



# CANADIAN HOUSING UPDATE

# **THESIS REFRESH + EMERGING THEMES**

April 24<sup>th</sup>, 2019

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### PLEASE SUBMIT QUESTIONS\* TO

# QA@HEDGEYE.COM

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# **HEDGEYE FINANCIALS POSITION MONITOR**

INVES	STMENT IDEAS - LONG								
Ticker	Name	Price	N	1kt Cap (M)	3M.	ADV (M)	S.I. (%Float) Mar-12-19'	DTC Mar-12-19'	Rating Distribution (Buy - Hold - Sell)
V	Visa Inc.	\$154.25	\$	328,566	\$1	,275	2%	3.3	37 - 2 - 1
CFG	Citizens Bank	\$ 31.94	\$	14,705	\$	171	2%	2.4	19 - 3 - 0
CACC	Credit Acceptance Corp.	\$444.09	\$	8,426	\$	41	8%	13.6	0 - 6 - 3
WRLD	World Acceptance Corp.	\$114.14	\$	1,098	\$	9	9%	14.7	0 - 1 - 3

LONG	BENCH								
Ticker	Name	Price		Mkt Cap (M)	зм	ADV (M)	S.I. (%Float) Mar-12-19'	DTC Mar-12-19'	Rating Distribution (Buy - Hold - Sell)
MA	Mastercard inc.	\$231.57	\$2	34,867	\$	781	1%	2.2	38 - 3 - 1
RLGY	Realogy Holdings Corp.	\$ 11.74	\$	1,341	\$	36	23%	8.9	1 - 4 - 3
RMAX	RE/MAX Holdings Inc.	\$ 38.00	\$	1,300	\$	6	5%	6.8	4 - 4 - 1

INVES	STMENT IDEAS - SHORT	Г							
Ticker	Name	Price	N	1kt Cap (M)	3M	ADV (M)	S.I. (%Float) Mar-12-19'	DTC Mar-12-19'	Rating Distribution (Buy - Hold - Sell)
RDFN	Redfin Corporation	\$ 20.41	\$	1,847	\$	19	26%	13.5	5 - 5 - 4
AUSTR	RALIAN HOUSING:								
WBC	Westpac Banking Corp.	\$ 25.95	\$	89,464	\$	157	NA	NA	6 - 5 - 4
СВА	CW Bank of Australia	\$ 70.84	\$	125,404	\$	221	NA	NA	3 - 9 - 4
ANZ	Australia and NZ Bank	\$ 25.94	\$	73,493	\$	147	NA	NA	7 - 5 - 2
NAB	National Australia Bank	\$ 25.04	\$	70,395	\$	141	NA	NA	7 - 6 - 1
CANA	DIAN HOUSING:								
MIC	Genworth MI Canada	\$ 40.20	\$	3,521	\$	8	5%	12.5	3 - 3 - 1
NA	National Bank of Canada	\$ 60.99	\$	20,467	\$	83	2%	4.8	2 - 10 - 1
СМ	CIBC	\$107.13	\$	47,545	\$	158	2%	10.0	6 - 5 - 2
RY	Royal Bank of Canada	\$102.15	\$	146,624	\$	298	0%	3.8	7 - 4 - 2
CWB	Canadian Western Bank	\$ 28.47	\$	2,510	\$	8	2%	5.8	3 - 7 - 2
PRAA	PRA Group	\$ 26.76	\$	1,213	\$	10	18%	12.5	2 - 7 - 0
ECPG	Encore Capital Group	\$ 27.03	\$	835	\$	7	24%	32.6	7 - 2 - 0
CARDS	5:								
COF	Capital One	\$ 80.48	\$	37,653	\$	231	1%	2.5	16 - 5 - 2
AXP	American Express	\$108.87	\$	91,314	\$	375	1%	2.6	12 - 16 - 1
01105									

SHO	RT BENCH						
Ticker	Name	Price	Mkt Cap (M)	3M ADV (M)	S.I. (%Float) Mar-12-19'	DTC Mar-12-19'	Rating Distribution (Buy - Hold - Sell)
BMO	Bank of Montreal	\$100.80	\$ 64,351	\$ 172	1%	5.4	4 - 7 - 2
BNS	Bank of Nova Scotia	\$ 70.74	\$ 86,721	\$ 204	1%	10.1	5 - 7 - 1
TD	Toronto-Dominion Bank	\$ 73.03	\$133,854	\$ 276	0%	11.4	9 - 3 - 1

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### **OVERVIEW**



#### **THESIS RECAP**

A review of the prevailing set of financial system instabilities born out of the unprecedented interdependence between housing-related industries and the historical sustenance of the broader Canadian economy.




### LAST TWELVE MONTHS IN REVIEW

An updated summary and analysis of the major Canadian housing finance policies and regional regulatory measures enacted over the last 12 months, paired with a contextualized review of regional housing data (Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal).



#### EMERGING THEMES

An overview of emerging themes and potential catalysts, including: the dampened outlook for an economy losing the thrust of its two historically dominant engines, the diminished competitive position from an improved and increasingly friendly U.S. business climate, a deterioration in household finances under the growing weight of burdensome debt loads, the significance of newly rising tensions in Canada-China relations, the relevance of the broader China short case, and growing alarm and public scrutiny over relaxed money laundering law.



# THESIS RECAP


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# **<u>90 SECOND RUNDOWN</u> OF THE CANADIAN HOUSING STORY**


- Unlike Canadian equities, the Canadian housing market has not experienced a major correction since the Toronto condo bubble of the 1980's

   with the fallout from the GFC largely mitigated by the government's rollout of the Insured Mortgage Purchase Program in 2008 and the
   economic tailwinds from the Chinese credit-fueled global commodity surge of 2009-2013.
- Removed from any recent memory of a major correction, housing transcended function and emerged as a lucrative asset class with a perceived return profile bolstered by:
  - Historically cheap and abundant financing
  - A principal residence exemption on capital gains taxation
  - · Land-use policies and geographical constraints restraining supply in two major Canadian housing markets
    - Greater Toronto Area: Greenbelt + Lake Ontario
    - <u>Metro Vancouver Area</u>: Agriculture Land Reserve + Sea, Mountains, Southern Border
  - A severely weakened CAD in the years following the end of the 2009-2013 commodities boom, creating a near 30% discount, exacerbated by a lack of transparency in
    property ownership, on Canadian real estate for holders of the effectively USD-pegged Yuan fearing a Chinese slowdown and policy-driven currency devaluation,
    culminating in a 1/3 depletion of China's liquid foreign reserves and an incremental pricing of Canadian real estate –the servicing of which was independent of income that
    was earned locally.
- As regional pricing appreciation took effect, giving way to contagion in surrounding regions, lucrative stories of quick flipping and large taxfree property-related gains spread throughout the market, sparking a reflexivity-inducing, speculative homebuyer psychology.
- Perceived wealth effects saw households augment consumption, consolidating unsecured, high interest debt and making increasing use of HELOCs, which, in tandem with increased residential structure investment, crystalized in an unprecedented interdependence between housing and the broader economy.
- While several regulatory measures have been enacted in the last 16-32 months to limit the availability of credit to overleveraged households and curb speculative activity, the prospect of engineering a soft landing appears seemingly dim.
- In sum, we argue that the level of domestic wealth creation is insufficient and incapable of sustaining the pace and upholding the elevated levels of Canadian real estate, setting up a troublesome unwind for the leverage and expectations built atop of it.

### SWELLING MORTGAGE DEBT



#### HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE DEBT




### HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE DEBT TO GDP

While total mortgage debt as a share of GDP has not yet reached the U.S. peak, it remains on a trajectory to do so.

### HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE DEBT INDEXED

Speaking to that trajectory, we can see that Canadian mortgage debt has thoroughly outpaced its U.S. equivalent in the years following the financial crisis.

### **ASSET PRICE INFLATION + HEAVY DEBT BURDEN**



#### CANADA VS. US HOME PRICES

In the years following the financial crisis, Canadian real estate has thoroughly outpaced its neighbor to the south. In particular, the run-up in Canadian housing has surpassed the level of appreciation seen in the U.S. from 2000-2007.

#### 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 © Hedgeve Risk Management Source: BEA, Federal Reserve, StatsCAN, Bank of Canada

12/31/2007, 135

12/31/2007. 11

#### HOUSEHOLD DEBT TO DISPOSABLE INCOME

12/31/2007, 1

Canadian household debt to income continues to move up and well ahead of the levels of its southern neighbor, even after adjusting U.S. incomes down for healthcare spending.


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
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2017

### DEBT SERVICE RATIO BIS






#### **CROSS-BORDER DIVERGENCE**

U.S. disposable income is likely not adjusted for healthcare spend, but this does not take away from the significant divergence in debt service ratios for U.S. and Canadian households.

