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Weekly European Monitor: The Eurocrat Shuffle

Takeaway: Greece was on the center of the dance floor this week with Eurocrats lining the walls afraid to make a move.

-- For specific questions on anything Europe, please contact me at to set up a call.

 

No Current Real-Time Positions in Europe

 

Asset Class Performance:

  • Equities:  The STOXX Europe 600 closed down -1.7% week-over-week vs +1.6% last week. Bottom performers: Spain -4.2%; Italy -3.7%; Russia (RTSI) -3.0%; Germany -2.7%; Finland -2.7%; France -2.0%; Austria -2.0%; UK -1.7%.  Top performers: Turkey +0.6%; Slovakia +0.5%; Switzerland +0.2%. [Other: Greece +0.0%].
  • FX:  The EUR/USD is down -0.94% week-over-week.  W/W Divergences: TRY/EUR +1.01%; NOK/EUR +0.83%; SEK/EUR +0.43%; GBP/EUR +0.18%; CHF/EUR +0.10%; DKK/EUR +0.02%; HUF/EUR -0.44%; CZK/EUR -0.46%; PLN/EUR -1.17%.
  • Fixed Income:  The 10YR yield for sovereigns were mixed week-on-week. Portugal rose the most at +51bps to 8.86%, followed by Spain +23bps to 5.83%. Greece saw the largest decline at -34bps to 17.87%.  Germany, Belgium, and France were notable decliners, falling -12bps, -11bps, and -9bps to 1.33%, 2.31%, and 2.13%, respectively.    

Weekly European Monitor: The Eurocrat Shuffle - 11. yields

 

  • The EUR/USD hit its lowest level in 2 months this week. We maintain an immediate term TRADE range of $1.27 to $1.29 and a heavy intermediate term TREND resistance level of $1.31.

Weekly European Monitor: The Eurocrat Shuffle - 222. NEU EUR

 

Weekly European Monitor: The Eurocrat Shuffle - 11. cftc data

 

 

The Eurocrat Shuffle:

 

The Eurozone continues to take two steps forward and one step back, or is it, one step forward and two steps back?  Headline risk continues to be a governing factor. This week it largely revolved around Greece – waiting on the narrow passage of a €13.5B package of spending cuts, tax increases and structural reforms late Wednesday night and ahead of Sunday’s vote on its 2013 budget.

 

Markets remained constipated over Greece’s next lifeline aid tranche of €31.5B, as the European Commission, Eurogroup, and IMF are in disagreement about how to both reduce Greece’s debt load and set appropriate debt reduction targets for such far-out dates as 2020. On some level an agreement to both will be needed before the money is dropped from the skies. [See our note titled “November ECB Presser: No Surprises” for our commentary on the ECB’s decision to keep rates on hold this week.]

 

 Away from the politically compromised Eurocrats and structural flaws of the Eurosystem, Keith noted that his multi-factor quantitative model was flashing a major buy signal for the German DAX. [Note: we sold our Real-Time Position in German Bonds (BUNL) on Thursday (11/8) so we have no exposure to Europe].  He also said that the broader equity market of Denmark looks good; whereas the UK is flashing a negative set-up.

 

Weekly European Monitor: The Eurocrat Shuffle - 22. dax

 

 

Beyond the headline news, and broader negative data out this week (see below in the section “Data Dump”), there were a couple positive charts that caught our attention this week:

  • Target 2 exposure is actually slowly improving across the periphery.

Weekly European Monitor: The Eurocrat Shuffle - 11. target 2

 

  • Current Account Balances are showing improvement across countries that have historically had heavy deficits.

Weekly European Monitor: The Eurocrat Shuffle - 11. current acct bal

 

 

 

The European Week Ahead:


Monday: Eurogroup Meeting in Brussels; Oct. Germany Wholesale Price Index (Nov. 12-13); Oct. UK RICS House Price Balance; Sep. Spain House Transactions

 

Tuesday: Nov. Eurozone ZEW Survey Economic Sentiment; Nov. Germany ZEW Survey Current Situation and Economic Sentiment; Oct. UK PPI Input and Output, CPI, Retail Price Index; Sep. UK ONS House Price; Oct. France CPI - Final; Sep. France Current Account; 3Q France Wages and Non-Farm Payrolls – Preliminary; Oct. Italy CPI - Final; Sep. Italy General Government Debt

 

