

ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHICS OUTLOOK



September 20, 2018

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ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC OUTLOOK, Q3 2018

□ Demography

- U.S. Fertility
- U.S. Mortality
- U.S. Net Immigration
- Global Trends

☐ Employment, Productivity, & Income

- Employment & Wages
- GDP & Productivity
- Income & Poverty

☐ Housing, Healthcare, Millennials, and Midterms

- Housing
- Healthcare
- Millennial Risk Aversion (Update)
- 2018 Midterms

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U.S. FERTILITY DECLINE ACCELERATING

12-Month Ending General Fertility Rate* (Q1 2015 to Q1 2018**)




^{* &}quot;General fertility rate" is the total number of live births per 1,000 women age 15-49 in the population in a given year.

^{**} Provisional estimates for Q1 2018.


UNDER AGE 30 DRIVING ALL THE DECLINE

U.S. Quarterly 12-Month Ending Birthrates by Age (Q1 2016 to Q1 2018)



BRIEF FERTILITY RISE IN 2014... WAS A HEAD FAKE


Total Fertility Rate* (2005-2017)




^{* &}quot;Total fertility rate" is the theoretical total number of children who would be born per woman if she were to pass through each year of life (15-49) bearing children according to the current schedule of age-specific fertility rates.

SPENDING AND BABIES LATELY PARTING WAYS

% YOY Change: Real Monthly PCE vs. Annual TFR Lagged by 9 Months (2005 to Present)




MILLENNIAL "FERTILITY PLATEAU" IS... OVER



Total fertility has fallen **29% from** 1970 to 2017. We remain above the record 1976 low (during the Gen-X "baby bust"). But not by much.


BIRTHRATES PLUMMETING UNDER AGE 25

U.S. Birthrates by Age of Mother (Decade Intervals)



\$ CONCERNS WEIGH ON U.S. YOUNG ADULTS

Why Americans Are Having Fewer Children Than Their Ideal Number* (2018)



^{*} Includes U.S. adults ages 20 to 45 who have/expect to have fewer children than they consider ideal.

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MORTALITY NOW RISING YEAR OVER YEAR

3-Month Ending Age-Adjusted Mortality Rate (Q1 2016 to Q1 2018*)




Mortality is rising again—both on an absolute and YoY basis.

* Provisional estimates for Q1 2018.

MORTALITY ON A LONG TERM DECLINE...

Annual Age-Adjusted Mortality Rate Per 100,000 (1968 to Q1 2018*)




Though the age-adjusted mortality rate has been on a long-term downward slope, lately that slope has flattened.

^{*} Values projected for 2017 and 2018.

... BUT THAT DECLINE HAS BEEN ARRESTED

Annual Age-Adjusted Mortality Rate Per 100,000 (2005 to 2018*)




If current trends persist, the U.S. mortality rate will be higher in 2018 than it was in 2012...

* Values projected for 2017 and 2018.

WE'RE IN PRECARIOUS HISTORICAL TERRITORY

Annual Age-Adjusted Mortality Rate Per 100,000 (1900 to 2018*)




...The last such six-year stretch of no mortality progress came back when Eisenhower was president.


* Values projected for 2017 and 2018.

OPIOID EPIDEMIC SPREADING EVERYWHERE...

U.S. Drug Overdose Deaths Per 100,000 Population 1999 2016




...AND STILL NOT SLOWING DOWN



ALL AGE BRACKETS UNDER 65 TAKING PART

U.S. Drug Overdose Death Rate by Age Group (1999 to 2016)



% Increase in Drug Death Rate, 1999-2016:

age 15-24: 288%

age 25-34: 327%


age 35-44: 150%

age 45-54: 211%

(age 55-64: **510%**)

PRESCRIPTION CLAMPDOWN ISN'T WORKING YET


Number of Opioid Prescriptions vs. Number of Drug Overdose Deaths (2006 to 2018*)



^{*} Drug overdose deaths for 2017 and 2018 ESTIMATED using 12-month ending monthly provisional counts.