### **BEYOND STRUCTURAL DISPARITY**

The delta clearly extends beyond structural differences in disposable income.

### DEBT SERVICE RATIO STATISTICS CANADA, FED COMPOSITION



#### **CROSS-BORDER DIVERGENCE**

U.S. disposable income is likely not adjusted for healthcare spend, but this does not take away from the significant divergence in debt service ratios for U.S. and Canadian households.

### **BEYOND STRUCTURAL DISPARITY**

The delta clearly extends beyond structural differences in disposable income.

### A PREVIOUSLY RELIABLE MEANS OF AUGMENTED CONSUMPTION

	Held	by all family	units	Percentag	je holding a debt	isset or	Median amount for	family units hold debt	ling asset or
	1999	2005	2012	1999	2005	2012	1999	2005	2012
	m	illions of dolla			%			dollars	
Total assets	4,489,109	6,395,134	9,410,656	100.0	100.0	100.0	209,900	261,500	371,300
Private pension assets	1,309,523	1,856,089	2,829,705	69.7	70.6	70.5	65,500	77,400	116,700
Financial assets, non pension	554,126	664,900	1,047,214	89.8	89.4	95.0	6,000	6,900	9,900
Deposits in financial institutions	207,339	269,929	343,984	87.5	87.0	92.8	3,300	4,100	4,000
Mutual funds / investment funds / income trusts	103,102	152,129	239,468	14.0	12.3	11.6	17,000	27,500	50,000
Stocks	117,919	117,222	204,864	9.9	9.9	8.5	11,800	13,100	30,000
Bonds (saving and other)	33,172	39,375	24,378	14.0	10.4	7.4	3,300	2,800	3,000
Tax-free savings accounts			65,939			33.7			10,000
Other financial assets	92,595	86,246	168,580	13.2	17.5	21.6	6,300	6,800	10,000
Non-financial assets	2,176,597	3,203,286	4,744,580	100.0	100.0	100.0	131,000	161,200	227,000
Principal residence	1,418,971	2,137,890	3,254,275	59.6	61.9	62.5	163,800	204,700	300,000
Other real estate	302,863	546,886	931,762	16.3	16.1	18.4	82,500	96,700	180,000
Vehicles	161,343	194,726	245,520	76.5	75.4	78.1	11,800	13,100	15,000
Other non-financial assets	293,420	323,785	313,023	100.0	100.0	100.0	13,100	11,400	10,000
Equity in business	448,863	670,859	789,158	19.0	16.6	17.1	11,800	18,000	10,000
Total debts	586,095	864,625	1,337,071	67.3	69.4	71.1	36,700	50,600	60,100
Mortgages	453,557	650,751	1,029,811	34.3	36.5	36.7	90,400	105,800	150,000
Principal residence	388,119	552,849	821,010	32.0	34.1	33.8	87,100	102,400	145,000
Other real estate	65,438	97,901	208,801	4.6	4.7	6.4	78,600	102,400	140,000
Line of credit	33,220	77,492	144,946	15.4	24.9	24.8	6,600	10,200	15,000
Credit card and installment debt	18,507	29,316	35,321	38.0	39.3	39.9	2,400	2,700	3,000
Student loans	19,623	22,718	28,272	11.7	11.8	12.5	9,400	10,200	10,000
Vehicle loans	37,093	52,439	75,814	20.8	25.8	28.5	11,800	12,500	15,000
Other debt	24,096	31,909	22,908	16.2	14.1	11.2	5,200	6,800	4,800
Net worth (assets less debts)	3,903,014	5,530,509	8,073,585	100.0	100.0	100.0	137,000	168,700	243,800

### THE WEALTH EFFECT

Assets, dabte and not use the hald by all family units in Canada

The wealth effect, driven primarily by housing, has been substantive.

Direct wealth, measured by  $\Delta$ FinancialSecurities +  $\Delta$ RealEstate -  $\Delta$ MortgageLiabilities, has grown by \$CAD 1.1 trillion from 2005-2012, or ~152 bn/year.

Assuming 6% wealth effect spending, this would driven +C62B in additional spending, accounting for ~16% of GDP growth over this period.


	20	005	2012	2017	2005-2012 Growth	2012-2017 Growt
MFs / Stocks	\$	308	\$ 467	\$ 571	\$159	\$104
Real Estate	1	1,722	2,685	3,780	963	1,095
Total	\$ 2	2,030	\$ 3,152	\$4,351	\$1,122	\$1,19
Wealth Effect Sp	endin	g (CAD i	n Billions), A	ssuming 6% <sup>(1</sup>	.)	
2005 - 2012						\$67.33
2012 - 2017						\$71.94
Contribution to			. ,			\$71.94 \$71
<b>Contribution to</b> Canadian Nomir	nal GD		. ,			\$71.94 \$71.94
Contribution to Canadian Nomir 2012	nal GD \$1,8	P (CAD i	. ,			\$71.9 \$71.9
2012 - 2017 Contribution to Canadian Nomir 2012 2017 Δ	nal GD \$1,8 2,1	P (CAD i 822.8	. ,			\$71.9 \$71.9

### THE WEALTH EFFECT (REINVIGORATED)

Using implied growth rates derived from the TSX and the Teranet HPI, we can estimate the growth in direct wealth beyond 2012 until present day. It is clear that the wealth effect, substantive already, has grown even more significantly in the subsequent 5-year period. In particular, direct wealth has growth \$CAD 1.2 trillion from 2012-2017, or ~240 bn/year.

Using the same 6% wealth effect spending, this has driven +\$C72B in additional spending, accounting for ~22% of GDP growth over this period.

### THE F.I.R.E. ECONOMY



#### 29% 28% 27% Jan-19, 25.8% 26% 25% 24% 23% 22% 21% 20% 19% Jan-97 Jan-99 Jan-01 Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 Jan-19 Jan-17 C Hedgeye Risk Management Source: Statistics Canada

F.I.R.E + Construction /GDP (SA. 2012 Chained Dollars)

#### F.I.R.E / GDP (SA, 2012 CHAINED DOLLARS)

F.I.R.E's representation of Canadian GDP of 18.7% remains elevated at 1.8 standard deviations above the long-term average.


#### F.I.R.E + CONSTRUCTION / GDP (SA, 2012 CHAINED DOLLARS)

Adding hard hats to the mix, the F.I.R.E and Construction industries have grown to account for 25.8% of total economic activity. The rise has been steady and the current representation stands over 1 standard deviation about its long-term average.

### **RESIDENTIAL R.E. INVESTMENT**

#### INVESTMENT IN RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION AS A SHARE OF GDP






#### PRIVATE FIXED INVESTMENT IN RESIDENTIAL STRUCTURES

At an expenditure level, private investment in residential real estate accounted for 7.2% of GDP in 4Q2018 –down from slightly less than two standard deviations above the long-term average.

#### RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT / GDP IN UNITS OF STDEV ABOVE THE LONG-TERM AVERAGE

Seasonally adjusted at annual rates, Current prices



#### THE FORMER IN STDEV TERMS


Following the G.F.C , the contribution of Canadian residential real estate investment to GDP had been steadily edging up to the U.S. peak in 2005.

### **EXTREME PHENOMENA**

Ownership transfer costs / Canadian GDP 2.0% **+3**σ 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% Q1 1981 · Q3 1982 · Q11984 Q3 1985 · Q1 1987 Q3 1988 Q1 1990 Q3 1991 Q11993 Q3 1994 Q1 1996 Q3 1997 Q1 1999 Q3 2000 Q1 2002 Q3 2003 Q1 2005 Q3 2006 Q12008 Q3 2009 Q12011 Q1 2014 Q3 2015 Q3 2012 Q1 2017 2018 © Hedgeve Risk Management

#### **BROKER COMMISSIONS 1.46% OF GDP**


Another useful measure of the housing craze north of the border is broker commissions and other ownership transfer fees as a share of GDP. This figure once stood at 1.82% or > 2.5 standard deviations above its long-term average.




#### THE FORMER IN STDEV TERMS

On a relative basis, broker commissions and other ownership transfer fees once nearly eclipsed levels reached during the U.S. housing peak, having come down meaningfully in the last year.

### FLASHBACK: CANADA 1981





### NATIONWIDE: HOME PRICES +17%


policy-induced spike in immigration led to increasing Α population/settlement along the west coast of Canada, ultimately spurring a run-up in Vancouver housing from 1970-1980. Like the current state of Canadian housing, this local/regional phenomenon extended outwards and had a contagion effect on the broader market.


