re certainly not wed to the concept of #EmergingOutflows at every TIME and PRICE.


That said, however, proceed with such speculation at your own risk. If the UST 10Y Yield is signaling anything to us at the current juncture, it is that the TREND in US growth – on both a reported and expectations basis – continues to accelerate.


Either that or the market is coming to the conclusion that Janet Yellen winds up being slightly more hawkish or responsive to economic fundamentals than her current boss has been – which, obviously, is not that hard to do.


At any rate, whether or not a TREND-based acceleration in domestic economic growth is sustainable from here largely depends on what happens to the purchasing power of the American consumer (i.e. 70-plus percent of US GDP) from here.


With Fed tapering on hold likely though year-end (the next FOMC decision is on OCT 30 – too soon for economic data to show enough improvement for Bernanke to justify tapering then vs. not tapering yesterday; and the following FOMC decision is on DEC 18 – they probably won’t do anything meaningful around Christmas time), the direction of fiscal policy will take center stage in determining the course of the world’s reserve currency.


Our latest thoughts on US fiscal policy can be found in yesterday’s Early Look. Stay tuned for more; we’ll be publishing a deep-dive on US fiscal policy in the coming weeks.


For now, we think it’s worth reducing your gross exposure to our #EmergingOutflows theme, to the extent you have any positions on that are attempting to express this view.


In conclusion, while we still think the structural underpinnings of #EmergingOutflows remains intact and, thus, should continue to help US-centric assets outperform EM assets over the long-term TAIL, we think the timing of that call should be appropriately delayed pending more clarity on the scope and pace of US monetary policy renormalization.


Delayed US monetary policy renormalization = #EmergingINflows for the time being (emphasis on the world, “delayed”).


Per World Bank Managing Director Sri Mulyani Indrawati: “Emerging nations should prepare for an eventual reduction in US stimulus even as the Federal Reserve unexpectedly refrained from adjusting policy this week. They have to prepare, they don’t have any other choice.”


We concur.


As always, however, TIMING trumps our/anyone's interpretation of the FUNDAMENTALS (i.e. risk management > research).


Darius Dale

Senior Analyst



Using previous crises as a guidepost, we carefully indentified ten key economic indicators across four key categories (i.e. “Pillars”) to rank emerging market economies according to their risk of experiencing a crisis.


At the single indicator level, each country is ranked according to its length of standard deviations from the sample average. A higher deviation always indicates greater risk, so for indicators where a higher value is healthy (like a current account balance or fiscal balance), we inverted the signs.


Each country’s deviations are then averaged and multiplied by a constant to produce a composite score at the Pillar level. Certain indicators were given a higher weighting in the average based on both historical precedent and what we viewed as the eminent areas of risk in the current cycle.


Lastly, the aggregated risk score for any country is an arithmetic mean of its four Pillar-level scores.
















On our proprietary risk metrics, we think the following setup is how investors should be allocated to EM equities over the intermediate-term TREND and long-term TAIL:


  • On the LONG side of EM equities from here (TREND and TAIL duration), we like South Korea, Poland, Thailand and Mexico. While absent from our EM Crisis Risk Index due to the lack of cross-country comparable data, Taiwan also looks solid fundamentally (e.g. a stable currency, great BOP dynamics and mature and liquid financial markets).
  • On the SHORT side of EM equities from here (TREND and TAIL duration), we like South Africa, Nigeria, Turkey and Indonesia. We’re also inclined to loop India and Brazil back into this mix, but they’re so bombed-out on longer-term durations (i.e. 1Y, 18M and 3Y), one has to start to wonder how much more downside is left.


To the extent #RatesRising and #StrongDollar remain in play, we remain bearish on emerging market debt (both USD and local currency paper) and emerging market currencies with respect to the intermediate-term TREND and long-term TAIL.



To help clients get a better grasp of all the moving parts across EM capital and currency markets, we have created a dashboard to systematically monitor performance divergences with the intent on flagging developing, existing, and dissipating trends in the marketplace.


The dashboard is specifically programmed to highlight divergences in EM primary and secondary asset classes that are in excess of [1] standard deviation relative to their respective sample means.


The dashboard is grouped into three distinct buckets (i.e. samples): Asset Classes, Regions and Countries.


Realizing that we could and should do better than implementing an all-or-nothing strategy in emerging markets, this multi-tiered setup will allow us to spot the development and dissipation of said trends at the level most appropriate for any given investor.