Wednesday: Sep. Eurozone Industrial Production; BoE Inflation Report; Oct. UK Claimant Count Rate, Jobless Claims Change; Sep. UK Weekly Earnings, ILO Unemployment Rate, Employment Change; Oct. France Consumer Price Index; 3Q Greece GDP - Advance

 

Thursday: ECB Publishes Nov. Monthly Report; Oct. Eurozone CPI; 3Q Eurozone GDP – Advance; 3Q Germany GDP – Preliminary; Oct. UK Retail Sales; 3Q France GDP – Preliminary; Spain Catalonia Regional Election; 3Q GDP - Final 3Q Spain GDP – Final; Sep. Italy Current Account; 3Q Italy GDP - Preliminary

 

Friday: Sep. Eurozone Current Account, Trade Balance; Sep. Italy Trade Balance

 

 

Extended Calendar:


NOV 19  –            Eurozone Finance Ministers Meeting

NOV 22 –             EU Summit and ECB Governing Council Meeting

NOV 26  –            Finance Ministers may sign off on Greece’s next bailout tranche, 31.5B EUR

NOV 27 –             AFME 4th Annual Spanish Funding Conference in Madrid

DEC 1 –                Beginning of the Russian Presidency of G20

DEC 3 –                Eurogroup Meeting in Brussels

DEC 6 –                ECB Governing Council Meeting

DEC 12-13 –          First public consultation between the Russian government, B20 Coalition and international civil society representatives on G20 agenda for 2013 (in Moscow)

DEC 20 –               ECB Governing and General Council Meeting

APR 2013 –           Parliamentary elections in Italy

MAY 2013 –           Presidential elections in Italy

 

 

Call Outs:

 

Turkey - received its first investment- grade ranking since 1994 after Fitch Ratings raised the country by one level (BB+ to BBB-), citing an easing in economic risk and lower debt.

 

Italy - Italian Treasury officials rejected proposals to create a so-called bad bank for the non-performing loans of the nation’s lenders amid concern the plan would strengthen the link between sovereign and bank debt, said people with knowledge of the matter.

 

France - the IMF warned that France risks falling behind the likes of Spain and Italy if it does not reform its economy. It called for a comprehensive program of structural reforms, citing the country's significant loss of competitiveness.

 

 

Data Dump:

 

Weekly European Monitor: The Eurocrat Shuffle - 22. PMIs

 

Eurozone PPI 2.7% SEPT Y/Y vs 2.7% AUG

Eurozone Retail Sales -0.8% SEPT Y/Y vs -0.9% AUG

Eurozone Sentix Investor Confidence -18.8 NOV (exp. -21) vs -22.2 OCT

 

UK Halifax House Price -1.7% OCT Y/Y vs -1.2% September

UK New Car Registrations 12.1% OCT Y/Y vs 8.2% September

UK Industrial Production -2.6% SEPT Y/Y vs -1.0% AUG

UK Manufacturing Production -1.0% SEPT Y/Y vs -1.2% AUG

 

Germany CPI 2.1% OCT Final Y/Y UNCH  [0.1% M/M UNCH]

Germany Exports -2.5% SEPT M/M vs 2.3% AUG

Germany Imports -1.6% SEPT M/M vs 0.4% AUG

Germany Industrial Sales -1.2% SEPT Y/Y vs -1.3% AUG

Germany Factory Orders -4.7% SEPT Y/Y vs -4.6% AUG   [-3.3% SEPT M/M vs -0.8% AUG]

 

Weekly European Monitor: The Eurocrat Shuffle - 11. German fact orders

 

France Bank of France Business Sentiment 92 OCT vs 92 SEPT

France Industrial Production -2.5% SEPT Y/Y vs -0.9% AUG

France Manufacturing Production -2.5% SEPT Y/Y vs -0.3% AUG

 

Italy Industrial Production SA -1.5% SEPT Y/Y vs 1.7% AUG

Italy Industrial Production WDA -4.8% SEPT Y/Y vs -5.2% AUG

Italy Industrial Production NSA -10.5% SEPT Y/Y vs -5.1% AUG

 

Spain Industrial Output NSA -11.7% SEPT Y/Y vs -2.5% AUG

Spain Unemployment Change 128.2k OCT M/M (exp. 110k) vs 79.6k SEPT

 

Norway Industrial Production -5.0% SEPT Y/Y vs 1.9% AUG

Norway CPI 1.1% OCT Y/Y vs 0.5% SEPT

Norway CPI incl. oil 1.7% OCT Y/Y vs 1.4% SEPT

Finland Industrial Production -1.7% SEPT Y/Y vs -1.4% AUG

Sweden Industrial Production -5.0% SEPT Y/Y vs 2.7% AUG

 