### TSX +42%

From May 1981 to June 1982, the TSX lost -42% of its value, with the financial services index faring slightly better.

Nov-84

### **FLASHBACK: CANADA 1990**





### NATIONWIDE: HOME PRICES +11%

The housing hysteria of the late 80's originated from a rampant increase in condo development in the city of Toronto. Like the current state of Canadian housing, this local/regional phenomenon extended outwards and had a contagion effect on the broader market.

# TSX +11%

From August 1989 to October 1990, the TSX fell -23% with the financial services index faring far worse at -30% over this same period.



# **EVOLUTION OF THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE**

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### **MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ENACTED: 2016 – PRESENT**

#### February 2016

• Minimum down payment, for the portion of insured mortgages >C\$500K, raised to 10%

#### August 2016

• B.C. government establishes 15% tax on foreign buyers in Metro Vancouver Area

#### September 2016

• OFSI targets lenders and mortgage insurers by imposing higher capital requirements for insured mortgages that do not meet the regulator's underwriting standards, and requiring mortgage insurers to hold supplementary capital based on mortgage characteristics

#### October 2016

- All high-ratio insured homebuyers must qualify for mortgage insurance at an interest rate the greater of their contract mortgage rate or the Bank of Canada's five-year fixed posted rate
- Principal residence exemption from capital gains taxation limited to Canadian residents only and tax reporting requirements introduced for all dispositions of real estate

#### November 2016

- New low-ratio mortgages insured using portfolio insurance must satisfy the same eligibility criteria as high-ratio insured mortgages. Most notably, low-ratio mortgages insured at the portfolio level <u>can no longer include refinancings</u> and have been limited to a <u>maximum amortization length of 25 years</u> and <u>property values below C\$ 1 million</u>.
- Vancouver City Council approved the EHT program and enacted the Vacancy Tax By-law No. 11674 (EHT by-law) to levy a tax on empty and under-utilized class 1 residential properties within the City of Vancouver. Homes that are determined or deemed to be empty are subject to a tax of 1% of the property's assessed taxable value.

### MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ENACTED: 2016 – PRESENT

#### April 2017

 Ontario government introduces Fair Housing Plan, formally establishing a 15% non-resident speculation tax applicable throughout the Greater Golden Horseshoe area and empowering interested municipalities to introduce home vacancy taxes to encourage the sale or rental of unoccupied units left vacant by speculative owners

#### July 2017

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- OFSI drafts revisions to B-20 Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices and Procedures, which include:
  - i. a qualifying stress test for all uninsured mortgages
  - ii. LTV measurements that adjust for local market conditions used to assess the risk of qualifying borrowers (i.e. mandated, marketspecific haircuts on appraisal values)
  - iii. the express **prohibition of co-lending arrangements** that are designed, or appear to be designed to circumvent regulatory requirements
  - The Bank of Canada raises its overnight lending rate by +25 bps from 0.5% to 0.75%, marking the **first rate hike in seven years** while citing "bolstered" confidence in the Canadian economy's emergence from years of tame growth and **increasing expectations for further rate hikes** –especially one more by the end of 2017.
- The city of Vancouver imposes Vacancy Tax ByLaw 11674, also known as the Empty Homes Tax, in order to relieve pressure on Vancouver's rental housing market and deter speculation
  - The tax is calculated as 1% of a property's assessed taxable value

# TURNING UP THE HEAT CONT.

### **MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ENACTED: 2016 – PRESENT**

#### September 2017

• The Bank of Canada raises its overnight lending rate by +25 bps from 0.75% to 1.00%.

#### October 2017

- OFSI publishes the final version of its revised B-20 Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices and Procedures, which includes:
  - i. The implementation of a minimum qualification rate for uninsured mortgages, calculated as the greater of the Bank of Canada 5-year posted rate and the contract rate + 200 bps
  - ii. Restrictions on co-lending and bundled mortgages that give the appearance of an attempt to circumvent LTV limits
  - iii. LTV measurements that adjust for local market conditions used to assess the risk of qualifying borrowers (i.e. encouraging the use of internally assigned haircuts to appraisal values based on regional market characteristics)
- The Bank of Canada raises its overnight lending rate by +25 bps from 0.75% to 1.00%.

#### January 2018

- The Bank of Canada raises its overnight lending rate by +25 bps from 1.00% to 1.25%.
- OSFI's new B20 Underwriting Guideline for federally regulated financial institutions goes into effect.

#### February 2018

- B.C. government raises its tax on foreign buyers in Metro Vancouver Area from 15% to 20%, expanding its applicability beyond the Vancouver region to properties in Victoria and other parts of the province
- B.C. government announces new speculator tax to take effect in the fall of 2018 and apply to foreign and domestic investors who do not pay income tax in the province
  - The tax will start at 0.5% of the property's assessed value in 2018 and rise to 2% thereafter
  - Primary residences and homes leased as long-term rentals will be exempt

## TURNING UP THE HEAT CONT.

### **MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ENACTED: 2016 – PRESENT**

#### July 2018

• The Bank of Canada raises its overnight lending rate by +25 bps from 1.25% to 1.50%.

#### October 2018

• The Bank of Canada raises its overnight lending rate by +25 bps from 1.50% to 1.75%.

#### March 2019

- Addressing affordability concerns, the federal government announced a First-Time Home Buyer Incentive, available to those with household incomes under \$120,000 per year. The CMHC will offer qualified first-time homebuyers a 10 per cent shared equity mortgage without interest for a newly constructed home or a five per cent shared equity mortgage for an existing home, with the amount of the insured mortgage plus the CMHC incentive capped at 4x the home buyers' annual incomes.
- In the release of 2019-2020 Canadian Federal Budget, mortgage stress tests and the 25-year amortization limit on transactionally insured mortgages were left unchanged.

#### <u>April 2019</u>

- Legislation introduced by the B.C. government to fight the use of shell companies and other legal entities to anonymously hide wealth, evade taxes and launder money.
- The land owner transparency act, when passed, will establish a public registry of beneficial owners of property in B.C., meaning true ownership will no longer be hidden. The act will require corporations, trusts and partnerships, which currently own or buy land, to disclose their beneficial owners in the registry. Corporations, trusts and partnerships that fail to disclose could face fines of up to \$100,000 or 15% of the assessed property value, whichever is greater.

### **B20 – ASSESSING THE IMPACT**

#### SHARE OF NEW MORTGAGES WITH A LOAN-TO-INCOME RATIO > 450% ; 5-YEAR MORTGAGE RATE



s year mortgage rate (left scale)


Over the past two years, federal authorities have tightened the criteria for mortgage qualification with the aim of improving the quality of new mortgage lending. Mortgage insurance rules for high-ratio mortgages1 (those with loan-to-value ratios greater than 80 per cent) were modified in October 2016 to contain an expanded stress test that checks whether borrowers can still alford payments if interest rates increase. Borrowers who intend to take on loans that are more than 4.5 times (450 per cent of) their annual income are particularly vulnerable to unfavourable situations, such as higher interest rates or a loss of income. The expanded stress test helped to reduce the proportion of new high-ratio mortgages with loan-to-income [LT] ratios above 450 per cent – from 20 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2016 to 6 per cent in the second quarter of 2018.

The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) included a similar stress test for low-ratio mortgages in the revised Guideline B-20 that came into effect in January 2018. Subsequently, the share of low-ratio mortgages with a loan-to-income (LTI) ratio over 450 per cent has fallen to 14 per cent as of the second quarter of 2018, down from 20 per cent a year before.

Recent increases in interest rates are also contributing to the reduction in the number of highly indebted households. Since they spend a larger fraction of their incrome making debt payments, highly indebted borrowers are the most affected by higher interest rates. As average contractual rates for five-year fixed-rate mortgages have increased from 2.7 per cent to 3.3 per cent over the past year, the overall share of new highly indebted borrowers has decreased, from 18 per cent to 13 per cent.

Note: Data include mortgages for residential purchases and refinances originated by federally regulated financial institutions. The 5-year mortgage rate is the median contractual interest rate for a fixed-rate mortgage issued by a federally regulated lender.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF NEW BORROWERS' LOAN-TO-INCOME RATIOS



Some borrowers obtaining a low-ratio mortgage have adjusted their purchasing decisions, as suggested by a shift in the distribution of LTI ratios since the second quarter of 2017.

As fewer loans are given to highly indebted borrowers, a larger share of mortgages is now concentrated around LTI ratios between 250 per cent and 450 per cent.


Mortgages with an LTI just below 450 per cent are still relatively risky and likely include borrowers obliged to take smaller loans than they would have obtained without a stress test.

At the same time, the revised Guideline B-20 has not eliminated high-LTI loans altogether, since lenders can apply other criteria to extend such mortgages, including the applicant's housing equity and financial assets.