TODAY'S EPIDEMIC EXCEEDS MOST PRECEDENTS






80,000


BROADER "DESPAIR" EPIDEMIC: MIDLIFE WHITES





POPULATION AGING = MORE CHRONIC DISEASES


Distribution of Cause of Death by Age



CHRONIC DISEASE RATE BY AGE IS ALSO RISING

Women

Prevalence of Two or More of Nine Selected Chronic Conditions Amung Adults Age 45+ (1999-2000 vs. 2009-2010)



10


Total

Men

45-64

Women

Prevalence of the Three Most Common Combinations of the Nine Selected Chronic Conditions (1999-2000 vs. 2009-2010)




Age in years

Total

65 and over

BOOMERS NOT AS HEALTHY IN MIDLIFE

Share of Respondents Reporting Various Health Conditions




RECENT MORTALITY RISES REVEAL PATTERNS


Age-Adjusted Death Rates for 10 Leading Causes of Death (Selected Years)



BOOMERS & XERS: RISING HEALTH INEQUALITY

Widening Boomer Spread in Mortality by Income (2000 to 2015)






GAIN IN LIFE EXPECTANCY AT AGE 40, 2000-2015:

HIGHEST INCOME QUARTILE: +3.00 YEARS (MEN), +3.45 YEARS (WOMEN)

LOWEST INCOME QUARTILE: +1.20 YEARS (MEN), +1.50 YEARS (WOMEN)

U.S. LIFE EXPECTANCY LAGGING BEHIND...


Life Expectancy at Birth for Selected High-Income Countries (1960 to 2016)




...DESPITE HUGE ADVANTAGE IN HEALTHCARE \$

Life Expectancy vs. Health Expenditures





2017 (or latest year available)



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
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
IMMIGRATION PROJECTIONS RATCHETING DOWN...

Annual Net Immigration: History and Projections (1930 to 2060)




ECON RECOVERY SURGE APPEARS TO BE LARGELY LEGAL


Change in Net Immigration by Type* (2011 to 2016)




^{* &}quot;Other" includes categories such as diplomats and other representatives; transit aliens; Legal Immigration Family Equity Act; and unknown.


SINCE 2006, ILLEGAL INFLUX ESSENTIALLY NETS AT ZERO






SINCE 2010, ENTERING ASIANS OUTNUMBER LATINS





FUTURE POP GROWTH DEPENDS MAINLY ON IMMIGRATION





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
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THE GREAT GLOBAL FERTILITY COOLDOWN





Top 5 Countries by Population and 2015 Fertility Grouping

Very High (>4.0)

- l. Nigeria
- 2. Ethiopia
- Democratic Republic of Congo
- 4. United Republic of Tanzania
- 5. Kenva

Above Replacement (2.1 - 4.0)

- India
- Indonesia
- B. Pakistan
- 4. Bangladesh
- 5. Mexico

Below Replacement (1.5 – 2.1)

- 1. China
- 2. United States
- 3. Brazil
- 4. Russia
- 5. Vietnam


Very Low (<1.5)

- 1. Japan
- 2. Germany
- 3. Italy
- 4. South Korea
- 5. Spain

^{* &}quot;Very high fertility" refers to a TFR above 4.0. "Above Replacement" refers to a TFR between 2.1 and 4.0. "Below Replacement" refers to a TFR of less than 2.1 but at least 1.5. "Very Low Fertility" refers to a TFR of less than 1.5.


SINCE 2007, U.S. TFR FALLS OUT OF 1ST PLACE

Total Fertility Rates by Country (2000 to 2016)




RECENT FERTILITY GAINERS AND LOSERS

Change in TFR by Period for Selected Countries



HISTORY OF U.S. "RELATIVE FERTILITY" SINCE 1960


TFR: U.S. vs. Rest of Developed World** (1960 to 2016)



^{**} As designated by CIA The World Factbook.

A GLIMPSE INTO OUR LOWER-FERTILITY FUTURE?


Age-Specific Birthrates by Country (Latest Year*)



^{*} Uses latest annual data for each country. U.S. figures are from 2017; all other figures are from 2016.


JAPANESE TRYING AN UNDER-30 COMEBACK

Japanese Birthrates by Age of Mother (Various Years)




RUSSIAN FERTILITY MAKES STRONGER COMEBACK

Russian Birthrates by Age of Mother (Various Years)



BUT GOOD NEWS MAY HIT DEMOGRAPHIC CLIFF


Russia: TFR vs. Total Number of Births (2005 to 2017*)



^{*} Estimated number of births for 2017 comes from Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Final TFR for 2016 comes from World Bank.