Switzerland Unemployment Rate 3.0% OCT vs 2.9%

Switzerland CPI -0.1% OCT Y/Y vs -0.3% SEPT

Austria Wholesale Price Index 4.2% OCT Y/Y vs 4.2% SEPT

 

Netherlands CPI 2.9% OCT Y/Y vs 2.3% SEPT

Netherlands Industrial Production -0.2% SEPT Y/Y vs -0.6% AUG

 

Greece Unemployment Rate 25.4% AUG vs 24.8% JUL

Greece Industrial Production -7.3% SEPT Y/Y vs 2.5% AUG

Greece CPI 1.6% OCT Y/Y vs 0.9% September

 

Ireland CPI 2.1% OCT Y/Y vs 2.4% SEPT

Ireland Industrial Production -12.7% SEPT Y/Y vs -0.5% AUG

Portugal Industrial Sales -8.1% SEPT Y/Y vs -1.3% AUG

 

Russia Consumer Prices 6.5% OCT Y/Y vs 6.6% SEPT

 

Czech Republic Unemployment Rate 8.5% OCT vs 8.4% SEPT

Czech Republic Retail Sales -3.3% SEPT Y/Y vs -0.8% AUG

Czech Republic CPI 3.4% OCT Y/Y vs 3.4% September

 

Romania Retail Sales 5.1% SEPT Y/Y vs 4.7% AUG

Hungary Industrial Production 0.6% SEPT Y/Y vs 1.8% AUG

Slovenia Industrial Production -0.2% SEPT Y/Y vs 4.2% AUG

Latvia Preliminary Q3 GDP 5.3% Y/Y vs 5.0% in Q2   [1.7% Q/Q vs 1.3% in Q2]

 

Turkey Consumer Prices 7.80% OCT Y/Y vs 9.19% SEPT

Turkey Producer Prices 2.57% OCT Y/Y vs 4.03% September

Turkey Industrial Production 6.2% SEPT Y/Y vs 0.9% AUG

 

 

Interest Rate Decisions:

 

(11/8) BOE Main Interest Rate UNCH at 0.50% (and asset purchase program UNCH)

(11/8) ECB Main Interest Rate UNCH at 0.75%

(11/8) Serbia Repo Rate HIKED to 10.95% from 10.75% (exp. 11%)

(11/9) Russia Refinancing Rate UNCH at 8.25%

(11/9) Russia Overnight Deposit Rate UNCH at 4.25%

(11/9) Russia Overnight Auction-Based Repo UNCH at 5.50%

 

Matthew Hedrick

Senior Analyst


TRADE OF THE DAY: OZM

Today we bought Och-Ziff Capital Management Group (OZM) at $9.06 a share at 9:42 AM EDT in our Real Time Alerts. Och Ziff remains one of our favorite long-term stocks in financials. The firm is capable of preserving capital and generating alpha in a market where other asset managers are losing money. As always, we bought on the red and will sell when it’s green.

 

TRADE OF THE DAY: OZM  - OCHZIFF


THE WEEK AHEAD

The Economic Data calendar for the week of the 12th of November through the 16th is full of critical releases and events. Attached below is a snapshot of some (though far from all) of the headline numbers that we will be focused on.

 

THE WEEK AHEAD - week

 

 


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Best Ideas Call November 15th

Best Ideas Call November 15th - BESTIDEAS

 

Hedgeye Risk Management invites you to join us Thursday, November 15th, for our bi-annual BEST IDEAS CALL at 1:30pm EST. We will be outlining the top investment ideas, both long and short, across each vertical of our world-class research team. In aggregate, we will offer one high conviction and differentiated investment idea from each of our 8 verticals over the intermediate term duration.  

 

Below is a list of speakers:

  • Keith McCullough, CEO
  • Daryl Jones, Macro
  • Brian McGough, Retail
  • Todd Jordan, Gaming, Lodging and Leisure
  • Howard Penney, Restaurants
  • Tom Tobin, Healthcare
  • Josh Steiner, Financials
  • Jay Van Sciver, Industrials
  • Kevin Kaiser, Energy

Please dial in 5-10 minutes prior to the 1:30pm EST start time using the number provided below, a copy of the presentation will be distributed before the call. If you have any further questions email .

