- The double whammy. The cost differential in manufacturing a garment is about 15 to 1 domestic/offshore. This was a clear boom for the US apparel industry. But people often look past the impact on existing import prices during an excess capacity/deflationary input cost environment. Factory owners locked up multi-year deals with US brands and retailers at fire-sale rates to ensure factories did not run idle. The bottom line is that 2-3% annual import price reductions combined with a 3-point average annual increase in the import ratio resulted in unprecedented cost savings for the industry. Our math suggests about $4-5bn, or about 3 points of margin per year.
- Where'd the money go?? About 70% of the cash was passed through to consumers to stimulate demand. The other portion padded industry margins. The key call-out here is that pricing came down, per capita consumption rose dramatically, and margins went UP. We can't find many examples in other industries where pricing comes down and margins go up. This industry had lots of cake and ate it all.
- Now what? 1) The import ratio just hit 99%. Ouch! Not much room to go there. 2) Apparel import costs are rising at the greatest rate since 1992. Unless oil is going back to $50, this industry has a lasting problem. Ouch again!
The timing bugs us. 2 weeks prior, Barron's ran a positive story (citing management) which highlighted the growth, but glossed over the risks on the cost side of the equation. The bigger timing issue is the 3.6mm shares that CEO Chamandy sold in 4Q for $147mm. We don't have a huge problem with executive stock sales - as it is within their right to diversify in a prudent and responsible fashion. But this sale was near the top, and just as pressures in the businesses started to build. The $147mm in proceeds is one thing, but the $70mm in loss avoidance is another. We wish the investing public at the other end of the trade had the same insight.
- YUM's U.S. business has performed poorly and management does not hold out any hope that things will improve anytime soon. Management echoed previous commentary regarding its disappointment with the U.S. business, and it also seemed to indicate that a fundamental improvement in trends would not occur in the near term, given that many initiatives will be rolled out over '08 and well into '09. Consistent with continued negative same-store sales growth, U.S. EBIT continues to decline, despite the resilience of a highly franchised model.
- Recently, management suggested that it is looking to mirror MCD's success by leveraging its current asset base, with more innovative menu offerings, daypart expansions (breakfast, late-night), and an even better value proposition. Many of the new offerings (Taco Bell's Fresco Healthy Line, Pizza Hut's Tuscani Pastas, and KFC's Grilled Chicken) appear enticing, yet will take time to roll out across the system. In our view, the new product pipeline does not address the structural issues associated with an old out-dated asset base.
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Yum's China division operates the leading chain restaurant company in China
- We estimate that both concepts are running better than 3% pricing. P4 comparisons are easy for both chains.
- Carl's Jr has seen a nice rebound despite its California concentration.
- Hardee's is clearly experiencing a slower sales environment.
- We believe that investors have a reason to be concerned about the level of G&A spending at the company. As seen in Chart 1, since 2002 CKE restaurants system-wide store count has declined by 8.2%.
- The company has stated publically that its incremental spending in G&A per store is around $20,000 to $24,000 per year. Therefore, given the decline in the system-wide store base, G&A should be $5-7 million lower form the levels seen in 2003.
- Despite the system-wide store count declining by 8%, G&A per store has increased 39.8%
The total percentage of successful long and short trading signals since the inception of Real-Time Alerts in August of 2008.
LONG SIGNALS 80.38%
SHORT SIGNALS 78.41%