NIKE, INC NKE - IS THE NIKESTER BROKEN?
November 23, 2016

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## HEDGEYE RETAIL IDEA LIST

OHEDGEYE RISK MANAGEMENT

| BEST LONG IDEAS |  | TRADE | TREND | TAIL | BEST SHORT IDEAS |  | TRADE | TREND | TAIL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| RH | Restoration Hardware | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | HBI | HanesBrands | $X$ | $X$ | $X$ |
| NKE | Nike, Inc. | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | TGT | Target | - | $x$ | $X$ |
|  |  |  |  |  | KSS | Kohl's | - | X | X |
|  |  |  |  |  | LULU | Lululemon | - | - | $x$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Foot Locker | X | X | $X$ |
| OTHER ACTIVE LONGS |  |  |  |  | OTHER ACTIVE SHORTS |  |  |  |  |
| WMT | Wal-Mart | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | TIF | Tiffany | X | $x$ | $x$ |
| DKS | Dick's Sporting Goods | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | - | HIBB | Hibbett Sports | - | $x$ | $X$ |
| RL | Ralph Lauren | - | - | $\checkmark$ | BBBY | Bed, Bath \& Beyond | $x$ | X | $X$ |
|  |  |  |  |  | WSM | Williams-Sonoma | $X$ | $x$ | $X$ |
|  |  |  |  |  | CRI | Carters Inc. | - | X | X |
| LONG VETTING BENCH |  |  |  |  | SHORT VETTING BENCH |  |  |  |  |
| TSCO | Tractor Supply |  |  |  | GPS | Gap, Inc |  |  |  |
| ABF-GB | ABF/Primark |  |  |  | JWN | Nordstrom |  |  |  |
| KATE | Kate Spade |  |  |  | JCP | JC Penney |  |  |  |
| AMZN | Amazon.com |  |  |  | FINL | Finish Line |  |  |  |
| ULTA | Ulta Salon |  |  |  | SHOO | Steve Madden |  |  |  |
| WWW | Wolverine Worldwide |  |  |  | M | Macy's |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | PRTY | Party City |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | ELY | Callaway Golf |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | COLM | Columbia |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | GNC | GNC Inc |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | VSI | Vitamin Shoppe |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | FRAN | Francesca's |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | AMZN | Amazon.com |  |  |  |

Bench $=$ timing is not right, or research is in progress.

## \$2.50 COMES BEFORE \$5.00

## Sentiment

The Quarter
Guidance
Market Share
Brand Perception
Valuation


Financial Reality
Earnings Puts and Takes through May '17

Trade
Trend

The '\$5 in EPS' Call It Does Not Matter Today

## THE BATTLEGROUND TODAY RESTS IN THE TREND DURATION

If you get this right/wrong, you'll get the stock right/wrong.

## TAIL CALL = \$5.00. BUT WHO CARES?

Changing a 40-year paradigm in the most complex and capital intensive consumer non-durable industry in less than 10\% of the time it took to build it.
o Harvest 10-years of strategic investments.
o Mass customization
o Shift to US Manufacturing while reducing variable costs by 2030\%.
o Fastest growing consumer-direct business outside of Amazon.
o Gross margins should push past $50 \%$ on $\$ 50+$ bn in revs.
o Does not need to lever SG\&A to hit \$5.00.

## TRADE = BOTCHED MESSAGING WRITTEN IN THE COSMOS

o Beat the quarter + keep the year.
o = implied Feb/May guide down.
o Adidas/ UA and futures pressure/disclosure.
o CFO too new and 'unsavvy' to manage through the most treacherous change in the model since 1999.
o People already looking at a 'hockey stick' in expectations for FY17 (May), with $24 \%$ EPS growth by 4Q vs $8 \%$ in msd in 1 H .
o Now they'll have to have even MORE confidence while futures are likely to weaken.
o Bifurcation between futures growth and revenue is irrelevant until it's not.

## TREND CALL = FY17 NUMBERS ARE TOO LOW

o Revenue halo from DTC/e-comm consolidation.
o Top line should be easier to hit than ever.
o There's more than just the US. Just sayin...
o Re Innovation, people don't know what they don't know.
o GM\% bottomed, improving on the margin. E-comm (should) help from here - but we've been early on that one thus far.
o SG\&A is rolling meaningfully, in part due to spending around the Olympics.
0 FX is misunderstood. It will negatively impact quality of earnings, but should have a minimal impact on the actual numbers. That mattered at 25x earnings. Not today.