1990S BIRTH DEARTH MAY NIX POP GROWTH...

Russia: Live Births vs. Deaths (1946 to 2016)




...DESPITE GREAT PROGRESS ON DEATH RATES

Russia: Deaths from External Causes (1990 to 2012)



U.S., RUSSIA, AND JAPAN COMPARED

Birthrates by Country and Age of Mother (Latest Year*)



^{*} Uses latest annual data for each country. U.S. figures are from 2017; Russian figures are from 2016; Japanese figures are from 2015.

HOW NATIONS ARE ENCOURAGING PROCREATION

Recently Instituted Pronatalist Policies by Country


Policy	Participating Countries				
"Baby Bonuses"	Australia, Canada, France, Poland, Russia, Singapore				
"Baby Bonuses" Plus Monthly Stipends	South Korea				
Tax Breaks	Singapore				
Subsidized Child Care	Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden				
Enhanced Family Leave	Czech Republic, Singapore				
State-Sponsored Matchmaking	Japan				
Civic Marketing and Awards	Denmark, Hungary, Russia, Singapore				
Other Perks*	Russia, Singapore				
Tighter Abortion and Divorce Laws	China				

^{*} Includes miscellaneous perks such as preferential housing, raffles for new parents, etc.

Source: EURACTIV (2011), Smithsonian (2012), Slate (2013), The Washington Post (2014), BBC (2015), The Economist (2015), DW News (2018), The New York Times (2018), The Wall Street Journal (2018)


FERTILITY IN EUROPE

TFR: U.S. vs. Europe (1960 to 2016)



EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN EUROPE


20-64 Pop. Projections*: U.S. vs. Europe (Index: 100 = 2000)



^{*} Uses U.N. Population Division "constant-fertility variant."


FERTILITY IN EAST ASIA & PACIFIC

TFR: U.S. vs. East Asia & Pacific (1960 to 2016)



EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN EAST ASIA & PACIFIC


20-64 Pop. Projections*: U.S. vs. East Asia & Pacific (Index: 100 = 2000)



^{*} Uses U.N. Population Division "constant-fertility variant."


FERTILITY IN LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN

TFR: U.S. vs. Latin America & Caribbean (1960 to 2016)



EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA


20-64 Pop. Projections*: U.S. vs. Latin America & Caribbean (Index: 100 = 2000)



^{*} Uses U.N. Population Division "constant-fertility variant."


FERTILITY IN SOUTH & CENTRAL ASIA

TFR: U.S. vs. South & Central Asia (1960 to 2016)



EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN SOUTH & CENTRAL ASIA


20-64 Pop. Projections: U.S. vs. South & Central Asia (Index: 100 = 2000)



^{*} Uses U.N. Population Division "constant-fertility variant."


FERTILITY IN MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

TFR: U.S. vs. Middle East & North Africa Region (1960 to 2016)



EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST


20-64 Pop. Projections: U.S. vs. Middle East & North Africa (Index: 100 = 2000)



^{*} Uses U.N. Population Division "constant-fertility variant."


FERTILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

TFR: U.S. vs. Sub-Saharan Africa (1960 to 2016)



EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

20-64 Pop. Projections: U.S. vs. Sub-Saharan Africa (Index: 100 = 2000)



Uses U.N. Population Division Constant-Tertility Variant.

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
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
EMPLOYMENT STILL WAY OUTPACING POP. GROWTH


U.S. Population Age 20-64: CPS and CES Employment Growth Rates (1990 to 2030)




AGE-ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT ALMOST ALL THE WAY BACK

Effect of Population Composition on Employment-Population Ratio (Jan-02 to Aug-18)






Men							
	All	16-24	25-34	35-44			
Distance from 2007	-3.7%	-5.3%	-2.4%	-0.9%			
% Recovered from 2010 to 2007	39.5%	44.9%	70.0%	82.8%			
% of Total Employment	53.1%	11.4%	23.0%	21.4%			
Women							
	All	16-24	25-34	35-44			
Distance from 2007	-1.8%	-2.4%	+1.8%	-0.3%			
% Recovered from 2010 to 2007	40.7%	64.1%	155.1%	92.0%			