  • Toll Free Number:
  • Direct Dial Number:
  • Conference Code: 666651#

 

"You just need a solid bench of analysts and inventory of long/short ideas to pick from"      

-@KeithMcCullough  

 


THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN

Takeaway: We are once again short the yen and remain bearish on the JPY in light of Japan’s deteriorating cyclical and structural GIP outlooks.

SUMMARY BULLETS:

 

  • We continue to hold a bearish bias on the JPY vs. the USD as we anticipate a series of economic and political catalysts that we think will drive the Bank of Japan to ease monetary POLICY like it never has before with respect to the intermediate-term TREND.
  • With respect to the long-term TAIL duration, at the present moment we think Japan faces material risk of a currency crisis (as loosely defined by a peak-to-trough move of -20% vs. the USD). During that decline, we would expect to see some reflation among Japanese equities as the exporters and industrials reap the obvious benefits of an FX tailwind. We think that beta risk is to be eventually faded however, as the JGB market may start to aggressively price in the confluence of rising inflation expectations and capital flight.
  • Ultimately, we continue to view these steps as the most probable functional mechanisms for a Japanese sovereign debt crisis, though we believe that remains an improbable risk for now.

 

Yesterday, a very astute client of ours pinged us with a question on the morning call asking about tail risk within the Japanese sovereign debt market in light of yesterday’s bombed-out SEP current account data, which, like Japan’s SEP trade balance, narrowed to an all-time low on a monthly basis:

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 1

 

Our answer was that the client was 100% correct to callout the awful current account data point, as Japan’s significant loss of international competitiveness due to secular yen appreciation (JPY up over +50% vs. the USD over the last 10yrs) will remain a headwind to Japanese GROWTH over the intermediate term – especially in light of the erosion of export demand stemming from the geopolitical dispute with China. That is but one more domino among a series of economic and political catalysts that we think will drive the Bank of Japan to ease monetary POLICY like it never has before – literally, as a foreign asset purchase program remain a critical tail risk for the JPY. In support of our view that the BOJ is poised to accelerate its balance sheet expansion in a potentially unprecedented way over the intermediate term are the latest trends in implied volatility in the JGB futures market, which recently dropped to the lowest since 2002 (1.27%).

 

Regarding the BOJ, in its latest meeting (OCT 31), the BOJ announced its first back-to-back monthly stimulus expansion since 2003, increasing its revolving Asset Purchase Program by ¥11 trillion to ¥66 trillion and introducing an “unlimited” credit program for Japanese banks. We doubt Japanese banks will respond to this easing of liquidity conditions with a commensurate expansion of their balance sheets. Net interest margins at Japanese banks are at decade-plus lows (~140bps) as the average interest rate on new loans continues to track the 10yr nominal JGB yield lower.

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 2

 

We continue to view these latest easing measures as mere precursors to the real fireworks, likely beginning around mid-2013, shortly after current BOJ governor Masaaki Shirakawa steps down from his post; he’ll likely be replaced by an incrementally dovish puppet of whichever party controls the Diet – more on this later. For now, Japan is likely to continue edging towards recession as companies like Sharp, Panasonic and Toshiba continue to scramble for ways to cut costs amid material profit erosion. To say corporate credit risk in Japan has undergone a demonstrably negative phase change with the JPY consistently trading just shy of post-war highs would be an understatement.

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 3

 

Leading and concurrent indicators in Japan continue to support our bleak cyclical expectations for Japanese GROWTH – expectations that continue to be driven lower by de facto protectionism emanating from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, which has weighed on both Japanese exports and industrial production in recent months. The latest developments on that front is that Japan is now seeking to revise its military cooperation pact with the US amid fears of China’s increasing military presence in the region (especially after Hu’s incredibly hawkish foreign policy speech yesterday).

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 4

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 5

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 6

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 7

 

Meanwhile the Japanese bond market – with the 5yr breakeven rate at/near all-time highs and the yield premium to take on additional duration risk widening – continues to support our hawkish structural expectations for Japanese INFLATION:

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 8

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 9

 

Interestingly, we continue to point to Shirakawa’s term expiration as one of the key catalysts for an acceleration of monetary easing by the BOJ, as the Milton Friedman-trained economist has been somewhat of a human dam, shielding the the BOJ board at the margins from the bi-partisan will [to inflate] of Japan’s two dominant political parties – the DPJ and LDP.