TRADE MODEL DETAIL

|  | 1Q17A | 2Q17E | Trade |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Segment Revenue |  |  | Mathematically, the regions are a push. Though clearly the US garners more attention. |
| North America | 6.1\% | 4.0\% |  |
| Western Europe | 7.4\% | 5.0\% |  |
| Central and Eastern Euro | 9.7\% | 15.0\% | US and WEurope down $=200 \mathrm{bps}$. Everything else acclerates. |
| Greater China | 15.1\% | 20.0\% |  |
| Japan | 36.9\% | 30.0\% |  |
| Emerging Markets | -2.2\% | 10.0\% |  |
| Converse | 3.4\% | 10.0\% |  |
| e-Commerce | 47\% | 50\% | DTC still en-fuego |
| DTC | 19\% | 30\% |  |
|  |  |  | Rev mid-hsd -- about flat sequentially |
| Revenue Growth | 7.7\% | 8.3\% |  |
| Gross Margins | 45.5\% | 44.6\% | Down 100bps (-125bp guide) 98bp sequential improvement. |
| Gross Profit Growth | 3.2\% | 5.9\% |  |
| Demand Creation | 25.1\% | 5.0\% | Big yy growth slowdown begins. |
| Operating Overhead | 6.4\% | 4.0\% |  |
| EBIT Margin | 14.2\% | 12.8\% | EBIT grows low teens. |
| EBIT Growth | -11.1\% | 9.0\% |  |
| Non-Op Income | 9 | 80.0\% | Mark to market on translation hedges shows up here. |
| Shares Outstanding | -2.6\% | -2.4\% |  |
| EPS | \$0.73 | \$0.48 | 2Q punk EPS growth -- but $2 x$ the rate of retail overall. |
| EPS Growth | 8.8\% | 8.0\% |  |

TREND MODEL DETAIL

|  | 1Q17A | 2Q17E | 3Q17E | 4Q17E | Trend |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Segment Revenue |  |  |  |  | Remember that 4Q of FY16 missed eggregiously. Only grew 0.1\%. <br> Easy compare this year. |
| North America | 6.1\% | 4.0\% | 5.0\% | 15.0\% |  |
| Western Europe | 7.4\% | 5.0\% | 10.0\% | 8.0\% |  |
| Central and Eastern Euro | 9.7\% | 15.0\% | 5.0\% | 15.0\% |  |
| Greater China | 15.1\% | 20.0\% | 20.0\% | 20.0\% |  |
| Japan | 36.9\% | 30.0\% | 25.0\% | 20.0\% |  |
| Emerging Markets | -2.2\% | 10.0\% | 10.0\% | 10.0\% |  |
| Converse | 3.4\% | 10.0\% | 10.0\% | -10.0\% |  |
| e-Commerce | 47\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | Same w DTC. |
| DTC | 19\% | 30\% | 30\% | 30\% |  |
| Revenue Growth | 7.7\% | 8.3\% | 9.0\% | 12.3\% | Rev acceleration, even w futures decelerating. |
| Gross Margins | 45.5\% | 44.6\% | 46.2\% | 46.7\% | GM chg turns positive (only line of the model that gives us pause). |
| Gross Profit Growth | 3.2\% | 5.9\% | 9.6\% | 14.2\% |  |
| Demand Creation | 25.1\% | 5.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | Going up against stepped-up spending in 2 H last year. |
| Operating Overhead | 6.4\% | 4.0\% | 4.0\% | 4.0\% |  |
| EBIT Margin | 14.2\% | 12.8\% | 16.1\% | 16.0\% | Hockey stick should be a reality. |
| EBIT Growth | -11.1\% | 9.0\% | 23.5\% | 37.4\% |  |
| Non-Op Income | 9 | 80.0\% | 9 | 9 | Should be higher than this -- but if so it would take down EBIT accordingly. |
| Shares Outstanding | -2.6\% | -2.4\% | -1.9\% | -1.5\% |  |
| EPS | \$0.73 | \$0.48 | \$0.64 | \$0.68 | Big acceleration in 2 H . |
| EPS Growth | 8.8\% | 8.0\% | 17.8\% | 38.6\% |  |