Lastly, we thought it would be best to use actual ETFs, rather than the benchmark indices themselves to track said divergences because:


  1. The universe of liquid ETFs most likely accurately reflects the universe of broadly investable emerging market securities and asset classes;
  2. The ETFs are all both un-hedged and priced in US dollars, which means they automatically adjust for deltas in the currency markets; and
  3. ETFs have an underlying fund flow element to them that influences price trends – which is precisely what we’re trying to capture with our #EmergingOutflows thesis.


It’s also worth noting that whenever there was a collection of ETFs that represented a particular asset class, region and/or country, we selected the specific ETF in our sample based on a combo score of size (AUM) and liquidity (average daily trading volume).

Early Look

daily macro intelligence

Relied upon by big institutional and individual investors across the world, this granular morning newsletter distills the latest and most vital market developments and insures that you are always in the know.


FY2013 should be ok but what about 2014?



Our pricing survey indicates some Caribbean weakness for the Carnival brand particularly FQ1 2014.  CCL reports FQ3 earnings next Tuesday morning.  We expect CCL to report at the upper end of its net yield guidance (-3.5% to -4.5%) and tighten its FY 2013 yield guidance (-2% to -3%).  While Carnival brand pricing in the Caribbean remains stubbornly low, we believe management had already taken the significant discounting into account for FY 2013.  However, the Street may be underestimating the potential for significant weakness in Carnival brand pricing for FQ1 2014.   In fact, we are projecting FQ1 EPS and yields of $0.05 and 0.6%, respectively, well below the Street at $0.16 and 2.0%.


Management may point to better pricing growth in the summer but we think it’s too early as wave season is not for a few months.  For the full year of fiscal 2014, we’re projecting $2.09 versus the Street at $2.22.  Wave season risk is high next year, as are fuel prices.


Bunker fuel mix prices (80% IFO 380, 3% IFO 180, 17% MGO) have gained 4% since Carnival issued guidance.  We estimate higher fuel prices and adverse FX has cut 2H 2013 EPS by 4 cents.


At an expensive forward valuation at 18x 2014 EPS - 1.4x above its 5-year average – Carnival is trading at a level that suggests a full pricing recovery in FY2015.  The coast is definitely not clear yet, particularly in the Caribbean.


Takeaway: The historical relationship between Fed purchases and initial jobless claims is strong. We consider the implications below.

Our base framework for looking at countries from a macro perspective is our GIP (Growth/Inflation/Policy) model.


It allows us to analyze a country as we would a company and provides a tractable framework for contextualizing how marginal macro data and policy decisions are likely to impact the slope of the revenue and margin lines (Ie. Growth/GDP and Inflation) at the sovereign level. 


Our bull case on U.S. growth in 2013, in terms of our most basic US dollar based economic flow model,  looked something like this:


$USD Higher --> Energy/Commodities/Inflation lower --> Real Growth Higher  --> Pro-Growth Equities Exposure Outperformance


Left to itself, we think this flow sets the stage for positive macro reflexivity and some sustainable economic & market mojo.  Of course, policy is the other dynamic variable and, depending on its flavor, can work to catalyze, amplify, or reverse the trajectories of growth and inflation (and equity, bond and currency values by extension).   


The Fed and congress were largely non-existent in the first 8 months of the year and all was mostly quiet on the policy front – that was a good thing for the markets, organic macro trends, and main street confidence. 


With Bernanke back to perpetuating uncertainty/volatility yesterday and Congress back from recess and promising to save us from their next self-created crisis, the threat is that the above cycle – and the reason we’ve remained positive on the domestic growth outlook – reverses.   We’ve obviously seen this movie before as the aforementioned cycle and its converse have played out recurrently over the last four years.  


As it stands currently, the strength the of economic data continues to belie the Fed’s wimpish policy stance.   Labor Market and Consumer Confidence trends remain strong, ISM figures hit multi-year highs in the latest report, and Existing Home Sales and the Phili Fed trounced expectation this morning. 


What does that mean within the context of the emergent policy (monetary and fiscal) dynamics.  Right here, we don’t have a convicted call. 