Note: Data are for uninsured low-ratio mortgages for residential purchases originated by federally regulated financial institutions.

### **B20 – ASSESSING THE IMPACT** CONT.

#### %ΔΥ/Y IN THE NUMBER OF NEW UNINSURED BORROWERS, BY LOAN-TO-INCOME RATIO



SHARE OF NEW MORTGAGES WITH A LOAN-TO-INCOME RATIO > 450%, BY REGION



The number of new low-ratio mortgages for home purchases has declined, beginning in the second half of 2017 and continuing through the first half of 2018. In the first quarter of 2018, old qualifying rules were still being applied to some mortgages that were pre-approved before the updated Guideline B-20 took effect. In the second quarter, when the new rules were fully in effect, the number of new low-ratio mortgages fell 15 per cent from a year earlier.

The most pronounced decline has been in the number of new mortgages extended to highly indebted borrowers, which fell by 39 per cent year-over-year in the second quarter of 2018. Contributing to this decline were the expanded stress test, as well as the effects of higher interest rates on highly indebted borrowers, potentially reinforced by changes in general market sentiment.

However, the significant drop in the number of mortgages with lower LTI ratios indicates that other factors, such as provincial and municipal housing policies, are playing an important part. Most notably, a foreign buyers' tax for Vancouver was announced in July 2016 and the coverage expanded in February 2018. Ontario's provincial government implemented a similar tax in April 2017. Other regional policies include an empty house tax, restrictions on short-term rentals and measures to increase affordable housing. These measures helped change market sentiment, which in turn has slowed activity and price growth.

Note: Data are for uninsured low-ratio mortgages for residential purchases originated by federally regulated financial institutions.

The revisions to Guideline B-20 and the increase in mortgage rates coincided with a decline in the proportion of high-LTI borrowers across most major cities, but to varying extents.


Toronto saw its share of highly indebted borrowers fall from a peak of 39 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2017 to 28 per cent in the second quarter of 2018.

Hamilton, Toronto's neighbour, also saw a steep drop in riskier mortgages, although from a lower level. In Vancouver, there has been a shift of the LTI distribution away from mortgages with very high LTIs, but the share above 450 per cent remains substantial.

Note: Data are for uninsured low-ratio mortgages for residential purchases originated by federally regulated financial institutions

### **B20 – ASSESSING THE IMPACT** CONT.

#### %ΔY/Y IN THE NUMBER OF BORROWERS, 2018 Q2, BY REGION



 $\Delta Y/Y$  in volume and market share of various lender types in the gTa



Year-over-year change in volume, 2018Q2 (left scale)

Year-over-year absolute change in market share, 2018Q2 (right scale)

 Other factors have been at play as well. Many cities experienced a slowing in new mortgage activity in the second quarter of
 Guideline B-20 applies on

 2018. Housing markets in Toronto, Vancouver and their surrounding areas have the highest price-to-income ratios in the
 mortgage stress tests. Mo

 country and were also subject to regional housing policy measures over the past two years. These markets slowed before the
 standards, since the bulk

 revised Guideline B-20 was introduced and remained weak through the second quarter of 2018. In Calgary, the real estate
 however, do not need to combination of higher rates, tighter mortgage rules and

 weak income growth continuing to be a drag on local housing. Ottawa–Gatineau and Halifax are on the opposite end of the
 Areas with high house prix

 mortgages from private le
 mortgages from private le
 mortgages from private le


The overall riskiness of new mortgages has therefore decreased because the proportion of risky borrowers has declined across cities. As well, the regional composition has shifted, with a somewhat larger share of new mortgages recently coming from areas outside Toronto and Vancouver. Guideline B-20 applies only to federally regulated lenders such as banks, although credit unions often use their own mortgage stress tests. Mortgages originated by mortgage finance companies (MFCs) generally meet federal mortgage standards, since the bulk of their funding comes from government-sponsored securitization programs. Private lenders, however, do not need to comply with federal mortgage standards. 3

Areas with high house prices, such as the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), could therefore see more borrowers obtaining mortgages from private lenders because they might not be able to qualify with other lenders. While the volume of new mortgage lending in the GTA fell for all lender types in the second quarter of 2018, private lenders saw smaller declines. This boosted their market share from 6 per cent in the second quarter of 2017 to 9 per cent in the second quarter of 2018, continuing an upward trend observed over the past couple of years. We do not currently have data to verify whether the same trend is evident in markets outside Ontario.


modest.

- Tighter mortgage policies have contributed to a decrease in the creation of highly indebted households
- But **it isn't possible to separate the role of these policies** from that of other measures in changing mortgage market trends
  - Higher interest rates are directly increasing the cost of mortgage borrowing and effectively making mortgage underwriting requirements stricter
  - At the same time, house price dynamics have changed in some large markets, in part because of regional policy measures
  - Less mortgage borrowing can be both a cause and an effect of changes in house price trends
- With multiple factors at play, the role of individual policies cannot be precisely determined

### TIGHTENING CREDIT ACROSS THE CONSUMER CREDIT COMPLEX



SECOND ORDER RATE OF CHANGE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE CREDIT




Source: Bank of Canada, Statistics Canada

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## **STEALTH STIMULUS?**

### Bank of Canada Assets: Canada Mortgage Bonds

The dollar value of Canada Mortgage Bonds held by the Bank of Canada, in millions of Canadian dollars.



Not quite yet ready to cut rates from an already lowly level, the Bank of Canada, purchased C\$250M in Canada Mortgage Bonds in March, monetizing the federally-insured, assetbacked debt instruments.

While some may say this is mere balance sheet diversification on behalf of the central bank, we think it is noteworthy at this juncture.

Source: Bank of Canada, Better Dwelling.



# **REGIONAL ANALYSIS**

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### THE LAY OF THE LAND THROUGH THE OPTIMISTIC LENS OF THE TERANET HPI

CANADIAN HOME PRICES BY MAJOR CITY (1999-PRESENT)

#### 500 40% ■ Weight ■ YoY % Chg---March 2019 35% 450 30% Vancouver, 422.1 400 25% Toronto, 357.2 350 Victoria, 337.4 Jamilton, 336.1 20% Vinnipea, 318,3 300 Montreal, 300.1 15% Edmonton, 285.1 10% Calgary, 253.1 Ottawa, 247.5 250 Halifax, 229.4 5% 3% 2% 200 0% -2% 150 -3% -5% ON-Toronto AB Calgary Montreal Vancouver 10tal 100 Mar-1999 Mar-2003 Mar-2007 Mar-2011 Mar-2015 Mar-2019

#### TERANET 11-CITY HOME PRICE INDEX WEIGHTS & ROC

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Data Source: Teranet

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ENT Source: Teranet

HEDGEYE RISK MANAGEMENT




# TORONTO

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#### **GREATER TORONTO AREA**

### **EXISTING HOME SALES**




### DEAD CAT BOUNCE

After a revival in mid-2018, Toronto sales have again slowed.

### **EXISTING HOME SALES, STACK**






#### **BOTTOM-DWELLING**

Sales volumes reside at the lows of the past 9 years.

#### **GREATER TORONTO AREA**

### **EXISTING HOME SALES, BY MONTH**



Data Source: TREB

### **ACTIVE LISTINGS**

#### **GREATER TORONTO AREA**




#### NORMALIZING INVENTORIES

Inventories continue to rise to historical averages.

### **ACTIVE LISTINGS, BY MONTH**

#### **GREATER TORONTO AREA**



#### **CLIMBING UP**

Inventories have so far normalized in the middle of the 9-year historical pack, after having consecutively declined from 2013-2016.

