CONCLUSION: As we’ve previously stated, political headwinds, especially from Romney and Ryan, will serve to inhibit further monetary easing out of the Fed between now and election day.


America’s currency (via the DXY), which is bullish TREND and TAIL on our quantitative factoring, loves how the political winds are blowing of late. More specifically, international FX investors continue to see what we see – Bernanke being forced into a tighter and tighter box as we head into the heart of election season.




On our APR 13th 2Q Macro Themes Conference Call, we identified the intermediate-term political calendar as a headwind to further iterations of QE out of the Federal Reserve and continue to view it as such. As part of our Asymmetric Risks theme, we walked through the logic and reasoning behind our conclusion in slides 38-41 of that presentation. To access the replay podcast and the presentation materials, please copy/paste the following two links into the URL of your browser: 

Jumping ahead, we encourage you to check out the following Bloomberg article titled, “Romney-Ryan See Fed QE As Inflation Risk Amid Low Prices”. While the article, written by Jeff Kearns and Joshua Zumbrun, demonstrates a clear bias that attempts to make Romney and Ryan look like economic donkeys for being worried about the inflationary impact of incremental QE on US consumers and businesses “amid low prices”, we were able to glean few key quotes from Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney that we don’t think the #BailoutBull crowd is currently factoring into their immediate-to-intermediate term expectations for Fed policy: 

  • Romney said on June 17 the second round of quantitative easing was ineffective while potentially causing inflation and undermining the dollar. A third round would pose the same risks, he said. (Bloomberg)
  • “QE2, as it’s called, which was a monetary stimulus, did not have the desired effect,” the former Massachusetts governor said in an interview on CBS’s “Face the Nation.” “It was not extraordinarily harmful, but it does put in question the future value of the dollar, and will, obviously, encourage some inflation.” (Bloomberg)
  • “A QE3 would do the same thing,” Romney said. “But the potential threat down the road in inflation is something which we have to be aware of, and the last QE2, the last monetary stimulus, did not put Americans back to work, did not raise our home values, did not bring jobs back to this country or encourage small businesses to open their doors.” (Bloomberg) 

Romney’s new running mate, Paul Ryan, has been even more outspoken and negative on the Fed’s expansionary monetary policy and we think his influence can force the Fed’s policies into the mainstream focus and do one of two things: 

  1. Significantly raise the bar for further QE due to Bernanke feeling increased political heat; or
  2. Force Obama to either defend or reject the quantitative easing policy in a very public forum – either of which is prohibitive for a new round of QE. The former because A) he knows Bernanke would look incrementally politicized by pursing action amid such heightened political rhetoric; and B) members of the Federal Reserve would have to talk down their assessment of the economy in conjunction with announcing a new LSAP. The last thing the Obama campaign needs right now are bureaucrats that he appointed talking negatively about the economy. 

Jumping back to Ryan specifically, in a 2H10 piece co-authored by renowned Stanford economist John Taylor, Ryan remarked (with Taylor): 

  • “Quantitative easing is part of a recent Fed trend toward discretionary and away from rules-based monetary actions. The consequences of this trend are clear: The Fed's decision to hold interest rates too low for too long from 2002 to 2004 exacerbated the formation of the housing bubble. And while the Fed did help to arrest the ensuing panic in the fall of 2008, its subsequent interventions have done more long-run harm than good.”
  • “QE1 failed to strengthen the economy, which has remained in a high-unemployment, low-growth slump, and there is no convincing evidence that QE2 will help either. On the contrary, QE2 will create more economic uncertainty, stemming mainly from reasonable doubts over whether the Fed will know exactly when and how to contract its balance sheet after such an unprecedented expansion.”
  • “While consistent with the "sugar-high economics" practiced in Washington of late, quantitative easing marks a further departure from the foundations for prosperity and another step toward an increasingly politicized central bank.”
  • “For all of these reasons, Congress should reform the Federal Reserve Act, particularly the section of the act that establishes the Fed's dual mandate. The Fed should be tasked with the single goal of long-run price stability within a clear framework of overall economic stability. Such a reform would not prevent the Fed from providing liquidity, serving as lender of last resort, or cutting interest rates in a financial crisis or a recession.”
  • “Experience shows that a focus on price stability is the surest way for monetary policy to lay the groundwork for strong economic growth. The 1980s and 1990s had better economic performance than the stagflationary 1970s in part because the Fed did not waver from its primary goal of checking inflation.”
  • “In particular, the Fed should explicitly publish and follow a monetary rule as its means to achieve price stability. Such a rule should include, among other things: greater simplicity; a description of interest-rate responses to economic developments including how the Fed will achieve those responses through money growth; and greater attention to commodity prices, including food and energy, as opposed to a myopic overemphasis on core inflation.” 