## TAIL MODEL DETAIL

|  | 2017E | 2018E | 2019E | 2020E | Tail |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Segment Revenue |  |  |  |  | These top line numbers look very aggressive, but excluding the consolidation of DTC, we're looking at top line growth closer to $5 \%$. |
| North America | 7.6\% | 12.0\% | 12.0\% | 10.0\% |  |
| Western Europe | 7.7\% | 12.0\% | 12.0\% | 12.0\% |  |
| Central and Eastern Euro | 11.0\% | 12.0\% | 12.0\% | 12.0\% |  |
| Greater China | 18.9\% | 15.0\% | 12.0\% | 10.0\% |  |
| Japan | 27.0\% | 5.0\% | 6.0\% | 7.0\% |  |
| Emerging Markets | 6.8\% | 25.0\% | 20.0\% | 20.0\% |  |
| Converse | 2.9\% | 5.0\% | 5.0\% | 5.0\% |  |
| e-Commerce | 50\% | 65\% | 50\% | 40\% | We 'only' need 38\% DTC growth to get to \$7bn from \$2.5bn today. \#doable. |
| DTC | 27\% | 29\% | 27\% | 25\% |  |
|  | 9.4\% | 13.2\% | 12.4\% | 11.4\% | DTC consolidation |
| Gross Margins | 45.8\% | 47.3\% | 48.8\% | 49.8\% | Needs to keep 60-75\% of the mgn from DTC and lower var costs from mftgr chg. |
| Gross Profit Growth | 8.2\% | 16.9\% | 16.0\% | 13.7\% |  |
| Demand Creation | 7.5\% | 12.0\% | 15.0\% | 15.0\% | DC likely going up in perpituity. If not, that's when we get concerned about the |
| Operating Overhead | 4.6\% | 12.0\% | 12.0\% | 12.0\% |  |
| EBIT Margin | 14.8\% | 16.4\% | 17.8\% | 18.3\% | The stability we imply likely not right. One year could be $25 \%$, another $5 \%$. |
| EBIT Growth | 12.9\% | 25.4\% | 21.8\% | 15.0\% |  |
| Non-Op Income | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | If the dollar strengthens, this number goes higher. |
| Shares Outstanding | -2.1\% | -2.0\% | -2.2\% | -2.2\% |  |
| EPS | \$2.54 | \$3.26 | \$4.08 | \$4.81 | Visibility to $\$ 5.00$. It will matter when it matters. |
| EPS Growth | 17.7\% | 28.5\% | 24.9\% | 18.0\% |  |
| Capex | 23.9\% | 13.2\% | 12.4\% | 11.4\% | Needs to remain elevated. |

## EPS ALGORITHM BIFURCATION



## HEDGEYE VS STREET: ALGORITHM ESTIMATES BY QUARTER

We're well ahead, but the company's guidance won't support this.

## NKE FINANCIAL SUMMARY

| Nike, Inc. (NKE) |  |  |  |  | \$51.71 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FY17 ends May 2017 | 2Q17E | 2017E | 2018E | 2019E | 2020E |
| Hedgeye EPS (\$) | $\mathbf{0 . 4 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 5 4}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 2 6}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 8 1}$ |
| Consensus (\$) | 0.43 | 2.37 | 2.69 | 3.16 | 3.42 |
| Variance \% | $11.6 \%$ | $7.1 \%$ | $21.2 \%$ | $29.0 \%$ | $40.7 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales (\$MM) |  | 35,404 | 40,084 | 45,074 | 50,227 |
| EBIT Margin | $14.8 \%$ | $16.4 \%$ | $17.8 \%$ | $18.3 \%$ |  |
| EBITDA (\$MM) |  | 5,865 | 7.334 | 8,912 | 10,270 |
| FCF Per Share (\$) | 1.87 | 2.49 | 3.26 | 3.94 |  |
| Book Value Per Share (\$) | 7.59 | 8.44 | 9.67 | 11.17 |  |
| Net Debt to Total Capital | $-29.4 \%$ | $-24.9 \%$ | $-25.3 \%$ | $-27.6 \%$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| P/E | $20.4 \times$ | $15.8 \times$ | $12.7 \times$ | $10.7 \times$ |  |
| EV/EBITDA | $14.8 \times$ | $11.6 \times$ | $9.4 \times$ | $7.9 \times$ |  |
| Price/Book | $6.8 \times$ | $6.1 \times$ | $5.3 \times$ | $4.6 \times$ |  |
| Cash Yield | $3.6 \%$ | $4.8 \%$ | $6.3 \%$ | $7.6 \%$ |  |


| Targeted Valuation Range |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | EPS \% | P/E | Price | EV/EBITDA |
| 2017 E | $17.7 \%$ | $18.0 \times$ | $\mathbf{4 6}$ | $13.0 \times$ |
| 2018 E | $28.5 \%$ | $20.0 \times$ | $\mathbf{6 5}$ | $14.8 \times$ |
| 2019 E | $24.9 \%$ | $22.0 \times$ | $\mathbf{9 0}$ | $16.5 \times$ |
| 2020 E | $18.0 \%$ | $25.0 \times$ | $\mathbf{1 2 0}$ | $18.8 \times$ |

> Investment Thesis Snapshot
> 1. Changing up a 40-year sourcing, manufacturing and distribution paradigm = $\$ 5$ in earnings. But today, that does not matter.
> 2. TRADE duration looks bad. Likely to be an implied guide down on the 2Q print in 4 weeks -even though Nike does not need it.
> 3. The financial model is in tact for FY17 (May), and should come in ahead of consensus.
> 4. There will be a day -- likely soon -- to Buy Nike with impunity. Today is not the day.