## **ACTIVE LISTINGS, BY MONTH**

#### **GREATER TORONTO AREA**

50%

40%

30%

10%

0%

-10%

-20%

-30%

-40%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

-20%

-40%

-60%

200%

150%


100%

50%

0%

-50%


-100%



Data Source: TREB

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**MONTHS OF SUPPLY** 



**GREATER TORONTO AREA: MONTHS OF SUPPLY (ADJUSTED FOR SEASONALITY)** 

Source: Toronto Real Estate Board

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### SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Change in Unit Sales

### GTA: Adjusted Months Supply Sensitivity Analysis

		-10%	-5%	0%	5%	10%	15%	20%	25%	30%	35%	40%	45%	50%
	10%	2.49	2.63	2.77	2.91	3.05	3.19	3.32	3.46	3.60	3.74	3.88	4.02	4.15
	5%	2.61	2.76	2.90	3.05	3.19	3.34	3.48	3.63	3.77	3.92	4.06	4.21	4.35
	0%	2.74	2.89	3.05	3.20	3.35	3.50	3.66	3.81	3.96	4.11	4.27	4.42	4.57
	-5%	2.89	3.05	3.21	3.37	3.53	3.69	3.85	4.01	4.17	4.33	4.49	4.65	4.81
	-10%	3.05	3.22	3.39	3.55	3.72	3.89	4.06	4.23	4.40	4.57	4.74	4.91	5.08
	-15%	3.23	3.41	3.58	3.76	3.94	4.12	4.30	4.48	4.66	4.84	5.02	5.20	5.38
	-20%	3.43	3.62	3.81	4.00	4.19	4.38	4.57	4.76	4.95	5.14	5.33	5.52	5.71
	-25%	3.66	3.86	4.06	4.27	4.47	4.67	4.88	5.08	5.28	5.48	5.69	5.89	6.09
2	-30%	3.92	4.14	4.35	4.57	4.79	5.01	5.22	5.44	5.66	5.88			6.53
	-35%	4.22	4.45	4.69	4.92	5.16	5.39	5.63	5.86					7.03
5	-40%	4.57	4.82	5.08	5.33	5.59	5.84							7.62
	-45%	4.99	5.26	5.54	5.82									8.31
	-50%	5.48	5.79	6.09	6.40	6.70	7.01	7.31	7.62	7.92	8.23	8.53	8.84	9.14

### Change in Unit Inventory


Key: y = -0.10x + 0.30

Months Supply

Home

25% 0.50 = 1.00 = 20% 1.50 15% = 2.00 = 10% 2.50 5% = 3.00 = 0% 3.50 -5% = 4.00 -10% = -15% 4.50 = 5.00 = -20% 5.50 -25% = -30% 6.00 =

Home Price % AY/Y \*\* SA Sales Changes Explain ~54% of SA Inventory Changes \*\*




60% Average Price (Annual % Change) Median Price 40% (Annual % Change) Benchmark Price (Annual % 20% Change) -20% -40% AU9-12 3 FOD AUG FOD AUG FOD AUG FOD 17

#### March 2019 - City of Toronto Detached - Annual Price Change (%)

#### **CITY OF TORONTO DETACHED HOMES**

At worst, those who bought in March 2017 saw their homes lose ~ -20% in one year. The average, median, and benchmark prices of a detached home in March of 2017 were \$1.57M, \$1.26M, and \$1.17M, respectively.



#### March 2019 - City of Toronto Condos - Annual Price Change (%)

**CITY OF TORONTO CONDOS** 

Despite declining sales, condominium prices have held steady as sellers have not yet capitulate.



March 2019 - Markham Detached - Annual Price Change (%)

### MARKHAM DETACHED


Those who bought in March 2017 saw their homes lose ~ - 27.6% in one year. The average, median, and benchmark prices of a detached home in March of 2017 were \$1.68M, \$1.26M, and \$1.17M, respectively.



March 2019 - Richmond Hill Detached - Annual Price Change (%)

### **RICHMOND HILL DETACHED**

At worst, those who bought in March 2017 saw their homes lose ~ -28.5% in one year. The average, median, and benchmark prices of a detached home in March of 2017 were \$1.84M, \$1.68M, and \$1.45M, respectively.



March 2019 - Ajax Detached - Annual Price Change (%)



#### **VAUGHN DETACHED**

Those who bought in March 2017 saw their homes lose ~ - 23% in one year. The average, median, and benchmark prices of a detached home in March of 2017 were \$1.61M, \$1.45M, and \$1.13M, respectively.


### AJAX DETACHED

At worst, those who bought in March 2017 saw their homes lose ~ -17.8% in one year. The average, median, and benchmark prices of a detached home in March of 2017 were \$842K, \$821K, and \$669K, respectively.

60% Average Price (Annual % Change) Median Price (Annual % 40% Change) Benchmark Price (Annual % Change) 20% -20% NUG-15 EB-16 NUG-16 EB-17

March 2019 - Mississauga Detached - Annual Price Change (%)

March 2019 - Milton Detached - Annual Price Change (%)




#### **MISSISSAUGA DETACHED**

Those who bought in March 2017 saw their homes lose ~ -15.6% in one year. The average, median, and benchmark prices of a detached home in March of 2017 were \$1.25M, \$1.13M, and \$1.06M, respectively.


### **MILTON DETACHED**

At worst, those who bought in March 2017 saw their homes lose ~ -17.8% in one year. The average, median, and benchmark prices of a detached home in March of 2017 were \$978K, \$933K, and \$881K, respectively.

March 2019 - Oakville Detached - Annual Price Change (%)



#### March 2019 - Burlington Detached - Annual Price Change (%)



#### **OAKVILLE DETACHED**

Those who bought in March 2017 saw their homes lose ~ - 21.7% in one year. The average, median, and benchmark prices of a detached home in March of 2017 were \$1.63M, \$1.48M, and \$1.18M, respectively.

### **BURLINGTON DETACHED**

At worst, those who bought in February 2017 saw their homes lose ~ -14.3% in one year. The average, median, and benchmark prices of a detached home in February of 2017 were \$1.03M, \$925K, and \$873K, respectively.

### **A FEW ANECDOTES**




#### **TWO HOMES, SAME STREET**

While no two houses are the same, even on the same street, someone is still eating a considerable loss here. The house on the left is not renovated at all, so let's generously throw in \$200K for renovations – that's still an implied loss of \$395K or -27%.

#### SAME HOME, -\$730K LOSS

Buying at the peak and taking a -35% haircut two years later – brutal, to say the least.

### **A FEW ANECDOTES**



#### **TWO HOMES, SAME STREET**

Implied loss of -25% on nearly identical home.

#### SAME HOME, -\$250K LOSS

A -17% haircut on a home purchased for 1.5M three years ago.

### **A FEW ANECDOTES**




#### TWO HOMES, SAME NEIGHBORHOOD

House on the right purchased for \$1.86M in June of 2016. A very similar house, one street over, bigger lot, sold for \$1.15M in March of 2019. Implied loss of -38% or -\$705K.

#### TWO HOMES, SAME STREET


House on the right sold for \$2M in December of 2016. An nearly identical house, with the same lot size sold for \$1.36M in March of 2019. Implied loss of -32% or -\$640K.

## WHAT ABOUT CONDOS?



### SAME CONDO

Indeed, GTA condos have been more resilient in the correction off the highs of 2017 compared to detached homes in places like Markham, but they have not necessarily been the source of sound and steady appreciation that market zealots have made them out to be.



### SAME CONDO

Similar tale here as well.

## WHAT ABOUT CONDOS?



### SAME CONDO

Indeed, GTA condos have been more resilient in the correction off the highs of 2017 compared to detached homes in places like Markham, but they have not necessarily been the source of sound and steady appreciation that market zealots have made them out to be.

### SAME CONDO

Similar tale here as well.




# VANCOUVER

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#### **METRO VANCOUVER AREA**

## **EXISTING HOME SALES, BY MONTH**




### DEAD CAT BOUNCE

Having rebounded somewhat in mid-2017, Vancouver sales volumes are back in freefall.

### **EXISTING HOME SALES, STACK**

METRO VANCOUVER AREA




#### **BOTTOM DWELLING**

Sales volumes reside at the lows of the past 9 years.

#### **METRO VANCOUVER AREA**


## **EXISTING HOME SALES, BY MONTH**



Data Source: REBGV

### **ACTIVE LISTINGS**

#### **METRO VANCOUVER AREA**




#### **GROWING INVENTORIES**

Active listings continue to climb toward normalization.


## **ACTIVE LISTINGS, BY MONTH**

#### METRO VANCOUVER AREA




























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Data Source: REBGV

### **ACTIVE LISTINGS, STACKED**


METRO VANCOUVER AREA



#### **RISING UP THE RANKS**

Having fallen consecutively from 2013-2016, inventories have reclaimed a normalized level.

**MONTHS OF SUPPLY** 



GREATER VANCOUVER: MONTHS OF SUPPLY (ADJUSTED FOR SEASONALITY)

A massive rise in supply.