All told, we continue to anticipate growing political headwinds to further iterations of monetary easing out of the Fed, with the general election and preceding debates serving as a much-needed forum to publically discuss the course of US monetary policy. We think that is likely to keep Bernanke in his box until at least after the election. And while Romney may be getting crushed by Obama on our proprietary Election Indicator and in various polls across the country, we think a narrowing of that spread is in the cards and that this is the key political risk to manage over the TRADE and TREND durations.


Darius Dale

Senior Analyst



DRI: Shorting Lobsters and Breadsticks

Takeaway: Darden is burning cash trying to grow Red Lobster and Olive Garden. If the stock breaks its support level of $51.56, expect a free fall.

Hedgeye Restaurants Sector Head Howard Penney has been bearish on Olive Garden owner Darden Restaurants (DRI) for months now. But sometimes you have to wait until quantitative and qualitative metrics fall into place. Time and price matter in these markets and today, we’ve decided to short Darden in the Hedgeye Virtual Portfolio.


The case for Darden is that in the immediate term TRADE duration, the stock is overbought. Right now, the stock has TREND duration support (3 months or more) at $51.56. This is the line in the sand. Snap $51.56 and Darden is headed into the low $40s in rapid fashion.


Our bearish thesis on Darden focuses on its two largest chains and revenue drivers: Olive Garden and Red Lobster. Traffic at both restaurants is on the decline and are having difficulties growing their respective brands. Penney has outlined his concerns on Darden below:


• Anemic sales trends at Olive Garden, Red Lobster

• Focusing on growth rather than remedying issues at OG & RL

• Capex growth outstripping sales growth

• The company is burning cash

• Maintaining the dividend, growth profile, and operating margins not possible with current fundamentals

• Difficult macro outlook is not encouraging

• Absent a resurrection in sales trends, we believe downside in stock is significant (to $43)




DRI: Shorting Lobsters and Breadsticks - DRI quantlevels



The fact that this company is busy burning cash in an effort to grow two mediocre, stagnant brands is an easy-to-spot red flag. Add in a slowdown in sales growth and same store sales and the picture becomes bleak for Darden. Again, should the stock fall through the $51.56 level, it’s going to be a messy free fall into the low $40 range very quickly.


Takeaway: Growth slowing but LVS better positioned

We sound like our macro team: growth slowing 



  • Data derived from LVS and Genting earnings reports
  • LVS should be a little better off since MBS has a greater share of the foreign Mass business which continues to grow at a much higher rate than domestic Mass
  • To some extent, the slow growth is a result of the initial strength of the local business but also the saturation of the small local population



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CONCLUSION: We see downside risk in the US equity market over the intermediate term as the structural bull thesis is riddled with shortcomings.


According to Dr. Richard Peterson, renowned behavioral psychologist and author of the highly-acclaimed book, Inside The Investor’s Brain, an asset class needs to two features to be correctly identified as a bubble: 

  1. A good story; and
  2. Price confirmation. 

While we don’t care enough to argue whether the US equity market is or is not a bubble at the current juncture, we can confirm that this market does indeed satisfy the previous criteria. In reverse order, the S&P 500 remains in a Bullish Formation on our quantitative factoring – albeit amid some of the most worrisome volume and volatility signals in years.




In line with Keith’s remarks on our Morning Call yesterday, we continue to be unsurprised to see prices jammed higher due to the sheer level of performance chasing and “short low/cover high” strategies being employed across the oversupplied asset management industry. In spite of this, we continue to side with our proprietary Global Macro GROWTH/INFLATION/POLICY fundamental research process that continues to auger bearishly for global equity markets (including domestic stocks) with respect to the TREND duration.


To address the former of the aforementioned criteria, below we debunk what we see as three of the most deeply ingrained arguments in the structural bull thesis on US equities:


“Investors are massively underweight equities, therefore the market should continue to trend higher as both investors and fund managers chase performance.”

On a variety of measures, there is a bit of truth to this statement. At the fund manager level (excluding money market mutual funds), investors ended 2011 with a 61.5% allocation to equities (per the 2012 ICI Factbook), which is -0.2 standard deviations from the long-term average (yearly data starting in 1990). At the broader mutual fund investor level, which has been shown to be even more sensitive to forward-looking economic variables than the asset allocation strategies of fund managers (many of whom may be constrained from a mandate perspective), equities represented 44.8% of total net assets of the mutual fund industry. That is 0.2 standard deviations from the long-term average (yearly data starting in 1975). Net-net, at -0.2x and 0.2x standard deviations from their respective historical means, we’d argue that neither fund managers nor mutual fund investors are grossly underexposed to equities.