Men							
	45-54	55-64	65-74	75+			
Distance from 2007	-1.1%	+2.2%	+2.9%	+2.4%			
% Recovered from 2010 to 2007	81.3%	172.5%	N/A	N/A			
% of Total Employment	20.5%	17.1%	5.3%	1.3%			
Women							
	45-54	55-64	65-74	75+			
Distance from 2007	-0.4%	+0.4%	+2.0%	+1.1%			
% Recovered from 2010 to 2007	84.9%	308.7%	N/A	N/A			
% of Total Employment	21.1%	17.1%	4.9%	1.0%			

TOTAL COMPENSATION GROWING FASTER THAN WAGES


Employment Cost Index vs. Average Hourly Earnings: YoY Change (Mar-07 to Aug-18)



^{*} Employment Cost Index includes wages, salaries, and employer costs for employee benefits.


BENEFITS RISING AS A SHARE OF COMPENSATION

Quarterly Employer Costs for Employee Compensation, by Type of Compensation (Q1 2004 to Q1 2018)



JOB HOPPERS AND NONCOLLEGE GAINING ON PACK

YoY Wage Growth* by Education Level (Jan-98 to Jul-18)



^{*} From the Atlanta Wage Growth Tracker, which measures the nominal wage growth of a fixed group of individuals using Current Population Survey microdata.

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
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO GDP GROWTH?

U.S. GDP: Trailing 10-YR CAGR (1962 to 2017)



WHATEVER HAPPENED TO GDP GROWTH?


Fundamental GDP Growth* vs. Actual GDP Growth: Trailing 10-YR CAGR (1962 to 2017)



^{*} Fundamental GDP growth = 10-YR trailing productivity CAGR multiplied by YOY working-age population growth rate.

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO GDP GROWTH?


Fundamental GDP Growth* vs. Actual GDP Growth: Trailing 10-YR CAGR (1962 to 2017)



^{*} Fundamental GDP growth = 10-YR trailing productivity CAGR multiplied by YOY working-age population growth rate.

WHERE WE'RE HEADING

Fundamental GDP Growth* vs. Actual GDP Growth: Trailing 10-YR CAGR (1962 to 2050**)




^{*} Fundamental GDP growth = 10-YR trailing productivity CAGR multiplied by YOY working-age population growth rate.

^{**} Outyear projections assume a constant 2017 10-YR trailing productivity rate.

^{^ 2018} forecasts for 2027. Exceptions: "longer run" for Fed; and 2023 for IMF

THE PRODUCTIVITY BUST: A CLOSE-UP VIEW

Quarterly U.S. Nonfarm Business Sector Real Output Per Hour, YoY, 5 YR Moving Average (1952 to Q2 2018)



YES, THE PRODUCTIVITY DECLINE IS REAL


Is the productivity decline a mirage due to mismeasurement of technology gains? Most economists (see the extensive Brookings research on this question) believe it is not.

The decline occurred, after 2005, just as much IT production was being moved offshore.

What's more, even countries producing little IT are experiencing a similar decline.

If the gains of IT have been underestimated (and inflation has been overestimated), few Americans believe this compensates for the deceleration of real incomes and national living standards. (See chart.)

"Are You Better Off Than You Were Eight Years Ago?"




DRIVERS OF PRODUCTIVITY DECELERATION

WHAT'S DRIVING THE SLOWDOWN?
☐ Poor Macro Performance/Policy Uncertainty (in wake of GFC)
☐ Inadequate Investment & Infrastructure (Alan Blinder)
☐ Sectoral Failure of Success ("Baumol's Cost Disease")
☐ Disappearance of Low-Hanging Fruit (Robert Gordon)
☐ Declining Business Dynamism (startups, mobility, risk appetite, & more

UNPRECEDENTED DROPOFF IN CAPITAL INTENSITY


Annual U.S. Capital Intensity* Growth, YoY, 5YR Moving Average (1953 to 2017)



^{* &}quot;Capital Intensity" refers to the amount of capital services used to produce output, relative to the amount of labor hours used. Increases in capital intensity mean that more capital is being used per worker throughout the economy.