Source: REBGV


© Hedgeye Risk Management

### SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

### **GVA: Adjusted Months Supply Sensitivity Analysis**

		-10%	-5%	0%	5%	10%	15%	20%	25%	30%	35%	40%	45%	50%
6	10%	3.94	4.16	4.38	4.60	4.82	5.04	5.26	5.48	5.70	5.92	6.14	6.36	6.57
ö	5%	4.13	4.36	4.59	4.82	5.05	5.28	5.51	5.74	5.97	6.20	6.43	6.66	6.89
Sales	0%	4.34	4.58	4.82	5.06	5.30	5.54	5.79	6.03	6.27	6.51	6.75	6.99	7.23
	-5%	4.57	4.82	5.08	5.33	5.58	5.84	6.09	6.34	6.60	6.85	7.11	7.36	7.61
Unit	-10%	4.82	5.09	5.36	5.62	5.89	6.16	6.43	6.70	6.96	7.23	7.50	7.77	8.04
	-15%	5.10	5.39	5.67	5.96	6.24	6.52	6.81	7.09	7.37	7.66	7.94	8.22	8.51
2	-20%	5.42	5.73	6.03	6.33	6.63	6.93	7.23	7.53	7.83	8.14	8.44	8.74	9.04
<b>e</b>	-25%	5.79	6.11	6.43	6.75	7.07	7.39	7.71	8.04	8.36	8.68	9.00	9.32	9.64
Change	-30%	6.20	6.54	6.89	7.23	7.58	7.92	8.27	8.61	8.95	9.30	9.64	9.99	10.33
a	-35%	6.68	7.05	7.42	7.79	8.16	8.53	8.90	9.27	9.64				11.13
ò	-40%	7.23	7.63	8.04	8.44	8.84	9.24	9.64						12.05
-	-45%	7.89	8.33	8.77	9.20	9.64								13.15
	-50%	8.68	9.16	9.64										14.46

#### Change in Unit Inventory




Change in Unit Sale

Key: y = -0.042x + 0.290

### **PRICING DYNAMICS: ROLLING OVER**

### **METRO VANCOUVER AREA, MLS HPI**

%**Δ**Υ/Υ




Data Source: CREA, MLS HPI

© Hedgeye Risk Management

Source: CREA, MLS HPI

### WEST VANCOUVER GETTING ROUGHED UP

### AVERAGE SALES PRICE OF DETACHED HOME DOWN -32% FROM 2016 PEAK




VVW - Vancouver West

Each data point is one month of activity. Data is from April 9, 2019.

Data © 2019 BCNREB, CADREB, FVREB and REBGV. All rights reserved. StatsCentre © 2019 ShowingTime.

### BENCHMARK SALES PRICE OF DETACHED HOME DOWN -25% FROM 2016 PEAK




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# CALGARY

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
### **EXISTING HOME SALES, BY MONTH**



### **FALLING SALES**

The Calgary market continues to see struggling sales since the beginnings of the oil downturn in 2014/2015.

### **EXISTING HOME SALES, STACK**



### **BOTTOM DWELLING**

Sales volumes reside at the lows of the past 9 years.

**CITY OF CALGARY** 

#### **CITY OF CALGARY**

### **EXISTING HOME SALES, BY MONTH**















March

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Julv

17.9%

-3.0%

17.4%

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

13.1%

20.8%

1.500

500

2,500

2,300

2,100

1,900

1.300

1.100

900

700

500

18.9%

-10.5%

-2.9%

25%

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%

20%

-27.6%

-4.8%

2017 2018 2019








Data Source: CREB

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### **ACTIVE LISTINGS**


#### **CITY OF CALGARY**



#### **BIG INVENTORY BUILD IN 2018**

2019 should be a year of easy comps.

### **ACTIVE LISTINGS, STACKED**




### ALL-TIME HIGHS OF THE LAST 9 YEARS

Inventories are elevated by historical standards.

**CITY OF CALGARY** 

## **ACTIVE LISTINGS, BY MONTH**

#### **CITY OF CALGARY**



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### MONTHS OF SUPPLY

CALGARY: MONTHS OF SUPPLY 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.47 4.96 4.67 5.0 4.61 .3 80 4.0 3.0 .41 .87 2.0 159 34 ).96 1.0 0.46 0.0 1250

Apparent ramp-up in supply.

Source: CREB


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\*Note, this chart is not seasonally adjusted.

### **PRICING DYNAMICS: FLAT AS A PANCAKE SINCE 2014**

### **CITY OF CALGARY, MLS HPI**

%**ΔY**/Y



Data Source: CREA, MLS HPI

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


# MONTREAL



### **EXISTING HOME SALES, BY MONTH**

#### **GREATER MONTREAL AREA**




#### **STABLE SALES GROWTH**

Montreal sales volumes have grown more steadily over the last three years.

### **EXISTING HOME SALES, STACK**

#### **GREATER MONTREAL AREA**



#### **NINE-YEAR HIGHS**

2019 sales volumes sit atop the set of 9-year historicals.

#### **GREATER MONTREAL AREA**

## **EXISTING HOME SALES, BY MONTH**




Data Source: GMREB

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## **ACTIVE LISTINGS**

#### **GREATER MONTREAL AREA**




#### **INVENTORIES ARE CLEARING**

Active listings in Montreal have declined steadily over the last three years.

## **ACTIVE LISTINGS, STACKED**

**GREATER MONTREAL AREA** 




#### **SMALLEST LISTINGS IN 9 YEARS**

Montreal inventories currently reside below every level of the last 9 years,

## **ACTIVE LISTINGS, BY MONTH**


#### **GREATER MONTREAL AREA**



Data Source: GMREB

## **MONTHS OF SUPPLY**

77



MONTREAL METRO AREA: MONTHS OF SUPPLY (ADJUSTED FOR SEASONALITY)


Source: Toronto Real Estate Board


© Hedgeye Risk Management

Steady decline in supply.

## **PRICING DYNAMICS: SURGING**

## **GREATER MONTREAL AREA, MLS HPI**





Source: CREA, MLS HPI

%**Δ**Υ/Υ

Data Source: CREA, MLS HPI

Source: CREA, MLS HPI

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# **EMERGING THEMES**

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# THE RUNDOWN



#### **TWO-CYLINDER ENGINE STALLING**

The dampened outlook for an economy losing the thrust of its two historically dominant engines, housing and commodities, in addition to a diminished competitive position from an improved and increasingly friendly U.S. business climate.



#### HELOC? MORE LIKE HEadLOCk!

Deteriorating household finances under the growing weight of burdensome debt loads, reflected in slowing consumer credit growth and rising insolvencies.



## THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHINA SHORT

The relevance of the broader China short case as it pertains to, among other things, the strong potential for intensified capital controls and a further weakening of foreign real estate demand given China's precarious dollar position in the face of an emerging twin-deficit problem.



## **RISING TENSIONS IN CANADA-CHINA RELATIONS**


USMCA, the epic arrest of the Huawei Princess, and Chinese bans on Canadian Canola exports – with more to come.



### PUBLIC ALARM OVER MONEY LAUNDERING

Growing alarm and public scrutiny over relaxed money laundering laws, and the enabled flow of dirty money into real estate, giving rise to an emboldened regulatory response

## **1. TWO-CYLINDER ENGINE STALLING**



#### NOT WELL POSITIONED TO PICK UP THE SLACK FROM SLOWING HOUSING AND A DEPRESSED DOMESTIC ENERGY ECONOMY

Negative Net FDI and uninspired (relative to easy comps in 15', 16', and 17') business investment spending set to face continued drag from the improving business conditions south of the border. With housing slowing, and no commodities super cycle in sight, the two-cylinder economic engine of old is breaking down.

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


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# **2. DETERIORATING HOUSEHOLD FINANCES**

## **IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE**



Source: Freddie Mac

#### Data Source: Freddie Mac, Bloomberg, DBRS, Federal Reserve

Canada were \$4,849 in October, more than quadruple the \$1,080 in the U.S., according to Bloomberg calculations based on DBRS and

bubble.

based on DBRS and Federal Reserve data.

Cash-out refi home equity withdrawal amounts reached obscene levels in

the 2005-2007 period,

per quarter. Currently,

levels are in the \$10-20 billion range per quarter,

and that's not adjusted for inflation, which means

today's equity extraction is still running below 1/5th of

what occurred during the


On a per capita basis,

**HELOC** balances in

averaging \$70-80 billion

Total Home Equity Cashed Out (\$ billions) - Quarterly (1994-3Q18)

# 2. DETERIORATING HOUSEHOLD FINANCES CONT.




Increasing consumer proposals are causing total consumer insolvencies to rise as borrowers seek alternatives to personal bankruptcy.

Recall, a consumer proposal is a formal, legally binding process to negotiate an offer to pay creditors a percentage of what is owed to them, or extend the time until the debts must be paid off.

Source: FactSet, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada


## **2. DETERIORATING HOUSEHOLD FINANCES CONT.**

#### **PROPOSALS HITTING ALL-TIME RECORDED HIGHS:**




#### CONSUMER PROPOSALS, CANADA

#### **BANKRUPTCY DATA NOT FOLLOWING SUIT:**



## **2. DETERIORATING HOUSEHOLD FINANCES CONT.**

### **INVERSE RELATIONSHIP:**



Demonstrated clearly here, a consumer proposal is a popular alternative to personal bankruptcy.