Given the understanding of the aggregated prescience of mutual fund investors as indicated in the previously hyperlinked article, we decided to run the analysis a bit deeper. We regressed the broad allocation to money market funds against the broad allocation to equity funds, finding exactly what we expected to find: an obvious and statistically tight negative relationship (i.e. “risk on/risk off”). Furthermore, we looked at the residual of the latest data point (2011) to see if A) it implied whether equities were over/under allocated to with respect to the model and B) by how much. In short, this analysis suggests that according to the weight of mutual fund investors’ allocations to money market funds (i.e. cash), they are underweight equities by -730bps in their portfolios – a fair amount (-0.9 standard deviations to be exact), but not nearly as underweight as they were in the late ‘80s/early ‘90s ahead of that bull market in US stocks.






All told, while there is certainly room to return to prior peaks in equity allocations, the notion that investors and fund managers are massively underweight equities and, thus, are poised to materially ramp up their exposure to this asset class is more than likely a gross overstatement.


“The US is not headed for a Japanese-like financial market outcome(s), largely because we continue to have favorable demographics, whereas Japan does not.”

***We attribute much credit for the following analysis to our Healthcare team, led by Managing Director, Tom Tobin. To the extent you like what you see below and would like to trial their research, please email .


While perhaps not as acute as the gaping bi-partisan leadership void in Washington D.C., the US’s demographic headwinds can be considered equally as problematic as it relates to the long-term health of the US economy. To arrive at this conclusion, we initially source a 2007 paper from The Review of Economics and Statistics that strongly demonstrates a consistent pattern of consumption throughout the human life cycle – specifically the presence of a steep hump with peak consumption typically occurring in the mid-to-late 40s due to changes in household size and makeup. Not surprisingly, we were able to document similar humps in the latest US census data, from both an income and expenditures perspective.






As it pertains to the most economically important cohort (i.e. people at/near peak earnings and peak consumption), YoY growth rates in this segment of the US population are set to remain negative through 2019 – after having turned negative for the first time since 1975 in 2008 (coincidence?). Needless to say, contraction here will continue to weigh on the US and global economy for quite some time. Specifically, by applying a demographic overlay (i.e. # of people per age bucket) to the income and expenditure data from the two charts above, we have created metrics that project total after-tax income and total consumer expenditures; YoY growth rates in both series are set to continue slowing though 2022.






In summary, we would agree with the view that the US does not have as negative a demographic outlook as has been repeatedly documented in Japan. That said, however, the US economy does have its own demographic challenges to contend with over the next 5-10 years, making a return to persistent rates of +2-3% real GDP growth an unlikely scenario over the long-term. Perhaps the trailing 10yr average of +1.6% is just about right. If that is, in fact, the most probable scenario, we’d argue that investors are NOT missing a generational opportunity to allocate funds to the equity market, as many perma-bull marketers would have you believe.


“Corporate profits – which have been outstanding of late – will ascend to even greater heights when the economy bounces back, rendering US equities substantially undervalued on a broad basis.”

This is arguably the easiest tenet of the long-term bull thesis to debunk and we’ve already completed a compendium of thoughtful work on the topic. In short, we certainly do commend the efforts of US corporates for being able to consistently generate margins at/near peak during such a challenging economic environment. Inclusive of this tipping of the hat, we’ve walked though the steps they’ve taken to achieve such lofty results in great detail and, needless to say, we are not completely impressed. Specifically, the broad-based trend of cost-cutting and negligible investment sets US corporate revenue growth to remain sluggish for the foreseeable future.


This is on top of incessant capital misallocation out of central planners across the globe, which is likely to perpetuate muted top line (i.e. GDP) expansion from a macroeconomic perspective for the foreseeable future.


In short, we find it unreasonable for investors to expect anything but weak sales growth, given that instead of investing in their businesses, companies are using capital to buy back stock with the hopes of juicing earnings. We don’t see how that is sustainable from a long-term perspective. By all means, email us if you disagree.