## THIS IS WHAT SINKS THE STOCK

o Miss the quarter/guide down -- obvious
o -5 to -10\% US Futures. Why Not?
o Tangible evidence of US share DECLINE - not share eroding share GAIN - there's a difference
o The 'Portfolio' Failing to Work (Int'l fails to pick up slack)
o Gross margin still not showing up for it's own party
o New CFO handles the call even worse than the 1Q call.
o NKE Throwing in the towel on Futures. Likely in '17. Don't be there that day.

## TANK FACTOR 1: SHARE NEEDS TO OUTRICHT DECLINE



## NORTH AMERICA: NIKE VS ATHLETIC VS APPAREL

Nike lost share when the last of the Millennials was born - and not since.
There's a difference between 'losing share' and 'gaining less share'.

## theoretically, lt rev tarcet easier to hit than ever

## NKE NA DTC \% OF TOTAL



NA DTC ACCELERATING OFF BIGGER BASE
NA DTC penetration up 500bps on P\&L in 3yrs. Now 18\% of end NKE retail dollars.

CHANNEL SHIFT \$ BUFFER


## CHANNEL SHIFT BTW OBPS-180BPS OF GROWTH

For every $1 \%$ change in sales mix at end retail, gives NKE 60bps of growth assuming no growth in category and flat market share.

## NIKE FUMBLING FUTURES DISCLOSURE

## 2Q16 10-Q Jan 2016

"Moreover, a portion of our revenue is not derived from futures orders, including sales of at-once and closeout NIKE Brand footwear and apparel, sales of NIKE Brand equipment, sales from our DTC operations and sales from Converse, NIKE Golf and Hurley."


3Q16 CC Mar 2016 - Q/A answer when asked about futures variance with revenue growth...
2 "One (point) is the lag between the futures order date for our DTC business, and the timing of sell-through to DTC end consumers, and that is a dynamic as we have a fast growing DTC business, particularly led by NIKE.com."

## 3Q16 10-Q Apr 2016

"Consistent with prior periods, NIKE Brand reported futures include (1) orders from external wholesale customers and (2) internal orders from our DTC in-line stores and e-commerce operations which are reflected at prices that are comparable to prices charged to external wholesale customers."

## 1Q17 CC Sep 2016

"Going forward... we will change the sequencing of our futures reporting. Futures will first be referenced in the context of the broader guidance that we provide on the earnings conference call, rather than as a standalone forward-looking metric in our Earnings Release."

## THE TRUTH ABOUT FUTURES

FUTURES NUMBERS LESS RELEVANT - EVEN AFTER PORTFOLIO PURGED


The 'Futures Does Not Matter As Much' argument only holds a little water globally.

But....

## ...BUT FUTURES ONLY 50\% OF NA BUSINESS



## FUTURES PROGRAM TRENDING DOWN

FW peaked out at $94 \%$, to $84 \%$ today. That's just $39 \%$ of the business.


FORGET THE ACCOUNTING NOISE ON FUTURES
As a \% of total NA revenue, futures orders placed by wholesale accounts has decreased by 900bps in 7 years.

Total wholesale futures just $50 \%$ of NA business.