 

The primary reason we have been so focused on Japan’s looming government shutdown is that the LDP was previously using a brinksmanship tactic on the outstanding deficit financing bill (covering ~40% of FY12 expenditures), only agreeing to negotiate in exchange for a promise of early elections – likely sometime before year-end. The LDP, which would be likely to regain control of Diet as it has been heavily favored in the latest polls vs. the DPJ, has been outspoken in favor of hiking the BOJ’s long-term inflation target +200bps to +3% (and with it, the pace and scope of BOJ balance sheet expansion).

 

Turning back to Japan’s debt ceiling showdown, we’ve received some directionally positive news on this front this week. Japan’s three main parties (the DPJ, LDP and New Komeito Party) agreed to approve the deficit financing legislation in the Lower House on NOV 15 after the previous impasse slowed public expenditures enough to begin causing increasing disruptions in funding at the regional and local levels. LDP chief Shinzo Abe even gave his blessing to the local media, though promising to forge ahead with his party’s demands:

 

“It might be called a sunshine policy, but we will continue to press our demands… We are allowing Mr. Noda a chance to keep his end of the promise.”

 

In addition to recent weakness across Global Macro markets, this latest news has been very positive for the JPY with respect to the TRADE duration, giving us a new opportunity to re-short a favorite TREND and TAIL thesis within the FX market. Our quantitative risk management levels on the CurrencyShares Japanese Yen Trust etf “FXY” are included in the chart below. Do not, however, disrespect what the former of the previous two catalysts could do as it relates to further JPY strength from here (email us for more details) and we would look to re-short the FXY at TREND resistance if it manages to recapture its TRADE line.

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 10

 

All that being said, we were never of the view that Japanese government would actually shutdown; nor did we expect a near-term Japanese sovereign default (a view supported by the continued tightening of Japanese sovereign CDS). Instead we fully anticipated a deal being struck with early parliamentary elections being the ultimate outcome. We still believe this is the base case scenario, though chatter from senior officials within the DPJ suggest a that the current redistricting process may delay dissolution of the Diet even further. Still, Noda is out recently affirming his AUG promise to call elections in the “near term” (by law, they must be called by AUG ’13) and we think Noda might just be trying to buy himself and the DPJ a bit more time to potentially regain some lost momentum in the polls.

 

THINKING THROUGH A POTENTIAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN JAPAN - 11

 

Regardless of the actual timing of the election (DEC or early 2013), a potential recession is unlikely to sit well with the Japanese populace and we would expect the LDP to maintain its advantage among Japanese voters over the intermediate term – making them Japan’s “new” ruling party (they were in power for over a generation before the DPJ won in 2009). As we mentioned before, that event would be overtly bearish for the JPY – a currency that is already struggling with gaggle of cyclical headwinds.

 

With respect to the long-term TAIL duration, at the present moment we think Japan faces material risk of a currency crisis (as loosely defined by a peak-to-trough move of -20% vs. the USD). During that decline, we would expect to see some reflation among Japanese equities as the exporters and industrials reap the obvious benefits of an FX tailwind. We think that beta risk is to be eventually faded however, as the JGB market may start to aggressively price in the confluence of rising inflation expectations and capital flight.

 

Ultimately, we continue to view these steps as the most probable functional mechanisms for a Japanese sovereign debt crisis and, as we highlighted on our MAR 2 presentation titled, “JAPAN’S DEBT, DEFICIT AND DEMOGRAPHIC RECKONING”, mere storytelling about Japan’s fiscal imbalances simply will not suffice to nail the timing of the “Widowmaker Trade”. It will pay to focus on the specific catalysts going forward, as well as any other globally interconnected risks that may impact marginal demand for the JPY and JGBs (such as US monetary and fiscal POLICY).

 

For those of you looking to establish a position here or generally interested in understanding the foreign exchange and global financial market risk embedded in our thesis, we encourage you to review the notes below. As always, we are available to dialogue further; simply email us and we’ll set up a call.