Data Source: FactSet, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada

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
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# **3. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHINA SHORT**

### **REMEMBER THE "SHANGHAI ACCORD"?**


#### THE FED RHETORICALLY EASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING THE 2015-16 GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RECESSION...






#### ...WHICH ALLOWED THE PBOC TO UNLEASH AN UNPRECEDENTED WAVE OF LIQUIDITY

#### Net Liquidity Provided as a % of GDP




# **3. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHINA SHORT CONT.**

## ... YOU SHOULD; IT WAS EVEN BIGGER THAN CHINA'S 2008-2009 STIMULUS



## **3. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHINA SHORT** CONT.

## BEIJING HAS TO AUTHORIZE EVEN MORE STIMULUS TO COMP THESE COMPS




Data Source: Hedgeye Macro 2Q19 Themes Deck, Bloomberg

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## **3. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHINA SHORT** CONT.

### THE MYTHICAL "UNCOMPABLE" COMP



DATA SOLIRCE: BLOOMBERG

## IN SUM,

- Harmful debt load
- Rapidly weakening economy
- On the verge of shifting into a structural current account deficit after years of surplus
- Twin deficit, closed capital account
- Trade negotiations the U.S. dollar pain of tariffs
- Need to stem outflow of money abroad
- Capital account liberalization doubtful
  - Some symptom treatment via MSCI inclusion
- Intensified capital controls likely
- Hence, potential Implications for Canadian Housing:
  - Weaker foreign real estate demand from heightened capital controls
  - Macro contagion effect of slowing Chinese growth given the level of integration between a resource economy like Canada and a big natural resource user like China

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# **4. RISING TENSIONS IN SINO-CANADIAN RELATIONS**



Canada is clearly caught in the middle of a U.S. China Thucydides Trap, and the turning point seems to have been the final shakeout in the NAFTA negotiations.


Specifically, the controversial new clause in the USMCA that calls on the countries to notify each other if they enter into trade talks with a "nonmarket" economy.


# 4. RISING TENSIONS IN SINO-CANADIAN RELATIONS CONT.

#### WORLD POLITICS

Sinéad Baker Aug. 26, 2018, 2:55 AM

# Saudi Arabia is selling off its Canadian assets as row intensifies, report says





#### THE SAUDI ARABIA PRECEDENT

In addition to a \$3T foreign reserve position that it can use to dump Canadian assets, a throttling or full recall of Chinese students studying abroad in Canada would have a definite dampening effect on foreign real estate demand in key markets like Toronto and Vancouver, given the extensive use of Canada's student permanent residency program by Chinese nationals to move their money outside of China.

f @....

# 4. RISING TENSIONS IN SINO-CANADIAN RELATIONS CONT.

# **RECALL:**

- In March of 2019, the CMHC published its latest Housing Market Insight Report.
- Previous housing data understated the amount of non-resident buyers in Vancouver and Toronto.
  - The CMHC condo survey of 2015, a busy year for the real estate market, maintained that foreign ownership of condos was low in metro Vancouver and metro Toronto, at 3.5 and 3.3 per cent respectively.
- Among the report's findings:
  - If every residential property unit that was built in the city of Vancouver from 2006 to 2017 was put into a single building, every tenth unit [and a bit more] would have been owned by somebody who doesn't live in the country
  - 20% of Vancouver's newly built condo market was purchased by non-residents form 2016-2017.
  - 9% of Toronto's new-build condos were purchased by non-residents in 2016-2017.
  - Non-residents purchased 14% of all housing units sold in the City of Vancouver in the past decade. In Richmond, the figure rises to 26% from 2016-2017.
- These are all further exposures, and forms of integration, that China can use to apply pressure to Canada in its standoff with the United States,

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FENTANYL: MAKING A KILLING

#### Secret police study finds crime networks could have laundered over \$1B through Vancouver homes in 2016

STORY BY Sam Cooper Stewart Bell Andrew Russell November 26th, 2018

The stately \$17-million mansion owned by a suspected fentanyl importer is at the end of a gated

driveway on one of the priciest streets in Shaughnessy, Vancouver's most exclusive neighbourhood.

A block away is a \$22-million gabled manor that police have linked to a high-stakes gambler and property developer with suspected ties to the Chinese police services.

#### MORE: Read the full Fentanyl investigation

Both mansions appear on a list of more than \$1-billion worth of Vancouver-area property transactions in 2016 that a confidential police intelligence study has linked to Chinese organized crime.

The study of more than 1,200 luxury real estate purchases in B.C.'s Lower Mainland in 2016 found that more than 10 per cent were tied to buyers with criminal records. And 95 per cent of those transactions were believed by police intelligence to be linked to Chinese crime networks.

The study findings, obtained by Global News, are a startling look at what police believe to be the massive money laundering occurring in the Vancouver-area real estate market.

The illicit money yield of the continent-wide opioid crisis appears to have even played a role in helping drive the Vancouver real estate craze.

Link: https://globalnews.ca/news/4658157/fentanyl-vancouver-real-estatebillion-money-laundering-police-study/

An Independent Review of Money Laundering in B.C. Real Estate, Luxury Vehicle Sales & Horse Racing

**Release of Chapter 6-4** 

Peter M. German, QC, PhD

Peter German & Associates Inc.

#### FINDINGS

There are no RCMP members within its federal business line in B.C. who are currently dedicated to criminal money laundering investigations.

The only dedicated money laundering resources in the RCMP within B.C. are provincial resources in the JIGIT, formed to deal with laundering in casinos.

The RCMP resources engaged on asset forfeiture work are focussed on referring cases out of the criminal justice system, to the Civil Forfeiture Office.

Law enforcement is frustratingly low on resources to combat these activities.

Link: https://news.gov.bc.ca/files/An\_Independent\_Review\_of\_Money\_Laun dering\_in\_BC.pdf



Updated: March 25, 2019 7:37 arr

## From Colombia to Lebanon to Toronto: How a DEA probe uncovered Hezbollah's Canadian money laundering ops

By Sam Cooper National Online Journalist, Investigative Global News

Professional money laundering networks are growing in Canada, washing vast sums of cocaine and fentanyl cash, and helping to drive up prices in Vancouver and Toronto real estate. <u>Canada's federal government proposed a new federal anti-</u> money laundering task force last week, specifically to tackle these concerns. But according to U.S. law enforcement sources, Canada has been aware of this for over a decade. This story explains untold international details behind recent RCMP investigations, missed early warnings, and lessons from Australian police, that could jump-start Canada's late response to these growing risks, sources say.

In January 2008, a team of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents travelled to Ottawa to meet with RCMP leaders. They had stunning news. The DEA said an elite group of Middle East narco-terrorists in Colombia was using Canada as a key money laundering hub.

According to a former senior U.S. official with knowledge of the meeting, the DEA had "dirty calls" — meaning calls providing criminal evidence of cocaine shipments and cash movements in Canada — from narco-kingpins in Colombia to a network of operatives in Halifax, Vancouver, Calgary, and London, Ont.

The evidence included allegations from an elite Colombian police unit and extensive DEA phone tap records.

"We were giving RCMP dirty calls to phone numbers and identified targets in Canada," the former official said. "In our minds that should have been enough to begin intercepts in Canada." But RCMP leaders didn't want to pursue the cases, according to the former official. He said the RCMP cited differences between Canadian and U.S. court disclosure rules, and questions about the DEA's use of confidential sources.

The U.S. source believes the RCMP missed an early opportunity to fight the incursion of sophisticated professional money laundering networks with ties to China, the Middle East, Colombia and Mexico that are now plaguing Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal.

"We were dumbfounded," the U.S. source said.

In addition to not having suitable resources in place to tackle a clearly widespread problem, soft laws appear to also be a contributing factor.

Link: https://globalnews.ca/news/5084587/hezbollahs-canadian-moneylaundering-ops/

CANADA April 2, 2019 9:59 am

Updated: April 2, 2019 11:06 am

# U.S. deems Canada 'major money laundering country' as gangs exploit weak law enforcement

By Sam Cooper National Online Journalist, Investigative Global News

The U.S. Department of State has designated Canada a "major money laundering country" where foreign drug-trafficking gangs are exploiting weak law enforcement and soft laws.


The March 2019 report, which places Canada on a short list of countries vulnerable to significant drug money laundering transactions — such as Afghanistan, the British Virgin Islands, China, Colombia and Macau — underlines a number of threats reported over the past year in Global News investigations, such as the laundering of fentanyltrafficking proceeds from China through British Columbia casinos, real estate and underground banks.