## REVENUE SENSITIVITY ALCORITHM

|  | Actual | Share-100 | Obps | Share | bps | Share + | Obps |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2016 | 20 |  | 20 |  |  |  |
| Market Size (Global Ath APP+FW) | 256,134 | 266,379 | 266,379 | 266,379 | 266,379 | 266,379 | 266,379 |
| Market Growth | 4.2\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% |
| Retail Equivalent (\$) | \$49,784 | \$49,112 | \$49,112 | \$51,776 | \$51,776 | \$54,440 | \$54,440 |
| YY\% change | 4.6\% | -1.4\% | -1.4\% | 4.0\% | 4.0\% | 9.4\% | 9.4\% |
| Market Share | 19.4\% | 18.4\% | 18.4\% | 19.4\% | 19.4\% | 20.4\% | 20.4\% |
| YY bps change | 6 bps | -100 bps | -100 bps | 0 bps | 0 bps | 100 bps | 100 bps |
| DTC (\$) | \$7,857 | \$9,036 | \$9,821 | \$9,036 | \$9,821 | \$9,036 | \$9,821 |
| DTC Change | 18\% | 15\% | 25\% | 15\% | 25\% | 15\% | 25\% |
| \% Wholesale | 75.7\% | 72.2\% | 70.1\% | 73.4\% | 71.4\% | 74.6\% | 72.7\% |
| \% DTC | 24.3\% | 27.8\% | 29.9\% | 26.6\% | 28.6\% | 25.4\% | 27.3\% |
| Reported (\$) | \$32,376 | \$32,472 | \$32,798 | \$34,030 | \$34,356 | \$35,588 | \$35,914 |
| Reported Revenue Growth | 5.8\% | 0.3\% | 1.3\% | 5.1\% | 6.1\% | 9.9\% | 10.9\% |
| Wholesale Equivalent (\$) | \$29,114 | \$28,721 | \$28,721 | \$30,278 | \$30,278 | \$31,836 | \$31,836 |
| Wholesale Equivalent Growth | 4.6\% | -1.4\% | -1.4\% | 4.0\% | 4.0\% | 9.4\% | 9.4\% |

REPORTED REVS - NOT FUTURES - GO UP IN WORST CASE SCENARIO


## A VERY HIGH STAKES CHESS MATCH

## NIKE DROVE WHOLESALE TO FUEL DTC...



## NIKE \% OF PURCHASES FOR FOOT LOCKER INC.

Both parties won here. Nike accelerated cash flow growth to fund investment in e-comm business, and FL stock went up $5 x$.

## ...WHILE ADIBOK HEMORRHACED SHARE...

2007

- Nike

■ Skechers
$\square$ Adidas

- Asics
- Converse

■ Under Armour - Reebok

■ New Balance
-Puma

- Other

2011


2016E


## 10 YEAR USA SPORTS FOOTWEAR MARKET SHARE

The footwear landscape has changed dramatically over the last decade.

## REMEMBER THE BASE ADIBOK IS COMING FROM

## US MARKET SHARE



## ADIBOK + STUFF + CONVERSE + OUTLETS = WINNING



## REVERSAL OF 10-YEAR POWER MOVE HAS CONSEQUENCES



NKE/FL IN '02/'03 CHANNEL CONFLICT
This happened once, and it will happen again.

FL: "Adidas is on a great run, they're having a lot of success"

FL: "Nike resetting the price/value relationship of many of its shoes"
HIBB: "Adidas has been the brand coming on strong in the category"
FINL: "Our Adidas business remains on fire across several platforms"
HIBB: "The margin complications of the lower price, that's a Nike issue."

## RECENT NIKE/ADIDAS COMMENTARY

These statements are always made to appease the brands from which the retailers want better allocations.

## ALL INNOVATION IS NOT CREATED EQUAL



## FOOTLOCKER SHOE RELEASES BY BRAND

NKE \% of monthly shoe releases at Footlocker down to 60\% after peaking at 83\% in May. This does not mean 'lack of innovation, it means 'lack of innovation for FL.
oThe shift to a DTC model hurts perceived competitive positioning.
olt also hurts futures relative to realized growth.
oThat should lead to futures being abandoned as a tracking metric.
oMost of this is necessary if Nike wants to change the 40-year paradigm of shoe manufacturing and distribution.

## NIKE US UNIT DISTRIBUTION



Nike has a solid distribution of units by price point. The $\$ 90-\$ 160$ zone can definitely grow, but it's not the path of least resistance. If Nike sells more at a lower price (KSS) that's bad. Higher price point (\$200) accrues to Nike.

## ASP IMPACT TO ACCRUE TO NIKE NOT WHOLESALE



## CHANNEL / ASP BIFURCATION

## IS THE BRAND BROK=N?

## NIKE ONLINE CONSUMER DEMO SPECIFICS



## SNAPSHOT IN TIME IS A GOOD ONE

We'd like to see a greater proportion of Females in the mix, but 'urban dudes' are the authenticator here.

## THE CHART NIKE WON'T WANT YOU TO SEE

MONTHLY AVERAGE CUSTOMER AGE VS. INCOME


## TTM AVG. CUSTOMER AGE VS. INCOME



## AVG. AGE OF NKE EXEC TEAM DECLINING



## NKE EXECUTIVE TEAM AVERAGE AGE

This is actually the most bullish we've seen out of Nike in over a decade.