Maybe Bernanke doomed us to another compressed economic cycle yesterday, maybe congress will amplify market volatility again over the next month,  maybe positive organic macro trends are healthy enough to persist in the face of a policy headwind, maybe Grand Theft Auto sales will take GDP & real final sales to +5% in 3Q.  The Risk Management business may be confounding at times, but it’s not boring…… 


Below is the breakdown of this morning's claims data, along with an analysis of the historical relationship between Claims and Fed Purchases, from the Hedgeye Financials team.  If you would like to setup a call with Josh or Jonathan or trial their research, please contact .


- Hedgeye Macro 




Will This Time be Different?

In light of yesterday's announcement by the Federal Reserve that they will not begin tapering QE asset purchases, we thought it would be helpful to evaluate the historical relationship of QE and initial jobless claims. The chart below looks at the Fed's holdings of Treasury and Agency securities on the x-axis and compares those against corresponding levels of initial jobless claims (SA, rolling) on a zero lag basis. The time period is 2009-Present and the data points are weekly. We're using a second order polynomial (i.e. parabolic) regression here to reflect the fact that the level of jobless claims begins to reach frictional resistance below 300k. The equation of the line is shown in the chart for anyone who wants to run their own assessment. Assuming the Fed remains unchanged in its purchases for a further 6 months, which is what we would argue the market likely now assumes, the relationship suggests that we could expect to see claims running in the 275k range by March/April of next year. We're assuming $85bn/mo for 6 months would bring total Fed holdings to just under $4 Trillion.


Assuming their is a causal relationship here and assuming that it persists going forward, this would be very good news for lenders from a credit standpoint. One of our central tenets on COF has been that the labor market is getting better at a faster rate than people realize. This would certainly be consistent with that viewpoint. 


While we're personally disappointed in the Fed's decision, the game is what it is, and this has been the historical relationship between claims and Fed securities holdings, i.e. QE. Rather than fight the logic of the decision, we'll look to profit from understanding its implications.





The Data

Prior to revision, initial jobless claims rose 17k to 309k from 292k WoW, as the prior week's number was revised up by 2k to 294k.


The headline (unrevised) number shows claims were higher by 15k WoW. Meanwhile, the 4-week rolling average of seasonally-adjusted claims fell -7k WoW to 314.5k.


The 4-week rolling average of NSA claims, which we consider a more accurate representation of the underlying labor market trend, was -16.3% lower YoY, which is a sequential improvement versus the previous week's YoY change of -14.3%.






Joshua Steiner, CFA


Jonathan Casteleyn, CFA, CMT


Shame on You, Ben Bernanke

By Keith McCullough


“Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again, and expecting different results.” -Albert Einstein


Albert Einstein’s famous quote on insanity is rather apropos today in light of the Bernanke Fed’s shameful decision to shirk its duties and avoid tapering yesterday.


As I wrote in my morning newsletter, I’m going to keep this missive tight. Because if I really ranted about what I really think about what Ben Bernanke just did failed to do, I might lose some of my firm’s clients and have the NSA parked outside of my house.


Moving on.


Shame on You, Ben Bernanke - deba


Here are some quick observations regarding the implications of the Fed’s unfathomable dereliction of duty.

  • The US Dollar has been bloodied. It has been beaten down to 3 month lows by our un-elected, unaccountable, Fed Chief. Thanks Ben.
  • Bernanke just confused every Institutional portfolio manager I talk to. Implied volatility is going up on this decision. You can take that to the bank.
  • Unsurprisingly, Asia ripped higher on Down Dollar. India up +3.7%, Indonesia up +4.7%, Thailand up +3.8%. Nikkei up+1.8%. Other Emerging Markets that love this US Dollar Debauchery? Take a look at Turkey. It shot up +7.6%.
  • Witness the new highs in Europe. It’s across-the-board for the majors; FTSE  up +1.4%, DAX up 1.2%.
  • Vladimir Putin? He loves Bernanke’s Dollar Debauchery. That’s a no-brainer. It lines his pockets. It means up Oil. Russia up almost 4%. Just great. Got #CommodityInflation?
  • The good news is that if you’re a gold bug, Bernanke may have saved your precious metal from totally crashing to earth (at the expense of the purchasing power of the American people). The bad news is our Fed overlords have decided to keep the oppressive oil tax intact on average Americans at the pump (Down Dollar, Up Oil). No, not good.
  • Growth, as an investment style factor, has been smoking slow-growth in 2013 year-to-date. That may very well change now. More to be revealed.

Bottom line: It was a great day for US stock market bulls. But a very sad day for America.


Keith McCullough is the founder and CEO of Hedgeye Risk Management.


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