• We’ve documented mass hold climbing higher over the years.  VIP hold has also been trending higher lately above the theoretical win rate of 2.85% and closer to 2.96%.
  • March junket hold on a trailing twelve-month basis (TTM) was 3.21%, about 20bps higher than the TTM hold in January 2010.  If we take into account direct play, adjusted VIP hold on a TTM was 3.00% in March, compared with a 2.80% adjusted VIP hold TTM in January 2010.
  • While mass volumes have been resilient so far in the face of higher hold, it remains to be seen how the high hold will affect VIP volume growth.  The good news is that comps are relatively easy for the back half of the year.



LINN Energy: Tit For Tat

Sez You

Last week LINN Energy (LINE) published “LINN Energy Response To Another Round Of Short Seller Comments” on its website.  Two points are in order before we proceed.  First, Hedgeye is is not a short seller.  We are purely a research firm, an on-line financial media firm providing investment research free from the conflicts of proprietary trading or of managing money for third parties.  Second, we leave it to you to consider the implications of LINN posting this “rebuttal” on April Fool’s Day.  As we said in our initial presentation, we believe LINN’s financial reporting is… how shall we say…? lacking in transparency.  That has not changed.  Read on.


Your Bottom Line Hasn’t Changed

If you are like most investors, your own LINN units for the income they provide.  As was asked again at the close of today’s call – where else can you get an instrument yielding over 8%?  Would it upset you if we suggested that Argentina 2-year bonds are yielding over 8%?  The bottom line for LINN is: how safe is the distribution yield?  In our opinion – not very.  Maybe not at all.


Sez We

For our money – more importantly, for yours – we say LINN has not addressed the issue of Free Cash Flow.  There just doesn’t appear to be enough for them to reliably keep hitting the targets they keep setting when they announce guidance of what next quarter’s distribution to unitholders will be.

To review, we raised four fundamental issues in our March 21st call – and we added a new one today:

1-     Not enough Free Cash Flow (FCF)

2-     LINN’s unusual accounting for its options hedging gives them dollar-for-dollar credit for what they spend as cash available to the company

3-     The “Maintenance CapEx” metric is not even appropriate to this kind of company, and it understates the actual costs of m the business

4-     Thanks for the second look: on re-examination, we have lowered our valuation for LINN shares.  On March 21st we were willing to give the shares a fair value of around $15.  We now think it may be as low as $5.

5-     New item: LINN may be providing misleading calculations of how it values its acquisitions.  We believe this continues to inflate the reported value of the company, and is part of the reason we have lowered our valuation

Here are some key points we re-emphasize from our first presentation – points that we believe LINN’s April 1st response did nothing to clarify.


Adjusted cash flows from operations: our analysis of LINN’s DCF (Discounted Cash Flows) calculation indicates there was a $1.047 billion cash shortfall over the 2009-2012 period, being the difference between what we calculate to be $686 million in actual free cash flow, and $1.732 billion paid out in distributions.


When we net out the treatment of option premiums, the numbers get worse.  The cash shortfall over the period doubles, to $2.165 billion.


Material?  We think so.


How safe is your 8% yield looking now?


LINN management says they are no longer buying put options to hedge production.  But that still leaves over 30% of their annual production hedged with existing puts out to 2017.  The way we figure it, this could overstate future cumulative DCF by more than $600 million.


To hit their distribution guidance targets – in other words, to keep you happy getting your 8% yield – LINN needs to raise between $500 million - $850 million every year, either from the capital markets, or by selling off assets.


Maintenance Capex: Kaiser says he has questioned LINN’s investor relations department on numerous occasions for clarification of their Maintenance CapEx calculation.  IR says it is impossible for anyone but LINN to calculate this, because it is derived from non-public company internal data.  To put it bluntly: Maintenance CapEx is unverifiable, which means it is what management says it is.  The real nugget here is that LINN’s asset base is much more capital intensive than investors seem to recognize.  Kaiser’s work indicates LINN’s actual maintenance capex expense may be nearly twice what company figures indicate.


More to the point (see our write-up of Kevin’s March 21st presentation) Maintenance CapEx is a metric that applies to pipeline companies, not to Exploration & Production companies.


Value: So what’s LINN worth, anyway?  The company claims its shares are undervalues.  Says Kaiser, “Markets don’t care what managements say.”  With so many estimates and non-public factors going into the calculation of LINN’s asset base, the net asset value calculation starts to look like a free-for-all. 


Kaiser says that, compared to companies in its peer group, LINN is trading at a significant premium on a number of key ratios.  As just one example, the Price to Undeveloped Acreage metric.  Most companies in the group have an average 75% still undeveloped acreage value to stock price ratio.  LINN’s ratio is 3%.  LINN says they have unproven drilling inventory worth between $27-$48 per unit.  In fact, based on comparisons to other companies, and using LINN’s publicly reported figures, Kaiser says LINN’s unproven drilling inventory may very well be zero. 