The report says Canada is especially vulnerable to money laundering through casinos, real estate, money services businesses, currency exchanges, wire exchanges, offshore corporations, legal "funnel accounts" and bulk cash and hawala transactions — meaning international exchanges of credit and debt between criminal bankers without money actually crossing borders.

In fact, the problem is so dire that Canada has recently landed on the State Department's exclusive list of major money laundering centers.

Link: https://globalnews.ca/news/5102137/us-canada-major-money laundering-country/

#### BOMBSHELL TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON GTA HOUSING



 In March of 2019, Transparency International Canada (TIL) published an in-depth review of the state of money laundering in Canada, entitled "Opacity: Why Criminals Love Canadian Real Estate (And How to Fix It)"

#### Among the report's findings:

- Corporate entities acquired \$28.4 billion in GTA housing from 2008-2018, mostly privately-owned with no information on the beneficial owners.
- \$9.8 billion in GTA housing was acquired by companies using cash to purchase, bypassing AML checks on sources of funds.
- Corporate ownership accounts for a staggering 37% of homes valued at over \$5 million and more than half of homes valued at over \$7 million.
- http://www.transparencycanada.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/BOT-GTA-Report-WEB-copy.pdf

The issue is increasingly drawing scrutiny from concerned citizens, eager to trigger a series of strong regulatory responses.

# Canada Has a Money Laundering Problem It's Pledging to Fix

By <u>Natalie Obiko Pearson</u> March 27, 2019, 9:16 PM EDT

Trudeau's <u>federal budget</u> tabled last week proposed to spend more than C\$190 million on measures to tackle money laundering and tax evasion. It also proposed legislative amendments to make it easier to identify the beneficiary owners of private companies, often used to hold property anonymously, and to also make it easier to prosecute individuals believed to be handling suspicious funds.

# New Registry Plans to Expose Hidden Vancouver Property Owners

By <u>Natalie Obiko Pearson</u> April 2, 2019, 6:51 PM EDT

- ▶ Province proposes bill to peel back anonymous ownership
- ▶ Shells, trusts failing to disclose may face C\$100,000 fine



#### **Regulatory Response:**

B.C. provincial government is **leading the** way with the **land owner transparency** act, which if passed, will establish a public registry of beneficial owners of property in B.C., meaning true ownership will no longer be hidden. The act will require corporations, trusts and partnerships, which currently own or buy land, to disclose their beneficial owners in the registry. Corporations, trusts and partnerships that fail to disclose could face fines of up to \$100,000 or 15% of the assessed property value, whichever is greater.

We believe this will be a major source of pressure on incremental foreign demand from illicit sources that have played a well-documented role in driving up real estate prices in markets like the Greater Vancouver Area.


Moreover, at the federal level, a further good sign rests in the proposed changes to Canada's AML regime to make it easier to investigate suspected moneylaundering, share information among government entities, pursue enforcement action and publicize violations and penalties for wrongdoing.



# THE BIG 6 BANKS

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**YTD PRICE PERFORMANCE** 



CIBC and BNS have performed worst in the last 15 months..

# THE BIG 6 – RESIDENTIAL MTG + HELOC EXPOSURE

The Big 6: Canadian Residential Mortgage and HELOC Exposure as at January 31, 2019 / 1Q19

CAD (MM)	ВМО			BNS			СМ		
	Insured	Uninsured	Total	Insured	Uninsured	Total	Insured	Uninsured	Total
Ontario	18,444	43,600	62,044	41,050	79,205	120,255	33,200	81,400	114,600
British Columbia	5,866	21,106	26,972	13,429	29,634	43,063	11,800	35,100	46,900
Alberta	10,349	8,877	19,226	18,113	15,695	33,808	14,400	13,900	28,300
Quebec	8,019	13,277	21,296	7,658	9,332	16,990	6,300	9,800	16,100
Other	5,426	5,327	10,753	11,441	11,306	22,747	8,600	8,700	17,300
Total	48,104	92,187	140,291	91,691	145,172	236,863	74,300	148,900	223,200
% of Total									
Ontario	13%	31%	44%	17%	33%	51%	15%	36%	51%
British Columbia	4%	15%	19%	6%	<b>13%</b>	18%	5%	16%	21%
Alberta	7%	6%	14%	8%	7%	14%	6%	6%	13%
Quebec	6%	9%	15%	3%	4%	7%	3%	4%	7%
Other	4%	4%	8%	5%	5%	10%	4%	4%	8%
	34%	66%	100%	39%	61%	100%	33%	<b>67%</b>	100%
Gross Consolid. Loans			399,232			571,216			376,776
Mtg Book % of Total			35%			41%			59%

CIBC (TSX:CM) has the greatest uninsured exposure to Ontario and B.C., home to Canada's two most notorious property markets.

# THE BIG 6 – RESIDENTIAL MTG + HELOC EXPOSURE


The Big 6: Canadian Residential Mortgage and HELOC Exposure as at January 31, 2019 / 1Q19

CAD (MM)	NA			RY			TD		
	Insured	Uninsured	Total	Insured	Uninsured	Total	Insured	Uninsured	Total
Ontario	7,497	10,441	17,938	37,802	97,183	134,985	41,261	102,510	143,771
British Columbia	2,151	2,359	4,510	15,274	42,248	57,522	14,000	38,360	52,360
Alberta*	3,537	1,712	5,249	20,490	23,629	44,119	26,632	26,102	52,734
Quebec	12,678	24,138	36,816	12,777	23,031	35,808	10,236	14,077	24,313
Other	2,089	1,303	3,392	16,525	19,547	36,072	3,869	3,908	7,777
Total	27,952	39,953	67,905	102,868	205,638	308,506	95,998	184,957	280,955
% of Total									
Ontario	11%	15%	26%	12%	32%	44%	15%	36%	51%
British Columbia	3%	3%	7%	5%	14%	19%	5%	14%	19%
Alberta	5%	3%	8%	7%	8%	14%	9%	9%	19%
Quebec	19%	36%	54%	4%	7%	12%	4%	5%	9%
Other	3%	2%	5%	5%	6%	12%	1%	1%	3%
	41%	59%	100%	33%	<b>67%</b>	100%	34%	66%	100%
Total Gross Loan Book			147,374			592,881			652,197
Mtg Book % of Total			46%			52%			43%

\*TD accounts for Alberta loans within its Prairies grouping

Royal Bank of Canada (TSX:RY) has the largest uninsured domestic mortgage book both on an absolute and relative basis.

# UNINSURED BOOK TO REGULATORY CAPITAL



Source: Company Documents

National Bank's (TSX:NA) uninsured mortgage book amounts to 7.7x of CET1, albeit a large part of that book is based in Quebec.

Meanwhile, CIBC's uninsured book constitutes 5.9x its CET1 capital, while maintaining the largest exposure to Ontario and B.C. among the big 6 banks.


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# HEDGEYE MACRO OVERLAY

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# HEDGEYE MACRO'S QUAD FRAMEWORK



Data Source: Hedgeye Macro Team, Bloomberg


## "BIG 6" CANADIAN BANK INDEX CAP-WEIGHTED



Source: FactSet, Bloomberg


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## NAMES OF INTEREST – QUAD I




Data Source: Bloomberg, FactSet

## NAMES OF INTEREST – QUAD II



Data Source: Bloomberg, FactSet


## NAMES OF INTEREST – QUAD III



Data Source: Bloomberg, FactSet

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## NAMES OF INTEREST – QUAD IV



**Batting Average** 


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Source: FactSet, Bloomberg

## THE BIG 6 CANADIAN BANKS

QUARTERLY RETURNS BY QUAD

QUARTERLY RETURNS BY QUAD



On an absolute basis, Quads III and IV are the weakest environments for the Big 6; however, in Quad IV, the Big 6 are, on average, relative outperformers.

# THE BIG 6 CANADIAN BANKS

Quarterly Returns	1	П	Ш	IV
Average	3.70%	3.25%	2.50%	1.83%
ΔS&P / TSX [Average Return]	1.85%	0.39%	-0.03%	2.13%
Median	3.73%	3.96%	2.29%	2.41%
Maximum	23.08%	24.39%	12.07%	28.68%
Minimum	-12.28%	-13.36%	-7.85%	-21.48%
Standard Deviation	7.67%	8.62%	5.50%	11.16%
Downside Deviation	5.57%	6.09%	3.64%	7.76%
Sharpe Ratio	0.48918	0.38191	0.46723	0.16421
Sortino Ratio	0.69503	0.53472	0.70462	0.23856
Batting Average [ $\Delta$ S&P / TSX > 0]	70.37%	64.74%	66.67%	59.88%
Batting Average [ $\Delta$ S&P > 0]	62.96%	55.77%	49.28%	61.73%

## FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT US AT:

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