## CONTENT WINNING, DISTRIBUTION LOSING

## NIKE.COM VS ADIDAS.COM DAILY ONLINE REACH GROWTH



Adidas is ripping, but Nike ain't doing too bad either.

FL = bad

EUROPE: WINNING


EUROPE: NIKE VS ATHLETIC VS APPAREL GROWTH

## CHINA: WINNING



CHINA: NIKE VS ATHLETIC VS APPAREL GROWTH

## APAC: (FINALLY) WINNING



JAPAN: NIKE VS ATHLETIC VS APPAREL GROWTH

## EMERGING MARKETS: EMERGING?



EMERGING MARKETS: NIKE VS ATHLETIC VS APPAREL GROWTH

ISSUE \#2. HIT NUMBERS OR NOT?

## EPS ALGORITHM BIFURCATION



## HEDGEYE VS STREET: ALGORITHM ESTIMATES BY QUARTER

We're well ahead, but the company's guidance won't support this.

## ECOMMERCE MARGIN WALK



## MARGIN BY SECMENT

$\left.\begin{array}{l}\text { NORTH AMERICA } \\ 500 \mathrm{bps} \\ 400 \mathrm{bps} \\ 300 \mathrm{bps} \\ 200 \mathrm{bps} \\ 100 \mathrm{bps} \\ 0 \mathrm{bps} \\ -100 \mathrm{bps} \\ -200 \mathrm{ps} \\ -30 \mathrm{bps} \\ -400 \mathrm{bps}\end{array}\right]$



## GREATER CHINA



TTM EBIT Margin: 36.1\%

EMERGING MARKETS
1500 bps
1000 bps
500 bps
0 bps
-500 bps
-1000 bps
$-1000 \mathrm{bps}$
000 bps

Downtrend continues as FX hits reported financials.

## FUTURES, INVENTORY, GROSS MARGIN TRIANGULATION

## FUTURES VS. INVENTORY GROWTH VS. GM



Here's the most important chart to watch.

## HIGH INVENTORIES + UNUSUAL DISCOUNTING

## NKE SIGMA



## UNUSUAL DISCOUNTING



## THIS IS NOT HORRIBLE, BUT IT'S NOT NORMAL

MEN WOMEN GIRLS CUSTOMIZE


## MIXED DATAPOINTS

## SPECIALTY ATHLETIC SIGMA



The channel is getting cleaner.

## FL VS DKS VS HIBB 3Q16 SIGMA



Uniform among retailers.

## NKE NORTH AMERICA -- FINALLY

## NKE NORTH AMERICA 1Q17 SIGMA



Inventories headed in the right direction here, but definitely came at the expense of margins

## INVENTORY ‘ISSUES’ ARE LARGELY FX/ACCOUNTING

## NKE INTERNATIONAL 1017 SIGMA



More likely than not, these will get incrementally better than worse.

Keep in mind DTC impact on Inventory as well as Revs.
${ }^{* *}$ Inventory and margin values become skewed by "standard rate" accounting method Nike uses.

FX

## BLENDED FX IMPACT SLIDE



FX IMPACT ON REVENUE - BLENDED AND BY REGION

## TWO PRONGED FX IMPACT

\#1 = TRANSACTION

- Lock in product costs on Futures orders.
- Entirely shows up in COGS line.
- Opened up to more risk here as goes vertical, but it's not material.
\#2 = TRANSLATION
- Nike hedges 60-80\% of expected PTI in every region. Today it is near the top end.
- When FX is negative...
- Rev

GM \%
ISG\&A
Balance Sheet
个雷'Other' Income

## NET SHORT CHINA - IN A BIG WAY

~50\% -- \$900mm

\% of COGS Sourced in China
\% of Revenue Generated in China $\quad$ 12\% -- \$4.9bn

~29\% -- \$4bn

28\% (\$853mm) levered to China

Implied Positioning
Less Absolute leverage to China despite 10 rev base

## \% OF REVENUE AND COGS SOURCING ATTRIBUTABLE TO CHINA

"We think China's recent economic stabilization is long in the tooth and we expect the preponderance of Chinese growth metrics to resume their structural downtrends within the next 3-6 months. ...China consumer story may very well be past-peak."

- Hedgeye Macro



## NIKE AND FLEX LTD

FLEX: "Last week, during Nike's Investor Day, Nike announced a partnership with Flex to accelerate the introduction of advanced innovation to Nike's manufacturing supply chain."

FLEX: "In Nike's most recent annual report dated July of this year, CEO Mark Parker said that Nike was, and I quote, partnering with innovators who help and accelerate systematic change at scale."