HIGH-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS SHRINKING

BAUMOL'S COST
DISEASE:
AGRICULTURE,
MINING, &
MANUFACTURING
FROM 75% TO 10%
OF EMPLOYMENT




WHAT IS DECLINING BUSINESS DYNAMISM?

Nine indicators of declining business dynamism

- 1) declining rates of job creation and destruction
- 2) declining rates of job churn and geographic mobility
- 3) declining rates of company start-ups and firm turnover
- 4) declining number of total firms and (especially) listed firms
- 5) growing age and size of typical firm
- 6) declining turnover/turbulence in S&P 100 giants
- 7) weakening firm response to productivity gaps
- 8) rising market concentration
- 9) a widening divide between industry winners and losers

ACCELERATING SLIDE IN GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY


One-Year Mover Rate* by Origination (Selected Years)



^{*} Describes the share of the population age 1 and older that moved during the stated year.

JOB TURNOVER AT AN ALL-TIME LOW

Annual Job Reallocation Rate*^ (1977 to 2015)




^{*} Job reallocation rate is calculated by adding together job creation rate and job destruction rate.

[^] Covers U.S. domestic firms of all types (corporations, LLCs, partnerships), excluding only sole proprietorships and the unincorporated self-employed.

FIRM TURNOVER NEAR AN ALL-TIME LOW


Annual "Firm Reallocation Rate" (1977 to 2015)*^



^{*} Firm reallocation rate is calculated by adding together firm startup rate and firm exit rate.


[^] U.S. domestic firms of all types (corporations, LLCs, partnerships), excluding only sole proprietorships and the unincorporated self-employed.

MARKET CONCENTRATION RISING




THE RISE OF GLOBAL "SUPERSTAR" FIRMS

Index: Manufacturing Sector Productivity by Firm Tier* (0 = 2001)




Index: Services Sector Productivity by Firm Tier* (0 = 2001)



^{* &}quot;Frontier firms" are the 100 most productive global firms in each sector. "Non-frontier firms" is the average of all other firms.

POST-GFC PRODUCTIVITY SLUMP IS A GLOBAL TREND

Average Annual Productivity Growth by Period



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
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U.S. MEDIAN INCOME FLAT SINCE DOT-COM BOOM


U.S. Real Median Household Income* (1947 to 2017)



^{*} Income in 2017 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars.


BOOMERS RULE: NO \$ GROWTH FOR XERS & MILLENNIALS


U.S. Real Median Income* by Age of Household (100 = 1999)



^{*} Income in 2017 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars.


MANY MILLENNIALS EARNING LESS THAN THEIR PARENTS





^{*} Represents the share of each cohort earning less at age 30 than their parents did at the same age.


DEATH IN THE MIDDLE OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION



^{* &}quot;Middle income" refers to adults whose annual household income is two-thirds to double the national median.

AGE 75+: BIGGEST \$ GAINERS, 2013 TO 2016

Real Median Family Net Worth* by Age (2013 vs. 2016)



^{*} In 2016 dollars.

MIDLIFE FLOUNDERS, LATE LIFE PROSPERS


Real Median Family Net Worth* by Age (1983 to 2016)



^{*} In 2016 dollars.


YOUNG RULE IN NUMBERS, OLD RULE IN DOLLARS

Adult Population & Household Net Worth (% of Total), by Generation (2016)





AN AGE REVERSAL ON POVERTY RATES

Share of Individuals Below Federal Poverty Line, by Age (1959 to 2017)



BRANDS GO ALL OUT FOR THE AGING CONSUMER












GRANDPARENTS LOOSEN THE PURSE STRINGS

Share of Grandparents Who Provide the Following Sources of Financial Support to Grandchildren Annually



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
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
HOUSING STARTS WELL BELOW PREVIOUS PEAKS

Quarterly U.S. Housing Starts (Q1 1959 to Q1 2018)




ADULT POPULATION GROWTH SLOWING DOWN

Annual Growth Rate of U.S. Adult Population, History and Projections (1959 to 2030)