 

Darius Dale

Senior Analyst

 

  • 10/26: IDEA ALERT: RE-SHORTING THE YEN, OUR FAVORITE CURRENCY SHORT ACROSS ASIA
    • We see downside risk in the JPY relative to the USD across our TRADE, TREND and TAIL durations, driven largely by our expectations for the BOJ to dramatically accelerate their monetary easing measures amid heightening political pressure, a rapidly-deteriorating domestic GROWTH outlook and a potential upward revision(s) to their long-term inflation target over the intermediate term.
  • 9/27: IDEA ALERT: SHORTING THE YEN AS SINO-JAPANESE TENSIONS ESCALATE
    • We are now short the Japanese yen (via the CurrencyShares Japanese Yen Trust etf “FXY”) in our Real-Time Positions product as a way to communicate our bearish TRADE and TREND thesis on the JPY relative to the USD.
    • The key catalyst in support of our bearish bias is a likely acceleration of the BOJ’s balance sheet expansion, which may include a potential implementation of a foreign asset purchase program as Japan’s economic outlook deteriorates on the margin due to slowing commerce with China and recent yen strength.
    • From a TAIL duration perspective, any sustained weakness in the yen risks Japanese banks and asset managers clearing out of the JGB market en masse in search of higher yields abroad (which they couldn’t do previously due to structural yen appreciation), as well as imposing the threat of structurally higher rates of inflation – a risk the JGB market hasn’t had to price in for over a decade.
  • 9/19: ARE CHINA AND JAPAN HEADING FOR WAR?
    • While we view the threat of military intervention as highly improbable, we do think the heightened tension over the Senkaku (Japan)/Diaoyu (China) islands risks facilitating a string of international protectionism – which is already poised to accelerate due to recent political promises out of the Obama and Romney camps.
    • Such protectionism would have dire economic effects globally, with Japanese industrial production and US/EU consumption getting hurt the most – the former due to lower Chinese demand; the latter due to higher import price inflation.
    • Retaliatory measures, while not an acute risk, could beget broader financial market and economic contagion globally. This is a meaningful TAIL risk, given the recent rhetoric and maneuvers of international policymakers.
  •  8/28: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF JAPAN’S LOOMING GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN
    • The political calendar poses a great deal of risk to the Japanese economy, JGBs and Japanese financial institutions over the next ~2 months.
    • The ramifications of a potential/actual Japanese government shutdown are three-fold: a potential sovereign default; a potential sovereign credit rating downgrade(s); and an associated $75-80 billion capital call across the Japanese banking system in the event JGBs are downgraded to single-A level by Moody’s and/or Standard and Poor’s, where the outlook is already “negative”.
  •  7/27: ARE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BONDS POISED TO MAKE SOME NOISE?
    • By authorizing BOJ purchases of foreign currency assets, Japanese policymakers risk materially elevating the risk of sustained yen depreciation and inflation within the JGB market.
    • Though we have yet to receive anything concrete on the policy front, we will be paying close attention to the next two BOJ monetary policy board meetings for signs of official movement in this direction. 
    • We are now short the Japanese yen (via the CurrencyShares Japanese Yen Trust etf “FXY”) in our Real-Time Positions product as a way to communicate our bearish TRADE and TREND thesis on the JPY relative to the USD.
    • The key catalyst in support of our bearish bias is a likely acceleration of the BOJ’s balance sheet expansion, which may include a potential implementation of a foreign asset purchase program as Japan’s economic outlook deteriorates on the margin due to slowing commerce with China and recent yen strength.
    • From a TAIL duration perspective, any sustained weakness in the yen risks Japanese banks and asset managers clearing out of the JGB market en masse in search of higher yields abroad (which they couldn’t do previously due to structural yen appreciation), as well as imposing the threat of structurally higher rates of inflation – a risk the JGB market hasn’t had to price in for over a decade.
  • 3/30: DIGGING DEEPER INTO JAPANESE SOVEREIGN DEBT RISK
    • Is there a historical tipping point for a sovereign interest expense burden as it relates to default and/or financial crises?
    • How large of a risk to Japanese banks are their holdings of JGBs?
    • What are the assumptions the government is making regarding Japan’s fiscal outlook? How do Japan’s fiscal metrics look under various economic scenarios?
    • What’s the composition of Japan’s current account? Can the income balance sustain the current account surplus even in the absence of a reflating trade balance?
    • What’s the risk that the ~95% never sells and how much damage could the ~5% do if they become a heavy seller?
    • What sorts of labor market reforms could Japan undertake to boost economic output and lower the financial burden?
    • What are the best ways to play your thesis?
    • What’s the timing of the VAT hike discussions, given its importance as a catalyst for a ratings downgrade(s)?

Crude Oil Differentials

For October/November, water-borne light, sweet crudes (Brent, LLS, ANS) continue to trend higher against WTI, and regional crudes (Bakken, Midland, Syncrude, WCS) have traded away from WTI since mid-September. Wide differentials could persist in 4Q12, but we expect them to tighten across the board in 2013.

 

Crude Oil Differentials  - CRUDEoiltypes


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