NKE: "Many of you know about the impressive work that Flex does. We're already accelerating our manufacturing revolution efforts. It's in the early stages yet, but in one specific process, they've combined automated material management with automated laser cutting, which can reduce waste by up to 50\%."

NKE: "With Flex, Nike is driving the modernization of footwear manufacturing process across its supply chain."

FLEX: "I think I would frame Nike this way...think about 2016 and 2017 as being invention and re-creation of how manufacturing happens, FY18 as a ramp year, which we will still have some profitability challenges as a result of course. And FY19 being full revenue, where we will expect to make very good progress around profitability."

## WATCH FLEX TO SEE IF WE゚RE RIGHT ON TIMING

## CONFERENCE CALL MENTIONS BY EACH PARTNER

In 2017 watch FLEX.

If it misses, it's Nike Bearish

Beats = Nike Bullish

Arguable a better way to play the 40-year paradigm change is to Long FLEX.


## IMPLICATIONS OF TRUMP PRESIDENCY



## WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO NKE TAX RATE DURING A TRUMP PRESIDENCY?

The Trump Administration intends to quit the Trans-Pacific Partnership in January when Trump takes office. Absence of a positive, which is probably a negative.

## AGAIN...NET SHORT CHINA

~50\% -- \$900mm

\% of COGS Sourced in China

## Implied Positioning


~29\% -- \$4bn

28\% (\$853mm) levered to China
\% of Revenue Generated in China
~12\% -- \$4.9bn

## \% OF REVENUE AND COGS SOURCING ATTRIBUTABLE TO CHINA

"We think China's recent economic stabilization is long in the tooth and we expect the preponderance of Chinese growth metrics to resume their structural downtrends within the next 3-6 months. ...China consumer story may very well be past-peak."

- Hedgeye Macro


## DESIGN PATENT HOLDERS TO FACE MORE COPIES/COSTS?

Issue(s): Whether, where a design patent is applied to only a component of a product, an award of infringer's profits should be limited to those profits attributable to the component.


Final Ruling TBD


## SUPREME COURT CASE - SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO. V. APPLE (ARGUED OCT 11)

The old precedent was that an infringed company could sue for all profits from a design infringement. The oral arguments lead us to believe that the court will change it to profits attributable to the infringed component. This means the penalty for copying designs will essentially be less severe, therefore more copies will be present, and the costs to defend design patents will be higher.

## NKE BRINGING MANUFACTURING CLOSER TO HOME

## STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT



NEW HOLLAND APPAREL


- New Holland has apparel facilities in Honduras and Nicaragua, doing Sewing, Embroidery, Screen Print, Laser Fabric Cutting, and Product Creation/Digital Printing.
- -Has port access on both Atlantic (Caribbean) and Pacific oceans. Facilities with 45 min drive of the port.
- -Has 4300 employees.
- ArtFX provides creative screen printing solutions.. including screen printing, graphic design, custom packaging
- -Has 3 locations, all in US: Virginia, Texas, and North Carolina.
- -Has 400 employees.


## NOT AN INVESTMENT FOR NKE - A STRATEGIC SOURCING PARTNERSHIP.

Management says "partnership will increase regional manufacturing capabilities, enable quicker delivery of more customized product to consumers and drive investment in sustainability ". Nike has not made any investment, but rather a strategic sourcing partnership.


## APPANDIX



## 2015 NIKE US REVENUE HEAT MAP

| Retail Value (\$mm) | 21,520 |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |
| Athletic Specialty | 10,621 | $49.4 \%$ |
| FL | 4,216 | $19.6 \%$ |
| FINL | 1,389 | $6.5 \%$ |
| DKS | 1,425 | $6.6 \%$ |
| HIBB | 533 | $2.5 \%$ |
| Academy | 939 | $4.4 \%$ |
| Sports Authority | 1,063 | $4.9 \%$ |
| Sport Chalet | 64 | $0.3 \%$ |
| BGFV | 147 | $0.7 \%$ |
| DTLR | 105 | $0.5 \%$ |
| Modells | 245 | $1.1 \%$ |
| Dunhams Sports | 113 | $0.5 \%$ |
| Schells | 98 | $0.5 \%$ |
| MC Sports | 34 | $0.2 \%$ |
| Olympia Sports | 69 | $0.3 \%$ |
| Fleet Feet | 53 | $0.2 \%$ |
| Shiekh Shoes | 96 | $0.4 \%$ |
| Road Runner Sports | 33 | $0.2 \%$ |


| NKE DTC | 3,583 | $16.6 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| NKE Retail | 2,866 | $13.3 \%$ |
| NKE e-comm | 717 | $3.3 \%$ |