The following research notes provide the analyses upon which we have formulated these conclusions: 

  • HAVE US CORPORATE EARNINGS GONE TOO FAR? (JUL 20): “When analyzed outside the vacuum of short-termism associated with quarterly reporting, US corporate profit margins appear particularly overstretched – from both an operational and a social perspective. This has potentially dire implications for corporate earnings growth over the long term.”
  • ARE  US EQUITIES SUFFERING FROM COGNITIVE DISSONANCE? (AUG 8): “We see a similar see a similar pattern in consensus storytelling and a similarly-asymmetric price setup as we did in the previous occurrences of our being bearish at cyclical tops in the US equity market and “risky assets” broadly (1Q08, 1Q10, 1Q11, 1Q12).”
  • THINKING OUT LOUD RE: GLOBAL GROWTH (AUG 10): “New data points, including negative revisions to the official growth forecasts out of Singapore and Hong Kong, affirm our bearish conviction on the slope of global growth with respect the intermediate-term TREND duration. Applying a longer-term lens, would argue that the incessant policy responses out of the global central planning cartel over the last ~5yrs have set us up for broadly weak economic fundamentals for the foreseeable future.” 

All told, while you may not agree with our ultimate conclusion that the US and other global equity markets are likely to head south over the intermediate term, we do think it’s important to help you contextualize the key top-down economic debates as you ponder the bottom-up exposures in your portfolios. In that regard, we find that three of the most central tenets of the structural bull thesis on US equities are substantially weaker than they are likely being perceived by popular consensus.


Darius Dale

Senior Analyst


Takeaway: If $DRI breaks $51.56, look out below. Industry data are not hinting at any sales recovery in casual dining.

Keith added a short position in Darden Restaurants (DRI) to the Hedgeye Virtual Portfolio today.  As we discuss below, our fundamental view on the stock, along with recent industry data, corroborates with his quantitative view of the stock.  For our recent Darden Black Book, please email us.


Quantitative Setup


Darden is immediate-term TRADE overbought with TREND support at $51.56.  If that line does not hold, the stock will likely drop to the low $40’s in short order.





Fundamental Perspective

Our view on Darden is predicated on the company’s focus on growth at a time when its two most important revenue drivers (Olive Garden and Red Lobster) are producing sustained traffic declines.  Multi-brand restaurant companies typically historically encounter difficulty when attempting to grow brands with weak fundamentals.  The company is using its balance sheet to grow what are currently poorly performing concepts.  Should the dividend come under threat, we believe that could force an entire constituency of shareholders to reconsider their positions.  Below are some of the concerns we have about Darden from a fundamental perspective:

  • Anemic sales trends at Olive Garden, Red Lobster
  • Focusing on growth rather than remedying issues at OG & RL
  • Capex growth outstripping sales growth
  • The company is burning cash
  • Maintaining the dividend, growth profile, and operating margins not possible with current fundamentals
  • Difficult macro outlook is not encouraging
  • Absent a resurrection in sales trends, we believe downside in stock is significant (to $43)


Industry Data Shows No Resurrection in Sales


We are non-believers in an Olive Garden or Red Lobster sales resurrection.  Industry data is indicating that no such sales recovery is happening. 


Malcolm Knapp released his estimates for July's Knapp Track Casual Dining Same-Restaurant Sales Index. Comparable sales grew 0.6% versus July '11 while traffic declined -1.8%.  On a sequential basis from June, July’s estimates imply a sequential deceleration in two year average trends of -80bps and -45bps for comps and guest counts, respectively.  This is not encouraging for Olive Garden or Red Lobster, both of which have had difficulty growing guest counts versus the industry over the last few years.


The Black Box Intelligence casual dining same-store sales data also implied a slowdown, on a sequential basis, in growth from June to July.  Comparable sales growth in July was 0.8% while traffic declined -1% year-over-year compared to the -0.6% slowdown in June.  


Our takeaway from the Knapp Track data is that a sales pick up at Olive Garden and Red Lobster is unlikely.  The Black Box data seems to be confirming this, from an industry standpoint, and we remain bearish on Darden at this price.



Howard Penney

Managing Director


Rory Green




Idea Alert: UA

Takeaway: Recent bearish developments won't impact UA's numbers near-term. We still like it long.


Keith added UA to the long side of the Hedgeye Virtual Portfolio as a TRADE. The resignation of UA’s SVP of sourcing and the developments at JJB are not bullish, but they will not impact UA’s numbers near-term, nor do they pose enough of a challenge to offset the company’s ability to capture the long-term opportunity before it. We’ll buy on red. Though this is one of our favorite TAIL ideas, look for us to keep a TRADE a TRADE on this one.


Idea Alert: UA - UA TTT


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