HH FORMATION LESS THAN POP. GROWTH

Population and Households Total Index (100 = 2003)




AVERAGE HH SIZE: NO LONGER FALLING

Average Adults (18+) Per Housing Unit (1948 to 2017)



AVERAGE HH SIZE: STARTING TO RISE AGAIN

Adults Per Occupied Housing Unit, History: 1990 to 2017




BEHAVIOR DRAGGING DOWN HH FORMATION

Cumulative Households Lost Due to Behavior Change Since 2007



HH FORMATION: HUGE DECLINES < AGE 55

Change in Number of Households by Cause (2007-2017)



THE MILLENNIAL CO-LIVING BOOM

- Common
- Ollie
- WeLive
- PMGx
- OpenDoor
- HubHaus














MILLENNIALS: RETURNING TO THE NEST

Record share of 25- to 34-year-olds living in parents' home

Share of U.S. young adults (ages 18-34) living in their parent(s)' home, by age




Note: "Living in parent(s)" home" means residing in a household headed by a parent regardless of the young adult's partnership status.

Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of the 1880-2000 U.S. decennial censuses and the 2006-2014 American Community Surveys (IPUMS).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Young men consistently more likely to live with a parent than young women, with few exceptions

% of 18- to 34-year-olds living in parent(s)' home




Note: "Living in parent(s)" home" means residing in a household headed by a parent regardless of the young adult's partnership status. Whites, blacks, Asians, and American Indian include only those who are not Hispanics are of any race. Asians include Pacific Islanders. American Indians include Alaska Natives. Hispanic identity was not ascertained before 1980.

Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of the 1880-2000 U.S. decennial censuses and 2010 and 2014 American Community Surveys (IPLIMS)

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

BOOMERS FUELING ALL HOUSEHOLD GROWTH

Index: Number of Households by Age of Household Head (100 = 2007)




BOOMERS FUELING ALL HOUSEHOLD GROWTH

Number of Households by Age of Householder and % Growth (2007 to 2017)

	Total	Under 25	25-29	30-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	75+
Number of Households (2007)	116.0m	6.7m	9.7m	9.8m	22.8m	24.1m	19.3m	11.9m	11.8m
Number of Households (2017)	126.2m	6.2m	9.5m	10.6m	21.5m	22.8m	23.8m Boomer	18.2m • Impact	13.6m
% Growth	+8.8%	-7.5%	-2.1%	+8.2%	-5.7%	-5.4%	+23.3%	+52.9%	+15.3%

HH FORMATION: IT COULD GET EVEN WORSE

YoY Household Growth: History and Projections (2004 to 2030)



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
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
HEALTH CARE PREMIUM COSTS STILL RISING


Average Annual Family Premium Per Employee Enrolled in Employer-Based Health Care (2013 to 2017)



TOTAL HC COSTS GROWING... MORE SLOWLY







^{*} MMI is an actuarial analysis of the projected total cost of health care for a hypothetical family of four covered by an employer-sponsored PPO plan.

HAS HC SPENDING PLATEAUED AS A % OF GDP?



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
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
YOUTH RISK-TAKING WAY DOWN

Share of High Schoolers Who Reported Engaging in Various Risk-Taking Behaviors (1991 to 2017)




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MILLENNIALS DRIVING DOWN ENTREPRENEURSHIP...


U.S. Entrepreneurship Rate* by Age (1996 to 2016)



^{*} Defined as individuals that do not own a business in the survey month that start a business in the following month as a share of the population. Uses a broader definition of "business" than U.S. Census Bureau. Survey group includes U.S. adults age 20-64.

... WHICH IS DOWN FOR YOUNG, BUT UP FOR OLD

Age Gradient of New Entrepreneurs* (1996 vs. 2016)



^{*} Defined as individuals that do not own a business in the survey month that start a business in the following month as a share of the population. Uses a broader definition of "business" than U.S. Census Bureau. Survey group includes U.S. adults age 20-64.

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
☐ Employment, Productivity, & Income


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
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
DEMOCRATS' HOUSE ODDS HIGH AND RISING





REPUBLICANS STILL A SAFE BET FOR THE SENATE





PLEASE SUBMIT QUESTIONS* TO

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