| Dept Stores | 3,198 | $14.9 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| M | 563 | $2.6 \%$ |
| KSS | 825 | $3.8 \%$ |
| JWN | 350 | $1.6 \%$ |
| JCP | 550 | $2.6 \%$ |
| DDS | 222 | $1.0 \%$ |
| BLKIA | 22 | $0.1 \%$ |
| WMT | 329 | $1.5 \%$ |
| TGT | 103 | $0.5 \%$ |
| SHLD | 236 | $1.1 \%$ |


| Family/Other | 767 | $3.6 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| SCVL | 273 | $1.3 \%$ |
| Famous Footwea। | 75 | $0.3 \%$ |
| DSW | 198 | $0.9 \%$ |
| TLYS | 17 | $0.1 \%$ |
| SSI | 64 | $0.3 \%$ |
| GCO | 30 | $0.1 \%$ |
| TJX | 55 | $0.3 \%$ |
| ZUMZ | 57 | $0.3 \%$ |


| Online | 515 | $2.4 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Zappos | 203 | $0.9 \%$ |
| AMZN | 312 | $1.5 \%$ |

## NIKE US SALES DISTRIBUTION BY CHANNEL

Here's our estimate for sales by channel and by retailer after triangulating current and historical disclosure by Nike and the companies noted above. $5 \%$ of US distribution went away this year. That's a $2 \%$ consolidated revenue hit all else equal.

## NIKE'S STATED COALS ARE DOABLE

DTC \& ECOMMERCE GOALS VS ACTUAL

| 2010 Meeting |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2015 DTC Target \$5.0 | 2015 DTC Actual \$6.6 |
| 2013 Meeting |  |
| 2017 DTC Target $\$ 8.0$ | 2016 DTC Actual \$7.9 |
| 2017 Ecommerce Target \$2.0 | 2016 Ecommerce Actual \$1.7 |
| 2015 Meeting |  |
| 2020 DTC Target \$16.0 | 2020 Ecommerce Target \$7.0 |

## ECOMMERCE TARGETS ARE DOABLE

ECOM TARGETS BREAKDOWN


Nike beat it's publiclystated e-commerce target twice so far, and there's likely to be a third.

Target = incremental \$5bn in e-comm, or 30\% CAGR. \#doable

40\% CAGR = \$8.5bn
50\% CAGR = \$12.5bn

OUR Targets \$9-11bn


## NIKE WHOLESALE VS RETAIL CONVERSION MATH

| Wholesale Margin Math |  | On-Line Margin Math |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Price at Retail | 100.0 | Online Direct Price | 100.0 |
|  |  | Apparel Attachment Rate | 30\% |
| 'At Once' Cost | 50.0 | Net Revenue | 130.0 |
| - Futures Discount | 5.0 |  |  |
| Retailer's Cost | 45.0 | Online Servicing Cost | 6.0 |
|  |  | Incr Mktg/Cust Acquisition | 4.5 |
|  |  | Cost of Goods | 26.0 |
|  |  | Shipping | 2.6 |
| Nike Revenue | 45.0 | Nike Revenue | 130.0 |
| Cost of Goods | 22.0 | Total Costs | 39.1 |
| Nike Margin | 23.0 | Nike Margin | 90.9 |
| GM \% | 51\% | GM \% | 70\% |

## ITS ALL ABOUT THE \$\$\$

20 points is not an extra $\$ 20$ dollars on a $\$ 100$ shoe. It's about $4 x$ as much. THAT's what matters to Nike.

## FL GROWTH HEADWIND FROM NIKE DISTRIBUTION SHIFT



In this analysis, in order for FL to meet street expectations, UA would need to grow FW 60\% and AdiBok 20\%, with $50 \%$ of that growth coming from wholesale in order for those brands to fill the Nike void, assuming FL captures $40 \%$ of the incremental share from each of the brands.

## ASP IMPACT TO ACCRUE TO NIKE NOT WHOLESALE

Shoe sold at Foot Locker
-Price \$140
-Nike Inc. consolidates \$63


Shoe sold on Nike.com
-Price \$170
-Nike Inc. consolidates \$170


NKE Gross Profit \$32


NKE Gross Profit \$119
$+270 \%$

## THE OLYMPIC TRADE



## OLYMPIC TRADE - BUY BEFORE SELL AFTER???

The reality is that an Olympic Trade does not exist. Never really did. If anything it does better AFTER the Olympics, not before. Why? Because the lead-up to the event hurts financials. The 'hangover' helps the numbers.

PLEASE SUBMIT QUESTIONS* TO

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