As an example of how confusing LINN’s reporting is, Kaiser points to the company’s independent auditor who assigned a reserve of 0.67 BCFE to 2500 of LINN’s locations.  (Billions of Cubic Feet Equivalent – an industry term meaning how much untapped gas can actually be pumped and delivered over the life of the well.)  In contrast, LINN – using its own data – assigns an average of 1.67 BCFE across more than 8500 locations.  This is a completely unequal comparison and all but impossible to analyze.  Kaiser says an investor would want to see the calrification for management assigning a BCFE figure two and one-half times the quantity assigned by their independent auditor.


Finally, Kaiser says LINN assigns high values to properties it acquires, implying that some of the biggest and most sophisticated energy companies are giving away valuable acreage.  He points to instances where LINN has cranked up the valuation of a property to three times the value implied in the purchase price.  Once it gets on LINN’s books, it appears these acquisitions all of a sudden become far more valuable than the amount LINN paid to acquire them.


Comparing LINN’s producing properties to other companies in the same geographic regions, Kaiser calculates that last week’s asset sales imply the units are potentially worth only… are you ready?  As little as $1-$6.50 a unit.


Acquisitions:  Kaiser’s work indicates LINN may have substantially overstated the value of its acquisitions.  By using its method of accounting for its options, LINN does not include the options expense in the stated price of an acquisition.  This makes deals look more accretive than they are, and Kaiser points to a key 2012 acquisition that LINN said was completed for 6.1 X first year EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation, a key investment banking metric).  On examination, Kaiser says LINN appears to have paid over 10 X EBITDA.



Nothing has changed.


LINN Energy continues to be one of Kaiser’s “Worst Ideas” – a cautionary tale for investors desperate for safe returns in this low-interest rate environment.  Holders of LINN units should reflect that the energy business by its nature throws off unpredictable revenues.  That means they have to find the cash somewhere else, in order to keep the distributions at the same level.  Unitholders will have to decide for themselves whether a steady, predictable return of 8% on your money looks too good to be true.


Credit Growth Accelerates

The latest numbers from First Data’s March SpendTrend report, which tracks aggregate same-store sales activity in the United States, shows a slight acceleration in credit card volume growth on a month-over-month basis.  Year-over-year, volume grew +8.1% versus +7.9% last year for the month of February. Consumer spending growth grew considerably in March to 6.0% year-over-year, up from 4.6% in February.


Credit Growth Accelerates - creditgrow1


First Data attributed the strength in March to markdowns on winter clearance items, retail dollar volume growth and holiday-related spending for both Easter and Passover. 


Credit Growth Accelerates - creditgrow2


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The Hedgeye Restaurants Team, led by Howard Penney, added Panera Bread Company (PNRA) as a short to Hedgeye's Best Ideas List on Friday, April 5th. We will be hosting a brief conference call on Wednesday, April 10th at 1:00pm entitled, "Competition Heats Up. Is it Time to Short PNRA?" to outline the key issues facing PNRA.







Gain an understanding of what has changed in the restaurant industry as well as for PNRA specifically that makes PNRA an attractive short case.  





PNRA's position as a healthy QSR option that is relatively free of competitors is gradually changing. An increased number of casual dining chains are now offering lower price points and other QSR chains are upgrading their menus to include items that are cheaper than PNRA's core offerings but are marketed competitively as healthy eating options. 


As a consequence:


This secular trend is manifesting itself in the components of comparable sales growth as PNRA traffic trends have shown recent weakness


We believe that the Street is overly optimistic about a recovery in SSS for 2H113


With limited upside to EPS the case for a multiple expansion seems unlikely from current levels




  • Toll Free Number:
  • Direct Dial Number:
  • Conference Code: 997891#
  • Materials: CLICK HERE

Howard Penney

Managing Director


Rory Green

Senior Analyst

Japanese Stocks On The Move

When the Bank of Japan announced its $1.4 trillion stimulus to help boost the economy last Thursday, two things happened: the value of the Japanese Yen plummeted and the Nikkei 225 Index - Japan's version of the Dow Jones Industrial Average - shot up and continues to post massive gains. The Nikkei is up +9.9% over the last five trading days alone and is up +27% year-to-date. That's what happens when a country's central bank starts messing around with the markets, folks.


Japanese Stocks On The Move - nikkei225


Recently updated Q1 Macau EBITDA and hold adjusted EBITDA projections – MPEL looks great



Q1 earnings season should be decent for the Macau operators although there are only 2 real standouts – both were impacted by low hold.  On a hold adjusted basis, which is what we care about, MPEL and MGM Macau performed very well in Q1.  Wynn Macau is the only property that looks like it could post a slight miss relative to consensus but that would be on a hold adjusted basis as our projection for actual EBITDA exceeds consensus slightly.


MPEL remains our favorite name in the space with the catalyst of a terrific Q1 earnings release looming.  More importantly, the stock remains incredibly inexpensive relative to most Macau names and could be ripe for a 2-3 multiple turn increase in its EV/EBITDA valuation.  As we wrote about in our note “INVESTABLE MPEL” on 03/21/13, MPEL should transition from a trading vehicle to a core long-term holding for many long only investors which should help inflate the multiple to something more realistic:  11-12x (post-opening of MSC).   



Hedgeye Statistics

The total percentage of successful long and short trading signals since the inception of Real-Time Alerts in August of 2008.

  • LONG SIGNALS 80.46%
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